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Foreword
I would not want to miss the opportunity to acknowledge my old comrade-in-
arms, Blaise Cronin, on the occasion of this Festschrift. There are very few the-
oreticians that I have known and admired amongst the community of citationists.
Blaise is one of them. However, I believe that this volume contains contributions
from most if not all of those living scholars who deserve similar recognition.
I consider my own work more a contribution by a pragmatist, constantly jug-
gling the exigencies of meeting payrolls and weekly deadlines. Well, those mun-
dane concernswere over when ISI was sold to Thomson Reuters over twenty years
ago. I am amazed that colleagues would still be seeking commentary from me.
My 1979 book, “Citation Indexing: Its theory and application in science, tech-
nology, and humanities”, was published before we heard of the Internet. In the
early days we lived with the constraints of the printed versions of the Science Ci-
tation Index and the Social Sciences Citation Index. Later on we added the Arts
and Humanities Citation Index. Keeping up with rapidly changing technology we
moved into the eras of the CD-Rom and online. From there wemoved into the age
of the Internet. By thenbibliometrics becamemore than just the obsessionof a few
citation analysts like myself and the growing informetrics community. During all
these decades of change Blaise Croninwas there and played a key role as constant
critic and gatekeeper.
While many publishers and scientists are preoccupied with journal impact
factors we must always remind them that the SCI was invented as a solution to
the problem of information retrieval. And as early as 1965 it was already providing
alerting services (selective dissemination of information) even before SDI became
a dirty word. And in spite of their suspicions and doubts about citation analysis,
administrators and editors know that high citation counts are justifiably associ-
ated with work of Nobel class.
Given the ubiquitous use of these metrics in higher education and science
policy, it is only fitting that a body of work be collected addressing the state of
theories in the field.
Eugene Garfield
Founder & Chairman Emeritus
Institute for Scientific Information
(now Thomson Reuters Scientific)
President & Founding Editor
The Scientist
Prologue
This Festschrift is compiled for Blaise Cronin upon the occasion of his retirement.
Unlike some Festschrifts, you will not find in these pages honorific essays or
deeply intimate recollections of theman. This is not an opportunity for his coevals
to wax eloquent on his legacy. Such a Festschrift would not befit an individual
of such professionalism and scholarship. Rather, the objective is to demonstrate
Cronin’s deep contextualization in the areas of informetrics and scholarly com-
munication and to explore the ways in which he shaped a theoretical foundation
for the field through his work, both critical and empirical (thus demonstrating
Hjorland’s notion of critical informetrics).
We honor the man by honoring his scholarship—what White terms the “au-
thor as person”. However, we would be remiss were we to forget the “somatics of
science” (Ekbia)—that this, to ignore the physicality of scientific practice. Cronin’s
position as Dean of the School of Library and Information Science at Indiana Uni-
versity allowed him the opportunity to bring together and mentor some of the
most active scholars in informetrics and scholarly communication. He collabo-
rated with a number of faculty members and students and his presence indelibly
altered the scholarshipof these individuals.Hehired, inspired, andprovokedand,
in doing so, created a vibrant center of scientometric activity in Middle America.
Two of his hires (Ekbia and Börner) are featured as contributors, and the editor of
this volume was in the last cohort of hires for the School.
In the Festschrift Cronin edited on the occasion of EugeneGarfield’s 75th birth-
day, he commented: “It is all too clear that a second volume could have been
musteredwithoutmuch additional effort or any loss of quality. All thosewhomwe
approached were heartily supportive of the idea and keen to show their affection
and respect for the man and his multifarious accomplishments.” Much the same
could be said for the present Festschrift—there was no shortage of potential con-
tributors and only I am blame if highly relevant authors were overlooked. I offer
my apologies to these individuals here.
To thosewhowere able to contribute, I offermy thanks. The authors represent
some of the foremost scholars in scientometrics—among the contributors to this
volume are nine awardees of the coveted Derek de Solla Price award (including, of
course, the honoree of this volume). I am grateful that these authors offered their
time and expertise. I would also like to express gratitude to my students, Nora
Prologue | VII
Wood, Andrew Tsou, Maureen Fitz-Gerald, and Bradford Demarest, who assisted
in the production of the Festschrift.
Finally, I am deeply indebted to Blaise Cronin, without whom, none of this
would have been possible.
Cassidy R. Sugimoto
Associate Professor
School of Informatics and Computing
Indiana University Bloomington
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Introduction
It has been suggested that crafting a theory of citation is a “Sisyphean undertak-
ing” (Cronin & Sugimoto, 2015, p. 25) and one that might be best avoided (Cronin,
this volume). Yet, while there may be no single unifying theory, there are a mul-
titude of theories that are employed in informetrics and the study of scholarly
communication. The chapters in this Festschrift—compiled on the occasion of
Blaise Cronin’s retirement—describe, extend, and propose several theories of
informetrics and scholarly communication.
One might question the coupling of informetrics and scholarly communica-
tion in the title of the Festschrift: it could be argued that informetrics is a domain,
while scholarly communication is merely an object of study. However, Cronin’s
oeuvre is an ideal justification for the pairing of these terms. As noted by a number
of contributors to this volume (e.g., Glinda, Scharnhorst, Börner; White; Leydes-
dorff), Cronin’s work bridges the gap between informetrics and scholarly com-
munication. Cronin cites a number of prominent sociologists to theorize about
scholarly communication, while his “image-makers” (those who frequently cite
him) reinforce his relevance for statistical studies of informetrics (White). Cronin
is therefore emblematic of the triangulation of theories and methods that bridge
informetrics and scholarly communication.
One difficulty in identifying theories of informetrics and scholarly commu-
nication is the diversity of terminology around theories. In this volume, contrib-
utors discuss models (Glinda, Scharnhorst, & Börner; Leydesdorff), taxonomies
(Bornmann), typologies (Desrochers), frameworks (Haustein, Bowman, & Costas;
White), indices (Rousseau & Rousseau), hypotheses (Thelwall), and principles
(Borgman), in addition to theories (Hjørland; Small; Furner). Several authors use
the terms synonymously. For the purpose of this compilation, a theory will be
defined as a set of statements, systems, or principles used to describe or explain
phenomena, thereby providing an umbrella term under which all of these terms
fall.
Informetrics has been defined as a quantitative domain (Stock) and one
whose theories are often methodological (Thelwall). The numerical and method-
ological emphases of informetrics has been used to argue that this is an atheo-
retical domain. However, as Bawden cautions, “the actual number is less impor-
tant that the theoretical perspective to which it points.” There are a number of
methodologically-oriented informetric theories with deep theoretical underpin-
nings. Hjørland, for example, describes the several similaritymeasures employed
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by informetricians and calls for a greater scrutiny of the theoretical assumptions
of these measures.
Many theories have been imported from other disciplines to describe patterns
and phenomena within informetrics and scholarly communication. These theo-
ries are conceptualized in other domains, but tested and empirically validated
within informetrics. Sociologist of science Robert K. Merton’s body of work is a
ready example of this. With the exception of Blaise Cronin, Merton is referenced
inmore chapters in this volume than any other author and his theories are used as
the foundation for empirical studies. Wolgang and Glänzel, for example, provide
a statistical model for operationalizing Merton’s “Matthew principle”.
Informetric studies often draw from physics and other more quantitatively-
oriented fields: a third of the contributors to this Festschrift cite physicist Mark
Newman and a quarter cite physicist Albert-Lázsló Barabási. Other disciplines
are also present: theories are drawn from evolutionary biology (Small), linguistics
(Furner), psychology (Bawden), and communication (Leydesdorff), to name but a
few. The appropriation of theories from other fields may speak to the inherently
interdisciplinary nature of the domain or possibly reflect the status of informetrics
as ameta-science (Hjørland).One thing is clear: there is anabundanceof available
theories of informetrics and scholarly communication.
1 Overview
The chapters in this Festschrift are organized into six sections, though these are
not exclusive categories. For example, the perspectives are nearly all critical, in
that they are reflexive about informetrics and consider biases and multidimen-
sionality in the scholarly communication system (critical informetrics). This mul-
tidimensionality requires theories that address all research objects: data, docu-
ments, references, and scholars as individual humanagents (citation theories and
author theories). Observed regularities in research events form the basis of sta-
tistical theories of informetrics (statistical theories). However, informetric units
are rarely independent and theories of informetrics must take into account the
relational and organizational aspects of knowledge (knowledge organization the-
ories). The Festschrift ends by looking towards the future and examining the role
of theory in contemporary metrics, particularly those derived from social media
and other web-based sources (altmetric theories).
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1.1 Critical informetrics
Cronin adopts the role of advocatus diaboli in his contribution to this volume.
This is not an unusual position for Cronin—his work and professional life are
characteristically provocative. In one of his earliest works, The Citation Process
(1984), Cronin challenged a major theoretical premise of the field, by questioning
the validity of citations as proxies for quality. In the present contribution, Cronin
criticizes the search for a unifying theory of citation, but does not leave the reader
without a set of objectives for moving forward.
These objectives could easily fall within what Hjørland calls “critical infor-
metrics”—a theoretical position proposed as an alternative to a positivist model
of bibliometrics. Hjørland argues that numerous arbitrary constructs are used in
informetric studies that produce a kind of hermeneutic circle in interpreting the
results of studies drawn from biased data and proposes the adoption of an itera-
tive and reflexive process to guide informetric studies.
Cronin and Sugimoto’s edited compilation, “Scholarly Metrics Under the Mi-
croscope: From Citation Analysis to Academic Auditing” (2015) can be seen as a
foundational text for critical informetrics. Collected in the volume are decades
of criticisms of informetrics—examining issues of validity, bias in data sources,
ethics of indicators, and the systemic effects of informetric analyses on the schol-
arly communication system. In chronicling these criticisms, Cronin and Sugimoto
do not attempt to displace informetric research, but to improve the rigor of the
methods and the ethical use of the results. A similar sentiment echoes throughout
the chapters of the present volume (e.g., Hjørland; Borgman; Leydesdorff; Born-
mann). The ubiquity of metrics in the evaluation of scholars and scholarship, the
rampant proliferation of novel metrics, and the increasing use of metrics by ama-
teur bibliometricians further fuels the need for a critical discourse of informetrics.
1.2 Citation theories
The debate between normative and social constructivist views is prominent in
informetric and scholarly communication research and in the pages of this
Festschrift (e.g., Cronin; Hjørland; Small; Bornmann; Haustein, Bowman, &
Costas). Small provides an overview of these perspectives on science and finds
them both lacking. He offers, as an alternative, theories of cooperation and com-
petition drawn from evolutionary biology. These evolutionary theories provide an
explanation of the strategies used by scholars in selecting references—evoking
notions of generosity and reciprocity. Referencing is seenas a signalingbehavior—
communicating a message to the group or community.
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Citations as signs, or semiotic devices, is a constant thread in theories of cita-
tion. Wouters and Furner, respectively, build upon Cronin’s use of Peirce’s “sign
triad” for a more holistic understanding of the scholarly communication system
(Cronin, 2000).Wouters argues for adoption of “material semiotics” in informetric
research—in which the reference, citation, and the “citation as part of the citation
index” are seen as ontologically different, but related objects—and urges the in-
formetric community to accept multiple realities. Wouters agrees with Cronin’s
assertion that a need for a unifying theory of citation is nonsensical and instead
argues for “a number of partly contradictory, andpartly overlapping set of citation
theories, each emerging in a particular set of knowledge practices.”
The need formultiple theories of citation is reinforced byBorgman,whonotes
the inadequacies of citation theories for data citation. The increasing heterogene-
ity of the scholarly communication system has challenged the degree to which
novel forms of scholarship can be understood under the existing frameworks.
Data, for example, are not equivalent to publication—argues Borgman—and the
fundamental differences must be fully understood before adopting citation theo-
ries for application to data.
1.3 Statistical theories
Citations are the coin of the realm for academicwriting—thosewho cornermore of
the citationmarket are seen of as having higher value than thosewhosework fails
to receive citations (Cronin, 2005). Success—in scientometric terms—is largely a
function of heightened output and impact. The theory of success is explored in
mathematical terms by Glänzel and Schubert and, separately, by Rousseau and
Rousseau. Glänzel and Schubert build uponMerton’s “Matthewprinciple”, which
describes a positive feedback loop in the reward structure of science, whereby
thosewho are successful havemore ease at achieving additional success. In short,
“success breeds success” (Glänzel & Schubert).
Rousseau and Rousseau examine input-output indicators of success, treating
the citation system as analogous to an economic one, in which authors seek to
game the system for personal reward. As noted, “input-output indicators reinforce
the current culture of assessing academic success in terms of publications and
citations, rather than stimulating original research as valuable in its own right”.
This research combines both references and citations in the operationalization of
success.
Seeking statistical regularities in human behavior—argues Furner—is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. Yet, as numerical regularities are observed, the prod-
uct gains theoretical significance (Bawden). Bawden describes a few such reg-
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ularities and the degree to which these can be used to “capture the structures
and patterns of the information world”. Common distributions were observed by
Zipf, Lotka, and Bradford—a familiar trio to anyone in informetrics. Furner ex-
plores these andother power-lawdistributions in the context of type-token theory,
continuing the long-standing bibliometric tradition of wedding linguistics and
statistical studies for application to science studies.
1.4 Author theories
Cronindedicatednumerous publications to studying thenotion of authorship and
subauthorship in scientific publishing (e.g., Cronin, 2005). Among other contri-
butions, Cronin is credited with coining the term “hyperauthorship”—to denote
massive numbers of authors on the byline of a scientific article (Cronin, 2001).
At the time of coining, the scientific community balked at 500 authors on an ar-
ticle. Numbers of co-authors have since increased by orders of magnitude: a re-
cent paper from the Large Hadron Collider at CERN set the record with more than
5000 authors and the trend towards increased collaboration rates are consistent
across all disciplines. These trends demonstrate a heightened need for theories of
authorship—particularly those which apply a critical lens to understanding the
components of contributorship and the place of the author in the scientific sys-
tem.
White proposes a theory for understanding authors as “persons” andas “bun-
dles of words”. In this theory of authorship, White draws upon empirical studies
of bibliometrics which demonstrate that authors behave in particular ways as
citers—that is, they cite themselves and those they know disproportionately and
create unique patterns of citing. As “bundles of words”, authors exhibit a distinct
discourse and cite in topically relevant ways. White thus elegantly weaves author
theories, citation theories, and linguistic theories for a greater understanding of
the function of authorship in scholarly communication.
The manifestation of a field in the person of a scientist (Bourdieu’s homo
academicus) is explored in Desrochers, Paul-Hus, and Larivière’s contribution
in this volume. Expanding upon Cronin’s theory of the “reward triangle” of
science, the contributors examine the vector of subauthorship in the form of
acknowledgements—a line of inquiry highly promotedbyCronin. They emphasize
the relational nature of science—that is, the intersection of citing, acknowledging,
and authorship—as fundamental in the reward system of science.
The theories of White and Desrocher and colleagues emphasize the multidi-
mensionality of an author as a writer, citer, and contributor. However, Ekbia ar-
gues that we should also examine the degree to which the embodiment of an “au-
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thor as person” transforms science. Ekbia proposes “somatics of science”: a the-
ory which assumes that bodily relationships—“from physical proximity to friend-
ship and romantic attachment”—affect the practice of science. This theory builds
upon Cronin’s rich micro-level analyses (e.g., Sugimoto & Cronin, 2012), in which
he has demonstrated the importance of place and personal relationships in me-
diating scholarly communication behavior.
1.5 Knowledge organization theories
The importance of knowledge organization systems for informetrics should not
be underestimated. One could argue that the maturation of scientometrics into a
vibrant field was entirely dependent upon the construction of the Web of Science
and subsequent citation indices. These systems have a powerful influence upon
science studies. However, Hjørland’s argument about search engines could apply
generally for knowledge organization systems: they are cultural-political agents
“making priorities in relation to what content should be relatively findable and
what should remain relatively invisible.”
They are also relational databases—which establish connections among var-
ious objects and actors in the scholarly communication system. While there have
beenmany criticisms of these systems (see Cronin& Sugimoto [2015] for a review),
fewhave developed frameworks for evaluating the quality of knowledge organiza-
tion systems within the context of informetrics. In proposing such a framework,
Stock’s chapter is simultaneously forward looking and deeply embedded in the
systems orientation of informetrics.
Knowledge organization can be embodied in a database, but can also be
constructed by examining the relationship among various information objects.
Relational aspects of scholarly communication—for example, citation relations
among authors and documents—have formed the theoretical backbone for cita-
tion analyses and science mapping projects (Leydesdorff). However, Leydesdorff
argues that “meaning nor knowledge is purely relational” and argues for theo-
ries that understand units positionally, rather than relationally. Building upon
Shannon and Weaver’s communication theory, Leydesdorff provides a layered
theory of informetrics moving from the relational to positional and finally to the
development of perspectives and translations. Leydesdorff uses Cronin as a case
study to examine redundancy among authored, citing, and cited sources. This is
demonstrated graphically through the use of networks, an increasingly common
approach in informetric studies.
The influence of network science on informetrics is particularly evident in
models of science. The landscape of models of science is examined in Glinda,
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Scharnhorst, and Börner’s chapter: the authors identify relevant items and cre-
ate semantic networks of topical clusters using World Cat data of library catalog
records, subject headings, and classification codes. In this way, the chapter serves
both to provide an overview ofmodels of science and to demonstrate the common
use of knowledge organization systems and mapping exercises to provide depic-
tions of a domain (the “mirror metaphor” as discussed by Hjørland).
1.6 Altmetric theories
Onemight question the prominent place in a Festschrift ofwhatmight seema rela-
tively newarea of study. However, nearly two decades before the term “altmetrics”
was coined, Cronin predicted a transformation of the scholarly communication
system in which “networked hypertext systems will promote popular authorship,
radiated reading and global gossip”, where “[m]ultimedia assemblages will re-
place monotexts, delivered on-demand and in real-time” (Cronin, 1992, p. 23).
Cronin’s prescience put him first on the scene during the birth of webometrics
(Thelwall) and arguably preempted the altmetric movement: Cronin has sought,
throughout his career, to make manifest invisible traces of scholarly activity
(Haustein, Bowman, & Costas).
Thepressure to track andanalyze altmetric datahasbeen spurred in largepart
by thegrowingemphasis placedon the communityby fundingagencies indemon-
strating societal impact of research (Moed). This pressure has challenged tradi-
tional understandings of the term impact in informetric research (Bornmann).
Bornmann argues that the broadening of impact from citation to societal rep-
resents a scientific revolution in the scientometrics. He presents altmetrics as a
potential source of data for measuring societal impact, but cautions that these
may not capture the wider sphere of public engagement activities. He suggests
that the taxonomic change in impactwill lead to similarmodifications of concepts
such as output or productivity. Moed, however, argues that altmetrics do not track
researchoutputs, but rather researchprocess.Moeddescribes altmetrics as “traces
of the computerization of the research process” noting the importance of knowl-
edge organization systems (Stock) in framing the conversation around traditional
bibliometrics.
Webometrics can, in many ways, be seen as the precursor to or umbrella term
for altmetrics. Thelwall contextualizes webometrics as a subfield of information
science “concerned with quantitative analyses of web data for various purposes.”
His depiction of the domain is largely amethodological one: he presents a theoret-
ical framework for link analysis and theoretical hypotheses regarding commercial
search engines, both of which focus on appropriate approaches to data collec-
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tion and the interpretation of the results (reinforcing the embeddedness of critical
informetrics [Hjørland] in contemporary research). Thelwall introduces altmetrics
and ends by leaving these metrics “in the hands of the next generation of infor-
mation scientists”.
This challenge is accepted by Haustein, Bowman, and Costas who evaluate
the application of citation and social theories to altmetrics—which they refer to
as a “group of metrics based (largely) on social media events relating to scholarly
communication.” The authors provide a novel framework focused on the notion
of engagement, which focuses more on the mechanisms underlying acts of alt-
metrics rather than the derivation of indicators from the counts of these acts.
The authors provide numerous examples of the application of their framework—
highlighting the nimbleness of this framework for the contemporary scholarly
communication system.
2 Continuing the conversation
Cronin suggests that we understand citations as conversations between texts. A
deliberate conversation with Cronin can be seen within these chapters: 43 unique
works of Cronin’s were cited, demonstrating the wide diversity and utility of
his oeuvre. The contributors were also in conversations with one another—
demonstrated by the high degree of references to other contributors within the
volume. However, chitter chatter among the contributors does not imply that
everyone is in concert—in fact, many disagreements can be seen in the text par-
ticularly in debating the existence of a singular reality and the degree to which
informetrics can be seen as representations of reality. What emerges from the
Festschrift is a web of dialogue around theories of informetrics and scholarly
communication.
This Festschrift is not meant to end the conversation, but rather to start it. As
many contributors note, the dynamicity and increasingheterogeneity of the schol-
arly communication system challenges contemporary theories. Furthermore, if
informetrics is, as Bornmann argues, in a time of revolution, there may be a need
for the construction of new theories that can adapt to the transformation of key
concepts in the domain. In charting the path ahead, informetricians would do
well to heed Cronin’s advice to “paymore attention to what is actually being said,
by whom, to whom, in what ways, and when”. Only with deep engagement with
the content and connectivity of conversations can we continue to develop robust
and useful theories of informetrics and scholarly communication.
Introduction | 9
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Part I: Critical informetrics

Blaise Cronin
The Incessant Chattering of Texts
“All the really good ideas I’ve ever had came to me
while I was milking a cow. You don’t get panicky
about some ‘-ism’ or other while you have Bossy by
the business end.”
Grant Wood (painter of “American Gothic”)¹
Citation attracts metaphors as flame attracts moths. You will find citations de-
scribed variously, though by no means exhaustively, as scholarly bricks (Price,
1963), as signposts left behind (Smith, 1981), as applause (Nelson, 1997), as gifts
(Hagstrom, 1982), as forms of reward or income (Ravetz, 1971), as tools of persua-
sion (Gilbert, 1977), as pellets of peer recognition (Merton, 2000), as paratextual
baubles (Cronin, 2014), or, verging on the poetic, as frozen footprints on the land-
scape of scholarly achievement (Cronin, 1981). Such is the chameleon nature of
citation.
Citations are both instrumental (they direct the reader to related and poten-
tially relevant work) and symbolic (they commodify kudos) in nature, at once
straightforward and ramified: “constitutionally complex,” as Leydesdorff (1998,
p. 6) put it. It may help, therefore, to think of citation as a cluster-concept². Com-
mon sense, a sometimes undervalued asset, tells us that the institutionalized
practice of sprinkling a paper with references is to no small extent rule-based
and normatively governed, even if it is also inherently subjective, motivationally
messy and susceptible to abuse. These factors, taken together, make the (ques-
tionable) quest for a theory of citation³ about as likely to succeed as the search
for the Loch Ness Monster—and I speak as a sometime Nessie-spotter!
Metaphors are handy devices for helping us better understand concepts or
practices that are arcane, specialized, or resistant to easy grasp, but they do have
their limits and a downside is that they may encourage reductionist thinking. (It
was Samuel Taylor Coleridge, I think, who famously said: “No simile runs on all
four legs.”) None of the metaphors I just mentioned quite does justice to the com-
plexity of a practice—for some one hardly deserving of an afterthought—that has
1 Quoted in: Evans, R. T. (2010, October 15). Departmental Gothic: Grant Wood at the U. of Iowa.
Chronicle of Higher Education, B10–11.
2 See: http://itisonlyatheory.blogspot.com/2010/01/cluster-concepts.html
3 You won’t, for what it is worth, find an entry for theory of citation or theory of referencing
in: Bothamley, J. (2004). Dictionary of Theories: More than 5000 Theories, Laws and Hypotheses
Described. New York: Barnes & Noble.
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become a sine qua non of academic writing, a literary convention and account-
ing mechanism rolled into one, without which it would be impossible to imagine
contemporary science, certainly not its formal communication processes and (in-
creasingly) its formalized evaluation mechanisms.
When it comes to metaphors I confess to having a personal favorite: Barbara
Czarniawska-Joerges’s idea of citation as conversation between texts—albeit, I
might add, a particular kind of slow, asynchronous conversation. As she so aptly
put it some years ago, longbefore Twitter and tweets, Facebook and ‘likes’ became
part of the socio-scholarly communications mix, the patterning of references re-
veals “a trace of conversations between texts” (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1998, p. 63).
By embedding a bibliographic reference to an earlier work in his paper an author
establishes a connection between the citing and cited works. Now imagine the
universe of papers on any given topic and all of the inter-citations and asso-
ciated co-citation networks—the “transtextual relationships,” to use Genette’s
term (1997, p. 1)—contained therein. A simple, one-off exchange has scaled up to
become a multi-person, snowballing conversation—the ‘incessant chattering’ of
my title—albeit one that for much of the time remains dimly perceived. Just as we
occasionally talk sotto voce in the physical world, so it is in the penumbral world
of citation,with the sustained susurration of texts. And in this veinwemight think
of self-citation as analogous to intrapersonal conversation, with each invoking of
one’s prior work a way of showing how the pith and substance of one’s thesis,
theory, or standpoint evolved over time. These different kinds of conversations
really only become apprehensible when we conduct a bibliometric analysis and
visualize the networked threads. Then we can see who talks to whom, which
voices and conversations seem to matter most. Of course, if no one pays any
attention to what is being said, a deathly silence ensues.
It is not uncommon for writers on the subject of citation behavior to speak
of two camps or worldviews, the normative and the relativistic. This is an admit-
tedly somewhat simplistic characterization of what is in reality a highly nuanced
debate, but it does at least capture the interpretative polarization that exists, and,
indeed, has existed for decades in the literature: for a chronology of the persistent
skepticism, intellectual indignation, and irruptions of ideological fervor, I recom-
mend our edited volume, Beyond Bibliometrics, and, for good measure, a con-
temporaneous companion compilation, Scholarly Metrics Under the Microscope,
both of which examine academe’s growing fascinationwith (one is tempted to say
fetishization of) metrics (Cronin & Sugimoto, 2014, 2015). In one corner we have
Merton (2000), arguing elegantly that authors’ citing behaviors are neither inher-
ently randomnorwhimsical innature. In themainauthors adhere to amore or less
codified, tacitly understood, and collectively enforceable set of norms, knowledge
of which may be acquired in a number of ways: osmotically; through appren-
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ticing; in graduate seminars; via mentoring programs, etc. In the other corner,
there are the doughty MacRoberts, who have long argued that citation behavior is
prone to errors and biases of different kinds; they, in fact, maintain that citation
is systemically biased and, as a consequence, citation analysis (and by exten-
sion the paraphernalia of evaluative bibliometrics) is an illegitimate tool for use
in research performance assessment exercises (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1989):
garbage in, garbage out, as itwere. Onehas only to dip into the extensive literature
on citation practices and motivations to see that generality (there is observable
consistency in the way authors cite, the intensity with which they cite, where in
the text they cite, the ostensible functions their citations perform) and particular-
ity (an author’s decision to citeA rather thanB remains a private choice influenced
by factors such as the author’s awareness of all candidate citations, their accessi-
bility, and their perceived relevance) co-exist when it comes to the dispensing of
citations. ’Twere ever thus and likely always will be.
Human nature being what it is, normative drift inevitably occurs, to a greater
or lesser extent: authors mis-cite, over-cite, under-cite, or cite preferentially
(Liang, Zhong, & Rousseau, 2014). We may, through laziness or plain ignorance,
fail to cite an important source, orwemay choose for reasons of collegiality or self-
interest to cite the work of a friend or colleague rather than the equally (perhaps
more) relevant work of another scholar. Or we may seem to indulge rather too
much in self-citation, though self-citation is no bad thing in itself; as already
noted, it serves an important purpose, akin in some regards to redundancy in
everyday speech, by allowing us to display the trajectory of our thinking and
connect the reader to our oeuvre. I doubt that such venalities and inadvertent
errors rise in most people’s estimation to the level of crimes and misdemeanors,
but for some they are evidence aplenty of the inherently randomnature of citation
behavior. And yet, arewe really supposed to believe that ThomsonReuters’Webof
Science and Elsevier’s Scopus are in essence “nothing more than gigantic houses
of cards resting on citational quick sands” (Cronin & Sugimoto, 2015, p. 934)? Is it
the case that these huge databases are the byproducts of “a hundred million acts
of whimsy” (Cronin, 2005, p. 1505)?
Fifty years ago, Eugene Garfield presciently envisaged intelligent software
that would automatically ‘dress’ scholarly articles with all the necessary citations
(Garfield, 1965) thereby relieving authors of the irksome responsibility. But even
with prodigious advances in artificial intelligence in the interim, the solution that
Garfield proposed remains elusive, and for good reason: the selection of citations
by an author is a residually (and necessarily) subjective act, impossible to predict
or second guess with certitude. Authors are human, citational perfection ulti-
mately unattainable. The governing norms that Merton invoked are thus perhaps
best viewed as aspirational in nature—stretch goals, in business jargon. This, of
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course, holds for other spheres of daily life; the aspirational and actual frequently
diverge, which helps explain the success ofWeightwatchers.
But back to chitter chatter. Think for amoment of a typical exchange between
twopersons andhow it unfurls. Conversation, as philosophers and socio-linguists
have shown, consists of a number of different kinds of speech acts (assertives,
directives, commissives, etc.) and is governed by certain norms or implicit rules
(e.g., turn-taking, avoidance of face-threatening acts). Here, by way of illustra-
tion, is what Grice (1989, p. 33) has to say: “Make your contribution such as it is
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of
the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” But as we all know, rational co-
operative action is often as much observed in the breach as the observance: as
with citation, so with conversation. Prescription (how we should behave) is not
description (how we actually behave). One knows that one shouldn’t interrupt or
talk over one’s interlocutor, but the excitement of themoment, the need to correct
a factually incorrect statement, or some other factormay cause one to overstep the
bounds of etiquette.
Conversation can be viewed as a set “collective social practices” (Hyland,
2000, p. 1), one that sometimes breaks down. In that regard it is not greatly
different from citation behavior, another set of collective social practices that
sometimes breaks down, or at least falls short of the Platonic ideal when authors
are less than scrupulous in their referencing of prior work, or, somewhat rarer,
attempt to game the system. Conversation (or discourse) analysis is an approach
to studying naturally occurring, primarily verbal, interactions between individ-
uals. To the best of my knowledge the considerable body of research that has
been carried out in this area has not yet resulted in the creation of a universally
accepted theory of conversation. That being so, I fail to see why we would expect
the last sixty or so years of research in citation analysis to have produced a grand,
unifying theory of citation behavior. To be sure, there is no shortage of metaphors
to help us get to grips with the nature, purpose and practice of citation, and while
these may well be illuminating and insightful, it has to be said that a congeries of
metaphors does not a theory make.
Permit me now to adopt the role of advocatus diaboli. Although I once au-
thored a paper with the title “The need for a theory of citing” (Cronin, 1981) I am
not altogether convinced that constant self-flagellation and fretting about the ab-
sence of an all-embracing theory are the most productive uses of our time—more
likely another case, I fancy, of what the literary scholar/critical theorist Stanley
Fish (1985, p. 112) called “theory hope.” Even if someone were to come up with
a humdinger of a theory, I fail to see how the well-documented problems (va-
lidity, reliability, etc.) associated with citation analysis, evaluative bibliometrics,
and the newwave of alternative metrics can be glossed over or made to disappear
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(Cronin, 2013). Theory or no theory, the ineradicable messiness (of meaning and
motivation) cannot simply be wished away: it is constitutive of citation behavior.
Perhaps, as Wouters (1999) has suggested, we need to give up on the Holy Grail
and approach thematter of theory construction froman oblique angle. In so doing
wewould not be alone; other academic tribes face similar challenges, have to deal
with similar frustrations. In the spirit of ludic irreverence, therefore, let me quote
a few lines from Thomas Erickson’s (2000) ditty “Theory Theory,” whichwaswrit-
ten specifically with the human-computer interaction (HCI) research community
in mind. It seems to me that Erickson’s message has potential relevance well be-
yond the borders of HCI.
The world is messy, fuzzy, sticky.
Theoretically ’tis all quite tricky.
Theories keep it at a distance,
Cov’ring up the awkward instance
…
So let not theory serve as blinders,
welcome disruptions as reminders!
I concludedmyaforementioned 1981 articlewith a low-keymotherhood and apple
pie statement: “If authors can be educated as to the informational role of citations
and encouraged to be restrained and selective in their referencing habits, then it
should be possible to arrive at greater consistency in referencing practice gener-
ally” (Cronin, 1981, p. 22). Some 35 years on and the need for critical self-reflexivity
is no less pressing, especially in light of the importance attached to citation data
in so many personnel evaluation and program assessment exercises. The metri-
cization of the academy is now in full swing and all hands are needed on deck to
ensure that best practices are followed, as far ashumanlypossible. Thus, and tobe
more concrete, I would like to see the scientometrics community, loosely defined
and scattered though it is, channel more of its collective energies into activities
such as the following: (a) encouraging informed discussion within academe on
the instrumental role and symbolic significance of citations (and other putative
performance indicators) in scholarly communication; (b) promoting better un-
derstanding of the strengths and limitations of citation analysis and related tech-
niques among different stakeholder groups; (c) developing, testing and refining
new scientometric methods and tools sets; (d) critically examining the validity
and ethicality of evaluative bibliometrics in research assessment exercises; and
(e) exploring the use and significance of alternative metrics in the scholarly com-
munication process. The Leiden Manifesto⁴ is a commendable step in the right
direction.
4 http://www.leidenmanifesto.org
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Although I, unlike Grant Wood (author of this essay’s epigraph), have very
limited experience of milking cows, I can nonetheless sympathize, up to a point
at any rate, with the artist’s jadedness when it comes to “-isms”. Perhaps pragma-
tism (an unsophisticated “-ism” in many people’s eyes, I don’t doubt) is the best
way forward. Instead of trying toweight contributions, quantify outputs,measure
quality, and calibrate downstream scholarly impact—in the process falling prey to
what Collini (2012, p. 108) calls the “fallacy of accountability”—we should instead
pay more attention to what is actually being said, by whom, to whom, in what
ways, and when. In other words, we should listen attentively to the chattering of
texts and develop better ways of capturing what is being said in the docuverse
and demonstrating how conversations spark, splutter, and spiral off in multiple
directions across time and disciplinary lines. Historiographical analysis of this
kind, coupled with textual engagement—i.e., actually readingwhat an author has
written—can probably teach us more about the process of scholarly communi-
cation, while also providing important insights into the issues and themes that
matter most to those at what Mr. Wood folksily termed “the business end.” In my
view, that is where we should be directing our energies: perhaps the search for an
overarching theory can—and here I risk incurring the wrath of the long-suffering
editor of this volume or, worse, excommunication from the fold—be left for an-
other day.
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Birger Hjørland
Informetrics Needs a Foundation in the
Theory of Science
1 Introduction
The terms “bibliometrics”, “informetrics” and “scientometrics” are—unless oth-
erwise specified—considered synonymous in this chapter. They refer to quantita-
tive studies of documents, collections of documents, and derived patterns (e.g.,
maps based on co-citations or bibliographic coupling, or evaluative techniques
such as journal impact factor (JIF), or the h-index). They also cover webometrics
and statistical patterns such as Bradford’s law, Lotka’s law, and Zipf’s law.
Traditionally, many informetrics studies have been made by using scien-
tific and scholarly databases (e.g., the Science Citation Index) and those studies
thereby represent studies of scholarly literatures (thus this subset of informetrics
may be termed “scientometrics”). By implication, scientometrics is a “science
of science”, a “metascience” or a field of “science studies” as also put forward
by Bates (1999, p. 1044). The family of metasciences includes fields such as the
history of science, the philosophy of science, and the sociology of science, men-
tioning only the most important,¹ where the term “science” is not limited to
natural science but covers all fields of scholarship. The main points in this pa-
per are: (1) information science with informetrics belongs to the meta-sciences,
(2) these meta-sciences are mutually interdependent, (3) all meta-fields are also
dependent on subject knowledge, and (4) “post-Kuhnian” views of knowledge are
based on social, historical, and pragmatic perspectives (rather than on individu-
alistic and foundational perspectives).
We shall start by having a brief introduction to the most important meta-
sciences: history of science typically studies lines of development (diachronic
analysis) in science and the life and works of great scientists often based on sci-
entific literature as well as unpublished sources focusing on science as a whole,
a single discipline, or a specific period or aspect. The principles of such historical
studies are developed in the field called historiography and the principles of the
history of science are developed in the subfield called historiography of science.
1 Here, I am using science studies in a broader way than, for example, Collin (2011) who does not
consider philosophy of science as a part of science studies.
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Philosophy of science is typically based on rationalist principles putting for-
ward normative criteria for scientific work and scientific methodology and is not
usually based on empirical or historical studies.² The logical positivists suggested
one family of norms in the first part of the 20th century: there is a universal and
a priori scientific method; theories must be translatable into observational terms;
the doctrines of behaviorism, operationalism, andmethodological individualism;
and the reduction of research objects into “variables”. Such norms can still be
found in textbooks of empirical methodologies in the social sciences, although
logical positivism today is generally considered an unsuccessful project based
on unfruitful premises. Philosopher Karl Popper developed another set of norms
based on the principle of falsificationism whereby good research should: (1) pro-
vide scientific statements, hypotheses, and theories which are precise in having
an inherent possibility to be proven false, (2) should not be based on empirical
generalisations, but should put forward theories which are bold and courageous,
and (3) should submit scientific theories to rigorous tests. The implications of
theories should be logically deduced and empirically tested; the best scientific
knowledge is able to resist careful scrutiny from the scientific community. Philo-
sophical positions and traditions such as hermeneutics, pragmatism, critical stud-
ies, and qualitative methodologies developed another set of norms which tend to
emphasise the historical nature of thinking; the active role of the researcher; the
study of conceptions, theories, and the dialectics between subject and object; and
emphasize that an object is always an object for a subject and a subject is always
historically, socially, and culturally situated.
Sociology of science typically studies empirical studies on scientific activities,
both internally in science and in their relations to broader society (power, econ-
omy, and policies). The field of scientometrics is often considered by sociologists
of science as a part of their field (just as we in information science consider it part
of our field). The field is closely related to “cultural studies of science”. Among the
important concepts in the sociology of science are “Mode 2” research and “triple
helix” which emphasise the growing influence of industrial and commercial in-
terests in the scientific system. Other important questions involve gender issues,
the role of social class and ethnicity, the career system, and issues that motivate
scientists to do things in the way they are done (versus how they could have be
done).
Information science with informetrics typically studies information systems
and information services; “memory institutions” such as research libraries, bib-
2 Although Kuhn’s philosophy of science, for example, represents a historicist philosophy of sci-
ence.
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liographic databases, knowledge organisation systems (see Stock, this volume);
as well as the users, non-users, and potential users of such information systems
and services. This field studies the whole system of actors, institutions, and ser-
vices connecting information producers and users (cf., Søndergaard, Andersen, &
Hjørland, 2003). Information science is largely an empirical field, but is also a nor-
mative field (studying, promoting, and providing standards for many aspects of
scientific communication). While relatively distinct from the other meta-sciences
given its purpose to contribute to optimal scientific communication and utilisa-
tion of recorded knowledge, information science often represents a design or con-
struction perspective and a relation to the practice of librarianship, documenta-
tion, and information services that makes it relatively unique.
When it is claimed that informetrics belongs to the meta-sciences, it may be
argued that this field is much broader than the scientific domain and today in-
cludes, among other things, webometrics and thus link-structures from all sectors
of broader society as well as ordinary peoples’ relation to information. Although
this is correct, two things should be recognized: (1) Within the narrower field of
science, it is important to consider the relation between scientometrics and the
domain of science in order to understand and explain bibliometric patterns; and
(2) In the broader field of other sectors of society and of everyday information
use, the same principles may also provide a fruitful basis for understanding in-
formation science and informetrics. It is wrong and harmful to ignore the field
of meta-sciences because it is considered too narrow (which is an argument fre-
quently encountered in schools of library and information science because of the
emphasis often placed on public libraries and information services for broader
society). We shall return to the importance of the philosophy of science for non-
scientific domains later.
Meta-sciences aremutually interdependent and all of themare also—first and
foremost—dependent on subject knowledge of the fields of knowledge they are
studying. In order to understand and evaluate research on say, the history of psy-
chology, one must do so based on knowledge about the field of psychology, what
counts as psychological knowledge, and what is a success or a blind alley in psy-
chology. The same is the case whenwe have to interpret or evaluate a bibliometric
map of psychology—in order to even draw it, first we need to identify which doc-
uments are psychological on which to draw the map (this is discussed in detail
later in this chapter). In both cases, we have an example of a hermeneutic circle:
in order to study a domain, you must delimit it, and in order to delimit it, you
must have knowledge about it. In other words: A lack of subject knowledge on the
part of meta-scientists may provide problematic interpretations of the empirical
patterns observed.
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Examples of interaction between the meta-sciences are Garfield’s (2004)
bibliometric contribution to historiography and Griffith’s (1979) bibliometrically
based criticism of some assumptions in the philosophy of science. On the other
hand, Kuhn’s (1962) theory of paradigms inspired bibliometric researchers to try
to identify paradigms empirically (cf. Chen, 2003). This chapter will briefly in-
troduce the relation between philosophy of science and other meta-sciences, but
will mainly focus on the relation between the theory of science and informetrics.
2 Philosophy of science after logical positivism
Often stated, Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
brought an end to logical positivism. Although this is disputed,³ the opposition
between “positivism” and “post-Kuhnian philosophy” provides the foundation
for this chapter; but what is (logical) positivism andwhat—if anything—has really
changed in the ground swell of Kuhn?
Defining “positivism” is not easy.⁴ There are many different positions in both
classical and logical positivism, just as there are different interpretations of these
positions (see, for example, Reisch, 2005 for a recent re-interpretation). A com-
mon view is that the term “positivism” includes three main characteristics:
1. the use of quantitative methodologies,
2. the use of scientific methods (as opposed to hermeneutic methods in the so-
cial sciences and humanities), and
3. the belief in realism and objectivity.
Given that Kuhnopposedpositivism, an easy conclusion is that theunderstanding
of positivism expressed in the first and second points must be wrong. Kuhn was a
physicist by training andphysics is based onmeasurements—hence a quantitative
discipline. Of course, Kuhn did not end physics or its quantitative methodology
and therefore it does not make sense to understand positivism in the first and
second sense. Kuhn’s revolution in the philosophy of science must have another
3 The Danish philosopher Stig Andur Pedersen (1995) demonstrated that even if Kuhn’s theory
represents a clash with positivist ideas it is in many ways a natural continuation of the work of
the logical positivists in the 1940s and 1950s . Friedman (2003), Moges (2010) and Reisch (1991)
made related observations. Tsou (2015), however, maintains that the logical positivism of Rudolf
Carnap and Kuhn’s work represent two distinctive traditions of doing philosophy of science.
4 “Questions such as ‘Is thesis T a positivist (empiricist, idealist, realist etc.) thesis?’ are notori-
ously difficult.” (Bird, 2004, p. 338).
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meaning (if the first view was correct, informetrics per definition would be posi-
tivist, which I will argue it cannot be).
The third view (that positivism is a realist position) is more complicated, but
is generally consideredwrong in the philosophy of science. For logical positivism,
speaking about any reality behind observations or causing observations is meta-
physical and metaphysics is considered illegitimate. “What exists in reality” is
consideredametaphysical questionandopposed to thepositivist spirit. It is rather
well-established in the philosophy of science that empiricism/positivism and re-
alism are different positions. It can even be argued that positivism is less realistic
compared tomore interpretative positions because it is better to have explicit sub-
jectivity than to have subjectivity disguised as objectivity. Such an argument will
be put forward below.
What then is positivism? Perhaps we can best describe it as the belief in “the
Leibnizian ideal”:
The Leibnizian ideal holds that all disputes aboutmatters of fact can be impartially resolved
by invoking appropriate rules of evidence. At least since Bacon, most philosophers have
believed there to be an algorithm or set of algorithms which would permit any impartial
observer to judge the degree to which a certain body of data rendered different explanations
of those data true or false, probable or improbable […] But whether optimists or pessimists,
rationalists or empiricist,most logicians andphilosophers of science from the 1930s through
the 1950s believed, at least in principle, in the Leibnizian ideal.
(Laudan, 1984, p. 5–6)
Although Kuhn was not the first to question this ideal,⁵ The Structure of Scientific
Revolutionsnonetheless had the greatest impact on the fall of the Leibnizian ideal.
What Kuhn brought to the forefront in the philosophy of science was the under-
standing that scientists are trained and socialized in paradigm-centered scientific
communities and much of what they do and think is based on the experiences
from their daily work with experiments. According to Mallery, Hurwitz, and Duffy
(1992), the notion of a paradigm-centered scientific community is analogous to
Gadamer’s notion of a linguistically encoded social tradition. Therefore, we could
say thatKuhn’s philosophy is closer tohermeneutics than topositivism.Kuhn thus
contributed in changing philosophy of science from an individualist to a social
epistemology (cf. Wray, 2011). Not only do explicit theories govern scientists’ ac-
tivities, but also do tacit knowledge.
5 Names like Dewey (1929), Feyerabend (1975), Hanson (1958) and Toulmin (1953) deserve to be
mentioned in this context.
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Logical positivism must therefore be understood in contrast to socially and
historically oriented philosophies of science. Logical positivism was an attempt
to combine two former traditions—rationalism and empiricism:
logical positivism arose as the joint product of two intellectual traditions [rationalism and
empiricism] that conflicted deeply with one another: In attempting to unite these traditions,
its adherents created an extremely influential approach to philosophy but one that embod-
ied serious intellectual tensions from its dual ancestry.
(Smith, 1986, p. 64)
In order tounderstandphilosophyof science after logical positivism, it is therefore
important to understand the inherent limitations of empiricism and rationalism
(in this paper only empiricism is analyzed).
As a doctrine in epistemology, empiricismholds that all knowledge ultimately
is based on experience; but empiricism should not be confused with the need for
science to be empirical, is it rather about certain ideals governing empirical stud-
ies. Widely recognised today, sciences are empirical in a broad understanding of
the term. In psychology, empiricism is in particular associated with behaviorism,
the “objective” study of stimuli and responses in organisms. The limitations of
behaviorism were strongly exposed by the linguist and cognitive scientist Noam
Chomsky (who explicitly subscribed to rationalism), who wrote:
A typical example of ‘stimulus control’ for [the behaviorist] Skinner would be the response
to a piece of music with the utterance Mozart or to a painting with the response Dutch.
These responses are asserted to be ‘under the control of extremely subtle properties’ of the
physical object or event (108). Suppose instead of saying Dutch we had said Clashes with
the wallpaper, I thought you liked abstract work, Never saw it before, Tilted, Hanging too
low, Beautiful, Hideous, Remember our camping trip last summer?, or whatever else might
come into our minds when looking at a picture (in Skinnerian translation, whatever other
responses exist in sufficient strength). Skinner could only say that each of these responses
is under the control of some other stimulus property of the physical object.
(Chomsky, 1959, p. 31)
The behaviorism of Skinner is a version of logical positivism attempting to predict
and control human behavior in terms of “stimuli” and “responses”. It may under-
stand itself as “objective science”but, asChomsky’s criticismdemonstrates, in the
case where a human being is looking at a painting and provides some response,
we are unable to tell what in the painting elicited the specific response: the stim-
ulus is not objectively given for the researcher. Because there is no objective way
to identify the stimulus, there is of course a great possibility that the behaviorist/
positivist psychologist uses his/her own subjective perception of the picture as the
basis for studying other peoples’ stimulus-response relations. If the psychologist
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is unaware of how the picture may be understood by different cultures and sub-
cultures, his/her own cultural understandingmay influence his/her perception of
the psychology of the observer.
An example from history may also illustrate the same point. When history
was established as a scholarly discipline in the United States, “universalism” was
assumed, i.e., that,
Truthwas one, the same for all people. It was, in principle, accessible to all and addressed to
all. Particular commitments —national, regional, ethnic, religious, ideological—were seen
as enemies of objective truth […] The close connection which historians saw between de-
tachment and objectivity made them sympathetic to Mannheim’s celebration of the vantage
point of free-floating and socially detached observers, whose liberation from particularist
loyalties allowed them to approach closer to objectivity.
(Novick, 1988, p. 469)
However, this universalism was later challenged:
The entry of large numbers of Jews into the upper reaches of the [historical] profession in
the 1950s and early 1960s was widely seen as the fulfillment of universalist norms. It was
otherwise with the arrival of blacks and women from the late sixties and onward. For their
rise to prominence within the profession coincided with a new, assertive, particularist con-
sciousness which both directly and indirectly challenged universalist norms. They defined
themselves not as “historians who happened to be Negroes,” with a consensually accept-
able integrationist standpoint, but as black historians, committed to one or another form of
cultural nationalism…
(Novick, 1988, p. 470; emphasis in original)
In short: Positivism is associated with the idea that researchers’ subjectivity does
not matter or may be eliminated while post-Kuhnian philosophy acknowledges
the influence of subjectivity. The idea that male, middle-class, white historians
maybe able to describe history in neutralways has been challenged just as has the
idea about behavioral psychologists being able to describe stimulus-response pat-
terns objectively. Somewhat paradoxically this makes positivism a less objective
and less realist science compared to hermeneutics and related traditions: pos-
itivism turns out to be a form of subjective idealism in which the researcher’s
cultural background and theoretical understanding is neglected and therefore
cannot be taken into account.⁶
6 An anonymous reviewer commented: “positivism turns out to be a form of subjective
idealism—only if you’re characterizing positivism froman anti-positivist position, surely? There’s
no ‘paradox’ there.” Answer: Yes, there is a real paradox in positivism. You cannot get rid of this
criticism just by ignoring it. The implication of what the reviewer says is that any position is a
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Kuhn introduced the concept of “paradigms”, which has been heavily dis-
cussed. In this chapter a paradigm is understood as a system of assumptions,
concepts, values, andpractices that constitute away of viewing reality. Paradigms
influence theway scientists see things and describe them. Perception is not a neu-
tral process of collecting data on which theories are afterwards developed, but
perception itself is theory-laden. Scientists in different paradigms see the world
differently and describe it differently. Concepts in one paradigm are not the same
in another paradigm thus making paradigms incommensurable. This is in sharp
conflict with the Leibnizian ideal because it changes the nature of scientists from
objective calculators to socially conditioned subjects. It also means that scientific
knowledge is not seen as a commonly agreed body of knowledge, but as different
theories full of disagreements (although Kuhn himself saw science as governed
by one paradigm at a time, the general post-Kuhnian tendency is to understand
science as consisting of competing paradigms at any point in time). Kuhn added
the historicist understanding that knowledge develops in historically constituted
paradigms and this historical or evolutionary dimension (in addition to the social
dimension) is important in order to understand the development of science. Fi-
nally, Kuhn also added the axiological dimension: Scientists may be governed by
different goals and values.
The following quote by Michael Kleineberg expresses a view that has gained
a stronghold today:
In the process of knowing, the known and the knower seem to be inextricably interwoven.
Knowledge as it appears in the consciousness of human beings is always knowledge about
something for someone. The now widely accepted epistemic pluralism maintains that the
validity of knowledge claims depends on the epistemic framework of the knower and cannot
be judged from a neutral “view from nowhere”. The knower as an agent of epistemic activity
is always already embodied as a material organism and embedded in a social and cultural
environment at a certain point in time and space. In other words, the prerequisites to create,
represent, organize, and communicate knowledge or information are limited by precondi-
tions which are investigated by theories of knowledge and constitute the epistemological
dimension.
(Kleineberg, 2014, p. 80)
This quote may sound relativistic (and Kuhn is often accused of being relativist).⁷
Of course, any paradigm is not as fruitful as any other, although the difficulty is
fruitful as any other and that disagreeing arguments can just be ignored. To say that any theoret-
ical position is true from its own point of view represent a problematic relativism.
7 An anonymous reviewer of this chapter wrote: “In this very interesting chapter, the author ar-
gues that, asmeta-scientists, designers and evaluators of informetric studies should heed certain
claims of “post-Kuhnian” philosophy of science—e.g., that the goal of science/meta-science is
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again that an evaluation of paradigms cannot be accomplished from a neutral
“view fromnowhere”. However, as Kleineberg (2014)writes: “If the claim ‘nothing
is valid for all contexts’ was true, then it would contradict itself since this state-
ment appears as a universal claim as well” (p. 85).
We conclude this section with a quote from historian Christopher Lloyd:
“Perhaps the greatest advance in understanding the nature of explanation made in the
post-positivist and post-Kuhnian era is the general realization that methodologies, theories,
and explanations are related to each other via extra-logical, historically variable constella-
tions variously described as ‘background knowledge’, ‘traditions’, ‘paradigms’, ‘research
programmes’, ‘fields’, or ‘domains’. We can call all of these ‘framework concepts.’
(Lloyd, 1993, p. 32)
3 Intermezzo: social constructivism is not
an alternative to positivism
Before we consider the implications of the Kuhnian revolution in the philosophy
of science, it is necessary to consider social constructivism because this position
is strongly influential today:
Originally proposed by sociologists of science, constructivism or social constructivism is a
view about the nature of scientific knowledge held by many philosophers of science. Con-
structivists maintain that scientific knowledge is made by scientists and not determined
by the world. This makes constructivists antirealists. […] Constructivism is more aptly com-
pared with Berkeley’s idealism.
(Downes, 1998, vol. 2, p. 624)
Sociologists of science, such as Bloor (1991), amain figure in the so-called “Strong
Programme”, conduct empirical studies of (natural) scientists and some of them
claim fromsuchfindings to demonstrate howscientists construct scientific knowl-
edge (rather than discover the truth). Bloor based the sociology of science on the
following principles (here quoted from Finn Collin):
not to discover objective (i.e., mind- or context-independent) truths about the world; that, in any
case, there is no way (e.g., a neutral “view from nowhere”) for scientists to discover objective
truths about the world; that, in any case, there are no objective truths about the world; that, in
any case, there is no objective reality—and should recognize the historically-, culturally-, and
institutionally-specific nature of their findings.” Answer: I did not made these claims, these are
something that the reviewer read into the chapter. The pragmatic view of truth and objectivity
is complicated, but most pragmatists do think that it is possible to give a pragmatic account of
objectivity that avoids bad relativism and conventionalism; see Bernstein (2010, 106–124).
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1. It [the sociology of science] would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which
bring about belief or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart
from social ones which will cooperate in bringing about belief.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success
or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies require examination.
3. It would be symmetrical in this style of explanation. The same types of cause would ex-
plain, say, true and false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable
to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for
general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology
would be a standing refutation of its own theories.
These conditions are meant to express a commitment to what Bloor sees as an uncontro-
versial, mainstream conception of science; thereby, he intends to safeguard the scientific
credentials of the programme.
(Collin, 2011, p. 37)
Collin continues pointing out how the above characteristics looks like a commit-
ment, not to scientific rigor as such, but to the idealized conception of science con-
structed and propagated by logical positivism. Other philosophers (e.g., Kjørup,
2008) have also shownhowBloor’s ideas are related to those of logical positivism.
My own thoughts related to the problem of subject knowledge (or lack thereof) in
much of meta-science come to the same conclusion: How is it possible for soci-
ologists to study the activities of scientists without proper knowledge about the
subject matter of those activities? (Recall Skinner’s interpretation of peoples’ re-
action to a painting.) How can sociologists decide which acts are important and
which are trivial? How is it decidedwhich acts turn out to be fruitful andwhich are
futile? In order to make these decisions, one needs detailed knowledge about the
arguments for and against a given theory strengthened or falsified by those acts.
To claim that a neutral and objective description of scientific activities is possible
without proper subject knowledge is a mistake related to positivist doctrines. As
formerly described, such positivist “objectivity” has often been demonstrated as
imposing upon the researcher his/her own subjective biases into descriptions and
claims.
Social constructivism seems to be based on a paradox: its own research is
“true” in claiming the impossibility of objective research. Additionally, it seems
to underestimate how difficult it is to produce knowledge and theories that are
consistent (i.e., how much resistance reality makes in the construction of theo-
ries). While they are right that there is an element of contingency in science this
does not mean that scientists can produce any truth they like. We shall return to
this issue in relation to bibliometric maps.
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Thomas Kuhn has often been used to support relativists and social construc-
tivists, but Kuhn’s philosophy does not imply a strong kind of constructivism (see
Wray, 2011) and Kuhn (2000, p. 110) famously rejected the Strong Programme as
“deconstruction gonemad”. It is important, in the words of Brian Cantwell Smith,
“to steer a path between the Scylla of naive realism and the Charybdis of pure con-
structivism” (Smith, 1996, p. 3). It is ironic that social constructivism–which tends
to regard positivism as its enemy par excellence—itself seems to be based on the
same problematic assumptions about the neutrality of the researcher. Therefore,
(strong) social constructivism is not an alternative to positivism.
4 Post-Kuhnian perspectives on the
meta-sciences
The issue of “positivism” versus “paradigm theory” is important in all specific
sciences (like physics, biology, psychology, and history) as well as in the meta-
sciences described above. In the field of history, Novick (1988) is a valuable ex-
ample of how the American historical profession has dealt with the idea and ideal
of objectivity from its foundation in the 1880s until the book was written. Its par-
ticular value is that it describes concretely how the ideal of objectivity was elab-
orated, challenged, modified, and defended over the last century. The study is
based on, among other sources, the archives of the American Historical Review,
and is thus a demonstration of howdifferent philosophical normshave influenced
decisions for the acceptance of papers for publication in a leading journal (philo-
sophical norms are thus not “merely” philosophical). My analysis of how “post-
Kuhnian” perspectives have changed the meta-sciences does not have the same
differentiated and balanced treatment as Novick, but is here presented in a purely
schematic and tentative form.
A scientific document is a report by a scientist observing the world and a sci-
entometric study is a report by a scientist observing the reports of other scientists.
In both cases, the ways the reports are made reflect norms in the theory of science
(even if thesenormsare implicit or unconscious). Theargument iswider, however:
Even if the documents are not scholarly papers, they are influenced by philosoph-
ical views or ideologies (e.g., by different kinds of -isms in art). All documents are
influenced by some views and interests, and all studies of documents are also
influenced by some kinds of subjectivity, which are partly culturally and socially
shaped. There are thus two levels at play: (1) the traditions and epistemologies
underlying document production and (2) the traditions and epistemologies un-
derlying informetrics, information science, and the study of scholarly communi-
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cation. This paper claims that the important theories of level 1 are identical with
the important theories of level 2 in that both levels may reflect a positivist or alter-
natively apost-Kuhnianphilosophy.Howpost-Kuhnianperspectives have affected
the meta-sciences is outlined in Table 1.
5 Post-Kuhnian perspectives on informetrics
Belver C. Griffith (1979) criticised howhistory and philosophy of science neglected
bibliometric findings (including Solla Price, 1965, and his own research). Griffith
claims that the empirical studies of science (bibliometrics) have challengedmany
claims in history and philosophy of science including Kuhn’s rejection of “crucial
experiments” in physics: “To have taken this image [provided by bibliometrics]
seriously would have wiped out many ‘hard won distinctions’ that philosophers
had wrested from their own scholarship” (p. 384). Griffith also praised two books
in information science (Brittain, 1970; Meadows, 1974) writing: “The books are,
however, philosophically blind—but perhaps nothing really was lost.” In other
words, in contrast to this article, Griffith did not expect philosophy of science to
be important for information science.
That philosophy is indeed important for science can be expressed with a
quote by Albert Einstein:
The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They are de-
pendent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty
scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and
muddled.
(Einstein, 1949, p. 683–684)⁸
My aim is thus twofold: (1) To argue the importance of philosophy of science
(against Griffith, 1979, among others, probably including the silent majority of
researchers), and (2) to outline what I see as the most important philosophical
perspective for informetrics.
8 Einstein’s relation to positivism is expressed in this quote: “I am not a Positivist. Positivism
states that what cannot be observed does not exist. This conception is scientifically indefensible,
for it is impossible tomake valid affirmations of what people ‘can’ or ‘cannot’ observe. Onewould
have to say ‘only what we observe exists’, which is obviously false” (Einstein, 2005, p. 238). This
quote is of course too simplistic to say something about positivism as well as Einstein’s philos-
ophy of science—or to indicate that Einstein would support my interpretation of post-Kuhnian
philosophy (see Howard, 1993 for a deeper discussion). It is cited only to indicate that positivism
is not necessarily the scientists’ philosophy and that it is justified to challenge it.
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5.1 The mirror metaphor
Griffith’s article, entitled Bibliometrics: How faulty a mirror of knowledge? did not,
however, address the problem of its title (but was, asmentioned above, a criticism
that philosophy of science neglected what he considered relevant bibliometric
findings). Here, however, the problem will be directly considered: How faulty a
mirror of science is a bibliometric map? (Moreover, how can we examine this?)
My first comment concerns the mirror metaphor,⁹ according to which scientific
knowledge shall be understood as representing a mirror of nature and bibliomet-
ric maps as representing mirrors of science.
John Dewey (1929, p. 215) criticized what he labelled “the spectator theory of
knowledge” (i.e., the view that the knower is only passively related to the thing
known) as did the pragmatic tradition to which he belonged (see also Rorty,
1979). The pragmatic alternative to the mirror metaphor considers knowledge
(and knowledge representations such as bibliometric maps) as tools and there-
fore they do not evaluate them according to how faulty (or how precise) a mirror
they provide, but according to how well they fulfil their functions as tools for
given tasks (implying that different tasks may require different perspectives). An
example: Boyack and Klavans (2010) asked “Which citation approach represents
the research frontmost accurately?”Asking the question thisway reveals a viewof
knowledge corresponding to the mirror metaphor. One of the problems in asking
which approach is best is that an answer to that question presupposes that there
is a neutral platform from which different approaches may be compared, that we
have a key on which to evaluate different approaches. But we do not have such
a key; we only have different, more or less equivalent approaches, each of which
may claim to be the best. The alternative is to ask: Which bibliometric approach
provides the best tool for a given task? Based on this pragmatic view, I consider
co-citation analysis and bibliometric coupling as two different approaches that
should not be evaluated on providing the most accurate picture, but as different
tools suited for different kinds of tasks (see Hjørland, 2013). To understand bib-
liographical coupling is to understand the degree of overlap in different authors’
citation identity, while to understand co-citation patterns is to understand the
reception history and scholarly impact of documents. My suggestions may of
course be questioned and further examined, but the point here is to follow John
Dewey and question the mirror view of knowledge and its use in informetrics
today.
9 The mirror metaphor is also known as “the picture theory of knowledge”, “the mimetic nature
of information”, and “the spectator theory of knowledge”.
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5.2 Selection of sources: a hermeneutical circle
A strong argument about the non-neutrality of bibliometric maps concerns the
selection of the journals (or other sources) on which a given map is constructed.
In a former paper I wrote:
Imagine that we are going to create a map of LIS. As Åström (2002) showed, former maps,
such as that of White and McCain (1998), seem to have a bias towards information science.
In order to provide a better alternative, Åström also includedmore library-oriented journals
in his study. However, there is no objective criterion for judgingwhich documents best repre-
sent LIS, and any selected set of journals can always be shown to have a bias in some direction
or another.
(Hjørland, 2013, p. 1322; emphasis in original)
Bibliometric researchers are mostly explicit about which journals they used in
their studies, and thus about their selection. This means that their research is ob-
jective in the sense that other researchers may replicate it. However, the claim put
forward here is that bibliometricans do not usually make explicit arguments for
how the journals were selected in relation to their conception of the field. It is as
if the researchers’ view of the domain in question is considered ‘obvious’ or of no
consequence, or that this would provide a kind of subjectivity that is antithetical
to the positivist ideals of the authors. White and McCain (1998, p. 329), for exam-
ple, wrote about co-citation maps: “The maps transcend the viewpoint—and the
individual biases—of any one observer.” The authors also argued that their choice
of journals reflects “mainstream information science” and “journals with strong
IS [information science] orientations, as indicated by title and scope statements”.
However, frommy point of view their conception of information science seems to
be biased towards “library automation”. If I had to make the choice of journals,
other journals should have been added (or replaced the library automation jour-
nals), because in my conception information science is less technology-oriented
andmore socially-oriented.Mypoint is thatwe all have our different views ofwhat
the core information science journals are and our perspectives influence our study
of the field. Therefore a bibliometric map is a subjective representation, not an
objective one. Any researcher may have a specific interest (e.g., in facet analysis)
and the journals/information sources with the best coverage of that focus could
be determined. If not included in the bibliometric investigation, this could be con-
sidered a “bias” in the study. This is not an insignificant complaint because such
maps are extremely vulnerable to such choices.
A study by Schneider (2010) may also confirm this view:
The highly specialized character of Scientometrics compared to the other journals in this set,
i.e., a larger share of publications and the large number of unique authors that only publish
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in the journal, obviously exacerbates the influence of this journal to the arbitrary construct
named IS. This raises some important questions on how fields ought to be delimited if at all
and how publications should be selected for mapping purposes. It is first of all a sampling
problem rather than a normalization problem. It is not a question of right or wrong. It is
the simple fact stemming from the phenomena of skewed distributions. Very few mapping
studies address this issue.
(Schneider, 2010, p. 257)
Schneider says that the domain under study, information science, is an “arbitrary
construct” and that it has important consequences whether a given journal is or
is not considered a part of the domain. I see this as a very strong support of my
claim that informetrics researchers have to base their studies on an explicate view
of what the field is, and what it should be.
We have a kind of hermeneutic circle: How can we identify a field by a set
of journals, a set of departments, a set of scholars, etc., unless we already know
the field? And how canwe know the field unless we know its journals, its research
institutions, and its leading scholars? The answer is not that it is hopeless, but that
it requires an iterative process whereby the views of the informetrics researchers
must be developed, considering the perspective of other meta-sciences, and used
to inform their opinion of which views of the field their map is meant to be a tool
to support.
A basic principle of critical theory has been formulated in this way:
In retrospect the most important contribution of critical theory to philosophy in the late
twentieth centurywould seem tobe their criticismof positivismand their demand that social
theory be reflective; that is, that theorists try to be as aware as possible of their own posi-
tion, the origin of their beliefs and attitudes, and the possible consequences their theorizing
might have on what they are studying.
(Geuss, 1998, p. 728)
Using this principle of critical theory in bibliometrics may be termed “critical
informetrics” and here we shall have a look at how former bibliometric inves-
tigations have been re-examined from such a critical perspective. Spear (2007)
criticized former bibliometric studies of the so-called cognitive revolution in
psychology. Among his findings are that subfields may develop independently
to overall paradigm shifts in a discipline and that scholarly fields may have self-
interest in appearing successful. Therefore, “flagship publications” may not be a
good place to look for criticism of main stream assumptions (see also Toomela,
2014, about common assumptions in mainstream research). Spear provided con-
vincing arguments and new empirical results questioning former studies. Spear
also emphasised the important ethical issues in simplistic bibliometric conclu-
sions:
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We can argue about indicators, data sources, and forms of analysis, but in the end what we
likely learn is that there are many ways to tell a complex story. The problem, of course, is
that the outcome of this story has real and important implications for the distribution of or-
ganizational resources. If indeed every dean, every granting agency, and every department
head “knows” that there has been a cognitive revolution or that a cognitive neuroscience
revolution is afoot, thenwhere does that leave the claims of those who do not identify them-
selves with cognitive psychology or, worse yet, those who identify with behavioral analysis?
There is much at stake in how the history of psychology is told.
(Spear, 2007, p. 377)
This may be generalized: there is much at stake in how the history and bibliomet-
ric patterns of any domain are represented.
5.3 Is the pragmatic/critical view trivial?
Are informetrics researchers well aware of the importance of the pragmatic/
critical philosophy outlined in this article? Is it a triviality? In my opinion, it is
not. Although there have been some critical voices, mainstream research in this
field is still reflecting the positivist model. For example, Henry Small has claimed
that co-citation studies—in opposition to manually constructed bibliographies—
does not involve subjective decisions:
Either an existing bibliography is used, or subject experts are called upon to comb the litera-
ture and select relevant items. The bibliography then becomes the data base for subsequent
analyses of the specialty, including its growth and structural characteristics. To the extent
that this approach is based upon subjective decisions of relevance by the individual(s) com-
piling the bibliography, the analysis is open to criticism for possible bias and lack of re-
producibility. The principal difficulty with this approach is that it is almost impossible to
establish precise criteria as to what should or should not be included within the boundaries
of the subject. The method employed here, on the other hand, uses a clustering algorithm
to establish these boundaries; it involves no subjective decisions on what is to be included or
excluded from the specialty literature.
(Small, 1977, p. 140, italics added)
Precisely the same argument was put forward 37 years later by Andersen, Bazer-
man and Schneider (2014, p. 317), whowrote: “Scientometricmaps provide a kind
of description of the cognitive or social structure of a research area independent
of subjective judgments and relevance criteria”¹⁰ and I have already discussed
how Boyack and Klavans (2010) asked “Which citation approach represents the
10 Subsequently Bazermanwrote in an email: “Birger, Goodpoint. […]Nonetheless, the sentence
does not say that the description provided is definitive or an ultimate or fully objective reality–
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research front most accurately” as an example that I find represent mainstream
informetrics research. Furthermore, informetric research often uses similarity
measures about which Ellis, Furner-Hines and Willett wrote:
Even in the field of numerical taxonomy, where the use of similarity coefficients has been
even more widespread than in information retrieval, Jackson, Somers and Harvey (1989)
were moved to conclude that ‘the choice of a similarity coefficient is largely subjective and
often based on tradition or on a posteriori criteria such as the ‘interpretability’ of the re-
sults”, and went on to quote Gordon (1987): ‘Human ingenuity is quite capable of providing
a post hoc justification of dubious classifications.’
(Ellis et al. 1993, 144)
They conclude:
We agree with Kruskal (1964) ‘that each scientific area that has use for different measures of
proximity should after appropriate argument and trial, settle down on those measures most
useful for its needs.’ Formost applications in information retrieval, thehistorical attachment
to the simple, linear, association coefficients provided by the Dice and cosine formulae is in
no need of revision.
(Ellis et al., 1993, 145)
What I miss in this paper—and in the whole of mainstream research in informa-
tion retrieval and bibliometrics—is the consideration that any two things may be
considered similar in many different ways. There is no such thing as measuring
similarity objectively. There should always be an argument about the perspective
from which two things (e.g., documents) are considered similar. This is a well-
known problem in biological taxonomy in which different species may have de-
veloped similar bones and other criteria of similarity in order to adjust to the same
environmental possibilities.
There have, of course, been researchers who have pointed out bias, uncer-
tainty, theoretical divergences, and subjectivity in informetrics research (for a
compilation, see Cronin & Sugimoto, 2015). What I believe has seldom—if ever—
been claimed explicitly is the principal unavoidability of such bias and subjectivity
and, by consequence, the necessity of acknowledgement of the researcher’s
standpoint.
only that it provides a description that is independent of interpretive judgments. But of course
scientometric methods themselves include criteria and procedural judgments. While it is hard to
reconstruct my state of mind while revising the text, I likely was thinking that it referred to the
kinds of narrative interpretation that historians or participants might give and I did not stop to
consider the assumptions embedded within scientometrics. […] Chuck”
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One argument that my claim is trivial was put forward in an informal commu-
nication with a bibliometric scholar:
It is well known that the results of bibliometric investigations often are expressed as
probabilities—usually a confidence interval at 95 percent is accepted. In other words is
it accepted that there may be up to five percent probability that the result is due to random
outcome. This is more or less accepted standard in the social sciences. In this is also given
a clear expression that the result is not necessarily “the objective truth”.
(Informal communication, January 12, 2015)
This argument does not catch my point, however. One thing is whether there is a
statically uncertainty in results, another thing iswhether there is a systematic bias
due to the researcher’s subjectivity. The belief that a certain result is within a cer-
tain confidence interval is still based on positivist assumptions. As an anonymous
reviewer of this chapter wrote:
The general argument that the results of informetric studies should not be treated as ob-
jective truths is by no means new.¹¹ I think there is scope for making reference to a wider
selection of previous work, published in the information science literature, in which similar
conclusions are drawn.
The reviewer subsequently, ondemand, referred to Edge (1979), Hicks (1987),Mac-
Roberts and MacRoberts (1989) and Sullivan, White, and Barboni, (1977).
My first answer is that it is correct that there have been critical voices about
bibliometric studies, and I consider the four examples mentioned by the reviewer
as being outside mainstream informetrics research. Of these four papers two
(Edge, 1979 and Sullivan, White, & Barboni, 1977) are more in line with my post-
Kuhnian position while the other two seem to be more in line with the positivist
position.
Hicks (1987) compared co-citation analysis with a manually generated bib-
liography in the specialty of “spin glass” and found that co-citation analysis is
a “premature” method for science policy decisions, but that further work may
improve its reliability and robustness. She describes the subjectivity involved in
co-citation analysis but overall her paper seems to suggest—in contradiction to
the present chapter—that such subjectivity may be removed when themethod be-
comesmature. She further wrote that “The identification of ‘specialties’ is fraught
with theoretical and empirical difficulties, which remain unresolved” (p. 304),
which we have already discussed.
11 See footnote 7 about the pragmatic view of realism and objectivity and the reviewer’s misin-
terpretation of my statements.
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MacRoberts and MacRoberts (1989) discussed seven kinds of problems in ci-
tation analysis (i.e., formal influences not cited; biased citing; information influ-
ences not cited; self-citing; different types of citation; variations in citation rate
placed to type of publication, nationality, time period, and the size and type of
specialty; and technical limitations of citation indices and bibliographies). They
concluded:
Consequently, whether or not, and in what ways, citations can be used as data remains
unclear and will continue so until all aspects of citation analysis—the theories and assump-
tions that inform it, as well as the data upon which it is based—are subjected to careful
scrutiny. Until this is done, any results obtained by using citations as data will, at best, have
to be considered tentative.
(MacRoberts and MacRoberts, 1989, p. 347)
This study also tries to identify kinds of errors in order to eliminate them rather
than reflecting the view that the bibliometric analyst should argue about his or her
view of the represented domain (although this viewmay be implicit in the paper).
Sullivan, White, and Barboni (1977) examined Henry Small’s claim that co-
citation analysis “involves no subjective decisions on what is to be included or
excluded from the specialty literature” and concluded:
The potential biases of which Small speaks [in constructingmanual bibliographies] are real,
and we find it necessary in our work to be as aware as possible of them. But there are biases
involved in co-citation analysis, as well.
(Sullivan, White, & Barboni, 1977, p. 236)
In other words, this paper confirms the thesis about the subjectivity in infor-
metrics. About the data used for examining the co-citation structure, the authors
admit (p. 225): “We do not claim that this intellectual history is necessarily the
true picture”. The difference between this viewandmyown is that Iwould assume
that any intellectual history reflects a specific perspective, and therefore suggests
that some work is made illuminating different possible perspectives and how
different methodological choices supports one or another perspective.
Edge (1979) is thepaper that comes closest tomyownview.Hediscusses quan-
titative methods in historical and sociological studies of modern astronomy and
writes:
…my overall approach is critical. I am not convinced by the stronger claims of the propo-
nents of these quantitative methods. I want to argue that those who adopt these methods
(and, in particular, citation analysis)make implicit assumptions about thenature of science:
and, moreover, that what they gloss over as unproblematic are precisely the points which
many of us find to be crucially at issue.
(Edge, 1979, p. 102)
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One of the important conclusions in his paper is:
These [bibliometric] data certainly make our case more convincing! However, it is impor-
tant to stress the derivative quality of these figures, which have (in my mind) the status of
secondary validation only. Essentially, our picture is derived from our ‘soft’ data.
(Edge, 1979, p. 126)
Edge is not rejecting quantitative studies, but finds that they should be used crit-
ically and based on qualitative knowledge. He is not—as I am—referring to phi-
losophy of science, Thomas Kuhn, critical theory or pragmatism, but his paper
is explicitly “critical”. Perhaps an explicit engagement with critical philosophy
could have made his analyses even deeper by helping to uncover conflicting per-
spectives and interests in the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the domain.
The examples given in this section demonstrates, in my opinion, that the
philosophical position defended in this paper is not trivial.
5.4 The historicist revolution and its implications for
informetrics and information science
We saw that Kuhn introduced a historicist approach in the philosophy of science.
The historical perspective has changed biological taxonomy (under the name
“cladism”) and may also have the potential of making a scientific revolution in
information science and informetrics:
Citation analysis can be compared to the paradigm shift in biological taxonomy over recent
decades. The classical approach to biological classification (exemplified by the Linnaean
taxonomy) is based on classifying organisms on the basis of shared properties (e.g., number
of stamens), that is to classify according to similarity of certain properties. Cladism repre-
sents a paradigm shift in biology in which organisms are classified solely on the basis of a
commonancestor (by Ereshefsky, 2000, called ‘the historical approach’). This newapproach
has made fundamental changes in the classification of plants and animals and this revolu-
tion is not yet complete. In the same way as cladism represents a revolution in biological
taxonomy, citation analysis may be considered a revolution in KO [knowledge organization]
and information retrieval. Both are based on a historical rather than a structural approach to
classification. The implication for KO is that the domains and scholarly traditions to which
documents belong are considered theirmost important criteria of classification (rather than,
for example, their statistical word patterns). Scholarly theories determine what is to be con-
sidered related and different theories imply different criteria of relatedness.
(Hjørland, 2013, p. 1321)
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Traditional information science and information retrieval tend to consider docu-
ments as isolated phenomena and to compare their individual characteristics.¹²
Informetrics is the most obvious perspective to consider documents as part of a
tradition and therefore to apply a historicist perspective (although this is not al-
ways the case). At this point, it shall just be stated that amore consequent histori-
cist philosophymayhave the potential to transform the field in a fruitful direction.
5.5 Non-scholarly domains
We have now considered informetrics in the perspective of the philosophy of sci-
ence. Are these perspectives also relevant to broader perspectives than just schol-
arly domains? To make such a generalisation means to move from the theory of
science to the theory of knowledge and cognition. My answer is yes: Any domain
(e.g., sport, religion, education, law, eHealthor e-commerce)maybeperceiveddif-
ferently, there is never just one, neutral and objective, way to describe a field. It is
important to consider from which perspective and for which purpose documents
are described and the relevance of information is evaluated. Google, for example,
is not a neutral search engine (even if we consider only so-called “organic search”
as opposed to advertisements). One could say that in principle any search engine
is always a cultural-political agent making priorities in relation to what content
should be relatively findable and what should remain relatively invisible.
Kuhn’s theory has not just been influential in the philosophy of science, but
also, for example, in psychology. “Theory theory” (Weiskopf, 2011) is a psycho-
logical theory that understands children’s thinking as corresponding to scientists’
way of thinking: Children have “theories”whichmay change like paradigm shifts.
Therefore, principles from the philosophy of science may have potential as a gen-
eral foundation for informetrics.
12 An anonymous reviewer commented: ”I would disagree, given the emphasis even in ‘tradi-
tional’ information retrieval on measures like tf.idf that take into account the collection-wide
frequencies of terms as well as within-document frequencies, on thesauri built on term co-
occurrence data, etc. Today’s web search algorithms, of course, are heavily link-based, and in no
sense treat documents as independent.” Answer: Yes, traditional IR often considers documents
as parts of collections or as being interlinked. Still, however, they do not consider the single doc-
ument as part of a genre and a tradition and none of the approaches mentioned by the reviewer
can be considered historicist. In biology related methods are known as numeric taxonomic ap-
proaches, but they are considered different from cladistics (historical) methods.
42 | Birger Hjørland
5.6 A paradox
This chapter is termed Informetrics needs a foundation in the theory of science.
However, the theory of science distinguishes between two kinds of epistemol-
ogy: (1) Foundationalism (a secure foundation of certainty exists) and (2) Anti-
foundationalism (no fundamental belief or principle provides the basis or founda-
tion for inquiry and knowledge); justification of knowledge claims is understood
here as a function of a relationship between beliefs, none of which are privileged
as maintained by foundationalist theories of justification. The paradox is that the
philosophical foundation I suggest for informetrics is anti-foundationalism. This
is, however, only a contradiction in the word used in the title: there is no contra-
diction in subscribing to anti-foundationalism.
6 Conclusion
The main point raised in the present paper is that insights from the theory of
science are important for informetrics. A bibliometric study or measure cannot
be judged from a neutral “view from nowhere”, but is always—consciously or
unconsciously—engaged in the theoretical issues in the field studied. The two
most important implications of a post-Kuhnian view of informetrics are:
1. Bibliometric researchers need to consider domain-knowledge and its theoreti-
cal foundation: they have to stand in relation to different views on the domain
being investigated; and,
2. The objects of bibliometric studies—the documents—must be understood
in relation to the broader contexts in which they are produced, used, and
cited. Concepts like “research tradition”, “paradigms”, “genres”, “activity
systems”, and the like are framework concepts necessary for deeper interpre-
tation and analysis of bibliometric patterns.
Where is Blaise Cronin situated in relation to this view of information science?
The following quote illuminates this question:
The texts we write and the texts we cite bear the marks of the epistemic cultures, socio-
cognitive networks and physical places to which we belong at the different stages of our
professional lives.
(Cronin, 2005, p. 1)
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This understanding of “epistemic cultures” and their importance for informetrics
and information science reflects the basic idea of the present chapter: The fruit-
fulness of a social and epistemological basis for the field.
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Part II: Citation theories

Henry Small
Referencing as Cooperation or Competition
1 The Citation Process Revisited
Blaise Cronin’s book The Citation Process (1984) gave the information science and
bibliometrics communities their firstmajor statement on citation theory. It framed
the theoretical discussion around the two principal approaches to science studies
at the time, theMertoniannormative viewand the post-modernist social construc-
tivist view. The book saw the conflict in sharp terms: between thosewho espouse a
positivist, normative, and aggregationist view of citation, and those who see it as
subtle, individualistic, and a product of research-in-practice, where norms carry
little or no weight.
Rereading The Citation Process after a hiatus of 30 years recalled feelings of
both excitement and depression. I was energized by these tentative theoretical
steps, but disheartened by his suggestion that we should follow the lead of the
social constructivist. As someone trained in science and the history of science,
the constructivist view did not ring true. Perhaps I was stuck in my story-book
version of science. In any event, the bibliometrics community ignored the new
sociology and remained largely empirical and atheoretical.
In a later paper, Cronin (1998) revisited the problem of citation theory in a
way more congenial to me, proposing a middle ground between the normative
and constructivist approaches, and then later even seemed to return to a more
normative position in the context of semiotic theory (2000).
This long interlude of three decades sawmany shifts in the positions of major
players in the contending camps, among these, the split between the bibliometri-
cians and constructivists with the formation of ISSI in 1993 and the burgeoning
of the 4S society. My purpose in revisiting this debate is to better understand the
fundamental issues it raised regarding the nature of science, the shortcomings
of both constructivist and normative theories, and to suggest some possible ways
forward based on recent theories in evolutionary biology which give a rationale
for cooperative behavior.
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2 Social Construction and Its Problems
One of the fundamental tenants of social construction is that science does not
have direct access to the “reality” of the external world. Rather, that access is so
thoroughly mediated by devices, presuppositions, and social constraints that our
knowledge is not about the external world at all. Furthermore, what knowledge
we do have is relative to the framework and circumstance in which it is created,
and no one framework is more valid or closer to reality than any other. In Latour
andWoolgar’s (1979) view, scientists in the lab are engaged inprocesses of inscrip-
tions that lead to the creation of a “mythology.” Inscription devices in the lab act
as black boxes allowing social interactions to dictate their output: “There thus
occurs a transformation of the simple end product of inscription into the terms
of the mythology which informs participants’ activities” (Latour & Woolgar, 1979,
p. 63).
From the “strong program” of the Edinburgh school, we have the view that
scientific knowledge is no different from any other belief system, including those
of primitive cultures, and the notion that “belief systems cannot be objectively
ranked in terms of their proximity to reality or their rationality” (Barnes, 1974,
p. 154). Knorr-Cetina, in The Manufacture of Knowledge asks (1981, p. 2), asks:
“Why should our interest-geared, instrumentally-generated world order mirror
some inherent structure in nature?” She claims that the lab is an artificial and
constructed environment, and this social environment and its instrumentsmanu-
facture what we call science, which bears no necessary relationship to the world.
According to Latour andWoolgar, the ultimate aimof the lab is the production
of papers. In writing papers the task is to persuade fellow scientists and the out-
side world that themythology they have created in the lab is valid. It is impossible
for facts and theories to be convincing on their own because, as myth, they can
only be made convincing by rhetorical means.
Knorr-Cetina sees the scientific paper as yet a further construction with its
own unique arguments and end products which bear little or no resemblance to
what went on in the lab. In fact: “Compared with the work observed in the lab-
oratory, the written paper is… a first complete perversion” (Knorr-Cetina, 1981,
p. 132). One reason for this is that the paper does not reveal the more or less irra-
tional andhaphazardpath thatwent on in the lab. Thepaper constructs a different
“logic” and sequence of events for the benefit of various audiences. Knorr-Cetina’s
view is echoed by the rhetorician Ken Hyland who states: “Texts… can never be
regarded as accurate representations of what the world is like…Reality is con-
structed through processes that are essentially social and involve crafting texts in
ways which will be persuasive to readers” (2009, p. 12).
Referencing as Cooperation or Competition | 51
The message is that we need to analyze the various rhetorical devices that
scientists use to convince (i.e., mislead) readers into thinking that the writer is
describing the physical world. As Swales puts it: “The art of the matter, as far as
the creation of facts is concerned, lies in deceiving the reader into thinking that
there is no rhetoric… that the facts are indeed speaking for themselves” (1990,
p. 112).
To show how “facts” are created in the lab, Latour introduces the idea that
there is a gradation in the so-called “facticity” of knowledge-claims. This is em-
bedded in statements scientistsmake about these claims and ismarked by the use
of “modalities”which, to varying degrees, cast doubt on or boost the credibility of
given assertions. Modalities are expressed by words or phrases such as “prema-
ture,” “suggested,” “reported,” “first described,” “assumed,” “confirmed,” etc.
The goal of the lab is to move statements from low to high facticity by rhetori-
cal persuasion such that all modalities disappear from the language. “Facticity”
does notmean that some fact about the real world has been established, only that
actors view it as such.
Latour introduces a theory of citation in Science in Action. In the citation con-
text, the text surrounding the reference,modalitywords andphrases are deployed
either to strengthen those who support the author or weaken the opposition. Ref-
erences are massed as opposing armies on a battlefield. In citation warfare all
distortions of the meaning of the prior text is fair game: “…do whatever you need
to the former literature to render it as helpful as possible…” (1987, p. 37) and “…all
deformations are fair” (1987, p. 40). Referencing becomes part of the process of
persuasion in which one mythical version of the world is promoted over another.
Constructivist theory is now under attack from within, in part, because it has
been hijacked by reactionary groups that invent their own versions of science (La-
tour 2004; Collins, 2014). Nevertheless, it is useful to review someof the objections
that have a bearing on a theory of citation.
One problem is that fraud or error in science would be indistinguishable from
any other type of science. If facts are socially constructed, then error and fraud
are as well. Failure to replicate or corroborate an author’s result would carry no
weight because these activities are not anchored in the real world. Replication or
reproducibility is, however, the basis for the detection of fraud or error in science
and is fundamental to the normative operation of science (Zuckerman, 1977; Hull,
1988, p. 435).
For constructivists there is nowayof evaluatingor comparing the relativemer-
its of one group’s scientific views over another group’s because neither is based on
reality. Each group can provide persuasive arguments for the validity of its beliefs.
Kuhn (1962), however, rejected this extreme relativism and conjectured that there
could be progress through scientific revolutions. Because of the increasing growth
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and specialization of science through a revolution “…both the list of problems
solved by science and the precision of individual problem-solutionswill grow and
grow” (p. 169).
Constructivists rely on rhetorical persuasion (Gilbert, 1977) to convert non-
believers to believers presumably because the evidence is not sufficiently com-
pelling on its own. Rhetorical devices include hedging and purging personal mo-
tives (Swales, 1990, p. 112). However, if rhetorical persuasion is all that it takes
to win converts, it is unlikely that Einstein’s theory of relativity or Heisenberg’s
matrix mechanics would have gained many converts. Persuasion can also come
about by presenting a coherent framework of theory and observations. In some
cases, a new finding is compelling enough to bring about the emergence of a new
research area (Small, Boyack, & Klavans, 2014). This is because rhetoric is weak
compared to the perception of a new ordering of facts and theory (Cole, 1992,
p. 47).
It could also be argued that the rigid form of the modern scientific paper
(Swales, 1990, p. 134) militates against persuasive presentation. The conventional
IMRD format (introduction,methods, results, discussion) forces papers to present
their findings in a uniform manner which may facilitate their browsing, compar-
ison, and registration in databases, but does not facilitate discursive argument
(Zuckerman, 1977, p. 125). Unlike the earliest scientific reports published in jour-
nals such as the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, the modern
scientific paper is not designed to be a first-hand account of an author’s obser-
vations in the lab and does not allow the “virtual witnessing” that Robert Boyle
practiced (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, p. 55).
Regarding Latour’s views on referencing as a strengthening of allies and a
weakening of enemies, there is little evidence that such a nuanced deploying of
individual references hasmuch effect on apaper’s impact.Muchmore depends on
the actual findings reported in the paper, on the data or theory it presents.Watson
and Crick’s 1953 paper on the structure of DNA had only six references, Darwin’s
Origin of Species relatively few, while Einstein’s 1905 paper on special relativity
contained no references at all. A careful deploying of modalized references is not
enough to make a trivial paper convincing.
3 The Realist Alternative
The idealist position espousedby the constructivists canbe contrastedwith the re-
alist position thatwe are observers of aworldwhichwehave access to through our
senses (Leplin, 1984).We extend the power of our senses by inventing instruments
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and analytical methods that magnify or probe our environment. The instruments
are not the black boxes of the constructivists because they obey the same physical
laws as the thing being observed. To understand the world, we make systematic
observations, and invent hypotheses and theories to explain our observations.
When our observations and theories agree, we claim to have discovered some-
thing about the world, but discoveries are always tentative and subject to revision
by more accurate observations or different theories that have better agreement
with the observations. We can think of this tentativeness of knowledge as a norm
which resulted from the numerous theories in historywhich turned out to be false.
Despite this rosy picture, the signals from nature are not always clear. They
can be noisy, contaminated, ambiguous, and affected by our prejudices, precon-
ceptions, biases, and expectations. When an experiment is successful, it is not
always apparent that it is until it can be replicated or corroborated by other ex-
periments or with theory. Scientists can disagree about the meaning and inter-
pretation of these signals. The realist response is to call for more research, and
scientists are always thinking about their next experiment.
Most scientists committed to a theory are aware of the possibility that new
evidence might prove them wrong. But the amount of effort required to develop
and test a theory requires a level of commitment that makes it difficult to keep an
open mind to alternative theories (Mitroff, 1974). However, what scientists work
toward is a plausible basis for further research, and this may involve abandoning
one hypothesis in favor a more plausible one. Latour’s levels of facticity are also
relevant in a realist approach as ameans of sorting the plausible from the implau-
sible. Thus, an important question is what makes some theories more plausible
than others?
The colloquialism “the facts speak for themselves” expresses the common
sense notion that the plausibility of hypotheses depends on their degree of fitwith
the existing body of facts and theories, like the fitting together of pieces of a puz-
zle. For example, quantummechanics fits with the ionization potentials of simple
atoms. The double helixmodel of DNA fits with the concept of genetic replication.
Human-caused global warming is consistent with an increase in the burning of
fossil fuels and more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Eachof these examples of consistent theory andobservation canbe expanded
into networks comprised of many elements that fit together in a larger puzzle. For
example, the quantum mechanical theory of the atom is also consistent with the
electromagnetic spectrum of the atom and the quantum nature of light. Anthro-
pogenic global warming is consistent not only with rising carbon dioxide levels in
the atmosphere, but also with the decrease in energy being re-radiated back into
space, and the wavelength of the main component of re-radiated energy is con-
sistent with the energy spectrum of carbon dioxide. A similar point was made by
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Gingras and Schweber in their critique of a social constructivist account of quarks
(1986, p. 379). In theory choice, scientists consider a network ofmultiple facts and
predictions, not single facts in isolation.
The general approach to fitting facts and theories together is called con-
silience and derives from the work of the 19th century philosopher and historian
William Whewell (1847) recently made popular by E. O. Wilson (1998). Whewell
wrote: “The consilience of induction takes place when an induction, obtained
from one class of facts, coincides with an induction obtained from another
different class” (1847, p. 469). A related network approach called “explanatory
coherence” has been proposed by Paul Thagard (1992; 2007). In this approach
various types of coherence relations are treated as constraints and the network
having the highest constraint satisfaction is considered the most likely to be
true, or at least, the best one given the currently available facts and theories.
Explanatory coherence provides an approximate guide to theory choice and a
way of understanding the history of science.
In writing scientific papers, authors are also engaged in fitting together the
pieces of a large puzzle that represents the problem space of their research area.
Some of this fitting together (but not all) is evident in the references authors cite
which associate facts, theories, or methods with prior papers. In fact, Thagard
applies his explanatory coherence to the process by which scientists arrive at a
consensus which, he notes, requires communication among researchers (2000,
p. 223).
Referencing is a passive form of communication between the cited and citing
authors so we can use this to illustrate consilience. Citation contexts, that is, the
portions of text where the papers are referenced, can reveal how authors see the
prior literature. For example, a citationmight represent the linking of a cause and
effect, where the effect is an observation and the cause is a deduction from theory
(Hanson, 1972).
To illustrate how a scientific paper builds a network of coherent facts and the-
ories through its references, we use a paper that was part of a co-citation cluster
from 2007 on the water pollution by estrogens (Small & Klavans, 2011). Focus-
ing on a single randomly selected citing paper (Thorpe, Benstead, Hutchinson, &
Tyler, 2007) from this cluster, all the contexts were extracted in which references
were made (see Table 1).
The 23 contexts are arranged sequentially by the section of the paper. Con-
tent words have been removed, leaving the non-technical or general words. This
allows us to see more clearly the function of the reference in the authors’ presen-
tation. The cited references within each context are denoted by integers in square
brackets. Somecontexts referencemultiple items, so-called redundant references,
and some items are cited repeatedly throughout the paper, the op. cit. references.
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Tab. 1: Reference structure of a scientific paper: citation contexts stripped of content words.
Introduction
1. It is now well-established that … may impair … with potential detrimental consequences
[5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14]
2. … implicated as causative [3] … were not previously subject to routine monitoring due
to …
3. In this regard … has been widely employed … that induce … response [23]
4. … that is produced … in response to … [29, 17, 27]
5. … but exposure to … has been shown to result in … [23, 29]
6. There is some evidence that … production … as a consequence of … [6, 11, 21, 31, 4, 22,
10] but the implications of … are less clear.
7. Even less is known on the consequences of … although an association between … has
been reported [11] …
8. … provide the majority … [30] and therefore … could potentially impact on …
9. … but is of considerable … relevance and was therefore used in … to expand on the ear-
lier work of [11] who investigated for association between …
Materials and Methods
10. … basic design … same … replicate treatment in experiment … [26 self]
11. … samples were assayed … using [28]
Results and discussion
12. … is consistent with reports from earlier investigations using … [24 self, 19] and indi-
cates that … significantly exceeds …
13. This supports the results of an earlier investigation reporting … [20]
14. … it has been hypothesized that … is thought to result in … [6, 21]
15. Indeed, a number of investigators have reported … effects … which are hypothesised to
result from … [11, 1, 12, 22, 10]
16. The effect … [25 self] shows …
17. This compares with previous observations where … were linked with … effects … but not
in … [11, 1, 12, 22,10]
18. It has previously been demonstrated that … are associated with … results in … leading
to … [4].
19. The observed … here is consistent with a previous investigation [2] …
20. This may reflect alterations … due to … and supports the earlier work of [2] who
showed … through … examination of …
Conclusions
21. The collective results from these investigations support an earlier investigation [11] in
demonstrating that … signals … adverse … impact …
22. The poor ability … however could lead to … that have adverse health effects during … as
can occur … and should be considered further [16, 18]
23. This further supports the work of [11, 15] in demonstrating that … could potentially be
used to signal for adverse … health effects.
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For example, the first context in the Introduction refers to “well established” facts
that potentially lead to detrimental consequences. In otherwords, the established
facts form a coherent picture and together with theory predict certain undesirable
effects. In the ninth context earlier workwas expanded on because an association
was found. Associations suggest possible causes. The contexts in the introductory
section emphasize causation using words such as “causative”, “induce”, “in re-
sponse to”, “result in”, etc. Words like “may”, “could”, and “potentially” act as
hypothetical connections that require further investigation.
Contexts in the Results and Discussion section focus mainly on documenting
the consistency of the paper’s results with empirical findings and hypotheses of
earlier papers. Words such as “consistent”, “supports”, and “compares” build a
web of relationships between the authors’ current results and the previous liter-
ature. These relationships differ from the cause-effect relationships of the Intro-
duction in that they are mainly about similarities and parallels between results
by different investigators.
Insteadof focusing onall contexts froma single paper,we canalso look across
all contexts at a particular cited reference. In the selected paper, reference #11
had the highest op. cit. rate, suggesting that it was of particular importance to the
authors. There were a total of 16 contexts for reference #11 across the 868 con-
texts from all papers in the sample. We then selected the most characteristic of
these contexts by computing the cosine vector similarity of each of the 16 contexts
against a composite of all 16. The context with the highest cosine vector (0.61) was
the seventh context in Table 1, and is thus the most representative of the 16:
Even less is known on the consequences of disruptions in VTG dynamics in females and
although an association between VTG induction and reduced egg production has been re-
ported [11], the effects on egg production were only observed at concentrations that were
toxic to males.
(Thorpe et al., 2007, p. 177)
Thus, this most typical context reports an association, or consilience, between
three observations: VTG induction, egg production, and toxicity to males. These
examples show that references serve to link observations with theory and effects
with varying degrees of certainty.
4 The Problem of Norms in Science
What is missing in the previous discussion of the coherence model of plausibility
is what establishes the acceptable forms of coherence between the pieces of the
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puzzle. A few of these noted already are the degree of fit between theory and ex-
periment, the accuracy of theoretical predictions, and the qualitative agreement
of a model and the evidence. Thagard mentions explanation, deduction, and as-
sociation (2000, p. 17). But where do these criteria come from?
One answer is that these are technical or epistemic norms analogous to the
norms that govern the social conduct of scientists proposed by Robert Merton,
such as, universalism, communality, disinterestedness, skepticism, and origi-
nality. Merton considered social norms necessary for the “extension of certified
knowledge” (1973 p. 270). Among the technical methods that allowed the creation
of certified knowledge were empirical confirmation and logical consistency. The
social norms supported the goal of certified knowledge.
Merton, however, does not spell out the “technicalmethods” that should gov-
ern scientific practice, or where they came from. These are discussed in greater
detail in a long article by Zuckerman (1977). She called them “cognitive norms
and methodological canons” (1977, p. 87), and related them to the philosophical
concept of demarcation, that is, the rules that define what it is to be scientific.
The problemwith both technical and social norms is that they appear to come
out of nowhere, although Merton’s early writings (1938) suggest a possible link to
the Puritan values held by many members of the Royal Society in the 17th cen-
tury. Zuckerman hints at the possible dynamic nature of norms when she dis-
cusses how the norm of disinterestedness, which encourages unrestrained pure
research, comes into conflict with the social hazards of certain scientific findings
(1977, p. 122). This suggests that under some circumstances restraints on pure re-
search may be necessary. Thus, a dynamic and evolutionary theory of social and
cognitive norms seems to be called for.
Mulkay rejects the idea that norms affect or control behavior. He sees moral
precepts as embodied in Mertonian norms as flexible vocabularies that are in-
voked rhetorically to rationalize scientists’ interests (Mulkay, 1991, p. 69). Yet, just
paying lip service to norms does not seem adequate to explain why so many sci-
entists adhere to formal conventions and rules in their work, and how these con-
ventions and rules arose and become sustained.
Technical norms could be collectively considered part of the “scientific
method” (Gower, 1997) for a given historical period. Francis Bacon provided
many examples of technical prescriptions for science including the method of
induction, the gathering of systematic observations, and the conducting of ex-
periments. Philosophers of science have proposed criteria on which to judge the
adequacy of theories called criteria for theory choice. Kuhn provided a short
list of what he considered key criteria or “values”: the accuracy of theoretical
predictions, the consistency of the theory with other accepted knowledge, the
ability of the theory to expand its scope to predict other phenomena, the need for
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a theory to be simple or parsimonious, and fruitful in generating new problems
and solutions (1977, p. 322). Rather than seeing these as givens, however, it should
be possible to trace their origins in history.
Technical norms clearly change over time and are subject to selection and
extinction: what is acceptable or required in today’s science is not what was ac-
ceptable or required in earlier historical periods. But norms probably change in a
reactive rather than a proactive manner. As Hull puts it, “The nature of science is
constantly under negotiation, and the currency of these negotiations is success”
(1988, p. 297). The availability of a successful or highly visible social or technical
practice might first become fashionable then later on required. That “accounts”
should “save appearances” is one of the oldest technical normsperhaps having its
origin in ancient Egyptian andMesopotamian creationmyths (Frankfort & Frank-
fort, 1949, p. 11).
Examples of technical norms that have gone extinct are the requirement that
theories be consistent with the writings of the ancients, or with the teaching of
the Church. A norm that emerged in the scientific revolution was that predictive
theories should be mathematical in form. This norm was spurred by the success
of Newton in predicting the motions of celestial bodies (and perhaps earlier ac-
cording to Crombie [1959]). Likewise, Lavoisier’s theory of combustion resulted
in adoption of quantitative criteria in the explanation of chemical change (Kuhn,
1977, p. 336).
A technical norm of more recent origin is the notion of symmetry which was
introduced in particle physics and relativity theory. Medicine has introduced its
own norms such as double-blind clinical trials and evidence based medicine. Be-
sides being induced by scientific discoveries or successes, it is likely that norms
migrate from one branch of science to another. An example is the diffusion of
statisticalmethods to various disciplines. Practical innovations can also be exem-
plars for new epistemic norms. For example, as new and more accurate scientific
instruments are introduced, the standards of measurement increase and higher
precision becomes required.
A potential difficulty in theory selection arises when a new discovery stimu-
lates the adoption of a new norm which is then used to rationalize the discovery
(Kuhn, 1977). It is not clear how often this situation arises, but it may account
for the delays in acceptance of some theories, such as relativity or string theory
where radical new ways to understand the world are proposed which are not eas-
ily testable.However, if the theoryhasmultiple confirmatory paths, someofwhich
rely on traditional criteria, this circularity is less problematic.
Mulkay argues that scientists often justify their behavior using awide range of
rules—some of which are contradictory—and their behavior can contradict their
own stated rules (1980; 1991). He also notes, referencing Kuhn (1977), that when
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technical norms are applied to theory selection, different scientists can arrive at
different choices. It is not difficult to envision situations where norms come into
conflict, for example, when an author attempts to publish a paper that violates
technical norms. Merton (1963) recognized that conflicting norms create ambiva-
lence towards them, for example when originality conflicts with humility. The
complex and contradictory nature of norms does not, however, invalidate their
importance.
The social norms discussed by Merton under broad categories probably also
evolved from exemplars of good practice or as reactions to new social realities. For
example, the norm of universalism may be related to the rise of distinctive styles
of national science in Europe (Ben-David, 1984), and the need to assert that scien-
tific findings are valid across national boundaries. The invention of the scientific
journal in the 1600s may have crystallized the norm of communality as well as
numerous publishing conventions as the medium evolved.
Norms also carry different weights and are associated with varying degrees
of sanctions, and the importance of a norm and the sanction that accompanies
its violation would likely change over time. For example, the norm of openness is
probably more important today than it was the in 17th century when many scien-
tists kept their discoveries secret for fear of not receiving proper credit.
The norm of honesty, which falls under Merton’s category of disinterested-
ness, however, carries amore severe sanction. Fraud, if proved, can jeopardize the
scientist’s career.Without adherence to the normof honesty the scientific commu-
nitywouldprobably cease to function. Scientists couldno longer trust oneanother
and would lose the support of the larger society (Zuckerman, 1977). The norm of
honesty in reporting scientific results may derive, in part, from the impracticality
of eye witnessing experiments (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985) and was a necessity if
scientists were to work independently.
5 Norms and the Scientific Paper
Central to the integrity of science is the connection between what is done in the
lab and thefinalwritten scientificpaper. Knorr-Cetinahas shown that the relation-
ship between what happens in the lab and the final report for publication is com-
plex (1981, p. 94). Results are selected, not reported as they actually happened,
and the argumentmay be reframed for various audiences. However, through these
transformations the author must take care not to misrepresent his or her results.
In some labs this norm is enforced by requiring themaintenance of lab notebooks
and diaries which can be reviewed in cases of suspected misconduct (Gaulton,
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2004). What is missing from Knorr-Cetina’s account is the powerful effect exerted
on the authors by both social and technical norms. The social norm of honesty is
the most important, but many other norms and conventions govern the form and
content of the paper, its style, sections, and references. Failure to follow generally
accepted technical norms and conventions may jeopardize publication.
We could speculate about what the scientific “paper” would look like if we
stripped away the norms and editorial conventions. Loss of a standardized format
or organization would make science appear more “literary” or perhaps autobio-
graphical. The personalization of the paper would probably result in fewer col-
laborators and co-authors. The paper would likely not start with a review of the
state of knowledge with references to prior literature. The most dramatic effect
would be loss of trust. Authors would have no need to tell the truth, and would
not beheld accountable. Readerswouldno longer have confidence that the author
actually observed what was observed or did what was said was done.
In 1988, Merton explicitly discussed referencing as a normative constraint in
science as part of the “composite cognitive and moral framework” (p. 622) which
had historically evolved. He pointed to its main function as a “moral obligation to
acknowledge one’s sources” and explained its origin as a response to the social
problem of plagiary in the 17th century. In 1965, Kaplan noted that there were few
if any normative guides for citation practices in the available style handbooks.
Nowadays we find many such guides and prescriptive texts (e.g., see Kamat &
Schatz, 2014).
So how do we know that a norm of citation is operating and has an effect on
behavior? Referee reports and letters to the editor are filled with complaints that
author X has failed to cite author Y (RetractionWatch, 2014; Hagstrom, 1974). One
kind of evidence is psychological discomfort: an author’s real or imagined em-
barrassment on failing to cite an obvious precursor (Wilson & O’Gorman, 2003).
Perhaps worse than the guilt the author may feel is concern that the omission will
be found out by colleagues. And there is always the nagging feeling that some-
where in the literature another author has made the same point and the feeling of
relief when a literature search fails to find anything of relevance. Sanctions can
be psychological as well as social.
As Merton suggests, the social norm of referencing perhaps beganwith schol-
ars wanting to lay claim to their ideas and avoid priority disputes. At first, the
only option was to keep their ideas secret, deposit sealed notes or anagrams, and
refrain from publication as Newton and others did. With the advent of the scien-
tific journal, scientists were able to disseminate and date their ideas. Thus, the
journal acted as a registry of their contributions. The author could then point to
this registry if a question of priority arose and this function gradually evolved into
the formal bibliographic reference. Thus, wewould expect that the early referenc-
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ing would be skewed toward self-citations, and that self-citations would be more
complete in terms of specifying the cited item than citations to others, and there
is some evidence that this is the case (Small, 2010).
The reference format has evolved over time as shown by studies of journals
such as the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of Londonwhich began
publication in 1665 (Allen, Qin & Lancaster, 1994). Early references were usually
embedded in the text, and often consisted only of an author name (italicized or
bolded), and, occasionally, a source. Later, references becamemore complete, giv-
ing pages, years, etc., andmoved fromembedded text to side notes, footnotes, and
finally endnotes.
Normative expectations probably evolved along with these changes in print-
ing and format. In addition to allowing the ownership of ideas and discouraging
plagiarism, referencing became a tool to carve out a niche for your idea by demon-
strating that it was different from those of other authors (Gilbert, 1977)—effectively
an extension of knowledge claiming.
Another evolutionary thread developed around summarizing the current
state of knowledge on a topic, what we would call a review of the literature.
The tradition of reviewing prior opinions on a topic goes back to the writings of
Aristotle (Small, 2010), and many examples of such proto-reviews can be found
in the Philosophical Transactions. The review, while not a novel knowledge claim,
can be a new synthesis and useful to others.
In referencing others either for differentiation or for review, we can speculate
that the norm of generosity of referencing came into being. What was originally a
defensive practice could also be used in a generous way to credit other authors for
their ideas. From this point the practice evolved from being customary, to one that
is expected and eventually required. Readers would then expect certain authors
to be credited if a topic was reviewed or a related knowledge claim was made.
Authorswho failed to referencewould be suspected of intellectual theft or, at best,
ignorance, and referencing others became a norm of scholarly practice.
In contrast to this normative account, in the constructivist approach, refer-
ences are only made for persuasive reasons motivated by self-interest. In this
world authors would be less likely to cite prior work closely related to their own
claim since it might jeopardize their own priority. Authors would bemore likely to
distort or misrepresent prior work to support their own point of view (Nicolaisen,
2007). Authors would be less likely to cite items that serve only to provide the
reader with background information, and they would be more likely to self-cite.
In addition, as White has argued (2004), constructivist authors would tend to
cite leading figures in order to convince readers, but this was not empirically
supported.
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In constructivist citation contexts we would expect to frequently encounter
modality terms that weaken or cast doubt on the cited work. However, studies
of citation contexts have found the rate of negative citations to be relatively low,
about 6%over seven separate studies (Small, 1982). In addition, in a randomsam-
ple of 265 citation contexts containing the word “not”, it was found that in about
85% of cases the citing authors were supporting a negative finding of an earlier
author, and were not themselves directly negating a cited work, in effect a nega-
tion by indirection.
Aswehave seen, Latour’s theory calls for a no-holds-barred approach to refer-
encing. However, in a norm-governed publicationworld, misquoting or distorting
a prior author’s work would not be regarded with equanimity. These instances
could be classified as “constructivist” (Small, 2004) and are relatively rare. Most
references are normative in the sense of adhering to some literal message in the
cited text. This is supported by theword similarity of citing and cited texts (Peters,
Braam & van Raan, 1995).
This does not mean that a range of interpretations of the cited work is not
possible. In fact, capsulizing, summarizing, and pigeonholing a prior text is part
of the compacting of knowledge, the process of creating symbols for ideas (Small,
1978), anda step towardMerton’s obliterationby incorporation (1968, p. 35). There
is, in addition, a gray area between distortion and legitimate interpretation. This
provides some room for reconciliation between normative and constructivist po-
sitions (Luukkonen, 1997) because differences of interpretation and debate are
expected in cases where the signals from nature are ambiguous, or there is ambi-
guity in the cited text. Cozzens shows that interpretations of specific papers can
differ within a field of science (1982). Cole (1992) also sees the lack of consensus
at the research front as an area of potential agreement between realists and con-
structivists. Riviera (2013) uses normative theory to describe the phenomenon of
high citation rate and constructivist theory to explain low rates. However, inter-
pretations can also converge—as seen in the emergence of regularized language
in citation contexts of highly cited papers indicating the formation of a consensus
(Small, 1978). In such cases, the significance of the paper for a majority of citing
authors is shared.
In the previous discussion we have shifted the focus from the citing side to
the cited side and the formation of consensus. Here a reconciliation of normative
and constructivist theories is less likely. For example, Mulkay (1980) argues that
scientists do not apply technical norms in a consistent way, and the meaning of
rules varies depending on the situation and who is applying them. In this view
it is difficult to see how a consensus could emerge, and yet, citation studies have
shown that consensus formation can be rapid and dramatic (Cole, 1982, p. 48).
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Aciting theorydealswith individual decisions onwhat to cite and cited theory
with aggregate citation phenomena and the perspective of a community. Since
the sum of all the citing acts results in what we see on the cited side, it might
appear that a theory of citing is allweneed. The resulting distributions of citations
are typical of cumulative advantage processes, or, to use current nomenclature,
preferential attachment networks, where the number of future cites depends on
the number already accumulated (Newman, 2010). To get such distributions there
must be some kind of coordination of action among citing authors, an awareness
of the references of other authors or a shared reaction to the cited work. Seeing
that an author has referenced a particular paper may motivate other authors to
read and cite the paper, but there also needs to be recognition of the paper’s value
or relevance (White, 2011). Of course, many social and intellectual factors could
contribute to citation inequality. Following Thagard’s (2007) theory, value may
derive from better alignment of theory and observation or, following sociological
theory, a higher degree of utility (Cole, 1982, p. 47; Hull, 1988, p. 301).
6 Generosity in Referencing
We tend to think of science as a competitive activity with scientists striving for
priority, recognition, and funding (Hagstrom, 1974). But scientists also act gener-
ously and cooperatively by sharingwork and collaborating. TheMertoniannorms,
of course, embody generosity in the norm of “communalism.” In constructivism,
by contrast, scientists are driven by self-interest. Mertonian referencing is gener-
ous in giving credit to others, but could such behavior also be motivated by self-
interest? In biology, RichardDawkins (2006) is known for his rejection of altruistic
behavior, favoring selfish behavior at the level of the gene. However, others have
argued that altruistic behavior—benefiting others at a personal cost—is reason-
able both biologically and psychologically (Sober & Wilson, 1998). Evolutionary
biologists and philosophers have long struggled with how cooperative behavior
could have existed at all in the face of fierce evolutionary competition. Yet both
cooperation and competition seem ubiquitous in human and animal societies.
E. O. Wilson recently described the inherent conflict between wanting to behave
competitively and cooperatively which has been hardwired in our genes by evo-
lutionary forces (2014, p. 24).
The decision to cite or not to cite a finding similar to our own is a difficult
one for authors who want to claim as much credit as possible. In some instances
authors may not go out of their way to find others who have expressed similar
ideas.Whenwe reference others, we are giving up credit to others that could have,
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hypothetically at least, come to us (Small, 2004; Hull, 1988, p. 319). This is espe-
cially true when the cited work is intellectually close to our own. At first glance,
this seems to be an act of generosity, a sacrificing of a portion of our originality to
others. On the other hand, we are motivated to cite others whose work is similar
to ours in order to demonstrate that our contribution is distinctive, and to avoid
negative sanctions for failing to cite related work. Thus, whether referencing is a
selfish or generous act is ambiguous. Sober and Wilson point out the hypothesis
of generosity is difficult to prove because, regardless of the apparent selfless act,
we can always think of some way the actor could have benefited.
Nicolaisen (2007) makes a related point inspired by a theory from evolution-
ary biology called the “handicap principle” or “costly signaling” (Zahavi, 1975).
In nature, animals engage in behaviors such as ostentatious displays, bluffs, and
mock threats which serve to enhance the fitness of the performer and protect the
herd from predators. Hence, costly signaling is behavior that risks our own well-
being for the apparent benefit of others and might be interpreted as generous or
altruistic. Nicolaisen sees referencing as costly signalingbecause the author is tak-
ing a risk and going out on a limb which could easily be cut off if a diligent reader
discovers that the reference is irrelevant or fallacious. Here he sees a connection
to Latour’s theory of citation which is based on self-interested manipulation of
the prior literature. Hence, referencing is a handicap and a gamble in the interest
of gaining advantage. Thus, although referencing may appear to benefit others,
it is actually done out of self-interest, to advance our own interests. The handi-
cap principle does not accord well with normative theory because the behavior is
based on trickery and deception.
The handicap principle is one of a number of theories now current in evolu-
tionary biology which may serve to stimulate further theorizing on citations and
other issues in science studies. Two of the most relevant theories are “reciprocal
altruism” and “strong reciprocity”. “Reciprocal altruism” is the tendency to help
those who are likely to return a favor (Arrow, 2007). But this form of altruism still
has a selfish motivation. Reciprocal altruism would work for referencing only if
the cited author is likely or capable of returning the citation. If the cited author is
incapable of reciprocating, as is often the case, this mechanism fails.
In another approach called “strong reciprocity” (Fehr, Fischbacker, & Gach-
ter, 2002) cooperators are rewarded and non-cooperators are punished but at a
cost to those who punish (the strong reciprocators). Under certain conditions this
model has been shown to lead to sustained cooperation in social groups. Unlike
reciprocal altruism or costly signaling, strong reciprocity is consistent with the
existence of norms which define what it means to cooperate, but it requires that
someone is willing to sanction the norm violators.
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One version of this model begins with a population of three types of agents:
cooperators who obey the norms but do not punish, selfish agents who violate
the norms, and strong reciprocators who obey the norms and punish violators
(Bowles & Gintis, 2003). In referencing, we can imagine that the selfish agents do
not cite others, the cooperators cite others, and the strong reciprocators cite others
and “punish” the non-referencing violators. Of course interactions of these agents
would run over years, not generations, as in evolutionary models.
Cozzens (1989) has studied the degree to which scientists involved in a prior-
ity dispute over the discovery of the opiate receptor behaved generously in their
referencing. She looked at each of the main co-discoverers and how they credited
the other co-discoverers. Over time there was a tendency for some co-discoverers
to be more generous in their referencing, and less inclined to claim the credit ex-
clusively for themselves. Also, the trend over time is toward a more standardized
and less specific or qualified citation of the competitor’s work as evidenced in ci-
tation contexts. The initial divergence of views at the time of discovery is followed
by a convergence over the next few years as distinctions and qualifications are
dropped, suggesting greater generosity over time. In addition, one co-discoverer
played the role of enforcer by complaining to the others about the excessive pri-
ority claiming of one of the co-discoverers.
Anotherwell known “multiple” is the discovery of oxygen involving Lavoisier,
Priestley, and Scheele. Lavoisier had received information from the others that
he was able to put to good use in making his discovery. However, initially he
claimed credit for himself and failed to acknowledge the contributions of the oth-
ers. Priestley, however, played the role of strong reciprocator and wrote a letter to
Lavoisier complaining about his failure to credit others. Subsequently Lavoisier
did acknowledge his fellow co-discoverers but not without pointing out how their
discoveries differed from his (Small, 2010).
Einstein’s special relativity paper, althoughnot amultiple discovery, is also an
example of delayed generosity. His celebrated 1905 paper contains no references
to other papers. Notable for its absence was the work of Michelson and Morley on
the constancy of the speed of light relative to the ether. However, two years later
Einstein wrote a longer article on relativity which contained a number of refer-
ences among them the Michelson-Morley paper (Small, 2010). Many years later,
Einstein claimed that he had been unaware of the earlier work and would have
cited it had he known about it (Holton, 1973, p. 282). It is not known if pressure
was brought to bear on Einstein to acknowledge others.
A possible hypothesis is that over time there is an increase in generosity of
referencing which is marked by a spreading of credit to multiple individuals, a
lessening of the tendency toward the differentiation of the contributions, and an
increasing standardization of language in the citation contexts. This can occur in
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the evolution of a single author’swork, in thework of independent co-discoverers,
or within an invisible college. There is some evidence of strong reciprocators act-
ing to enforce normative compliance.
Other evolutionary models of cooperation use “multilevel” strategies, advo-
cated by Sober and Wilson (1998), where selection occurs at the level of both the
individual and the group. When the focus changes from individual to the group
level success, it turns out that groups with many altruists are favored over groups
with more selfish individuals (Arrow, 2007). Taking this perspective requires that
we can think of science in functional terms at the group level. Because scientists
comprise a relatively distinct social group, it is possible that behaviors could have
evolved that enhanced group success. Historically we know that scientists often
had to defend their views from attack by various outside authorities, whether po-
litical, economic, religious, or scientific. At the same time, scientists depended
on these authorities for their support. Under these external threats it is not unex-
pected to find that cooperative behaviors and norms evolved that increased the
fitness and success of the community. Such cooperative mechanisms could have
included norms of behavior, the punishing of deviant behavior, and the mecha-
nisms for recognition. These mutual support mechanisms would be magnified by
the sub-structure of invisible colleges where individuals come face to face. Evo-
lution at the sub-group level might also give rise to other specialized technical
norms.
The next step might be to apply game theory to the process of writing papers
and making references. For example, Chatterjee and Chowdhury (2012) have ap-
plied game theory to citation networks. Another possibility is tomodel thewriting
process as a game between an author and an imagined reader or critic. Eachmove
in thewriting process could be scored as cooperative or competitive in a balancing
act to maximize the paper’s strengths andminimize its weaknesses. For example,
not citing a precursor or citing an irrelevant paper would be scored as selfish,
while citing a review or rival would be seen as generous and enhance the score.
Obviously the paper’s fitness is not just a matter of what references are cited, but
what connections aremade to experiment and theory, that is, the paper’s explana-
tory coherence, which is aswe have seen partially revealed in its citation contexts.
7 Conclusions
Social construction leads to an anti-realist position on scientific knowledge and
a community of scientists bent on self-interests. In this view, facts and theories
have no basis in reality, and the only means of convincing others of the “truth”
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of a knowledge claim is rhetorical persuasion—even if that involves deception or
fabrication. In constructivism it would be impossible to detect fraud or error in
science or make a rational choice between theories. Deception, fabrication, and
distortion would become institutionalized norms of behavior.
The realist view, on the other hand, affirms that “eternal and immutable reg-
ularities” exist in nature (Hull, 1988, p. 476). Because science relies on the arbiter
of our senses, it does not require rhetorical persuasion or deception. The princi-
ple of consilience, favoring theories that have multiple empirical confirmations,
offers an approximate guide to theory selection and how science evolves. Citation
contexts in papers are shown to be a rich source of connections between theory
and observations, and can be used for the construction of consilience networks.
Both technical and social norms are pervasive in science and are critical in
regulating behavior. But their origin and evolution are little understood. Technical
norms governwhat counts as a consilience and the general procedureswe call the
“scientificmethod”. Changes in technical norms are perhaps spurred on bymajor
scientific successes or technical innovations that employ novel methods. If a new
method becomes popular and incorporated into general practice, it will eventu-
ally be seen as a rule. Social normsmayhave evolved fromgeneral cultural values,
but also from new social realities such as the rise of national styles of science and
the need to insure the integrity of independent researchers.
The invention of the scientific journal gave rise to numerous norms and con-
ventions, perhaps themost important ofwhichwas the communalismof scientific
knowledge. Numerous other norms pertain to the acceptable style and structure
of scientific papers. The norm of referencing may have originated as a means to
claim priority, to show how your work differs from others, and to review what is
known on a topic. Once specific concepts became associated with prior works,
normative expectations were raised that these works would be cited when these
concepts were used.
Competition and cooperation are pervasive in science as they are in all hu-
man endeavor, but cooperation is difficult to account for in an evolutionary view
stressing individual survival. Strong reciprocity, where cooperators are rewarded
and non-cooperators punished, is one viable mechanism for the emergence of co-
operation. Here norms play a critical role in defining what it means to cooperate.
An alternative explanation is multi-level selection, where individual selfishness
is counteracted by society level norms. Here norms act as group level adaptations
to maximize the fitness and success of the group. It seems obvious that science is
a mix of selfish and altruistic individuals, but, perhaps, each individual is also a
mix of these tendencies.
Referencing appears to fit the model of strong reciprocity where generous
citation is rewarded and non-citers are sanctioned. Historical examples of co-
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discoveries offer a preliminary confirmation. Referencing may trend toward a
sharing of credit and symbolic consensus in cases ofmultiple discovery or priority
disputes.
The tools of game theory and computer simulation now being used by evo-
lutionary biologists and economists to study cooperation and competition may
offer a promising new avenue for research into citation practice and social norms
in science. While referencing decisions are undoubtedly situationally complex,
we can expect that both competitive and cooperative motives are at work.
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Paul Wouters
Semiotics and Citations
In his essay “Semiotics and Evaluative Bibliometrics”, Blaise Cronin discusses the
implications of a tight link between research funding and citation analysis. He
calls attention to a marketplace for a new species of sign—the citation (Cronin,
2000)—and suggests that semiotics offers the bibliometric community a suite of
supra-disciplinary tools to “develop greater sensitivity to the variable symbolic
significance of the signs they routinely manipulate and treat as quasi-objective
indicators of quality, impact and esteem” (p. 450). This chapter aims to honor and
further develop this perspective. I explore towhat extent a semiotic approachmay
enable us to better understand the “constitutive effects” of performance indicators
(Dahler-Larsen, 2013) and how this perspective can further contribute to a more
inclusive attitude to the problem of citation theory (Nicolaisen, 2007).
Before recapitulating the key elements of Cronin’s (2000) argument, we need
to clarify what we mean by semiotics. It is usually presented as the science of
signs (Eco, 1976), but can perhaps better be summarized as the systematic schol-
arly analysis of sign systems. Eco’s (1976) definition of a sign is straightforward:
“Everything that, on the grounds of a previously established social convention,
can be taken as something standing for something else” (cf. Walker, 2014, p. 317).
Semiotics has developed two different mainstream approaches, one developed
by the father of structuralist linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure (Day, 2005) (who
used the term ‘semiology’), and the other by the inventor of pragmatist philos-
ophy, Charles Sanders Peirce (James, 1898). Saussure’s thinking is firmly within
the domain of the symbolic and focuses on structural motifs and differential
inter-textual positions. Its analysis is confined to relations among signifiers and
signifieds, and since signifieds are conceptual in nature, they too are part of the
linguistic system. They are meanings, not actual objects of reference (Keane,
2003, p. 412). Peirce is interested in the link between signs and real world objects,
based on his pragmatist philosophy. Consequently, both define the concept of
“sign” rather differently. For de Saussure, the radical separation of the word and
the world is fundamental (Irvine, 1989). Peirce, on the contrary, places as central
the linkages between sign vehicles and real world objects. Given Cronin’s interest
in contributing to citation theory and making the link between citations and
research behavior, it is not surprising that he adopted Peirce’s approach.
For Cronin (2000), the usefulness of semiotics is evident: “What, after all, are
references and citations if not signaling devices?” (Cronin, 2000, p. 440). How-
ever, this obvious fact is “all too easily overlooked”, by which Cronin meant that
he had overlooked it himself in his previous work on the citation process (Cronin,
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1984). Many authors, inside of bibliometrics as well as outside of the field, still
use the terms “reference” and “citation” interchangeably and see the difference
between the two signs as trivial. With his essay, Cronin clarified this nontrivial
distinction and drew the attention of the bibliometric community to the potential
of semiotics to explain the differential roles of the reference, acknowledgement,
in-text citation, and citation asmeasurement instruments, freed from the original
citing context. In summary, the essay sought to demonstrate “how semiotics can
contribute to the ongoing debate on the role and significance of citations in the
primary communication system” (Cronin, 2000, p. 440).
Cronin was not the first to call attention to these important differences in bib-
liometric signs. Derek de Solla Price (1970) first made the distinction between the
words reference and citation. Narin (1976, p. 3) an others (e.g., Nicolaisen & Frand-
sen, 2008; Egghe & Rousseau, 1990) followed suite. Egghe and Rousseau (1990)
summarized the distinction as follows:
If onewishes to be precise, one should distinguish between the notions ‘reference’ and ‘cita-
tion’. If paper R contains a bibliographic note using and describing paper C, then R contains
a reference to C and C has a citation from R (Price, 1970). Stated otherwise, a reference is
the acknowledgement that one document gives to another, while a citation is the acknowl-
edgement that one document receives from another. So, ‘reference’ is a backward-looking
concept while ‘citation’ is a forward-looking one. Although most authors are not so precise
in their usage of both terms, we agree with Price (1970) that using the words ‘citation’ and
‘reference’ interchangeably is a deplorable waste of a good technical term.
(Egghe & Rousseau, 1990, p. 204)
It would be silly to claim that bibliometricians would not be aware of the differ-
ences in characteristics of the distribution of references versus citations. After all,
the study of characteristics of these distributions belongs to the core of the field.
Nevertheless, most scientometricians have tended to use the term ‘citation’ and
‘reference’ interchangeably. Not only is this in accordance with the meaning of
the English word ‘citation’, it also facilitates the explanation of the number of ci-
tations as ameasure of scholarly quality or impact. After all, it seems obvious that
awork towhichmany researchers have referred is ofmore importance than awork
that is hardly cited.
Wouters (1998) was the first to make the difference between the two signs the
central point of departure for the development of citation theory. Building on this,
Wouters (1999) concluded that a theory of referencing behavior should be seen as
fundamentally distinct from a theory of evaluative bibliometrics. This was based
on the statement that there is a fundamental distinction between reference and
citation. By analyzing references and citations as different signs, they were essen-
tially positioned as different objects. Their relation is one of descent: the citation
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emerges in an act of “semiosis” (the creation of a novel sign) from the reference.
This has an important implication: it is no longer the scientist who creates the
citation. Its source lies in the citation index and the producer of that index is the
creator of the sign citation.
Of course, this does not mean that the citation is created out of nothing,
although it must be said that Wouters (1999) did not pay enough attention to
this implication of his proposal. The raw materials of the citation signs are still
the references and the link patterns among the references form constraints on
the possible citation patterns. These constraints are relatively flexible. Herein is
the expertise of the evaluative bibliometrician. Evaluative bibliometrics consists
of the fine-tuned creation of different citation indicators from the pool of links
between references and documents as well as from the links among references.
Field-normalized citation indicators are an example of such fine-tuning. Some
indicators are even combinations of citations and references, for example source-
normalized indicators (Waltman&Eck, 2012) or other improved journal indicators
(Nicolaisen & Frandsen, 2008). The need for technical expertise in evaluative
bibliometrics to create and measure these indicators, whether this expertise is
built into bibliometric algorithms or delivered by scientometricians, is itself an
indication that the relationship between reference and citation is anything but
self-evident or given.
Cronin (2000) developed this semiotic approach in much more detail than
Wouters (1999), extending his earlier analysis of the citation process (Cronin,
1984). Moreover, Cronin (2000, p. 441) already expected forms of altmetrics:
The web is giving rise to new modes of communication, representation, recommendation
and invocation. The ways in which, and reasons why, individual researchers and scholars
arementioned, or linked to on theweb, aremultifaceted. It is conceivable that novel forms of
signalling will evolve, which could also be used as indicators of cognitive or social influence
within specific disciplines or communities of professional practice.
His essay emphasizes the polysemy of signs: “Multiple interpretations of ref-
erences and their extra-textual import are possible” (Cronin, 2000, p. 440). He
looked into the different relationships between the sign vehicles and their con-
text and included acknowledgements into the analysis (which Wouters [1999]
had ignored): “References and acknowledgements, along with citations, are first
cousins in an extended family of scholarly signs” (Cronin, 2000, p. 441) (for more
on the interrelationship of these signs, see Desrochers, Paul-Hus, and Larivière,
this volume). The essay shows how technical semiotic analysis can clarify the dif-
ference between different scholarly signs. For example, the reference embedded
in the text is a different sign from the full bibliographic reference at the end of the
scholarly article.
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1 Sign Triads
The “sign triad” developed by Peirce is central in this mode of analysis (Gluck,
1997): “This triad allows us to examine references and citations in terms of three
common dimensions: (i) the carrier of meaning (sign-vehicle); (ii) the meaning
or concept referred to (interpretant); and (iii) the object pointed to (referent)”
(Cronin, 2000, p. 443).
Sign-Vehicle
Interpretant Referent Fig. 1: Peirce’s sign triad (after Gluck, [17]).
The triad makes visually clear the important differences between the embedded
reference, acknowledgement statement, and individual citation as incorporated
in the citation index and various forms of aggregated citations. The shape of the
triad is identical, but the meaning of the three corners is different in different
signs.
Embedded reference
Situated
meaning
Work/object
invoked Fig. 2: Bibliographic reference sign triad.
In the case of the embedded reference, the sign vehicle is part of the citing text.
Its interpretant is the concept flagged by the reference. This can be located in a
specific part in the cited text (e.g., the methodology part), but it can also be more
diffuse, such as when a complete book is cited. The embedded reference always
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Citation
in citation index
Connectedness
Relatedness
Absent referent
and
Other citing works Fig. 3: Citation sign triad.
has two different referents: the full reference in the bibliography (or footnote) of
the citing text and the cited text.
In the case of the individual citation, the triad is quite different. First of all,
the sign vehicle is no longer to be found in the citing text, but in the citation index.
It is produced from the reference in the citing text, albeit not from the embedded
reference but from the references as far as they are visible in the bibliography
(footnotes are still poorly processed). It also has dual referents: it points back to
its “parent text” and, in addition, all the texts that are listed by the citation index
as having invoked it are its collective referent. The interpretant is also distinct
from the interpretant of the embedded reference. Basically, it denotes inter-textual
linking interpreted by Cronin (2000) as connectedness or relatedness.
Citation
aggregations
Impact
Esteem
Value
Authors
Fig. 4: Commodified citation sign triad.
The aggregated citation sign is a more important sign than the individual citation
since a lone citation does not make much difference. It is in the aggregation that
the power of citation analysis manifests itself (see also Day, 2014). Again, the sign
vehicle is located in the citation indexes, not in the form of a bibliographic string,
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but rather as a calculated indicator. It can therefore also travel independently of
the citation database proper, in the form of bibliometric reports or online biblio-
metric services. The referent relates to the unit of measurement at the specified
level of aggregation. Cronin (2000) takes this to be the author, but of course this
can also be the research group, the university, or the country as awhole. The inter-
pretant is related to scientific impact as defined by the user of the citation analysis
(“impact, esteem and/or value”). This can take subtly different formulations but
the basic idea is that the more citations a work accrues, the bigger its scientific
influence. In other words, the lower left corner of the commodified citation triad
is the actual focus of evaluative bibliometrics.
Scientometricians have always examined the meaning and motivations un-
derlying citations and the implications for citation analysis. However, since they
have usually neglected to acknowledge the different configurations of the sign
they were discussing, different realities have been collapsed into one another.
In terms of the Peircean triads: the lower left corner of the embedded reference
may be “situatedmeaning” and therefore able to explain why an author made the
reference in the first place. Yet, in citation analysis, we are not dealing with em-
bedded references but with the aggregated and commodified citations. Because
the individual commodified citation is produced from the reference as listed in
the bibliography, the original situated meaning of the embedded reference is lost
in a two-step procedure. First, the embedded reference is transformed into the
reference as listed in the bibliography. Then this list is inverted in the production
of the citation index. Because the reference is decontextualized twice, the situated
meaning cannot be aggregated and simply gets lost. This is why Wouters (1999)
stressed that the resulting citation sign is in and of itself essentially meaning-
less. The application of citation analysis can no longer base itself on the original
situated meaning of the embedded reference. A new theoretical foundation for
citation analysis has to be created. This is the quest for the citation theory as con-
ceived in the field of scientometrics (Leydesdorff, 1998; Nicolaisen, 2007).
According to Cronin (2000), the value of semiotics for the scientometric com-
munity lies primarily in its sensitivity to the variable interpretative possibilities of
citations in the context of evaluative bibliometrics:
Referencing is a complex phenomenon which can be analysed in terms of a set of sign sys-
tems (…). Furthermore, referencing and citation behaviours vary within and between disci-
plines, such that blanket criticism is misplaced.
(Cronin, 2000, p. 445)
In addition, the processes of production and consumption of the relevant signs
can be studied, which can be the basis for the study of the variation in the mean-
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ing attached to these signs. In this context, Cronin pointed to studies showing
that referencing behavior is governed by epistemic and social norms and values
demonstrating that patterns in references are not completely arbitrary (in a de-
bate with the McRoberts critique of evaluative bibliometrics as basically mean-
ingless (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1996; MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 2009)). In
other words, Cronin (2000) addressed “the meaning of the citation” as the key
problem for citation theory.
Cronin (2000) acknowledged that it might become possible, especially in
the context of the UK national research assessment procedures (Research As-
sessment Exercise (RAE), now called Research Excellence Framework (REF),
see http://www.ref.ac.uk/) for the symbolic citation exchange processes to have
material consequences:
More specifically, if an individual’s, department’s or university’s ability to amass symbolic
capital of this kind were to become the critical determinant of future research funding and
career advancement, then it would not be difficult to imagine distortions creeping into the
system, as players devised recruitment, publication, collaboration and citation harvesting
stratagems to accelerate and maximise the accrual of symbolic capital.
(Cronin, 2000, p. 450)
Note the strong moral orientation of this fairly accurate prediction of the future—
“distortions creeping into the system” imply a negative view towards these de-
velopments. Moreover, the semiotic analysis that Cronin (2000) advocates to un-
derstand the meaning of the citation is not mobilized to understand the material
implications of the increased use of citations in the reputational system. They
merely appear as an afterthought.
This conception of semiotics as relevant for scientometrics is therefore by def-
inition restricted to the classical Mertonian approach in which the relationship
between sign systems and behavior is central. References and citations are seen
as representations of real world relationships. Because of this focus, the analysis
proposed by Cronin (2000) andWouters (1999) remains firmly in the symbolic do-
main. Their semiotic citation analysis is completely intra- and inter-textual and
the material world of knowledge production does not have a direct reference in
this semiotic storyline.
As a consequence, it is not entirely clear what can actually be done with this
refined perspective on the signs reference and citation. The mechanisms through
which linguistic signs might affect the material world of knowledge creation are
not specified. It is especially difficult to understand how the subtle difference be-
tween an embedded reference and a citation that is part of a citation index leads
to the conclusion that the number of citations one getswould not be amore or less
direct consequence of the choice of scientists to refer to ones work. Most people
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simply keep speaking about references and citations asmore or less the samephe-
nomenon. The details of the linguistic links seem no more than that: details that
are only interesting for the person interested in the particularities of semiotic or
linguistic theory. The semiotic approach was largely ignored bymost researchers,
including scientometricians dealing with citation analysis. It did impact themore
theoretical discourse about citation theory, but even here its acceptance seems to
have been limited to a small group of scholars. For example, in his comprehen-
sive and well-documented review, Nicolaisen (2007) seems to conflate semantic
and semiotic approaches.
At the same time, however, the practical application of citation analysis in
the context of evaluation has taken off. Although the vast majority of “evalua-
tionmoments” are not recorded in a systematic way, it is clear that citation-based
indicators have become available on a much larger scale than the inventors of
the Science Citation Index could have predicted (Wouters, 2014). These indica-
tors are used by managers as well as by researchers. It would be far too simplistic
to assume that they are only management tools for which researchers can claim
innocence. They have settled themselves firmly in the fabric of science and schol-
arship. In order to understand why and how this happened, we need an extended
theoretical framework that is able to understand at a more fundamental level
how the real world and semiotic signs like the citation and the reference actually
interact.
2 Material Semiotics
This type of framework has already been developed, albeit outside of bibliomet-
rics, and is called material semiotics. Material semiotics is not so much a unified
theory as a family of attitudes and dispositions. They are relevant for the debate
about the foundations of evaluative bibliometrics because they question the very
distinction between the material and the symbolic. In order to understand how
the sign system of the citation, produced by the citation indexer from the rawma-
terials of the sign system of the reference delivered to the indexer by the research
community, interacts with the material production of knowledge, we need an in-
tegrated way of thinking about, and acting with, bothmateriality and symbolism.
The argument is succinctly formulated by the anthropologist Webb Keane:
Efforts to bring theories of the sign into a full, robust articulation with accounts of human
actions, self-consciousness, and social power are still commonly hampered by certain as-
sumptions built into the lineage that runs from Saussure to post-structuralism. They tend
still to demand that we divide our attention and choose between ideas and things. The re-
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sult is that even those whowould study “things” too often turn them either into expressions
or communications of “ideas,” or relegate those ideas to an epiphenomenal domain. Those
whowould study “ideas” too often treat the associatedmaterial forms as transparent, taking
their consequentiality to be suspect, and, at times, imputing implausible powers to human
desires to impose meaning on the world. And this divide seems to give rise to what is still a
common, if ill-informed, perception among social analysts, that “semiotics” is a species of
idealism.
(Keane, 2003, p. 410)
Keane is interested in the practical embodiments of semiotic ideologies in repre-
sentational economies. This work is particularly relevant because research eval-
uation can be interpreted as an important moment in the exchange of reputation
in the political economy of science and scholarship. He wants to draw attention
to “the dynamic interconnections among different modes of signification at play
within a particular historical and social formation” (Keane, 2003, p. 410). His re-
search shows that howpeople handle andvaluematerial goodsmaybe implicated
in how they use and interpret words, and vice versa, reflecting certain underlying
assumptions about the world and the beings that inhabit it (Keane, 2003, p. 410).
His goal is to “open up social analysis to the historicity and social power of ma-
terial things without reducing them either to being only vehicles of meaning, on
the one hand, or ultimate determinants, on the other” (Keane, 2003, p. 411). He
turns back to Peircean semiotics (in this sense his work is perhapsmore linguistic
in character than that of material semiotics in science and technology studies)
because of its promise to overcome the radical sign-world dichotomy which is
so characteristic for Saussurean analysis. Keane (2003) identifies two aspects of
Peircean analysis as particularly important.
First, it is processual: “signs give rise to new signs, in an unending process of
signification. This is important because, viewed sociologically, it can be taken to
entail sociability, struggle, historicity, and contingency” (Keane, 2003, p. 413). It
is striking howwell this quote summarizes what has happened to citation indica-
tors.
Second, it pays considerable attention to “the range of relationships not only
between signifier (sign) and signified (interpretant) but between both of those and
(possible) objects of signification” (Keane, 2003, p. 411). Keane argues that the na-
ture of those relations between signifier and objects of signification needs to be
grounded in the dynamics of the social relations. If we recall how Cronin (2000)
used a triad to understand the difference between different forms of references
and citations, it is clear that the anthropologist and the information scientist have
found common ground, possibly without being aware of each other’s existence.
Keane’s goal to “recognize how the cited materiality of signification is not just a
factor for the sign interpreter but gives rise to and transforms modalities of ac-
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tion and subjectivity” (Keane, 2003, p. 411) resonates with Cronin (2000)’s goal to
“develop greater sensitivity to the variable symbolic significance of the signs they
routinelymanipulate and treat as quasi-objective indicators of quality, impact and
esteem.”
Building on various critiques of modernist and realist philosophy of science,
material semiotics has developed particularly strongly in the field of science and
technology studies to understand how science is able to create new worlds and
how the interactions between “representations” and “real objects” can be ana-
lyzed (Latour&Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1988;Haraway, 1991; Berg&Mol, 1998;Mol,
2002; Law, 2004; Luukkonen, 1997). Material semiotics is a rather fundamental
and radical alternative to the dominant epistemology in European and American
thought.
Material semiotics is radical in that it refuses to accept the separationbetween
epistemology and ontology. It is not interested in the conditions for knowing (a
central problem in classical epistemology) but in the ways objects are handled in
practice and consequently in the performative nature of knowledge (Mol, 2002,
p. 5). Science and scholarship do not analyze and represent a reality “out-there”,
but engage in the creation of new worlds “in-here” (Law, 2004, pp. 54–55). This
does not mean, inter alia, that material semiotics denies the existence of reality.
On the contrary, it pays far more attention to how realities emerge than main-
stream social science tends to do. Its practitioners are also more sensitive to the
role of technology andmateriality in social processes than our usual sociologist or
psychologist. In actor network theory, one of the main embodiments of material
semiotics, the concept of construction is central (Latour &Woolgar, 1986). The key
idea is that science creates new objects that are unstable and contested in their
infancy, but then gets hardened into facts. Latour calls this the Janus face of sci-
ence: Science in themaking still recognizes theuncertainnature of scientific facts,
but science in the classroom discusses facts as if they are part of a stable nature
(Latour, 1987). Mol (2002) prefers to speak of the enactment of realities rather than
of their construction:
The term ‘construction’ was used to get across the view that objects have no fixed and given
identities, but gradually come into being. During their unstable childhoods their identities
tend to be highly contested, volatile, open to transformation. But once they have grown up
objects are taken to be stabilized.
(Mol, 2002, p. 42)
She does not adopt this notion of stabilization; in her perspective a certain fluidity
is a stable feature of reality:
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… the idea that objects might not just gradually acquire an identity that they then hold on to
has been pushed aside, or complemented, by this new idea. That maintaining the identity
of objects requires a continuing effort. That over time they may change. (…) If an object is
real this is because it is part of a practice. It is a reality enacted.
(Mol, 2002, pp. 43–44)
This has an important consequence which is relevant to citation theory: reality is
multiple rather than singular. In her study of the treatment of atherosclerosis¹ in
a Dutch hospital, Mol shows that it is not simply one disease reality that patients
and doctors are dealing with. The disease turns out to be quite different objects.
Atherosclerosis in thewalking therapy session is distinct from atherosclerosis un-
der themicroscope, and different again fromatherosclerosis as operated on by the
surgeon. The reality of the disease does not precede the diagnosis and treatment,
but is intertwined with them. In the diagnosis and treatment, the disease gets its
specific form that defines it (Mol, 2002, p. 96–97). We are not speaking of different
perspectives on one underlying reality here—the material interactions are differ-
ent in the ontological sense. Nor are they disconnected realities, as they can be
present within a single patient:
It is one of the great miracles of hospital life: there are different atheroscleroses in the hos-
pital but despite the differences between them they are connected. Atherosclerosis enacted
is more than one - but less than many. The body multiple is not fragmented. Even if it is
multiple, it also hangs together. The question to be asked, then, is how this is achieved.
(Mol, 2002, p. 55)
The question of how actors (human and non-human) achieve this hanging to-
gether dominates Mol’s (2002) work. She exposes the variety of strategies by
which reality is made coherent in the practical interaction between humans and
objects. Making the multiple character of reality invisible is an aspect of these
strategies.
This perspective diverges fundamentally from the way we commonly think
about both our social and our physical reality. The recognition of reality as mul-
tiple, rather than singular, has fundamental implications for the role of method-
ologies in the social sciences. These consequences have been explored by Law
(2004). He suggests the concept of a fractional object: “We are in a world where
bodies, or organisations, or machines are more than one and less than many. In
a world that is more than one and less than many. Somewhere in between” (Law,
2004, p. 62). According to Law, there are three options in ontology. The first op-
1 Atherosclerosis is a disease that leads to thickenedwalls of the arteries, see http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Atherosclerosis
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tion is to insist on singularity of the world. This means that those who perceive
the world differently from ourselves are simply wrong. In social science, there is
one best methodology to understand the world. The second option is to insist on
pluralism and “the irreducibility of worlds, of knowledge, of ethical sensibilities,
or of political preferences, to one another” (Law, 2004, p. 63). This is the relativist
attitude. A large number of methodological choices in social science are now al-
lowed, but the price we pay is that they are incommensurable.We have no criteria
to decide whether a particular approach is better than another one. In contrast
with these two options, Law advocates the third option which is in-between. Like
Mol (2002), Law (2004) considers the world as fundamentally multiple. It is only
through our active cohering of different practices and parts of realities that the
world can develop as a coherent reality. This has an important consequence. The
philosophical question on the nature of reality transforms into a political choice
about how to live.Ontology is no longer in thefirst place amatter ofdiscovering the
real nature of reality, but a matter of making political choices as to which realities
should be created. In terms of Law’s and Mol’s analysis: it is a matter of ontologi-
cal politics. As a consequence, there is no general blueprint for social science, no
generally valid methodology:
There is no general world and there are no general rules. Instead there are only specific
and enacted overlaps between provisionally congealed realities that have to be crafted in a
way that responds to and produces particular versions of the good that can only ever travel
so far. The general, then, disappears, along with the universal. The idea of the universal
transportability of universal knowledge was always a chimera. But if the universal disap-
pears then so too does the local - for the local is a subset of the general. Instead we are left
with situated enactments and sets of particle connections, and it is to those that we owe our
heterogeneous responsibilities.
(Law, 2004, p. 155)
3 Semiotic Citation Theories
So what do these new developments in philosophy and material semiotics mean
for the application of semiotics to the domain of citation theory? The step we
need to take, which neither Cronin (2000) nor Wouters (1999) took, is to under-
stand that the sign is not a representation of reality, however distorted, but an
object in the realworld of knowledgemaking. The differences between the embed-
ded reference, the reference in the bibliography, the disembedded citation which
is the in-between half-product hidden in the deep recesses of the citation index
machinery, and the citation as part of the citation index, are not differences of
representation of one and the same real world object, but ontological differences
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between objects. Each of them is a partially different but related object. This first
conceptual step is not easy because it requires us to distance ourselves from the
usual mainstream American/European epistemology. But we also need to take
a second step. We need to accept that reality is multiple. Although this step is
perhaps even more difficult, because of our common conceptual and ideological
inertia, it solves a number of problems that have plagued eminent theorists who
struggled with the problem of citation theory. If reality is multiple, we no longer
need to search for one integrated theory that can explain the whole process of
citing and citation. We can allow for a number of partly contradictory, and partly
overlapping sets of citation theories, each emerging in a particular set of knowl-
edge practices. The quest for a citation theory turns out to be the same type of
chimera as the quest for universal transportable knowledge.
Let us delve into the details and reinterpret the process of citing and citation
in these material semiotic terms. A scientist who cites a journal article or book
written by another scientist creates by this very act a newobject (different from the
citedwork). This object, the embedded reference, is tightly connected to the citing
text. However, the scientist usually also creates another object as a consequence
of his citing act: the reference in the bibliography. If she uses bibliographic soft-
ware, this is done automatically. This second object is in principle still connected
to the situatedmeaningof thefirst object but canbe easily disconnected. This hap-
pens, for example, whenever another scientist copies the listed reference in his
own bibliography or list of books to read. It is this second object which is the raw
material for the citation indexer. In the indexing software, the reference is first in-
verted by sorting each citation according to the text that it cites, rather than by the
citing texts from which it originated. This act of semiosis creates the third object,
the individual citation (Wouters, 1999). Then, the citations are grouped together
and counted. This results in the fourth citation object, the citation as part of the
citation index. Note that the last two objects are not created by the citing scientist
but by the citation indexing process. The citation indexes are sold commercially
by the citation indexer or provided freely on the web as stand-alone products.
They can also be sold or provided as part of more comprehensive research infor-
mation systems. The citations thus provided are meaningful to the stakeholders
involved, otherwise there would be no demand for them. But thismeaning cannot
be the situatedmeaning of the embedded reference since the citation objects have
been created in a semiotic process that involves decontextualization. The original
context has been lost. Therefore, the citation needs to be recontextualized in order
to function as a social object. This happens in twodifferentways ormodalities (see
below) and it will no longer be a surprise that this means that actually two differ-
ent types of citation objects are enacted in this process of recontextualization. And
this increasing variety of citation objects all exist at the same time—they engage in
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complex interactions with each other, as well as with other active objects such as
references, evaluation committees, deans, and researchers engaged in knowledge
creation.
4 Citation Link Object
In the first modality, the citation enters into a one-to-one relationship with the
cited text (the right hand side of the Peircean triad): the object is the link between
the cited text and the citing text. Let us call it the citation link object. In this recon-
textualization, the citation is literally the inversion of the reference as part of the
bibliography. This object canplay a variety of roles and take on a variety of shapes.
It can be an instrument for the cited author to locate the exact place at which his
work has been cited by the citing author. This is a form of inverse snowball sam-
pling and Eugene Garfield saw it as the main use of the citation index (Garfield,
1955). In this form, the citation is a novel bibliographic tool that enables scien-
tists to go forward in time in searching for literature, rather than only backwards
in time (as is the case in traditional snowball sampling using the bibliographies).
Interestingly, this means that the citation link object can be used to retrieve the
situated meaning of the embedded reference from which the citation link object
emerged. This is an important cause of the possibility for the citation link object
to appear as simply another format of the reference. In other words, because of
this potential as a search tool, which was actively advertised by Garfield in the
early years of the citation index (Garfield, 1955), the process of decontextualiza-
tion which creates the citation from the reference is made invisible. The citation
can pose as actually being nothing else but the reference and this has given a very
strong boost to the process of naturalization of the sign citation. It has made this
process almost seamless.
This citation link object canalso be thebuildingblock for creatingmaps of sci-
ence. In this endeavor, all publications in a given area are presented as nodes in a
network and their configuration is determinedby thepatterns of links between the
nodes. These links can be any kind of object: the authors, the references, shared
terminology, publication years, and, since the emergence of citation indexes, also
the citation relations. The direct citation link is the most basic citation link ob-
ject, but it can easily morph into much more complicated citation objects. For
example, co-citation links are links between two documents that are each cited
by a common third document, although they may not have other types of links
between them, e.g., they may not cite each other (Small, 1973). The inverse of the
co-citation link object is bibliographic coupling which is to the listed reference
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in the bibliography what co-citation is to the single citation object (Kessler, 1963).
Both direct citation links, co-citation links, aswell as bibliographic coupling links
are routinely used to create maps of science (Boyack, Klavans, & Börner, 2005;
Small, 1977; Waltman, van Eck, & Noyons, 2010) (for more on science mapping,
see Ginda, Scharnhorst and Börner, this volume).
5 Citation Number Objects
In the second modality, the citations to a cited text are aggregated and counted.
The citation is now recontextualized not as the link between two texts, but as an
attribute of the cited text. The cited text suddenly has a novel property: its citation
frequency. The citation object is in other words recontextualized as metadata of
the cited text. Moreover, it has now become a number and is therefore also re-
contextualized from the domain of textual strings and links into the domain of
numbers and statistics. As a result, the possibilities of manipulation that the sign
system of numbers has developed in the course of the last couple of centuries are
now also available to the citation sign. Perhaps most importantly, the citation is
thereby made commensurable and comparable. Cited texts can be compared in
terms of their number of citations. These numbers can be added, leading to the
number of citations of a particular oeuvre. As a result, the citation does not only
become an attribute of the cited text, but also of the cited author. These aggrega-
tions can go on from author, to research group, institute, university, and country.
At all levels of aggregation of the scientific system, we have a shadow reality of
citations that hover over the actors (texts, knowledge creators, as well as institu-
tions) as objects to which they can attach as well as detach. Practice, meaning,
and context are intimately intertwined, they define each other, and it is therefore
less fruitful to try to separate them into different domains of the symbolic repre-
sentation and the real world. The reality of citation is indeed enacted within the
double context of knowledge creation and research process evaluation.
6 Evaluative Bibliometrics
Evaluative bibliometrics as a field is the result of the emergence and enactment of
this new citation reality as an added reflexive layer to the fabric of the scientific
and scholarly system. Often, bibliometrics is seen as a data-driven field that has
been “captured” by the creation of the Science Citation Index. This is a rather
simple and poor explanation of the vastly richer semiotic reality that underlies
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the field of evaluative bibliometrics. If we take semiotics seriously as an analytical
lens, we have a much better framework to understand the historical development
of the field and the pervasive influence of the citation index on the way quality is
defined in the scientific and scholarly system.
To understand this role of the citation, we must pay close attention to the
subtle but important difference between the two modalities of the citation object.
The first form, that of the link between the cited and citing text from the position
of the cited text, is still only two steps removed from the situated meaning of the
embedded reference. It can be used to retrieve this situated meaning. It can also
be used to try to find similar locations of situated meaning in other texts. This
use of the citation sign is often firmly embedded within the context of knowledge
creation, for example when a researcher wishes to find traces in the literature of
researchers working on the same topic or thinking along the same lines. In the
second form (the number that has become an attribute of the cited text), the cita-
tion object is resolutely disconnected from the situatedmeaning of the embedded
reference which was at the origin of its semiosis. It is not the specific meaning of
the citing author to which it refers. As an object, it exclusively represents the fact
that a certain author or a certain number of authors has cited the text. What that
means is not prescribed by the citation object itself. In this sense, we can claim
that the citation included in the citation index as such is still an under-defined
object or perhaps better a proto-object. It will only become a fully-fledged func-
tional socio-material object if it materializes into a specific citation object, such as
a specific indicator (e.g., the normalized number of citations per paper). In other
words, the citation object in its second modality (as number) can be compared to
a stemcell object which has as its main function of morphing into one of a large
variety of concrete citation objectswithin specific citation, evaluation, andknowl-
edge creating contexts.
Thismeans that the development of specific citation theories that can explain
the structure and role of citation objects in their various forms requires the in-
clusion of the specific practices and institutional contexts that are co-enacted.
It clearly does not make sense to justify citation counts in an evaluative context
by claiming that the number of citations is like a vote by the scientific commu-
nity about the value of a particular piece of work or of a particular author. What
the citation means cannot be extracted from itself, because the citation object as
number is a decontextualized and underdefined proto-object. At the same time,
it is also not the case that the meaning of the citation is completely determined
by the context of evaluation. The meaning of the citation is not completely arbi-
trary and it does make a difference whether the number is higher or lower in a
particular context. The values and shapes that the citation object can adopt are
constrained by the patterns among the references fromwhich the citation objects
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emerge. Although the citation indexer is the producer of the citation objects, the
citation indexer does not determine its values or shapes. In this sense, citation
analysis is as objective as an analysis can be.
7 The Material Impact of Citation Objects
The system of citation has delivered key objects that are manipulated in this pro-
cess of research evaluation and assessment. The development of the governance
of research enabled and stimulated the uptake of these new objects (Wouters,
2014). The increased scale and specialization of scientific work as well as its in-
creased role as a key instrument of production, reproduction, and distribution
in current globalized capitalist economies have created a complex structure and
introduced new dynamics into the management of science. The “social contract”
that gave the scientific communities a relatively large amount of freedom (built on
a combination of the notion of “academic freedom” in traditional academia and
the promise of great economic and social progress—as well as profits—thanks to
programmatic research) has been breaking down since the early 1970s. As a re-
sult, traditional forms of accountability and quality control in the form of various
types of peer review have been supplemented as well as displaced by audits and
accountability by science funders and stakeholders external to the scientific com-
munities. The demand formore transparency in the organization of research than
provided by traditional peer review formshas stimulated this development. These
audits have created an increased demand for both quantitative and qualitative
indicators as well as for forms of external expert review. The result is a complex
dynamic of interactions between control by the relevant scientific communities
andelites and control by various stakeholders.Whocounts as a scientific expert or
representative of a stakeholder community is not given a priori but is permanently
redefined in these processes. Scientists play different roles in the interactions: as
researchers, as experts, and as representatives of various stakeholder interests.
How to combine these different roles and make them cohere is one of the chal-
lenges that researchers face in this complex science system.
National research systems have introduced a variety of performance based
funding mechanisms, both based on peer review (such as the UK REF) and bib-
liometric evaluations (such as the Nordic bibliometric indicator) (Hicks, 2012).
Currently, national systems vary in two dimensions: the tightnesswithwhich they
couple performance assessment to funding and the degree to which they usemet-
rics in addition to peer review (peer review based judgment is still the default).
All combinations of these two dimensions occur. But even in systems without a
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direct or tight coupling between funding and assessment outcomes, assessments
have direct material consequences as the reputation of a research group or se-
nior researcher is related to the outcome of the assessment. The systems only vary
with respect to the details of this feedback loop and the time it takes for this cycle
to complete. Countries with a relatively larger share of block funding may allow
researchersmore time to recover from a low rating in the regular assessment, pro-
vided that the block funding itself is not directly related to assessment outcomes.
But in the long run, researchers will have to have high scores or leave the sci-
entific system. This means that indicators do not only influence the judgment of
past work, but they indirectly shape the possibilities for future research via this
feedback loop. In other words, by influencing the research agenda of tomorrow
they have directmaterial consequences for researchers and for science in general.
Therefore, it seems insufficient to analyze citation indicators only symbolically
without attention to materiality and economics. This again underlines that the
material turn in semiotics may be fruitfully employed in scientometrics.
What does this mean for the position of citation theories? The field of sciento-
metrics has developed a variety of citation theories, all of them interesting, none
of them completely satisfactory or uncontested. One of themain lines of argument
has been that citations reflect the referencing behavior of researchers (see above)
and that therefore the citation rate of a paper, an author, a research group, an in-
stitute, and a country reflect the use of, and response to, the work by the relevant
scientific community. This response can then subsequently be seen as a proxy for
either quality or scientific impact (this varies in different citation theories). A sup-
porting argument has been that at the level of the individual paper many factors
other than the quality of the paper may influence the choice of references by the
author, but that these factors cancel out at higher levels of aggregation (van Raan,
1998). In a recent paper, we have shown that this expectation may be a belief that
is sometimes unsubstantiated (Waltman, van Eck, & Wouters, 2013), but it is still
implicitly used by most citation analysts. The inquiry of motivations and factors
influencing the references in scientific papers is still an active line of research in
the area of citation theories (Bornmann&Daniel, 2008). From a semiotic perspec-
tive, however, this line of attack is misdirected because it assumes that references
and citations are identical whereas from a semiotic perspective it is clear that this
cannot be the case.
By including the whole reputational cycle in research in a material semiotic
analysis, an empirical analysis based on this theoretical frameworkwould be akin
to Lenoir and Ross (1996). Lenoir and Ross (1996) aim to understand the way sci-
ence functions as a disunified enterprise with the help of historically grounded
semiotics: “We intend to demonstrate that the power of a sign, a representation,
or an interconnected set of representations to support scientificwork is notmerely
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a function of their own internal logic but also of their capacity to forge rhetori-
cal links to representations in other domains by drawing upon metaphor as well
as repertoires of tropes and narrative structures.” Lenoir and Ross (1996) devel-
oped this to show how natural history museums are able to create artificially con-
structed sites to create a “meaningful nature”. In the same vein, citation theory
should analyze the main tropes and narrative structures in selected case studies
of research evaluations (drawing on either documentary analysis or ethnographic
field notes). Such an ethnographically grounded approach to the problem of ci-
tation theory would contribute to the work that aims to dismantle the artificial
and unhelpful barrier between quantitative and qualitative work in scientomet-
rics and science and technology studies (Wyatt et al., 2015).
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Christine L. Borgman
Data Citation as a Bibliometric Oxymoron
1 Introduction
“Data citation” is a broad construct that incorporates credit, attribution, and dis-
covery of data. It has taken on a life of its own, quite apart from the theory and
method of bibliometrics, informetics, scientometrics, and other means to assess
the flow of scholarly information via citations between published documents. In-
ternational task groups have written hundreds of pages of reports. Manifestos
abound. Principles and standards for data citation are being set and implemented
in local practice (CODATA-ICSTI Task Group on Data Citation Standards and Prac-
tices, 2013; Crosas, Carpenter, Shotton, & Borgman, 2013; Datacitation Synthesis
Group, 2014; Uhlir, 2012).
The argument for data citation is mademost succinctly in the first of ten prin-
ciples promulgated by a joint task group of CODATA (the Committee onData of the
International Council of Scientific Unions) and ICSTI (the International Council
for Scientific and Technical Information):
TheStatusPrinciple:Data citations shouldbeaccorded the same importance in the scholarly
record as the citation of other objects (CODATA-ICSTI Task Group onData Citation Standards
and Practices, 2013; “International Council for Scientific and Technical Information,” 2015;
Lide & Wood, 2012).
The status principle puts data on equal footing with other objects that are cited
in scholarly communication—but without defining what those are or establish-
ing the basis for equal treatment. This equivalence raises a host of theoretical,
methodological, and practical problems for bibliometrics. Historically, bibliomet-
rics involves “written communication” (Pritchard, 1969, p. 348)—specifically, jour-
nals, periodicals, and books (Pritchard, 1969; Raisig, 1962). Bibliographic citation
styles differ widely in the choice of data elements and citable units, as discussed
further below. While the lack of agreement on bibliographic units for the purpose
of citation remains problematic, at least theseunits usually canbe aggregated into
discrete documents such as journal articles or books. Of the many differences be-
tween data and written communication, the difficulty of defining citable units for
data is the most problematic for bibliometrics.
Treating data citations as equivalent to bibliographic citations implies that
data are publications, which in turn gives rise to the popular “data publication”
metaphor. While “publication,” strictly speaking, means only “to make public,”
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publication in the sense of scholarly communication has a much higher bar.
Scholarly publicationnormally requires peer reviewanddissemination in a venue
with recognized status for credit and attribution (Borgman, 2007). Journals and
books usually meet this standard of publication, whereas talks, blog posts, and
objects posted on web pages generally do not. Reciprocal citation is a feature of
bibliometrics and of related methods such as webometrics, scientometrics, and
informetrics. Data are far more complex objects—if they are objects at all—than
the entities to which bibliometrics applies. Units of data might receive citations,
for example, but it is not clear that they can make references to other objects. The
status principle for data citation and the data publication metaphor combine to
muddy the waters of scholarly communication at a time when far more clarity
about the characteristics of data is needed (Borgman, 2007, 2012, 2015; Parsons &
Fox, 2013).
The leap from citing publications to citing data is a vast one, but if data are
to be discovered, exchanged, reused, and repurposed, robust mechanisms for ci-
tation are necessary. Transferring bibliographic citation principles to data must
be done carefully and selectively, lest the problems associated with citation prac-
tice be exacerbated and new ones introduced. Determining how to cite data is a
non-trivial matter. Giving credit for data, which is among the arguments for data
citation, also raises the complex ethical and policy issues associated with the use
of bibliometrics for evaluating scholarship (Declaration on Research Assessment,
2013; Furner, 2014; Rafols, de Rijcke, & Wouters, 2014). This Festschrift chapter,
which is informed by several decades of discussion with Blaise Cronin, explores
the thorny relationships between citing publications and citing data, asking how
theories of bibliometrics might be applied to the use of research data and vice
versa.
In a Festschrift chapter for EugeneGarfield, edited some 15 years ago byBlaise
Cronin and Helen Barsky Atkins (Borgman, 2000b), I expressed concerns about
the slow uptake of bibliometrics to study scholarly communication and about the
lackof understandingabouthowbibliometrics couldbe applied to electronic pub-
lishing. In the time since, the use of bibliometrics andwebometrics to study schol-
arly communication in digital environments has blossomed. Theory and method
in these areas is also far moremature (Almind & Ingwersen, 1997; Borgman, 1990;
Borgman& Furner, 2002; Cronin & Sugimoto, 2014a, 2014b; Thelwall, Vaughan, &
Bjorneborn, 2005). At this juncture, my concerns address how little is understood
about the implications of data citation for the theory, method, and practice of
bibliometrics—and conversely, how theories of bibliometrics can inform the de-
sign of citation mechanisms for data.
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2 A Short History of Data Citation
The open access movement, writ large, is about facilitating themovement of pub-
lications, software code, government data, research data, and other intellectual
contentwithminimal licensing restrictions andminimal costs (Kelty, 2008; “Open
Knowledge Foundation,” 2013; Suber, 2012). In the realm of scholarly commu-
nication, open access to publications and to data is being promoted or required
by funding agencies, journals, universities, and other stakeholders. Adoption of
these open access policies varies widely among fields, countries, institutions, and
individuals. The biosciences, especially the “omics” fields, have adopted open
data policies most fully. Genomic sequence data, for example, are submitted to
repositories in concert with submitting articles for publication. Journals may re-
quire evidence of deposit, such as a record number, to consider the article for
review. Inmost other fields, deposit of data is unevenat best,whether due to a lack
of repositories, resources, skills, or incentives (Borgman, 2015; Fecher, Friesike, &
Hebing, 2015; Kratz & Strasser, 2015; Wallis, Rolando, & Borgman, 2013).
Communities that value data as scholarly products to be shared, dissemi-
nated, recombined, and reusedneedways to describe those data. The firstmethod
proposed, naively, was simply to map established mechanisms of bibliographic
citation to data citation. The primary problem with this approach, as discussed
below, is the lack of agreement on what constitutes data. A second problem,
also discussed below, is the distinction between credit and attribution for data,
hence the broader title of the research agendaworkshop held by the U.S. National
Academies of Science, “ForAttribution—DevelopingDataAttribution andCitation
Practices and Standards” (Uhlir, 2012). The workshop explicated a wide range of
conceptual issues involved in the citation and attribution of data, allowing the
work of the international CODATA-ICSTI Task Group to move forward. The re-
port of that group promulgated a set of ten principles but did not establish an
implementation plan. The diversity of constituencies and practices was deemed
too great to be resolved by the Task Group alone (CODATA-ICSTI Task Group
on Data Citation Standards and Practices, 2013). However, other parties joined
the effort quickly. The several reports, in combination with a manifesto (Crosas
et al., 2013), provided the foundation for the community to implement the rec-
ommendations. Members of the Task Group, most of whom were practitioners
from libraries, archives, data repositories, policy and standards agencies, and
publishers, joined other stakeholders to refine the ten principles into a more
succinct list of eight (Datacitation Synthesis Group, 2014). These principles, now
finalized and endorsed bymany parties, are provided in full as ameans to explore
the comparisons between data and publications:
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1. Importance: Data should be considered legitimate, citable products of re-
search. Data citations should be accorded the same importance in the schol-
arly record as citations of other research objects, such as publications.
2. Credit and Attribution: Data citations should facilitate giving scholarly credit
and normative and legal attribution to all contributors to the data, recogniz-
ing that a single style or mechanism of attribution may not be applicable to
all data.
3. Evidence: In scholarly literature, whenever and wherever a claim relies upon
data, the corresponding data should be cited.
4. Unique Identification: A data citation should include a persistent method for
identification that is machine actionable, globally unique, and widely used
by a community.
5. Access: Data citations should facilitate access to the data themselves and to
such associated metadata, documentation, code, and other materials, as are
necessary for both humans and machines to make informed use of the refer-
enced data.
6. Persistence: Unique identifiers, andmetadata describing the data, and its dis-
position, should persist—even beyond the life span of the data they describe.
7. Specificity and Verifiability: Data citations should facilitate identification of,
access to, and verification of the specific data that support a claim. Cita-
tions or citation metadata should include information about provenance
and fixity sufficient to facilitate verifying that the specific timeslice, version
and/or granular portion of data retrieved subsequently is the same as was
originally cited.
8. Interoperability and Flexibility: Data citation methods should be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the variant practices among communities, but
should not differ so much that they compromise interoperability of data
citation practices across communities.
These principles map to the general functions of bibliographic citation, with con-
cerns for documenting evidence, accommodating variant practices among com-
munities, identifying cited items unambiguously, and improving access to the
cited objects. Two functional differences have notable ramifications for the the-
ory,method, and practice of bibliometrics. One is the assumption that referencing
and cited objects are in digital form and available online. A data citation is much
more than descriptive metadata; it should support machine action (principle 4).
The second, made most explicit in principle 7, is that a data citation should facili-
tate access to related objects. Data may be interpretable only in combination with
contextual information, and perhaps with software code, instrumentation, and
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other technologies. In contrast, publications are presumed to be interpretable as
independent units.
Workinggroupson thedisseminationand implementationof thedata citation
principles were established under the auspices of Force11, “a community working
together in support of the goal of advancing scholarly communication” (Force11,
2015). Data citation is but one of their topics of interest. This volunteer commu-
nity has weekly conference calls and daily flows of email. Some of their activi-
ties overlap with that of Research Objects for Scholarly Communication (ROSC),
a burgeoning eScience community established in 2014 under the auspices of the
World Wide Web Consortium (Bechhofer, De Roure, Gamble, Goble, & Buchan,
2010; “Research Object for Scholarly Communication Community Group,” 2014).
The Research Data Alliance (RDA), a more formal organization that has funding
from public agencies in the U.S., Europe, and Australia, has working groups, in-
terest groups, and birds-of-a-feather groups that intersect with the concerns of
Force11 and ROSC. RDA, established in 2013, has more than 1600 members from
70 countries. While the overlap in membership is considerable, RDA draws prac-
titioners, technologists, and policy makers interested in building infrastructures
for datamanagement; Force11 is concernedwith reforming scholarly communica-
tion generally; and Research Objects for Scholarly Communication is concerned
with technical approaches for managing data, publications, software, and other
objects created in scientific research.
Among the interests common to these groups, and to others within individ-
ual domains, are the desire to redesign scholarly communication for networked
environments, the changing relationships among stakeholders, the changing cri-
teria for evaluating scholarship, and the complexity of data management and
stewardship. A critical mass of stakeholders now considers these to be urgent
problems. Data citation is but one mechanism to address these issues, albeit a
fairly central one to the extent that it facilitates credit, attribution, discovery, ac-
cess, retrieval, management, use, and stewardship of scholarly content. These
developments should bewatched closely by bibliometricians, given the broad im-
plications for scholarly communication; “Data citation” has become a catchword
that encompasses a larger array of issues involved in managing the many digital
objects that are created or used in research.
3 Theoretical Problems of Data Citation
Scholarly authors are expected to document their evidence by citing their sources.
Bibliographic referencing, the traditional means to do so, matured in an era of
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print publication. Books, articles, and other scholarly products were stable en-
tities. Once published, they stayed published. Given adequate bibliographic de-
scription, most cited documents could be located in research libraries, or perhaps
in archives. As publication moved to digital formats, first as duplicates to print
publication, later as a primary format, the stability of documents and citations no
longer could be assumed.
Data are much different entities than publications, introducing many new
features and requirements for citations. In turn, these different characteristics re-
quire a new set of theoretical premises for bibliometrics. Modeling the flows of
data alone would be hard enough. To the extent that data are cited as objects on
par with publications, bibliometric analyses will draw upon heterogeneous pools
of cited entities. Thus it is useful to consider how citation practices differ between
genres of publication and of data.
Generally speaking, authors cite sources that are accessible to their readers.
In most cases, they cite other publications, providing enough information so that
readers can locate those sources in a library or online. The publication to which
a citation refers may exist in many copies. Metadata elements such as volume,
issue, and page numbers usually suffice to identify the item uniquely, whether in
a print issue or online. Even if the document was obtained online, citations may
reference the page numbers of the printed copy. When cited objects are available
only online, location information such as URLs, or unique and persistent iden-
tification such as digital object identifiers (DOI) that can resolve to a location,
are required. Publications usually are assumed be static objects, which facilitates
identity and location. In cases where cited objects are not assumed to be stable,
a specific version can be cited. Although links to online publications may break
fairly quickly, these objects tend to remain available somewhere, and discovery
mechanisms are improving (Klein &Nelson, 2010; Van de Sompel et al., 2012; Van
de Sompel, Nelson, & Sanderson, 2013)
Once outside the realm of formal publication, citations become less reliable
means to locate sources of evidence. Authors may cite rare or original sources but
not include the name and location of the archive in their bibliographic descrip-
tions. Authors rarely provide bibliographic citations for their owndataunless they
are depositing those data in a place accessible to readers. Rather,most authors de-
scribe theirmethods anddata to thedegree expectedby their field andpublication
venue, providing tables, figures, and supplementary materials as appropriate. In
caseswhere apublicationdrawsondata fromexternal sources, suchas those from
anarchive, repository, or colleague, those datamayormaynot be referenced.Data
in repositories are most easily cited, as these institutions usually offer suggested
citation formats that include unique and persistent identifiers. However, if exter-
nal data were obtained to calibrate instruments or to “ground truth” a field site,
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theymaynot be cited because theywere considered background to the research or
implicit in the methods (Wallis et al., 2013; Wynholds, Wallis, Borgman, Sands, &
Traweek, 2012). In other cases, authorsmight cite a “data paper” associatedwith a
data release, as in astronomy (Ahn et al., 2012), an entire archive (e.g., Sloan Digi-
tal Sky Survey), or publisher of data sources (e.g., OECD). References to data often
are informal, such as a URL, a footnote, a figure caption, or an obliquemention in
a sentence (Pepe, Goodman,Muench, Crosas, & Erdmann, 2014). Links to data de-
cay evenmore quickly than do links to publications, as researchers are much less
likely to curate data for long periods of time. The eternal quest for bibliographic
control (Borgman, 2000a) is even more ephemeral for data than for publications.
3.1 Stakeholders and Styles
Aparticular challenge in building bibliometric theory for data citation is the num-
ber of stakeholders involved. These include, for example, scholars, publishers,
librarians, funders, repository managers, policy makers, and technologists. Each
has different interests in the forms that data citation will take. Some would make
credit and attribution the highest priorities; others would focus on data citation
as a means to improve discovery and access. The diversity of publication manu-
als and bibliographic citation styles suggests that achieving unity in data citation
is highly unlikely. Bibliographic referencing tools such as Zotero, Endnote, Ref-
works, andMendeley provide style sheets that will render citations in the formats
of individual journals, conferences, andpublishers. For example, Zotero currently
supports 7429 citation styles (Zotero, 2015). Only a few fields and journals have
established citation styles for data.
The tensions are many. As discussed further below, scholars want credit for
their scholarly work, but do not necessarily desire separate credit for their data.
Most lack the skills, resources, andoftenmotivation to invest in curating their own
data well enough to make them citable. Search engines would like to add value to
existing assets bymaking themmore discoverable. Funding agenciesmay require
that data resulting from projects they support be shared and reused, but few such
agencies have been willing to invest heavily in data stewardship. Overall, better
knowledge infrastructures are needed to manage, discover, and exploit research
data and information (Borgman, 2015; CrossRef, 2013; Edwards et al., 2013).
Commercial interests see opportunities in hosting and providing access to
data. Cloud computing services will host data, but do not wish to be in the cu-
ratorial business. Publishers may provide access to data as value-added services,
but few are willing to host data except as a for-profit venture. Data repositories,
which typically are non-profit consortial organizations, are concerned about their
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long-term ability to curate resources in the face of commercial competition that
may have a shorter view. Universities seek better records of the scholarly output
of their faculty, students, and research staff for use in promoting their reputations,
managing their resources, and evaluating people and departments. Research li-
braries see a role in curating the data produced by researchers in their universities
or other organizations, but may not wish to compete with repositories. Rather,
libraries are more likely to apply their expertise in information organization, cu-
ration, and discovery of orphan data.
Each of these stakeholders addressed their concerns independently until
2005 or so. As interest grew in data management plans, data sharing, reuse, and
citation, competing stakeholders began to see some common ground. Influential
policy documents helped to lay foundations for further discussion (Atkins et al.,
2003; Boulton et al., 2012; Bourne et al., 2011; CODATA-ICSTI Task Group on Data
Citation Standards and Practices, 2013; Hey & Trefethen, 2005; National Science
Board, 2005; Uhlir, 2012; Wood et al., 2010). Some of these documents were
consensus reports; others resulted from conferences and workshops on several
continents. Coalitions such as Force11 and RDA bring competing stakeholders to
the same table to discuss the future of scholarly communication, including access
to data (Borgman, 2015).
3.2 Defining Data
At the core of the data citation problem is the lack of agreement on what consti-
tutes data. Despite the plethora of policies and press about data, big and small,
little effort is devoted to defining these terms. This is not a newproblem. As Rosen-
berg (2013) comments, histories of science and epistemology tend tomention data
only in passing, if at all (Blair, 2010; Daston, 1988; Poovey, 1998; Porter, 1995).
Foundational works on themaking of meaning in science discuss facts, represen-
tations, inscriptions, andpublications,with little attention to data per se (Bowker,
2005; Latour, 1987, 1988, 1993; Latour &Woolgar, 1979). Bibliometricians, asmem-
bers of the information sciences, are well aware of the difficulties in defining “in-
formation” (Buckland, 1991; Case, 2002, 2012; Furner, 2010). Precise operational
definitions of the units being cited are necessary for bibliometrics, and particu-
larly for machine discovery of cited objects. Attempts to distinguish between data
and datasets have not achievedmuch clarity, as notions of the identity of datasets
pose other theoretical challenges (Agosti & Ferro, 2007; Renear & Dubin, 2003;
Renear, Sacchi, & Wickett, 2010).
The definition proposed elsewhere is suitable for discussions of bibliomet-
rics and data citation: Data refers to entities used as evidence of phenomena for
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the purposes of research or scholarship (Borgman, 2015). The advantages of this
definition are several. It recognizes the degree to which data may exist in the eye
of the beholder. One person’s signal is another’s noise. Thus, one set of entities
could be used for evidence of different phenomena for different purposes. In sci-
entific publications, authors may consider their data to be the tables and figures
presented, the cleaned and analyzed data set fromwhich those tables and figures
were derived, the initial “raw” observations from the field or instrument—or all or
none of these. Collaborators may reasonably disagree on what were the data from
any given field site, experiment, or study (Borgman, Wallis, & Mayernik, 2012).
Thence comes the problem of granularity. A data citation might refer to one or a
few observations, to a dataset assembled over the course of a career, or anything
in between. The essence of principle 7 is that citations can be made to whatever
unit of data is appropriate evidence in a particular case. The citation should be
unique, as stated in principle 4.
Thegranularity problemalso arises inbibliographic citations. Scientific styles
tend to cite entire documents, whereas humanities styles tend to cite individual
page numbers or passages. Often these variant forms can be reconciled if enough
metadata is provided; e.g., author, title, date, page numbers. While bibliometric
analyses often aggregate documents by author, institution, journal, date range,
or other elements, the unit of analysis is usually the cited document (Borgman,
1990). Similarly, most namespaces for publications are based on the publication
as the basic unit—ISBN, LCCN, DOI, etc. As DOIs are assigned to articles, to data,
and to individual tables and figureswithin articles, identification and retrieval are
further complicated. Determining the “version of record” is ever more difficult in
digital environments. The technological solution may be to reconcile “versions of
the record” (Van de Sompel, 2013).
3.3 Provenance
Principles 4 and 5, on unique identification and access, and principle 8, on in-
teroperability and flexibility, indicate the need for provenance information. Data
citations can facilitate provenance, but may not be able to incorporate all the nec-
essary content and context. Provenance is both more and less than metadata. It
involves the origin and history of something, and documentation of the chain of
evidence, custody, and relationships to other entities (Borgman, 2015; Buneman,
Khanna,& Tan, 2001; Carata et al., 2014; Groth, Gil, Cheney, &Miles, 2012; Groth&
Moreau, 2013).
Rarely can data be interpreted without provenance information such as re-
search methods, protocols, and the software necessary to open a file or run the
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program. Data continue to change form and meaning as they are processed,
mined, aggregated, and disaggregated. The farther that reusers are from the
origins of data, whether in terms of time, theory, geography, domain, or other
factors, the more reliant they may be on provenance documentation. Provenance
records may provide the information necessary to interpret, trust, or determine
the legal rights to reuse, repurpose, or combine datasets—the evidentiary chain. If
data creators are to receive credit through citation, that credit must carry forward
through subsequent reprocessing. Sustaining the provenance chain is a daunting
technical challenge. Provenance chains will evolve over time as more relation-
ships are accrued and as links break. Provenance may also pose the greatest
theoretical challenge, as authors, readers, and later analysts encounter substan-
tially different aggregations of objects over time (Pepe, Mayernik, Borgman, &
Van de Sompel, 2010).
3.4 Releasing, Sharing, and Reusing Data
Authors cite evidence that is available to readers, so readers can evaluate that ev-
idence. Thus, determining what data to cite is partly a function of what data are
released andmade publicly available. Little is understood about what data schol-
ars choose to share or about how, when, and why they reuse data. Data sharing
and reuse are topics ripe for research and theorizing (Borgman, 2012, 2015).
Theoretical questions persist aboutwhat objects scholars choose to cite in any
given publication or about themeaning of individual citations, despite decades of
empirical research and theoretical development (Cronin, 1981). Citation practices
are more learned than taught. Publication manuals and “instructions to authors”
in journals provide explicit instructions on how to cite sources in specific styles,
but offer little guidance on what to cite. One commonality among data citation
practice, data sharing, and reuse is that these are localized behaviors that are dif-
ficult to articulate.
Data sharing and reuse rest heavily on trust between the parties involved.
Data repositories are intermediaries in the trust relationship between those who
give data and those who receive. Data citation is one mechanism to document
those relationships. Citing data already stored in repositories is the “low hanging
fruit” for data citation, and a starting point for initiatives such as DataCite (Dat-
aCite, 2013). Unique andpersistent identifiers, stable andpersistent links between
related digital objects, digital signatures that verify the integrity of digital objects,
and similar mechanisms contribute to the trust fabric. No matter how sophisti-
cated the technology, trust is based in the individuals and the social institutions
involved (Blanchette, 2012).
Data Citation as a Bibliometric Oxymoron | 103
The ability to share and reuse data rests on early decisions about how to de-
scribe and manage them. The earlier in the process that scholars document data
in ways that make them reusable, the better they can represent them as citable
objects. Data citationmechanisms can support these functions, although individ-
ual citations, per se, are unlikely to carry enough information to interpret data or
to document provenance.
3.5 Credit
Assigning credit for data is even more problematic than is assigning credit for au-
thoring publications. Contemporary authorship is negotiated with collaborators
or determined by the policy of the parent organization. Policies of publishers and
journals also may influence the designation of author or contributor roles. No-
tions of authorship credit appear to vary widely between domains, as Cronin has
shown (Cronin, 1984, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2008; Davenport & Cronin, 2001).
Policies at CERN, for example, are intended to provide authorship credit for early
contributions to data collection, thus conflating credit for data and for publica-
tion (Mele, 2013). In space-based astronomy missions, decisions about what data
to collect, how to collect them, and how to process them are made many years
before researchers use those data in publications. Data papers and instrument
papers are the means by which those involved early in the process get credit for
their contributions. By the time those data are used by later astronomers, individ-
uals responsible for creating the data may be invisible, anonymous, or departed
(Borgman, 2015).
In smaller teams, authorship is negotiated, but credit for data is not usually
part of the discussion. “Authorship” is not terminology that resonates with schol-
ars when thinking about their data (Wallis, 2012; Wallis & Borgman, 2011). Data
may not be released because the responsibility for data is so diffuse that no indi-
vidual is empowered or motivated to do so. The larger the collaboration, the less
familiarity the principal investigator (PI) may have with the specifics of the data
collection, and the greater likelihood that the PI has the long-term responsibil-
ity for a diffuse organization. The students and post-doctoral fellows who have
the most intimate knowledge of the data have the highest turnover rate as team
members. The PI may be responsible for stewardship of the data, which deserves
credit. Those who have the most intimate familiarity with the data possess tacit
knowledge that is necessary for interpretation, which also deserves credit. Exper-
tise, responsibility, and authorship are not equivalent with respect to data; it is
unclear how credit should be allocated in each instance.
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The workshop conducted by the National Academies and the CODATA-ICSTI
Task Group sought input from many stakeholders about how to assign credit for
data.While the starting assumptionwas that scholars cared themost about receiv-
ing credit for their data, it became clear over the two days of discussion that many
other parties also wanted credit: funding agencies who supported the research;
data repositories who acquire, curate, and release data; university research offi-
cers; and other data providers (Uhlir, 2012). Authors want credit for citations to
their publications, as these are currency for hiring and advancement; thus, cit-
ing publications as surrogates for the data reported in them suits the interests
of most authors. If datasets are cited instead of publications, authors may have
disincentives for citing data. Researchers usually receive more credit for citations
to peer-reviewed publications than for other activities such as teaching, editorial
work, or service. Where citations to data, or to other non-peer-reviewed objects,
fall on this credit spectrum is unknown, but it appears that any practice that risks
diluting credit for publications may be viewed with suspicion.
3.6 Attribution of Sources
Attribution of the sources for data is equally problematic to credit. Agencies pro-
viding data commonly do so under licenses that constrain who can use the data,
for what purposes, for how long, and with what attribution (Pearson, 2012). Re-
searchers often place restrictions on the sharing and reuse of their data, whether
by licensing or other means. They may require a specific citation to data. If they
use Creative Commons licenses, they may specify whether the dataset (or other
object) may be used only as a whole or whether in parts, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, and the form of attribution required (Creative Commons,
2013). While the desire for control is understandable, due to concerns for intellec-
tual property, credit, and misuse or misinterpretation, attribution requirements
complicate reuse considerably. Licensing also makes the process of combining
and reusing data more complex, if attributions must be carried forward in prove-
nance records (Guibault, 2013).
Due to these complications, many have argued for the open release of data
without licensing restrictions, or for direct release into thepublic domain (Murray-
Rust, Neylon, Pollock, & Wilbanks, 2010; Nielsen, 2011; Wilbanks, 2013). Releas-
ing data openly without restrictions and without requiring credit or attribution
certainly simplifies data sharing and reuse. However, it runs counter to the inter-
ests of most scholars. Documenting data for reuse often requires considerable in-
vestment of resources. Data can be assets to be controlled, protected, exchanged,
and bartered for other resources, including academic posts (Borgman, 2015; Hil-
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gartner & Brandt-Rauf, 1994; Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1979). Credit and
attribution may be insufficient rewards for scholars to relinquish those assets or
to expose themselves to potential liabilities associated with reuse.
3.7 Discovery
While discovery is not mentioned explicitly in the data citation principles, it is
implicit throughout. Describing data in sufficient detail to ensure unique iden-
tification, persistence, specificity, verifiability, and interoperability will improve
their discovery. Discovery is a precondition for gaining access to the desired data
or other objects (principle 5). Similar requirements apply in using bibliometrics
to discover, locate, and retrieve publications (Cronin, 2014; Kousha & Thelwall,
2014). In principle 4, “machine actionability” implies that a citation should sup-
port machine discovery of data. Rather than a citation providing enough informa-
tion to search the shelves of a library, it should have embedded links that allow
direct access to the referenced object. Digital object identifiers (DOIs), in combi-
nation with technical standards such as OpenURL and publisher-led initiatives
such as CrossRef, facilitate machine actionability from citations in online articles
to cited articles. However, many such links, whether for publications or for data,
lead to a landing pagewhere a human can identify the object of interest.When the
searcher is a computer, these discovery mechanisms fail (Van de Sompel, 2012).
A goal for the next generation of search technologies, especially for data discov-
ery, is to support machine actionable links for entire provenance chains (Bech-
hofer et al., 2010; CrossRef, 2009, 2014; Klein et al., 2014; Pepe et al., 2010; Sander-
son & Van de Sompel, 2012; Simons, 2012; Van de Sompel, 2015; Van de Sompel,
Hochstenbach, & Beit-Arie, 2000; Van de Sompel & Lagoze, 2009).
At present, most data discovery appears to be a fairly manual process. Indi-
viduals identify data of interest by reading papers or by searching repositories.
Discovery can be improved by more extensive description of data, figures, tables,
and other elements in publications. Such descriptions can be accommodated by
open annotation systems that facilitate interoperability across systems, which
includes synchronizing links to related resources (Ciccarese, Ocana, & Clark,
2012; Das et al., 2009; Foster &Moreau, 2006; Hunter, 2009; Van de Sompel et al.,
2012). These approaches may be effective to the extent that document enrich-
ment survives the publication process. Publishers tend to “flatten out” submitted
documents by reducing them to portable document format (PDF), which is a
proprietary standard, for ingest to their systems. In that process, they usually
strip annotations, citation records stored in the document by bibliographic ref-
erencing tools, and other features that support machine actions. New platforms,
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unencumberedby legacypublishing systems,may enrich research objects inways
that support more robust discovery and more complex document structures.
Initiatives such as DataCite, Schema.org, and Object Reuse and Exchange are
developingmetadata schema for data. Search engines,whichhave largely ignored
metadata andother formsof document enrichment, are implementingmore struc-
tured methods. Provenance graphs are essential for data management at scale
(DiLauro, 2013). Approaches that publish graphs of object relationships will aid
both discovery and bibliometrics. Proprietary control of these graphs will hide
those chains of evidence from other programs, users, and bibliometricians. To the
extent that these metadata schema are adopted, and especially to the extent that
graphs are open, they should aid in discovery of research data (DataCite, 2014;
“Object Reuse and Exchange,” 2014; Schema.org, 2012; World Wide Web Consor-
tium (W3C), 2013). However, individual researchers tend to invest very little effort
in providing metadata or other curatorial description to their data to make them
usable for others. Labor and skill requirements to do so are high and incentives
are low. Because digital data are far less self-describing than are textual objects
such as publications, discovery depends heavily on metadata. Thus data citation
is implicitly a means to improve the discovery of data (Borgman, 2015).
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Data are not equivalent to publications, hence data citation is not equivalent
to bibliographic citation. However, theories of bibliographic citation are useful
in thinking about what data citation is, or could be. The most fundamental dis-
tinction between bibliographic objects and data is the degree of independence.
Bibliometrics—including scientometrics, informetrics, webometrics, altmetrics,
and other variants—are used to model relationships between objects that can be
treated as independent entities, whether web pages or tweets. Data, however,
rarely can be interpreted as independent objects. Most are meaningless without
links to contextual information, software, and related objects. The scope and
identity of a dataset vary along multiple dimensions. Without agreements on
what constitutes data in any given instance, it is difficult to count or compare
the uses of those data. Empirical and theoretical work on what are data, how
those data are used, how data are aggregated and disaggregated, and when and
how they are cited as sources of evidence are avenues ripe for exploration at the
intersection of scholarly communication and bibliometrics.
Blaise Cronin was among the first to call for a theory of citation behavior, as
so little is understood about the purposes for which an object is cited (Cronin,
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1981). Data citation exacerbates that theoretical challenge. References to articles
are sometimes surrogates for citing the data within them. When data sets are ac-
cessible, those canbe cited. Later authorswhouse those datamay cite the dataset,
a larger dataset or repository from which the data were drawn, articles in which
the datasetswere discussed, or some combination of these. Early efforts to classify
the purposes for individual citations revealed that article citations are sometimes
data citations (Lipetz, 1965; White, 1982). When data are cited, it is often not in
the reference list, but buried in footnotes, URLs, or mentions in text. The diffi-
culty of identifying citations to data is not new, but demands to standardize and
promulgate data citation increase the urgency of addressing the problem.
Distinguishing between data citation and data use is another thorny theoreti-
cal challenge. The few studies on data reuse indicate that scientifically important
uses of data may not be mentioned or cited in publications (Palmer, Weber, &
Cragin, 2011; Wallis et al., 2013; Wynholds et al., 2012). The reasons for lack of
citation are many. One is that data citation is not (yet) common scholarly prac-
tice. Another may be that many sources are used in research, but few are cited.
Views, downloads, library reshelving statistics, and other measures of use tend
not to correlate well with citations of those same items (Bollen, Van de Sompel, &
Rodriguez, 2008; Haustein, 2014; Kousha & Thelwall, 2014; Thelwall, Haustein,
Larivière, & Sugimoto, 2013). Again, it has long been known that reading, library
use, and citation are different behaviors. How those differences translate to the
use, reuse, and citing of data is unexplored territory.
Another opportunity for theory building in bibliometrics posed by data cita-
tion is the changing notion of authorship. While authorship was never a stable
concept, as Blaise Cronin has shown (Cronin, 1981, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008,
2013, 2014; Davenport & Cronin, 2000), practical concerns for credit and attribu-
tion have focused largely on the roles of individuals in scholarly communication.
Some journals ask for precise descriptions of the contributions of each named au-
thor; e.g., writing, data collection, data analysis, instrumentation, and manage-
ment (Committee on Publication Ethics, 2013; Harvard University and Wellcome
Trust, 2012). The work associated with collecting, cleaning, analyzing, managing,
and reporting data is essential to the conduct of scholarly research, but that work
is not necessarily equivalent to authorship. How these roles should be credited in
data citation, and how they should be weighted in contributions to scholarship
are open questions. The labor associated with data management and software
engineering tends to be lower in status than the scientific work that leads to peer-
reviewed papers (Darch et al., 2015).
Lastly, the intersection of data citation and scholarly communication is an
example of the uneasy fit between structure and process in scholarly communi-
cation. While research on process should inform research on structure, and vice
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versa, rarely do these approaches intersect (Lievrouw, 1990). Bibliometrics and
their brethren address structural relationships in scholarly communication. The
validity of these analyses rests on understanding the processes by which these
structures arise and evolve. A better understanding of the processes associated
with the creation, use, and reuse of data, should lead to the design of better data
citation mechanisms.
Bibliometricians are in an ideal position to contribute to—and to learn from—
the development of theory and practice in data citation. The caveat is in the title of
this chapter. Bibliometrics, strictly speaking, are based on publications. Data are
not publications, therefore data citation is something other than bibliometrics.
However, data most certainly are objects exchanged in scholarly communication.
Theoretical approaches to data citation must accommodate the ways in which
data differ from publications. Data tend to be compound objects with unclear
boundaries, whereas publications can be treated as independent objects with
clear boundaries, at least for the purpose of bibliometrics. Data usually consist
of multiple objects that are interdependent, with relationships that often are
unstable and difficult to document. Theory and methods from bibliometrics,
scientometrics, and webometrics can be used to study the characteristics of these
relationships and how they evolve over time. The “catch-22” is that it will be
difficult to model these relationships until units of data are sufficiently docu-
mented to be traceable. This is an opportune moment for those concerned with
data, scholarly communication, knowledge infrastructures, and bibliometrics to
explore common ground. Blaise Cronin has laid the foundation that allows this
conversation to move forward.
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Part III: Statistical theories

Jonathan Furner
Type–Token Theory and Bibliometrics
1 Introduction
The terms “type” and “token” were introduced by the American pragmatist
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) in 1906 (Peirce, 1906, pp. 505–
506). Peirce’s distinction has proven useful in various fields as amodel of the sup-
posedly pervasive relationship between repeatable, instantiable, abstract objects
(such as the single word “the”) and their concrete instances (such as the numer-
ous individual occurrences of that word).While the importance of probability the-
ory for quantitative analyses of people’s document-handling activities—analyses,
for example, of the productivity of authors, or the citedness of publications—has
long been recognized, the common understanding that the probability distri-
butions of values of bibliometric variables may be treated as distributions of
sets of tokens over sets of types (i.e., publications over authors, or citations over
publications) is a more recent phenomenon, dating back only to the 1980s. The
goal of this paper is to examine critically the assumption that the application of
type–token theory to bibliometrics is warranted.
In the second section, the metaphysical foundations of type–token theory
are reviewed, and a distinction is made between two different, though possibly
complementary understandings of the type–token relationship: one inwhich this
relationship is conceived as roughly equivalent to that between kinds and individ-
uals, and another in which occurrences are identified as forming a third category
that consists of neither types nor tokens.
In the third section, the history is traced of attempts to apply type–token the-
ory in empirical studies of language use (in the field of quantitative linguistics)
and document use (in the field of quantitative bibliography, i.e., bibliometrics).
This section begins with an overview of some of the assumptions made and nota-
tion used in the description of probability distributions in general, and power-law
distributions in particular. The discovery (and regular rediscovery) of a power-law
regularity in the distribution of word-tokens over word-types—usually known as
Zipf’s lawofword frequency—ishighlightedas oneof themost important catalysts
for the development of bibliometrics as a scientific endeavor.
Lastly, in the final section, the utility and impact of the application of type–
token theory to bibliometrics is assessed, and the prospects for future develop-
ments evaluated. An analogy is drawn between the type–token distinction and a
work–item distinction that is commonly made in the field of library cataloging.
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The conclusion is reached that, while the importance of the type–token distinc-
tion for bibliometrics has at times been overplayed, a few opportunities for broad-
ening the scope of type–token bibliometrics remain under-explored, not least in
the analysis of the structure of large collections of bibliographic records.
2 Types and Tokens in Metaphysics
“Theworld is everything that is the case.” Howmanywords? Eight, if we’re count-
ingword-tokens; six, if we’re countingword-types, since twoof thoseword-types—
“the” and“is”—occur twice. Eachword-token stands for, signifies, represents, and
denotes a particular word-type—viz., the type whose essential formal features are
shared by the token. Tokens are said to instantiate types; they exemplify, embody,
manifest, fall under, belong to types; they’re occurrences, instances, members of
types. Tokens are treated as individuals, singles, particulars, substances, objects;
they’re concrete, real, material. Types, on the other hand, are like sorts, kinds,
forms, properties, classes, sets, universals; they’re said to be abstract, ideal, im-
material.
The relationship between types and tokens is sometimes characterized as on-
tologically fundamental, in that the two categories are among those that comprise
the basic elements of reality.¹ How is the type–token relationship precisely to be
distinguished from other dichotomies said to be ontologically fundamental, such
as the kind–individual relationship? The goal of this first section is to suggest
one way in which types and tokens may be distinguished from properties and
substances, kinds and individuals, abstracta and concreta, and universals and
particulars. We begin by describing each of these dichotomies in turn.
2.1 Properties and substances
Some metaphysicians describe a world comprised of properties and substances.
Typically, a thing X is said to be a property iff² there is something Y such that X
is predicable of (i.e., is attributable to, is characteristic of) Y; X is a substance iff
there is something Y such that Y is predicable of X. A few examples of properties
1 SeeWetzel (2006, 2009) for comprehensive overviews of philosophical approaches to the study
of concepts of type and token.
2 i.e., if and only if.
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are redness, wisdom, andmeaningfulness; those things that are red, wise, mean-
ingful, etc. (i.e., that “have the property of” being red, wise, meaningful, etc.) are
substances.
2.2 Kinds and individuals
Some metaphysicians describe a world comprised of kinds (a.k.a. categories,
classes, sorts) and individuals. A thing X is a kind “iff there is something Y such
that Y is an instance of X and Y is distinct from X”; while X is an individual “iff
X is an instance of something Y (other than itself) and X itself has no instances
(other than itself)” (Lowe, 1983, pp. 50–51). For example, the mountain kind is
instantiated by individualmountains, the artifact kind by individual artifacts, the
kind kind by individual kinds, and so on.
For any kind X—the mountain kind, the artifact kind, the kind kind, or any
other kind—we may ask: What are the individually necessary and jointly suffi-
cient identity conditions for instances of that kind? To put it this way is actually to
conflate two separate questions:³
1. What properties individuate (i.e., serve to distinguish) all instances of that
kind from all instances of a different kind? For example: On what criteria are
mountains to be distinguished from non-mountains? Among the properties
that have been suggested as such criteria are high elevation, high relative re-
lief, steep slope gradient, large land volume, small summit area, and short
inter-valley distance.⁴
2. What properties individuate any instance of that kind fromany other instance
of the same kind? For example: On what criteria is any one mountain to be
distinguished from any other mountain (assuming we have already identi-
fied both as instantiations of the mountain kind)? The single property that is
most commonly suggested as such a criterion is that of each instance’s precise
spatio-temporal coordinates (i.e., being located in a specific spatio-temporal
position).
3 Some authorsmake a distinction between individuation conditions (addressed by the first ques-
tion) and identity conditions (addressed by the second question).
4 See, e.g., Gerrard (1990, pp. 3–5); for the limitations of this approach, however, see Smith and
Mark (2003).
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2.3 Abstracta and concreta
Some metaphysicians describe a world comprised of abstracta (a.k.a. abstract
objects) and concreta (a.k.a. concrete objects). Treating concreta as a kind—i.e.,
the concretum kind—wemay ask:What are the individually necessary and jointly
sufficient identity conditions for instances of that kind? Among the properties
that are commonly said to distinguish instances of the concretum kind from in-
stances of other kinds are the following: (a) materiality: i.e., being constituted by
matter; (b) spatio-temporality: i.e., occupying space and persisting through time;
(c) causal efficacy: i.e., having the capacity to enter into causal relationships;
(d) endurability: i.e., having the capacity to undergo and survive change; and
(e) physical form: i.e., having size, shape, and color. The single property that
is most commonly said to distinguish individual concreta from one another is—
as in the case of individuals—the precise spatio-temporal coordinates of each
concretum.
2.4 Universals and particulars
It is no trivial matter to determine the precise nature of the relationships between
the property–substance distinction, the kind–individual distinction, and the
abstractum–concretum distinction. Are any two of these six purportedly funda-
mental categories identical? For example, are the categories of kinds and proper-
ties equivalent, such that X is a kind iff X is a property? At first, it might seem as if
this situation would only be complicated further if we were to allow an additional
distinction to be made between universals and particulars. It is rare, however, for
the universal–particular distinction to be characterized in a uniquely different
way from all others. Some metaphysicians define universals in the same way as
they do properties, and particulars in the same way as substances; others define
universals in the same way as they do kinds, and particulars in the same way as
individuals. An anonymous contributor to a standard dictionary of philosophy
takes the former approach, for example;⁵ while Jonathan Lowe (2006) is one who
takes the latter route, constructing a “four-category ontology” in which substan-
tial universals (e.g., themountain kind) are instantiatedby substantial particulars
(e.g., individual mountains), and non-substantial universals (e.g., redness) are
instantiated by non-substantial particulars (e.g., the redness of my shirt).
5 “Things are particulars and their qualities are universals. So a universal is the property predi-
cated of all the individuals of a certain sort or class. Redness is a universal, predicated of all red
objects.” (Flew 1979, p. 334).
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2.5 Types and tokens
Again, adding the type–token distinction to the mix might appear to complicate
the situation even further. Is the type kind identical to the property kind, the kind
kind, the abstractum kind, and/or the universal kind? And is the token kind iden-
tical to the substance kind, the individual kind, the concretum kind, and/or the
particular kind? To address these questions, it is instructive to turn to the origi-
nator of the type–token distinction in the form in which it has been understood
since the early twentieth century.
Writing in 1906, Peirce introduced the terms type, token, tone, and instance,
defining them in the following way:
A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count
the number of words.⁶ There will ordinarily be about twenty thes on a page, and of course
they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word ‘word,’ however, there is but one
word ‘the’ in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on
a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event.
It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form,
I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited
to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one
instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where
it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book,
I will venture to call a Token. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can
neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a Tone. In order that a
Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and
thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance
of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type ‘the’ on a page.
(Peirce, 1906, pp. 505–506; emphases in original)
As might be expected, Peirce draws his examples of types and tokens from the
domain of semeiotic, his theory of signs. Presentations of the concept of sign, fre-
quently varying in some large or small respect, abound in his papers; but one
recurrent idea is amodel relating entities of three kinds—objects, representamina,
and interpretants. A representamen is a sign standing for some object; and an in-
terpretant is a separate sign, for the same object, that is created “in the mind of a
person” by a representamen (Peirce, 1897/1932, p. 228). “Representamen,” “inter-
pretant,” and “object” may be understood as corresponding loosely to “symbol”
(or “term,” “signal”), “thought” (or “concept,” “sense”), and “referent,” respec-
tively, in later formulations of semiotic triangles by others.⁷
6 Peirce’s footnote in the original: “Dr. Edward Eggleston originated the method.”
7 See Cronin (2000) for discussion of a bibliometric application of Peirce’s sign triad.
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For Peirce, each word “on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a
book” is a “Single” object. All “Single” (i.e., individual) objects or events are to
be known as tokens; types are “definitely significant Form[s]” that “determine”
(or are “embodied” by) tokens; and the type that a token embodies is the type
of which that token is said to be an instance.⁸ Both token and type are said to
“signify”: A token is a sign both of the type of which it is an instance, and of the
“object” signified by the type. It may be tempting to infer from this that “token”
and “type” should be understood merely as synonyms for “representamen” and
“interpretant,” respectively. Such a reading is undermined by at least two factors,
however.
One relatively insignificant objection is that “object” seems to be used in at
least two different ways in the quoted passage—to refer both to the kind of thing
that a token is, and to the kind of thing that is signified by both token and type—
whereas it is not the primary function of representamina to stand for themselves.
The second difficulty is more important to address. Peirce talks of “twenty
Instances of the Type ‘the’ on a page,” and of the multiple occurrences of words
“on…a single page of a single copy of a book.” But he does not clarify how we
should count the words on the pages of multiple copies of the same book. For
example: Suppose we have two copies of the same page from the same book, each
copy showing twenty instances of “the.” Do we have forty instances of “the” in
total, or still only twenty?⁹
The source of this difficulty is that there is a difference between instantiation-
by-tokenization and instantiation-by-occurrence. In the case of the two copies of
the same page from the same book, for example, we may count twenty tokens
of the type “the,” while simultaneously counting forty occurrences. The type–
occurrence relationship would appear to correspond to the kind–individual re-
lationship discussed earlier; the type–token relationship, on the other hand, is
something new. To reduce ambiguity, then, “token” should be used as a name for
the products of events of only one of these two kinds of instantiation, not both.
It would appear that Peirce’s type–token distinction is orthogonal, rather
than equivalent, to his representamen–interpretant distinction. In the quoted
passage, the focus is on representamina, and on simple linguistic symbols in
particular: strictly speaking, the definitions given are of “word-type” and “word-
token.” We should be alert to the possibility of the type–token distinction’s
applying not only to words, but also to (a) more-complex linguistic symbols such
8 On other occasions, Peirce used “sinsign” instead of “token,” and “legisign” instead of “type.”
9 Williams (1936)wasoneof thefirst to stress the significanceof this ambiguity, buthis resolution
is different from the one presented here.
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as sentences; (b) aggregates of linguistic symbols such as the full texts of books
and other textual documents; (c) non-symbolic signs such as icons and indexes;¹⁰
(d) interpretants—concepts, propositions, beliefs, and other mental states; and
(e) objects or referents (including events, properties, relationships, and states of
affairs)—both natural and artifactual.
In this light, the type–token relationship begins to look a little more like the
kind–individual relationship. That there is a difference, however, is demonstra-
ble if we return to the token–occurrence contrast noted above. The latter distinc-
tion makes sense only when applied to signs. We can distinguish sensibly among
word-types, word-tokens, and word-occurrences, but not among bird-types, bird-
tokens, and bird-occurrences. To extend the type–token distinction to referents in
general would, it seems, be one step too far.
We are left, then, with one view of the world in which kinds (e.g., the bird
kind) are instantiated by individuals (e.g., Alex the parrot, 1976–2007¹¹ ); and an-
other in which types (e.g., the word “bird,” and the book Bird by Bird by Anne
Lamott) are instantiated by tokens (e.g., the seventeenth word of this paragraph,
and the 1994 edition of Lamott’s work), which in turn are instantiated by occur-
rences (e.g., the set of ink marks on my print-out of this paper, and my copy of
the book). These two viewsmay easily be reconciled if we equate kinds and types,
equate individuals and occurrences, and allow for intermediate tokenization of
signs only.
We shall return to this interpretation after considering, in the next section,
the role of the type–token distinction in statistical linguistics and statistical bibli-
ography. As a preliminary to that discussion, it may be helpful first to review some
theoretical, conceptual, and terminological aspects of the statistical approach.
10 Peirce (1911/1998, pp. 460–461) defined threemain classes of sign: icons, “which serve to rep-
resent their objects only in so far as they resemble them in themselves”; indices, “which represent
their objects independently of any resemblance to them, only by virtue of real connections with
them”; and symbols, “which represent their objects, independently alike of any resemblance or
any real connection, because dispositions or factitious habits of their interpreters insure their
being so understood.”
11 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_(parrot)
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3 Types and Tokens in Linguistics and
Bibliometrics
3.1 Power-Law Distributions
The field of statistics is concerned with random variables, i.e., observable prop-
erties (of events, cases, etc.) whose values are not predictable. Random variables
whose possible values may be specified in a list of finite length are known as dis-
crete; those that can take any numerical value are known as continuous.
In statistics, a probability distribution is “a description of the possible values
of a random variable, and of the probabilities of occurrence of these values” (Up-
ton & Cook, 2008). Any probability distribution is specifiable by a function pX(x)
that relates each possible value x to the probability of occurrence P(X = x) of that
value—a.k.a. a probability mass function (pmf) for discrete variables, or a prob-
ability density function (pdf) for continuous variables. For the discrete random
variable X whose possible values are x1, x2, x3, . . . , xM, where MX is the total
number of possible values, the pmf pX(x) may be given by fx = nx/NX, where
nx is the absolute frequency of occurrences of the value x, NX is the total number
of events, and fx is thus the relative frequency of occurrences of the value x. To
visualize in graphical form the probability distribution specified by such a pmf,
one might simply plot values of the variable X on the abscissa (x-axis) of a his-
togram, against the absolute frequencies of occurrence nx of each value on the
ordinate (y-axis).¹² This way of characterizing a probability distribution, however,
says nothing about the properties of the relation between values of X and their ex-
pected frequencies of occurrence; as a result, a probability distribution function
typically specifies such a relation explicitly. Some commonly instantiated types
of probability distribution include the discrete uniform distribution (which de-
scribes, for example, the rolls of a fair die; pmf pX(x) = 1/MX), the normal or
Gaussian distribution¹³ (which describes, for example, people’s heights), and the
Pareto distribution¹⁴ (which describes, for example, people’s incomes).
A number of different methods of classifying general families of distributions
have been defined by statisticians. Some distributions (e.g., the uniform and
normal distributions) are symmetric; others (e.g., the Pareto distribution) are
12 This presentation assumes the “frequency” interpretation of probability due to Venn (1876;
see also Hájek, 2011), which defines a value’s probability as the limit of its relative frequency in
a large number of trials.
13 Named for the German mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777–1855).
14 Named for the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923; see Pareto, 1895, 1896/1965).
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asymmetric, a.k.a. skewed. Among the skew distributions, some (e.g., the Pareto
distribution) are heavy-tailed (i.e., they have tails that are longer and/or fatter
than the tail of an exponential distribution); while others are light-tailed (i.e.,
they have tails that are shorter and/or thinner). The Zipf (a.k.a. zeta) distribution
(pmf pX(x) = c ⋅ x−a, where a and c are constants whose values depend on
context)¹⁵—like the skewed, heavy-tailed Pareto distribution of which it is the
discrete version—is an example of a power-law distribution. In general, power-
law distributions describe variables where events characterized by a large x are
so rare, and events characterized by a small x are so common, that the probability
of occurrence of a given value x is inversely proportional to a power (i.e., a in the
pmf given above) of that value.
Power-law distribution functions can be fitted to empirical datasets on many
different kinds of phenomena, both natural and social.¹⁶ Power-law relationships
have been observed not only in distributions of incomes of people, but also in dis-
tributions of magnitudes of earthquakes, populations of settlements, frequencies
of occurrence of words, productivities of authors, and frequencies of occurrence
of journal titles in bibliographic references or citations, among many others; see
Table 1 for a summary.¹⁷
The last three in this list (again among others) have long been studied by
bibliometricians interested in applying statistical techniques as ameans of under-
standing people’s document-related activities. Which words are used the most in
German-language publications? Who in the field of biochemistry has been cited
most often by philosophers? In which journals have papers about nanotechnol-
ogymost frequently appeared? These are a small sample of the kinds of questions
that may be answered simply by counting the number of times each value of a de-
fined variable occurs in a given bibliographic dataset, and then comparing those
counts to find the most frequently occurring values. Various bibliometric “laws”,
implying the existence of some sort of causal relationship between the values
of a variable and their probabilities of occurrence, have been proposed as deter-
minants of the distributions of probabilities—Zipf’s law of word frequency (Zipf,
1929, 1932, 1935, 1949), Lotka’s law of scientific productivity (Lotka, 1926), and
Bradford’s law of scattering (Bradford, 1934) are traditionally the “big three”—
but it should always be borne in mind that here we are observing mere statistical
15 Named for the American linguist George Kingsley Zipf (1902–1950; see Zipf, 1929, 1932, 1935,
1949).
16 The degree of “goodness of fit” may be calculated by comparing the observed data with the
data that would be expected if the function were accurate.
17 See Newman (2005) and Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009) for comprehensive reviews of
the properties of power-law distributions and their occurrence in the natural and social worlds.
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regularity, or conformance to patterns, not the operation of laws in anyway analo-
gous to the laws of physics. In any case, it is even debatable which (if any) of these
empirical datasets really are best-fitted by a power-law distribution, regardless of
the values that are computed for its parameters. In some cases, the regularities
observed are characteristic only of the middle range of the values of the defined
variable, while some other distribution (e.g., the lognormal distribution) is a bet-
ter fit for values in the upper or lower range.
Tab. 1: Some empirical phenomena that purportedly follow a power-law distribution.
Common name
(if applicable)
Early sources Classes Events Event-count
The Pareto law Pareto (1895,
1896/1965)
Persons Dollars Wealth
The rank–size rule Auerbach (1916) Settlements People Population
Zipf’s law Estoup (1916);
Condon (1928);
Zipf (1929, 1932,
1935, 1949)
Words Occurrences Occurrence-count
The Willis–Yule
distribution
Willis & Yule
(1922)
Taxa Subtaxa Subtaxon-count
Lotka’s law Lotka (1926) Authors Publications Productivity
Bradford’s law Bradford (1934,
1948); Vickery
(1948)
Journals Citations Citedness
The Gutenberg–
Richter law
Ishimoto & Iida
(1938); Guten-
berg & Richter
(1944)
Earthquakes Joules Magnitude
The species
abundance
distribution (SAD)¹⁸
Corbet (1941) Species Individual
organisms
Abundance
— Fleming & Kilgour
(1964)
Journals Uses Use-count
18 The distribution of individual organisms over species was originally modeled as a geometric
distribution (Motomura, 1932), and has since been modeled most frequently as either a logarith-
mic or a lognormal distribution.
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3.2 Three Different Terminological Approaches
The terminology used to discuss power-law distributions in general, and the bib-
liometric laws in particular, varies in accordance with the writer’s interpretation
of the nature of these distributions’ contexts.
One approach, as taken above, is to talk of sets of events (a.k.a. individuals,
cases, or objects), each characterized by a particular categorical variable (a.k.a
attribute, or property), which takes classes (a.k.a. kinds, or categories) as values.
We might say, “A set of events is distributed over a set of classes,” and tally the
events that constitute (belong to, are members of) each class, in order to produce
a set of class-specific event-counts that take numerical values nx representing the
size of each class.
An alternative is to speak of sets of items, each characterized by a particular
categorical variable that takes sources as values. We might say, “A set of items is
distributed over a set of sources,” and tally the itemsproduced (generated) by each
source, in order toproduce a set of source-specific item-counts that takenumerical
values nx representing the productivity of each source.
Thirdly, the terminology of classes and events (or sources and items) can be
mapped to types and tokens, so thatwe consider sets of tokens, each characterized
by a particular categorical variable that takes types as values.Wemight say, “A set
of tokens is distributed over a set of types,” and tally the tokens that signify (stand
for) each type, in order to produce a set of type-specific token-counts that take
numerical values x representing the incidence (a.k.a. prevalence) of each type.
3.3 Two Different Conceptual Approaches
The possibility that any presentation of a given distribution may involve any or
any combination of these terminological approaches is not the only potential
source of confusion for students of bibliometrics. The class/event relationship
manifested in any sample dataset can be represented by either or both of two
plots: a (class-)rank–(class-)size plot,¹⁹ in which classes of events are listed on the
x-axis in rank order (from largest to smallest), and the frequency of events in each
class plotted on the y-axis; and a (class-)size–(class-)frequency plot, in which the
various sizes of classes are listed on the x-axis (from smallest to largest), and the
frequency of classes of each size plotted on the y-axis.²⁰ The plots in Figures 1
19 A.k.a. a (class-)rank–(event-)frequency plot.
20 Rank–frequency and size–frequency plots are sometimes known as Zipfian and Lotkaian
plots, respectively, after the authors with whom they were originally associated.
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Fig. 1: A partial rank–size plot derived from
the data in Table 2.
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Fig. 2: A partial size–frequency plot derived
from the data in Table 2.
and 2 are derived from the data presented in Table 2. It is important to recognize
that the two plots “are not contradictory or competing descriptions; rather they
are complementary ways of summarizing the same data” (Herdan, 1960, p. 87).
In Figures 3 and 4, the same data is plotted on a double-log scale, producing the
straight line that is typical of power-law distributions.
To take the example of a random variable X, each value x of which is a dif-
ferent word-form: in a rank–size plot (e.g., Figure 1), the word-forms are listed
on the x-axis in descending order of frequency of occurrence (a.k.a. “size”), and
the frequency of occurrence of each word-form plotted on the y-axis; whereas in
a size–frequency plot, the various sizes of word-forms (i.e., the various frequen-
Type–Token Theory and Bibliometrics | 131
1
10
100
1000
1 10 100 1000
class-rank: rx
cla
ss
-s
ize
: x
Rank–size
on double-log scale
Fig. 3: The data from Figure 1 plotted on a
double-log scale.
1
10
100
1000
1 10 100 1000
Size–frequency
on double-log scale
cla
ss
-fr
eq
ue
nc
y:
 n
x
class-size: x
Fig. 4: The data from Figure 2 plotted on a
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cies of occurrence) are listed on the x-axis, and the frequency of word-forms of
each size plotted on the y-axis. In the case of the size–frequency plot (e.g., Fig-
ure 2), it is useful to think of class-sizes (e.g., the various possible frequencies of
word-occurrence) as classes in their own right, and word-forms as the individual
events in each class. In this way, we can conceive of the random variable X a little
differently, such that each of its values x is a different class-size (e.g., a different
frequency of word-occurrence).
Suppose, then, we are dealing with a population of N sources (e.g., word-
forms), for eachofwhichwe canobserve a value x of the randomvariable X, which
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x nx x ⋅ nx
1 271 271
2 53 106
3 23 69
4 13 52
5 8 40
6 6 36
7 4 28
8 3 24
9 2 18
10 2 20
11 2 22
12 1 12
13 2 26
14 1 14
15 1 15
17 1 17
18 1 18
20 1 20
21 1 21
22 1 22
25 1 25
29 1 29
33 1 33
40 1 40
50 1 50
67 1 67
100 1 100
200 1 200
Sum 404 1374
Tab. 2: Sample data consistent with a power-law distribution.
Each value in the column headed x represents a different class-
size, and each value in the column headed nx is the number of
classes that have the corresponding size x. We might imagine
a text comprising 1374 word-occurrences, distributed over
404 word-forms, so that 271 of those word-forms occur once,
53 occur twice, and so on.
is equal to the number of items (e.g., word-occurrences) produced by that source,
i.e., the source’s productivity. In this context, we canmake the following observa-
tions, using notation similar to that adopted by Burrell (1991), among others.
The number of sources that each have a productivity of exactly x is given by
nx; the combined productivity of those sources that each have a productivity of
exactly x is given by x ⋅ nx; and the total productivity of all sources is given by
M = ∑ x ⋅ nx. The mean productivity (i.e., the average number of items per source)
is given by μ = M/N. The probability that a randomly selected source has a pro-
ductivity of exactly x is given by P(X = x) = fx = nx/N; and the probability that
a randomly selected item is the product of a source that has a productivity of ex-
actly x is given by gx = x ⋅ nx/M.
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The rank of a sourcewith a productivity of exactly x is given by rx, and is equal
to the number of sources that each have a productivity of at least x. The combined
productivity of those sources that each have a productivity of at least x is given
by Rx. The probability that a randomly selected source has a productivity of at
least x is given by P(X ≥ x) = Φx = rx / N, which is known as the tail distribution
function (tdf) of X. The probability that a randomly selected item is the product
of a source that has a productivity of at least x is given by Ψx = Rx / M, which is
known as the tail moment function (tmf) of X. PlottingΦx against Ψx for all values
of x produces a Leimkuhler curve²¹ (see Figure 5).
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Fig. 5: The Leimkuhler curve derived from
the data in Table 2.
The probability that a randomly selected source has a productivity of at most x
is given by P(X ≤ x) = 1 − Φx, which is known as the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of X. The probability that a randomly selected item is the product of
a source that has a productivity of at most x is given by 1−Ψx, which is known as
the cumulative moment function (cmf) of X. Plotting 1 − Φx against 1 − Ψx for all
values of x produces a Lorenz curve²² (see Figure 6).
The Leimkuhler andLorenz curves are graphical representations of inequality
(a.k.a., concentration, diversity, dispersion, richness). They allow us to find, for
any given fraction of the total number of sources, what fraction of the total num-
ber of items are accounted for—i.e., to make statements like “the least-frequently
occurring 50% of word-forms account for only 20% of word-occurrences,” or
21 Named for the American engineer Ferdinand F. Leimkuhler (b. 1928; see Leimkuhler, 1967).
22 Named for the American economist Max Otto Lorenz (1876–1959; see Lorenz, 1905).
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“the most-frequently occurring 10% of word-forms account for 70% of word-
occurrences.”WhenΦx = Ψx (and 1−Φx = 1−Ψx) for all values of x , the amount
of inequality is zero, and the curve is a straight line drawn from (0, 0) to (1, 1).
The Gini index²³ G is a single-valued measure of the inequality of a probability
distribution, given by the ratio of A (the area between the Leimkuhler [or Lorenz]
curve and the 45° line of equality) to A + B (the total area above [or below] that
line).²⁴
Having reviewed this statisticalmaterial,wearenowready to focusdirectly on
the role played by type–token theory in the development of statistical approaches
to linguistics and bibliography. We shall see that it is Zipf’s work, not Peirce’s,
which has proved the more influential in both domains.
3.4 Zipf, Peirce, and Type–Token Theory: A Historical View
Zipf’s law appears to have been first stated by the French stenographer Jean-
Baptiste Estoup (1868–1950), in French, in 1916 (Estoup, 1916; see also Lelu, 2014),
and first stated in English by E. U. Condon of Bell Telephone Labs in 1928. “While
studying some data on the relative frequency of use of different words in the
23 Named for the Italian statistician Corrado Gini (1884–1965; see Gini, 1914).
24 The Gini index G (a.k.a. Gini coefficient) is equivalent to Herdan’s “Lorenz factor” L (Herdan,
1960, pp. 48–50). Herdan points out (p. 50, emphasis in original) that “for the lognormal distri-
bution the Lorenz factor depends only upon the value of the logarithmic standard deviation, σ and
can be read off immediately from a numerical table giving values of L for specified values of σ,”
characterizing this result as one “of great importance” for quantitative linguistics.
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English language,” writes Condon (1928, p. 300), “I noticed a rather interesting
functional relationship…”
The Harvard linguist George Kingsley Zipf (1902–1950) developed the idea in
a series of publications, beginning in 1929 with his doctoral dissertation, “Rel-
ative frequency as a determinant of phonetic change” (published as Zipf, 1929),
in which, acknowledging the help of Estoup, he proposes (p. 4) a phonological
“Principle of Frequency”: the ease with which a word may be pronounced is “in-
versely proportionate to the relative frequency of that word… among its fellow
words… in the stream of spoken language.” In other words, “as usage becomes
more frequent, form becomes…more easily pronounceable.” Zipf uses statistical
data on the frequency of occurrence of words supplied by Godfrey Dewey’s Rela-
tiv [sic] Frequency of English Speech Sounds,²⁵ in which Dewey analyzes 100,000
word-occurrences in English text (instantiating just over 10,000 different words),
and presents further statistical data, including some on Chinese, purportedly in
support of his phonological thesis, in Selected Studies of the Principle of Relative
Frequency in Language (Zipf, 1932).
Zipf’s next major work, The Psycho-Biology of Language (Zipf, 1935), presents
“in full” the results of his decade-long study of “speech as a natural phenomenon
… investigated, in the manner of the exact sciences, by the direct application of
statistical principles” (p. v). Here he argues not only that “the more complex any
speech-element phonetically, the less frequently it occurs” (p. v), but also that
“the length of a word… is closely related to the frequency of its usage—the greater
the frequency, the shorter the word” (p. v), and that “if the number of different
words occurring once in a given sample is taken as x, the number of different
words occurring twice, three times, four times, n times, in the same sample, is
respectively 1/22, 1/32, 1/42, . . . 1/n2 of x, up to, though not including, the few
most frequently used words; that is, we find an unmistakable progression accord-
ing to the inverse square, valid for well over 95% of all the different words used
in the sample” (p. vi). This evidence, Zipf says, “points quite conclusively to the
existence of a fundamental condition of equilibrium between the form and func-
tion of speech-habits, or speech-patterns, in any language” (p. vi). By the time he
came to write Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort (Zipf, 1949)—in
which he again acknowledges the pioneering work of Estoup²⁶—Zipf had gener-
25 Godfrey Dewey’s father was Melvil Dewey, the creator of the Dewey Decimal Classification.
Another English “frequency dictionary” that came to be widely used was The Teacher’s Word
Book of 30,000 Words (Thorndike & Lorge, 1944).
26 “The first person (to my knowledge) to note the hyperbolic nature of the frequency of word
usagewas French stenographer J.-B. Estoupwhomade statistical studies of French…” (Zipf, 1949,
p. 546).
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alized from this idea to a general theory of all kinds of human behavior, not just
linguistic behavior, purporting to explain such behavior by reference to a funda-
mental principle that people tend,when required to carry out a task, to expend the
least possible effort that is consistent with an adequately effective performance.
Whatever has beenmade of the explanation that Zipf infers from the evidence
(and contemporary reviews were not wholly kind²⁷), only a few have denied that
the empirical relationship that he establishes between word frequency and rank
is something to be explained. Over the years, however, the reliability of the data
used, and the validity of conclusions drawn, have been called into question. Gus-
tav Herdan (1960), for example, mounts a sustained attack, arguing that not only
is Zipf’s “law” not a law in the theoretical sense,²⁸ but that it is not even empiri-
cally true.²⁹ Herdan asserts (pp. 33, 35) that “[i]t is difficult to understand why the
Zipf law should have attained such notoriety, … since it is not…of much practical
use to the linguist, andmathematically a triviality. … [It] is the product of a period
when quantitative methods were a novelty in linguistics. What was an achieve-
ment then is quite obsolete now.” Herdan does allow (p. 38) that “the Zipf Law,
although unsuitable for the scientific description of linguistic distributions, has
its uses when it comes to the mechanical handling of word masses. … [I]t is often
sufficiently close to the actual distribution to be of service in the technology of
language, and we may regard it as a useful technological device.” But he then
goes on to argue that, in any case, the lognormal distribution is a much closer fit
than the Zipf distribution is to word-count data.
27 See, for example, E. Prokosch’s coruscating review of Selected Studies…in Language: “An ad-
equate review would consist in the two words ‘utterly worthless,’ and to say more seems waste
of space. But… [t]he censure should be directed not so much against him as against those…who
should have performed the duty of advising the Harvard University Press against accepting this
book for publication. Zipf’s book constitutes a disgrace to American scholarship…” (Prokosch,
1933, p. 92).
28 “That the decrease of frequency [of word-occurrences] should be related to an increase in
rank [ofword-forms] followsnot fromanynatural property of language structure, butmerely from
the fact that the word with the highest frequency is given the lowest rank, and as the frequency
decreases the words are given correspondingly higher ranks. Thus the inverse relation between
frequency and rank which is at the basis of the so-called Zipf law is one of our own making”
(Herdan, 1960, p. 35).
29 “… [A]ll kinds of exceptions have had to be suggested to make the ‘law’ fit the actual observa-
tions. According to some investigators, it does not hold for high-frequencywords, nor does it hold
for the low-frequency words, but seems to fit only the distribution of words of intermediate fre-
quency. Considering that no definition is given…for high- and low-frequency…, it is evident that
we cannot speak here of a law. … [T]he simple and straightforward relation between vocabulary
and occurrence which it suggests [is] just not… true” (Herdan, 1960, pp. 35–37).
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Zipf did not use the terminology of “type” and “token” in his work, prefer-
ring instead simply to talk of the number of times words occur (or are used). The
late 1930s and early 1940s saw the emergence of a research program in language
behavior regarded as scientific by its proponents,³⁰ and the opportunity to relate
Zipf’s work to Peirce’s gradually became apparent. One of the first to note the
applicability of Peirce’s terminology to discussions of Zipf’s rank–frequency re-
lationship was Wendell Johnson (Johnson, 1939), who discusses the type–token
ratio (TTR)³¹ and mentions that Zipf refrains from using the term—but Johnson
does not cite Peirce. In a 1944 paper, Johnson notes that the effectiveness of the
science-of-language program “depends upon the development of highly reliable
and differentiating measures, by means of which specified aspects of language
behavior might be systematically observed in relation to one another and to other
variables” (Johnson, 1944, p. 1), and identifies the TTR as just such a measure.
Even simpler, Johnson says, is the notion of type frequency, i.e., “the frequency
of occurrence of each different word, or type” (p. 3)—but instead of compiling
mere lists of the most-frequently occurring types in sample texts, à la Godfrey
Dewey, the aim of the language behaviorists of the 1940s was to compare sets of
type-frequency data for multiple individual language-users or group representa-
tives,with aview to identifying characteristic patterns, groupdifferences, changes
over time, correlationswith other variables, etc., while also distinguishing among
types of different grammatical or semantic kinds.
In his overview of “highly reliable and differentiating measures,” Johnson
also discusses the concept of proportionate vocabulary: “How many different
words or types make up 25, or 50, or 75 per cent of a given language sample?”
(p. 4). He explains how to plot a curve representing the observed percentages of
30 See Sanford (1942) for an early review of research on “the existence, consistency, and signifi-
cance of individual differences in themodeof verbal expression” (p. 811). Sanforddraws attention
to a development towards “a quantitative analysis and description of linguistic events…a quan-
titative science of language” (p. 813).
31 “This is ameasure of vocabulary ‘flexibility’ or variability, designed to indicate certain aspects
of language adequacy. It expresses the ratio of different words (types) to total words (tokens) in a
given language sample. If in speaking 100 words (tokens) an individual uses 64 different words
(types), his TTRwould be .64.” (Johnson, 1944, p. 1). The value of the TTR tends to decrease as the
sample size increases. Johnson explains howa cumulative TTR curve—possibly helpful in predict-
ing TTRs for larger samples (cf. Chotlos, 1944)—can be plotted “by computing successive TTRs as
increments are added to the sample” (Johnson, 1944, p. 2). Chotlos (1944) finds that the biloga-
rithmic TTR—i.e., the ratio of the logarithm of the number of types to the logarithm of the number
of tokens—is constant for samples of different sizes from the same text, and hence can be used
as a single-valued characteristic of the style of a text. “This fact [is] one of the most remarkable
in the field of quantitative linguistics…” (Herdan, 1960, p. 26).
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types (x-axis) that account for certain percentages of tokens (y-axis), and notes
(citing Zipf, 1935) that this curve can be expressed (a) mathematically, and (b) in
terms of rank as well as in terms of frequency.³²
John B. Carroll appears to have been one of the first to mention both Peirce
and Zipf in the same work. In his study of psychological aspects of linguistic be-
havior,³³ Carroll (1944) draws on the work of the semiotician Charles Morris to
define and focus on a category of linguistic response that is broader than that
implied by “word” or “phoneme,” encompassing “communicative habits which
do not specifically involve the speech mechanism; namely, non-vocal gestures,
expressive movements, and other conventionalized responses” (p. 104).³⁴ Carroll
points out (p. 107) that “it is necessary to introduce a distinction between the
terms response and response-type” that mirrors Peirce’s type–token distinction.³⁵
However, Carroll cites Ogden and Richards (1936, Appendix D) as his source for
Peirce’s distinction.³⁶
Meanwhile, in the course of his analysis of kinds of linguistic resource-types,
Carroll (p. 113) describes his Phrase Completion Test, “in which the subject must
give his first response to incomplete phrases like ‘Hounds and ______’; ‘And as for
______.’” He reports (p. 113) that “when a distribution is made of the responses to
these items, it is found that twoor three different responses constitute themajority
of all the running responses, while a relatively large number of infrequent re-
sponses constitute the remainder of the responses,” then notes (citing Zipf, 1935)
that “in general these distributions,when frequency is plotted against descending
rank order of frequency, follow roughly a Zipf-type curve.”
32 “[A] curve that is fitted to word-frequencies as a function of rank, the most frequent word
having the lowest rank number, 1, represents in an alternative way the same phenomenon that is
discussed here in terms of proportionate vocabulary.” (Johnson, 1944, p. 5).
33 “Our study is concerned, in the first instance, with the characteristics of verbal responses, the
frequency with which these responses are emitted, the sequences in which they are patterned,
and the general conditions of their occurrence.” (Carroll, 1944, p. 102).
34 ForMorris, semiosis is a process that involves three entities: the sign-vehicle, the designatum,
and the interpretant (see Carroll, 1944, p. 106). Cf. Peirce’s representamen, object, interpretant.
35 “The response-type is conceived here as an abstraction, a learned uniformity in linguistic be-
havior which has certain dynamic properties and which hence functions as a unit in behavior. In
speaking of a linguistic response, on the other hand, we refer to a specific behavioral occurrence
of a linguistic response-type. For example, the lexical form dogmay be taken as a response-type,
while a particular utterance of the sounds [dɔg] would constitute a linguistic response. This dis-
tinction is quite similar to C. S. Peirce’s distinction between token and type…, and is made in
order to avoid the confusion between the specific and the generic usages of the term response
often encountered in psychological writings.” (Carroll 1944, p. 107).
36 A few years later, Osgood (1952) discusses the TTR, cites Zipf and Morris, and mentions (but
does not cite) Peirce.
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The Moravian statistician and linguist Gustav Herdan (1897–1968) made a se-
ries of major contributions to the emerging field of quantitative (a.k.a. statistical)
linguistics in the 1950s and 1960s, including three pioneering textbooks (Her-
dan, 1956, 1960, 1966), one of which (1960) was called Type–Token Mathematics.
The concept of type–token duality, mined later by Egghe (see, e.g., Egghe, 2003),
was central to Herdan’s view of the field; yet he preferred to cite the distinction
madeby the Swiss linguist Ferdinandde Saussure (1857–1913) between langue and
parole (roughly, abstract linguistic rules and concrete speech acts) as historical
precursor, rather than Peirce (see, e.g., Saussure, 1916/1983).
Charls Pearson and Vladimir Slamecka’s Semiotic Foundations of Information
Science: Final Project Report (1977), drawing on Pearson’s research from 1974 on-
wards, appears to be the earliest work in library and information studies (LIS) to
cite both Zipf and Peirce on types and tokens, and is followed by further elabora-
tions by Pearson and by his erstwhile colleague Pranas Zunde (see, e.g., Zunde,
1984). LIS writers began to cite Herdan around the same time (see, e.g., Pratt,
1975), but did not straightaway pick up on the applicability of type–token the-
ory to bibliometrics. Herdan’s work was sufficiently well-known in bibliometric
circles to be listed in J. Vlachý’s bibliography of works relating to Lotka’s law in
volume 1, issue 1 of Scientometrics in 1978, and cited in J. J. Hubert’s monumen-
tal review of “linguistic indicators” that appeared in 1980 (Hubert, 1980; see also
Hubert, 1981).
By the late 1980s, Tague and Nicholls (1987, p. 155) were characterizing Zipf’s
law explicitly as “the distribution of a set of tokens over a set of types” (p. 155).
Tague and Nicholls give several examples of other kinds of type–token pairs:
author–publication, author–citation, publication–citation, and key–access (the
last apparently indicating thedistributionof search-termoccurrences over search-
term forms). From this time onwards, the terminology of types and tokens has
become standard in bibliometrics. However, citations to Peirce’s original work
are still relatively rare.
3.5 Recent Developments
In a 1990 article summarizing the contributions made in his Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Leo Egghe refers to the means by which sources such as authors, journals,
etc., produce bibliographic items as “information production processes” (IPPs;
Egghe, 1990, p. 17), and distinguishes one-dimensional bibliometrics—which
“deal[s] with the sources or items separately (i.e., when they are not linked
with each other)” (p. 18)—from two-dimensional or dual studies that examine
the quantitative relationships between sources and items. Egghe asserts that
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every bibliometric problem can be addressed using either of two complementary
approaches—“one looking at (sources, items), in that order, and the other looking
at (items, sources), in the reverse order” (p. 19). Following Herdan (1960, pp. 14–
15),³⁷ Egghe calls this “the duality principle,” and compares it with the duality
procedure in geometry, where “every time one obtains a theorem proving a rela-
tion between points and lines (in that order), one can formulate the dual theorem
by interchanging the words lines and points” (p. 19). Egghe goes on to advocate
for three- and even four-dimensional studies that involve more than one set of
sources and/or more than one set of items (e.g., journals as well as authors and
papers), and for examinations of the temporal aspects of IPPs.
By 2003, Egghe could write that “the dual approach” to bibliometrics—i.e.,
type–token (T/T), source–item, or Lotkaian bibliometrics—“is very well known”
(Egghe, 2003, p. 603; see also Egghe, 2005). In the same paper, Egghe introduces,
as a “more important” part of informetrics (p. 604), what he calls type/token–
taken (T/T–T) informetrics, which “studies the use of items rather than the items
[themselves]” (p. 603; emphasis added) by describing the source–item relation-
ship “as it is experienced by users (information professionals as well as infor-
mation seekers)” (p. 606). Egghe proposes that, rather than focus only on distri-
butions of sets of items over sets of sources, and on (e.g.) finding the probabil-
ity that a randomly-selected word-form occurs j times, we also consider distribu-
tions of sets of sources over sets of items, and (e.g.) finding the probability that
a randomly-selected word-occurrence is the product of a word-form that occurs
j times. His rationale is that, in doing so, we will be better able to understand
the ubiquitous scenario in which, for every value of j, the probability that a given
item is the product of a source with a productivity of at least j is greater than the
probability that a given source has a productivity of at least j.
For Egghe, the “taken” (i.e., use) component of his T/T–T formulation is a
“third level” (p. 605) that “has never been studied” (p. 604). QuentinBurrell, how-
ever, argues that Egghe’s proposal “adds little new to the theoretical framework
of informetrics” (Burrell, 2003, p. 1263). Burrell identifies two random variables
whose distributions form the core of Egghe’s proposal: the variable X, each value
of which denotes the productivity of a randomly chosen source, and whose dis-
tribution is defined by f(j); and the variable Y, each value of which denotes the
productivity of the source fromwhich a randomly selected item comes, andwhose
distribution is defined by g(j). Burrell shows that, in fact, the distribution of vari-
37 “This principle asserts for language that if in any valid proposition of language thewords type
(linguistic form, e.g., phoneme, morpheme) and token (frequency of occurrence, probability) are
interchanged, the resulting proposition is also valid.” (Herdan, 1960, p. 15).
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able Y is “nothing more than the proportional tail-moment distribution of X”
(p. 1261), while the relation between the distributions of X and Y “is illustrated
by the familiar Leimkuhler curve of concentration” (p. 1261)—as we may confirm
by comparing Egghe’s definitions of f(j) and g(j) with the definitions of fx and gx
given in the section on Two Different Conceptual Approaches, above.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
4.1 Not All Sources are Types
Bearing in mind the terminological distinctions noted above, we have now seen
that to characterize as types and tokens the classes and events of interest to bib-
liometricians, and to other seekers of statistical regularities in human behavior,
is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is also, wemight conclude, a tactic that con-
fuses rather than clarifies—for the simple reason that the type–token distinction
is quite different fromboth the source–itemdistinction and the class–event (a.k.a.
kind–individual) distinction. To take the example of authors and publications: it
is no stretch to see how each author may be conceived as the source of each of the
items they produce, nor to understand their publications as events that belong to
the class of those that share the property of being authored by the same person. It
is more difficult, however, to grasp the rationale for treating each author as a type
that is tokenized by publications, in the same way in which word-forms are tok-
enized by word-occurrences. The kinds of things that we typically consider to be
tokenizable are representamina (words, sentences, texts, etc.) and interpretants
(concepts, propositions, works, etc.). The terms we use to talk about these kinds
of things are essentially ambiguous: context may make our meaning clear, but
if it does not, then we can clarify only by specifying whether our subject is type
or token. No such issue arises with authors and publications: we seldommistake
the class for the event. So, for a bibliometrician to invoke, sweepingly, the type–
token distinction that works for words, but not for birds, is misleading at worst,
and simply unnecessary at best.
4.2 Not All Type–Token Relations are Power Laws
Mitzenmacher (2004) provides a comprehensive review of the various explana-
tions that have been given over the years for the apparent prevalence of power-law
(and lognormal) distributions in empirical data. He identifies three families of
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generative models for power-law distributions, each of which received particu-
lar attention in the 1950s before their later rediscovery: preferential attachment
models (see, e.g., Simon, 1955), optimizationmodels (see, e.g., Mandelbrot, 1953),
and multiplicative process models (see, e.g., Champernowne, 1953). Almost half
a century before Mitzenmacher’s review, Herdan disputes the assumption that
large numbers of heavy-tailed distributions can be explained by the same model:
“Simon’s claim [in Simon, 1955] to have provided a uniform mathematical expla-
nation of these distributions rests upon an insufficient realization of the differ-
ences in form between the distributions, and suffers from a neglect of considering
the relations between some of them which makes it highly unlikely, if not mathe-
matically impossible, that one mathematical model should fit them all” (Herdan,
1960, p. 207). Herdan’s view is not only that the contextual differences between,
for example, the distribution ofword-occurrences and thedistribution of personal
wealth are sufficiently significant to warrant a search for explanations of different
kinds, but also that closer inspectionof individual datasets reveals patterning that
fits just as closely with a distribution of some other (non-power-law) kind entirely.
Difficulties in distinguishing between instances of power-lawand instances of log-
normal distributions, especially, persist.
4.3 Not All Type–Token Relations Have Been Studied
by Bibliometricians
The article in which Peirce originally presented his ideas on types and tokens
was published to little notice from the wider philosophical community. It was the
British philosopher Frank Ramsey (1903–30) who set the ball rolling in 1923 with
his influential review of LudwigWittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in
the course of which Ramsey uses the type–token distinction to explain aspects of
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language (Ramsey, 1923; see also Nubiola, 1996,
for a detailed account of Ramsey’s role in the dissemination of Peirce’s thought).
Since then, the metaphysical status of types and tokens has been the subject of
much philosophical work (see, e.g., Wetzel, 2009; Hilpinen, 2012), very little of
which has been recognized as having implications for library and information
science (LIS) in general or bibliometrics in particular.
One of the directions taken in philosophy of language, philosophy of litera-
ture, and philosophy of art has been to explore the ramifications of sentences,
propositions, pictures, etc.—as well as aggregations of such phenomena at var-
ious levels—having type–token ambiguity (see, e.g., Stevenson, 1957; Jacquette,
1994; Howell, 2002). In LIS, meanwhile, a homegrown variation on type–token
theory has emerged in the modeling of resource description data, where an anal-
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ogous distinction between works and items is drawn in standards such as the
Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR; IFLA, 1998). It is clear
that thework carried out in philosophy is relevant to the ontology of bibliographic
phenomena that forms the core of contemporary library cataloging and classifi-
cation theory, and vice versa, but the connections have received little serious at-
tention from either side. This is unfortunate, since it is not unreasonable to imag-
ine philosophers’ contributing especially usefully to debates about the supposed
value of distinguishing not just between works and items, but among works, ex-
pressions, manifestations, and items (WEMI). Critics of FRBR, and of its instanti-
ation in the library cataloging standard RDA: Resource Description and Access,³⁸
point to the existence of many sets of related bibliographic items that strongly
resist WEMI modeling (see, e.g., Peponakis, 2012). A pluralist view of the bibli-
ographic universe, in which different types of library materials (books, moving
images, sound recordings, etc.) are modeled in different ways, may come to find
stronger support among aestheticians than the uniformist view exemplified in
FRBR.
Even more conspicuous by its absence is a bibliometric perspective on FRBR
and related models. What probability distribution functions best describe empir-
ical data on numbers of works, expressions, manifestations, and items, and what
explanations can be given for the processes producing such distributions? Hickey
and O’Neill (2005, pp. 243–245) present figures summarizing the distribution of
manifestations over works in OCLC’s WorldCat, as determined by the application
of an algorithm, developed in OCLC’s Office of Research, that identifies sets of
works in very large collections of bibliographic records. Of the 37.8 million works
identified, 36.3 million each had a single manifestation, 3.4 million each had two
manifestations, 0.8 million each had three, and so on. It was never Hickey and
O’Neill’s goal to analyze such data further: understandably, they were more in-
terested in the performance of their algorithm. But, given the relative ease with
which such data may be collected, it is surprising how few others have attempted
bibliometric analyses of the results of FRBRization.
4.4 Not All Bibliometricians Are Data Scientists (Yet)
It is already somewhat of a cliché that we live in an age of “big data”. One upshot
of the increasing scholarly interest in practical questions to dowith themost effec-
tivemeans ofmanaging large datasets has been a corresponding surge in the level
38 See http://www.rdatoolkit.org/
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of attention given to philosophical questions about the nature of data, data mod-
els, database records, etc. (see Borgman, this volume). There is a long story that
remains to be told about the development of standard database structures based
on the modeling of entities and relationships, attributes and values, etc., against
the backdrop of philosophical ideas about the ontological status of substances
and properties, kinds and individuals, and—yes—types and tokens. The field of
bibliometrics is both a participant in, and a contributor to the telling of this story.
And there is much more to do than fitting power-law functions to distributions of
links among websites. Bibliometricians are the natural pioneers of a science of
data use (as well asword and document use) that applies type–token theory in as
judicious a manner as did the language behaviorists three-quarters of a century
previously.
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Ronald Rousseau and Sandra Rousseau
From a Success Index to a Success Multiplier
1 Introduction: The Success Index
Recently Kosmulski (2011) and Franceschini et al. (2012a) introduced the success
index. This indicator, or better, family of indicators, is constructed as follows. One
considers a set of articles and collects for each of these the number of citations
received over a given citationwindowW. In a first step, a binary score (zero or one)
is determined for each of these articles: the score is one if the citations received by
a particular article reach a certain threshold value and it is zero otherwise. This
threshold can be determined in a variety of ways (which is why we say that the
success index is actually a family of indicators). In a next step the success index
of this set of articleswith respect to a particular threshold is defined as thenumber
of publications that has reached the threshold, or stated otherwise: the sum of all
binary scores.
Some variations of this index can be considered in which, for instance, time
plays a role (Kosmulski, 2011). Among other proposals, the following thresholds
could be used (Kosmulski, 2011; Franceschini et al., 2012a, b):
(a) The number of references (each publication’s citations is compared with its
own number of references). This is the original proposal by Kosmulski (2011).
(b) The mean or the median number of references in articles published in the
same journal and year as the article under consideration.
(c) Themean or themedian number of citations received by articles published in
the same journal and year as the article under consideration, where citations
are gathered over the same periodW (Franceschini et al., 2012a,b). Kosmulski
referred to this proposal as a modesty index, as it would reward publication
of high-impact articles in lower impact journals (Kosmulski, 2012).
We note that, in general, an index can be defined as a number, derived from a
formula, characterizing a property of a dataset. As such, this index is an indicator
for a particular characteristic. In the case of a success index, the set of data is a set
of articles and their citations, and its value is used as a proxy for the ‘success’—
the term visibility or popularity would be more to the point—of this dataset and
the corresponding entity (scientist, department, journal). In this contribution we
provide a short review of the family of success indices and introduce the success
multiplier, a non-discrete version of the success index. The success multiplier is
a number indicating to which extent citations reached or exceeded a threshold
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value. Examples are provided for articles published in the Journal of the Amer-
ican Society for Information Science and Technology, volumes 53 and 54 in 2002
and 2003. A simple statistical prediction exercise is performed for three success
indices and the corresponding multipliers. Results are described as a function of
variables such as the highest h-index of contributing authors, gender of the au-
thors, content descriptors, and affiliation.
2 Overview of Relevant Indicators
In this section we provide an overview of several relevant indicator groups. First
we look at the success index family, next we consider payback times and the suc-
cessmultiplier. Finally, we discuss somemathematical properties of these indica-
tors.
2.1 The Success Index Family
Besides the three thresholds mentioned in the introduction, Franceschini et al.
(2012a, b) also consider the following thresholds:
– Themeanor themediannumber of references in articles belonging to a neigh-
borhood of the article under consideration.
– Themean or themedian number of citations received by articles belonging to
a neighborhood of the article under consideration, where citations are gath-
ered over the same period W.
In these cases there are many ways of defining a neighborhood of a given article.
Consider the (directed) citation ego network of a given article A (Hu et al., 2011)
and define a neighborhood of A as all articles at distance atmost one, atmost two,
… in the cited direction (or in the citing direction), or neglecting the direction.
Clearly, the amount of possible thresholds is limitless. One may, for instance,
define a threshold by only considering citations in journals belonging to the first
quartile in one of Thomson Reuters’ JCR categories, or citations received from
authors with a high h-index. Such approaches would operationalize the idea of
“quality citations”. Alternatively, one may consider only recent references.
In the examples presented thus far, we only considered received citations (or
stated otherwise: different citing articles). Yet, instead of different citing articles,
one can compute different citers (authors, journals, countries, etc.). In such cases
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the threshold must also be adapted as explained in Franceschini et al. (2014),
where the problem is studied and examples are provided for citing authors.
Besides absolute success indices, one can also consider relative success in-
dices of a set, defined as the success index of this set divided by the number
of publications in the set under study. Finally, if all articles in a set are gauged
with respect to the same threshold such as the average number of citations of the
journal in which they are published (assuming that all articles in the set are all
published in the same year and in the same journal), one may define the success
index of a set of articles by comparing received citations and n (the number of arti-
cles in the set) times this threshold value. The result is again a success indexwhich
is either equal to one or to zero. Of course, this approach is not alwaysmeaningful,
for instance if the set consists of all articles published in a given journal and year
and the threshold is determined as its average number of citations. The success
index has been studied in a Lotkaian framework by Egghe (2014), and further clar-
ified by Rousseau (2014a).
2.2 Payback Times: A Variation on the Success Index
Instead of determining whether a given article has reached a certain threshold, a
moredynamic approach canbe consideredbydetermininghow long it takes for an
article to reach the threshold. Actually, this idea precedes the concept of a success
index. It was proposed by Liang and Rousseau (2008) for journals and is referred
to as the yield period or the payback time. The phrase ‘payback time’ refers to the
idea that a journal uses resources from the science system (as shown by its list of
references) and that it takes a certain time to pay back (through received citations)
to the science system what had been taken. Liang and Rousseau (2008) studied
yearly issues of Science and Nature, leading to so-called yield sequences. They
determined not only the time to reach a number of citations equal to the number
of used references, but also the time to reach twice, thrice, … this number. It was
observed that payback times tended to become shorter over the years. Another
variation on the success index and the idea of a payback timewould be to consider
the percentage of articles in a given set that already reached the threshold after a
given time t.
2.3 The Success Multiplier
Instead of a binary score leading to a success index, we can also determine the
fraction of the threshold reached by an article at any givenmoment. For instance,
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if the threshold is 10 citations and an article has obtained 7 citations, a value 0.7
can be associated with it.
Similarly, if an article received 15 citations, it receives a value of 1.5. The values
0.7 and 1.5 are then referred to as multipliers. An article’s multiplier reflects the
relative number of citations received by that article compared to the threshold
value that is used.
The success multiplier of a set of articles is simply the sum of the scores of all
articles in the set, generalizing the success index of a set of articles. When using
success multipliers it is still possible to separate an elite set from the other ones,
but this division is not as clear-cut as in the 0-1 case. Further, an average score is
created by dividing this general score by the total number of articles. When the
number of references is used as a threshold this leads to the formula
1
n
n∑
j=1
cj
rj
. (1)
Here n is the number of publications under consideration, cj is the number of
citations received by article j (over a given citation window) and rj is the number
of references of article j. In case all articles’ citations are compared with the same
threshold, say T, then formula (1) becomes:
1
n ⋅ T
n∑
j=1
cj . (2)
This average score no longer has a theoretical upper limit. Note that the multi-
plier idea is not completely new. Yanovsky (1981) was likely the first to use a ratio
of citations over references as a bibliometric indicator (his popularity factor and
citation factor). Multipliers have also been proposed for scientific leadership by
Matsas (2012) under the name of Normalized Impact Factor (NIF). The NIF of sci-
entist A in the sense of Matsas is defined as:
NIF(A) = ∑
n
j=1 ajcj
∑nj=1 bjrj =
(∑nj=1 ajcj)/n
(∑nj=1 bjrj)/n . (3)
Here n is the number of publications written by scientist A, during a given period;
cj is the number of citations received by article j (again over a given citation win-
dow) and rj is the number of references of article j. The numbers aj and bj are
weighting factors. In the simplest case they are all equal to one. In a somewhat
more complex setup, onemay take aj = bj = 1/(the number of authors of article j);
of course many other weighting factors are feasible. NIF(A) is the weighted av-
erage number of received citations divided by the weighted average number of
references. Note that here we run across the well-known difference between ra-
tios of averages and averages of ratios (Larivière & Gingras, 2011). In formula (1)
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we proposed an average of ratios (when dividing by the total number of articles
in the set) while Matsas, formula (3), proposed a (weighted) ratio of averages.
Matsas’ Normalized Impact Factor is very similar to the Reference Return Ra-
tio (3R in short) for journals introduced by Nicolaisen and Frandsen (2008). This
indicator for journal J is defined as:
3R(J) = ∑
n
j=1 cj
∑nj=1 rj ,
where the numerator denotes the number of citations received during a given cita-
tionwindowby articles published during a given publicationwindow (in the jour-
nal under consideration) and the denominator denotes the total number of refer-
ences in those same articles (published during the publication window), where
only references published during a given reference window are taken into ac-
count.
Besides using direct citations, one may also consider second-generation or
higher forward generation effects (recall that second and higher generations may
be defined in different ways as explained in Hu et al. [2011]) and calculate the
multiplier for the first, second, or higher generation only.
2.4 Mathematical Properties
Bouyssou and Marchant (2011) represent an author by a mapping f from the nat-
ural numbers to the natural numbers, where f(x) denotes the number of articles
with exactly x citations, i.e., the frequency distribution of citations over articles
in the author’s publication set. We observe that in their discussion an author is
actually represented by the set of his/her publications and hence the analysis in
Bouyssou and Marchant (2011) applies to any set of articles.
We note that a success index is independent according to the terminology
used by Bouyssou and Marchant. This means that if the value for set S1 is larger
than or equal to the value for set S2, and one adds a publication with the same
number of citations to each set, leading to sets S󸀠1 and S󸀠2 then the value of this
success index for S󸀠1 is larger than or equal to that for S󸀠2. Note that if the threshold
value is determined by some external set (such as the median value of all articles
in the same journal as those of the set S) then this threshold value must be the
same for sets S1 and S2 for the previously mentioned property to hold. This prop-
erty, though seemingly obvious, is not satisfied by the h-index. Clearly, success
multipliers are also independent in this sense.
Moreover, Franceschini et al. (2014) showed that the union of two disjoint
groups of publications with success indices su(1) and su(2) has success index
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su(1) + su(2) (with the same restriction for the thresholds). Again this addition
property remains valid for success multipliers.
Clearly these properties are not satisfied by relative success indices or by
relative success multipliers. Indeed, if set S1 contains 3 articles of which 2 have
reached the threshold value and set S2 contains 30 articles of which 21 have
reached the threshold value then the relative success index for S1 is 2/3 which is
smaller than the 21/30, the relative success index of S2. Adding one publication
that has reached the threshold to both sets, we obtain the new relative values
3/4 = 0.75 and 22/31 ≈ 0.71. As a result, the relative success index of set S1
becomes larger than that of S2, contradicting the independence requirement. Yet,
if S1 and S2 contain the same number of elements, the independence requirement
is clearly satisfied.
Observing that, for instance 27 + 37 ̸= 514 , suffices to show that also the ad-
dition property is not satisfied for relative success indices even if sets have the
same number of elements. Considering now the case of success multipliers, we
immediately assume that S1 and S2 have the same number of elements. It is clear
that, using formula (1), if
1
n
n∑
j=1
cj
rj
≤ 1n
n∑
j=1
c󸀠j
r󸀠j
then also 1n + 1(
n∑
j=1
cj
rj
+ cn+1rn+1 ) ≤
1
n + 1(
n∑
j=1
c󸀠j
r󸀠j
+ cn+1rn+1 ) .
This property also holds when using formula (2). Yet, the property does not hold
for formula (3), taking all weights equal to 1 for simplicity. Indeed:
5 + 4
10 + 10 ≤
1 + 2
3 + 3
but, adding one article with zero citations and two references yields:
5 + 4 + 0
10 + 10 + 2 >
1 + 2 + 0
3 + 3 + 2 .
Finally, as the addition property is not satisfied for relative success indices, it is
certainly not satisfied for relative success multipliers.
3 An Empirical Illustration
Next, we collected a dataset in order to have a closer look at success indices and
success multipliers in practice. More specifically, we consider all publications
in the Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology
(JASIST) in the years 2002 and 2003. This set is restricted to those publications
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classified as articles in the Web of Science (WoS). The dataset contained 208
articles. Data collection took place during the first week of June 2014.
After defining and describing three success indices and three corresponding
successmultipliers, we performed a statistical analysis to identify factors that can
be used to predict the different success indicators.
3.1 Examples: Success Indices
Three success indices for the articles in our dataset are determined by using three
different thresholds. These indices are denoted by SU1, SU2 and SU3, and de-
fined as:
SU1 = 1 if number of received citations ≥ number of references used,
SU2 = 1 if number of received citations ≥ average number of references used in
year of publication (in articles in JASIST), and
SU3 = 1 if number of received citations ≥ average number of citations received by
JASIST articles in the year of publication.
The average number of references and the average number of citations for our
dataset is presented in Table 1. Articles published in 2002 were cited more fre-
quently on average than articles published in 2003, while their average number
of references was lower.
Tab. 1: Average number of references and citations per year.
Average number
of references
Average number
of citations
2002 32.31 27.09
2003 34.35 22.71
We note that the indices SU1 and SU2 (corresponding to thresholds a and b of the
introduction) have a static denominator and hence are non-decreasing, while the
third one SU3 (comparingwith the average number of received citations) has a dy-
namic denominator if the citation window extends to the date of data collection.
Hence the resulting index may fluctuate depending on the fact if the target publi-
cation receives citations faster or slower than the average of the set of publications
under consideration.
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The calculated values for the three indices are distributed as shown in Table 2.
Clearly comparing the number of citations to an article to an article’s own refer-
ence list and comparing to the average number of received citations yield very
similar results, while comparing the number of citations to the average number of
references makes it somewhat more difficult to be a successful article. Recall that
these are citation values obtained after more than ten years (i.e., in June 2014).
Tab. 2: Percentages of successful JASIST articles, according to three success indices.
No success Success
SU1 68.1 % 31.9 %
SU2 74.0 % 26.0 %
SU3 68.3 % 31.7 %
It is not because the percentages of successful articles for SU1 and SU3 are almost
the same that these percentages necessarily refer to the same articles. We check
this in Table 3. For most articles the values for SU1 and SU3 are identical. Still, for
some 15 percent of the articles in this dataset the results for both indices differ.
Tab. 3: Overlap between SU1 and SU3.
SU3 = 0 SU3 = 1 Total
SU1 = 0 125 16 141
SU1 = 1 16 51 67
Total 141 67 208
In addition, we note that the percentage of articles for which SU3 = 1 is smaller
than 0.5 (namely 0.317) as expected by thewell-known skewness of citation distri-
butions (Rousseau, 2014b). Figure 1 shows the citation distribution. Its skewness
coefficient is 1.98; 44.23%of the articles receivedbetween0and 10 (incl.) citations
over a period of more than ten years.
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Fig. 1: Citation frequency distribution of articles published in JASIST (2002–2003); data col-
lected in June 2014. TC stands for total number of citations.
3.2 Examples: Multipliers
Next, we calculated the multiplier values for the same articles. These are denoted
MULTI1, MULTI2 and MULTI3 and defined as:
MULTI1 = number of received citations / number of references used,
MULTI2 = number of received citations / average number of references used in
year of publication (in articles in JASIST), and
MULTI3 = number of received citations / average number of citations received by
JASIST articles in the year of publication.
The distributions of these three multipliers are shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
The five articles with the highest values for MULTI1, MULTI2, MULTI3, and
number of received citations are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Note that, by definition,
ranks according to MULTI2, MULTI3, and total number of received citations are
the same. Coincidentally, there are more articles published in 2003 in these lists
than articles published in 2002.
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Fig. 3: Distribution of MULTI2.
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Fig. 4: Distribution of MULTI3.
Tab. 4: The five articles with the highest MULTI1 values.
Rank Author(s) # refer-
ences
Volume - issue
- year
Pages MULTI1
value
1 Pudovkin, AI; Garfield, E 15 53 - 13 - 2002 1113–1119 6.0
1 Garfield, E; Pudovkin, AI;
Istomin, VS
7 54 - 5 - 2003 400–412 6.0
3 Ahlgren, P; Jarneving, B;
Rousseau, R
35 54 - 6 - 2003 550–560 4.31
4 Morris, SA; Yen, G; Wu, Z;
Asnake, B
15 54 - 5 - 2003 413–422 3.67
5 White, HD 20 54 - 13 - 2003 1250–1259 3.5
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Tab. 5: The five articles with the highest numbers of received citations, MULTI2 and MULTI3
values.
Rank Author(s) Volume - issue
- year
Pages # received
citations
MULTI2
value
MULTI3
value
1 Ahlgren, P;
Jarneving, B;
Rousseau, R
54 - 6 - 2003 550–560 151 6.06 4.53
2 Rieh, SY 53 - 2 - 2002 145–161 148 5.94 4.44
3 Wathen, CN;
Burkell, J
53 - 2 - 2002 134–144 126 5.06 3.78
4 Borlund, P 54 - 10 - 2003 913–925 125 5.02 3.75
5 White, HD 54 - 13 - 2003 1250–1259 108 4.33 3.24
3.3 A Statistical Approach
Asa small exercisewe try to predict (certainly not explain) SU1, SU2, SU3,MULTI1,
MULTI2, MULTI3, and the total number of received citations (TC) as a function
of some predicting variables. For the continuous variables MULTI1, MULTI2,
MULTI3, and total citations (TC) we used OLS (ordinary least squares); while for
the discrete cases, SU1, SU2, and SU3, we used a logistic regression. From the
literature (Deschacht & Engels, 2014; Didegah, 2014; Didegah & Thelwall, 2013)
we know that possible predictors, at least for TC (we mention TC because, to the
best of our knowledge, a regression analysis has never been performed for the
success index), include: the journal’s impact factor, the h-index of the authors,
whether authors come from an English speaking country or not, the number of
co-authors, the number of references, the number of countries in the address
byline, the number of institutions involved in the research, the size of the field,
the recency of references, the field, the specific topic, the type of document, the
number of female authors, the length of the article, the length of the title, the
readability of the article, etc.
Some of these factors clearly do not apply to the present situation such as the
field, the journal’s impact factor (all articles are published in JASIST), or the type
of document (we only use the article type). Other factors were not constructed
and therefore not applied, such as the recency of references or the readability of
the article. Moreover, some factors were dichotomized such as number of authors
(one or more), number of female authors (one or more), while others were some-
what adapted (see further). The gender of authors was determined manually by
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Tab. 6: List of possible predictors.
Variable name Definition (dummy variables are zero when they are not equal to 1)
minref = 1 if the number of references is less than 15
maxref = 1 if the number of references is 50 or more
y2002 = 1 if the article has published in 2002
countauthors Number of co-authors
dauthors = 1 if the article was written by more than 1 author
female Number of female authors
dfemale = 1 if at least one author is female
pages Length of article expressed as number of pages
usa = 1 if at least one of the affiliations is in the USA
asia = 1 if at least one of the affiliations is in Asia (excl. Israel)
tec = 1 if at least one the affiliations has the letters ‘tec’ in its name
comp = 1 if at least one of the affiliations has the letters ‘comp’ in its name
keynr Number of keywords
retrieval = 1 if at least one of the keywords contains the word ‘retrieval’
web = 1 if at least one of the keywords contains one of the words ‘www’ ,
‘internet’, ‘online’ or ‘world wide web’
hirschmax The maximum h-index among all co-authors on January 1, 2003 according
to the WoS
time Time in days between date of acceptance and date of submission
searching for pictures on the Internet (at least in those cases where we did not
know the author(s) personally). Finally we tried a few factors whichmay not have
been studied before. The list of predictors is provided in Table 6.
Of course, some of the listed variables were never applied together, such as
a variable and its dichotomized version. Furthermore, it turned out that some of
these possible predictors were never significant or were not significant in combi-
nation with other highly significant ones.
We were not able to determine the gender of a few authors in the dataset.
The corresponding six articles were thus removed from the analysis and the final
analysis was done for 202 (or 201) articles. Indeed, it was not possible to calculate
MULTI1 for one article as it had no references, leading to 201 articles in the case
where a division by the number of actual references had to be performed.
Finally, the following variables were at least once statistically significant at
the 10% level: Hirschmax, Pages, Female, Keynr, Web, Retrieval, Y2002, Tec, and
Dauthors.
Results of our econometric estimation, performed in STATA, are presented in
Table 7. For the OLS the adjusted R2 is given, while for the logistic regression the
pseudo R2 is shown.
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3.4 Discussion of the Regression Results
The majority of the results were expected; however, several require more discus-
sion. The fact that the highest h-index of the co-authors is usually highly sig-
nificant is not surprising and might be related to the Matthew Effect (see also
Egghe et al., 2013; Glänzel & Schubert, this volume). A perhaps surprising result
is the positive influence of the number of keywords. As JASIST did not have author
keywords at that time, only KeyWords Plus are used. These are automatically gen-
erated by Thomson Reuters based on frequently occurring terms and phrases in
the reference list. Still, the fact that these keywords are related—via references—to
the content of the articles and are used for queries in the Web of Science seems
to have its rewards, resulting in higher values for success indicators. The fact that
a higher number of authors has no influence on the success indicators (or occa-
sionally a negative one) is also not obvious. This result might be explained by
the correlation between the number of authors and the number of female authors
(Pearson correlation of 0.36). For this reason, we removed number of authors (but
kept Dauthors). Still, having more than one author seems to influence the proba-
bility of being successful based on the SU3-index negatively. In addition, there is
some weak evidence that a longer article (more published pages) leads to more
success as expressed by the SU3-index. Moreover, one would expect that after
more than ten years one year more of exposure would not have any influence on
the success indicators, but see Table 1. While the variable Y2002 does not influ-
ence the success multipliers, it doesmake a difference with respect to the number
of received citations and hence with respect to the success indices SU1 and SU2.
Further, we find that topics and type of institute are of importance (at least for
these data); technical institutes have a positive influence as do web discussions,
while retrieval-related articles are less successful. Finally, female colleagues have
a positive influence on the number of citations and hence on the success (however
measured) of these articles. This observationdiffers from thatmade in earlierwork
(Cronin, 1996; Larivière et al., 2013). Yet, as we only studied one journal in the so-
cial sciences and a short publication period, this is, of course, no contradiction.
Let us consider it an encouraging sign for female scientists.
4 Conclusion
The success index and its extension to rational numbers, the success multiplier,
form a versatile family of research indicators. Some versions, such as SU1, are not
suitable for research evaluation as they are too easy to manipulate. Yet, the more
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difficult to manipulate (when comparing with a representative median number of
citations, it becomes much more difficult to influence the result), the higher their
potential in informetric studies. Our contribution provides only a small example
(JASIST, volumes 53–54) of their use and thus more examples leading to a better
appreciation of their advantages and disadvantages are required.
We note that some of the thresholds lead to an input-output system, thus
the corresponding indicator can be considered an input-output indicator. Clearly,
cases a and b, where the threshold is determined by references, fall within the
input-output framework, while case c, for which the threshold is determined by
citations received by related articles, does not. Related indicators such as Matsas’
NIF and the 3R-indicator also are input-output indicators.
These input-output indicators treat articles as devices that create citations
by using a certain amount of inputs (i.e., references). Such indicators, if applied
in evaluation exercises would lead to a market-based strategy by which pub-
lication/citation maximization brings game players significant economic gains
(Cronin, 1996). As such, input-output indicators reinforce the current culture of
assessing academic success in terms of publications and citations, rather than
stimulating original research as valuable in its own right. Success indices should
hence be used to describe a current state and not to evaluate research or re-
searchers. Furthermore, input-output indicators that are defined as ratios are not
useful to help with decision making. Success multipliers rely on averages and as
such tell an author nothing about the value of adding one more reference to a
manuscript. Multipliers could provide a useful picture of the degree of internal
linkage which exists in publication–citation networks.
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Wolfgang Glänzel and András Schubert
From Matthew to Hirsch:
A Success-Breeds-Success Story
1 Preamble: A Submicro-Level Bisociation Study
It was 50 years ago that James S. Coleman’s Introduction to Mathematical Sociol-
ogy was published (Coleman, 1964). The book has received more than 500 cita-
tions since then in Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science Core Collection (and more
than 1500 citations according to Google Scholar). One of these citations is found
in a 1982 review by a young information scientist from London: Blaise Cronin
(Cronin, 1982). Another one, two years later, was given by two authors from Bu-
dapest: Wolfgang Glänzel and András Schubert (Schubert & Glänzel, 1984). Al-
though both papers have been cited above average (as they belong to the Hirsch-
core of their respective authors), they have never been co-cited. As wemight learn
from Koestler (1964), some of the most remarkable instances of human creativ-
ity can be attributed to what he called bisociation: “the perceiving of a situation
or idea in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference”.
In his views, “creation” is making connection between two well-known, but yet
unconnected entities. In bibliometric terms, bisociation is encountered whenever
two frequently used but so far unconnected keywords co-occur, or when two fre-
quently cited items are co-cited. In such cases, there are increased chances for
outstanding achievements. For keyword bisociation, the conjecture was empiri-
cally supported by an inorganic chemistry example (Schubert & Schubert, 1997;
Schubert, 2013). No systematic studies on co-citation bisociation presently exist.
The present article may be considered a self-experiment in order to determine
whether an unprecedented co-citation of Cronin (1982) and Schubert and Glänzel
(1984) will lead to success. The result is the sole responsibility of the authors.
2 Introduction
In the present paper, an overview is given of statistical models of bibliometric dis-
tributions on the basis of the principle called “Matthew’s principle”, “cumulative
advantage”, or “success-breeds-success”, among others. A general introduction
is followed by the description of themodel, the properties of a particular distribu-
tion derived from themodel—theWaring distribution—and a family of apparently
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remote distributions all derivable from the model. In retrospect, the model can
be considered a precursor of Barabási’s celebrated “preferential attachment” net-
work model resulting in power law-type distributions, and some relations with
Hirsch’s h-index are also revealed.
Skewness is oneof themost conspicuous features of informetric distributions.
Whether we refer to Pareto’s 80/20 rule or any other specimen of unequal propor-
tions, strong inequalities are readily illustrated on the distribution of publication
productivity or citation impact. The skewness property is, however, only one of
the common features of informetric distributions.
The mathematical models of these distributions are sometimes taken from
the Gaussian distribution family, such as Poisson, negative binomial, etc., but
more often—as in the case of the classical laws of bibliometrics: those of Lotka,
Bradford, and Zipf—approximately follow an inverse power law (see Furner, this
volume, for more on these and other power-law distributions). This is the second
important feature of scientometric distributions: their heavy tail. The question
about the usefulness of the two families of distributions in scientometrics has
been discussed in detail, among others, by Brookes (1968) and Haitun (1982).
There is anapparent consensus that the generatingmechanismof thesedistri-
butions is some kind of positive feedback, what was called the Matthew principle
by Merton (1968), “cumulative advantage” by Price and Gürsey (1976), reinforce-
ment by Allison (1980), and “success-breeds-success” by Tague (1981).
From the mathematical viewpoint there are several ways of developing and
describing suchmodels. Proceeding from a simple point process, i.e., the random
sum of independent exponentially distributed random variables, where all spe-
cial properties of inequality, such as subject-specific peculiarities, the authors’
social status, or academic age, etc., can be obtained via (1) compound distributions
and stochastic processes, that is, by mixtures of random effects; (2) the urn model
according to Pólya and Eggenberger (Eggenberger & Pólya, 1923), where success
or failure might positively or negatively affect further trials; or (3) stochastic birth-
and-death processes with particular transition rules controlling for the extent of
cumulative advantage. All these models result in the same family of distributions
and processes but highlight different aspects of the genesis of inequality proper-
ties like skewness and heavy tails.
A versatile model was proposed in the 1980’s by Schubert and Glänzel (1984)
based on a simple counting process using a deterministic birth model with im-
migration and emigration and a transition rate that is a linear function of the
actual count. Depending on the supplementary conditions, the processmay result
in Poisson, negative binomial, geometric, or Waring distributions. Each of these
distributions may be used to model bibliometric samples in certain conditions.
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The model is based on the scheme of a simple Poisson process presented by
Coleman (1964, p. 289). In his model, all transition rates are equal and indepen-
dent of the previous counts. The more general model of a birth process can be
obtained if the transition rates may change according to the previous counts and
following particular rules (cf. Figure 1) (discussed in more detail later).
Fig. 1: Coleman’s scheme of the Poisson process (with fi = a = const. for all i ≥ 0).
In Coleman’s brand loyalty example, “the states labelled 1, 2, 3, … are the states
of having bought brand A one, two, three, etc., times in succession.”
Turning to bibliometrics, we can think about authors publishing 1, 2, 3, … pa-
pers on a topic before getting into state 0 by changing topic (or ceasing to publish
at all). In this simplest model there is no kind of “advantage”, the chances of pro-
ceeding from the i-th state to the (i + 1)-th are equal independently of the present
state (a).
3 The Schubert–Glänzel model
A somewhat modified and generalized version of Coleman’s scheme was used in
Schubert and Glänzel (1984). In order to build a (stochastic) birth process with
the desired features to model informetric processes we first consider an infinite
array of units or cells, indexed in succession by the non-negative integers, among
which a certain substance is distributed. The content of the i-th cell is denoted by
xi; the (finite) content of all units or cells by x.
Obviously, x = ∑i xi. Then the fraction yi = xi/x (i ≥ 0) expresses the share
of elements contained by the i-th cell. The change of content is postulated to obey
the following rules.
Substance may enter the system from the external environment
through the 0-th unit at a rate s;
(1)
substance may be transferred unidirectionally
from the i-th unit to the (i + 1)-th one at a rate fi (i ∈ N0); and (2)
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substance may leak out from the i-th unit
into the external environment at a rate gi (i ∈ N0) . (3)
The next step towards a stochastic model is to interpret the above ratios yi as the
(classical) probability with which an element is contained by the i-th unit. The
stochastic process is then formed by the change of the content of the cells (or
units), i.e., by the change of purchases or papers published by the authors, who
have entered the system. The discrete random variable X(t) denotes the (random)
number of purchases or papers published at time t, P(X(t) = i) = yi its probability.
In order to use an example from bibliometrics, P(X(t) = i)might, for instance, be
the probability that an author has published exactly i papers in the period from
the time of his/her entrance into the system, denoted by 0, until time t. Figure 2
visualizes the scheme of substance flow of this process.
Fig. 2: Scheme of substance flow with immigration and emigration according to Schubert and
Glänzel (1984).
According to Schubert and Glänzel, the following particular forms of the above
rate terms are used:
s = σ ⋅ x , (1*)
fi = (a + b ⋅ i) ⋅ xi ; (i ≥ 0) , (2*)
gi = 𝛾 ⋅ xi ; (i ≥ 0) , (3*)
where σ, a, b and 𝛾are non-negative real values. The distribution of the substance
over the units during time t can then be obtained as a solution of a relatively
simple system of first order linear differential equations (cf. Schubert & Glänzel,
1984).
The relationship of this model with Price’s author categorization bears men-
tioning. Price and Gürsey (1976) distinguished the following four categories of au-
thors: newcomers, continuants, transients, and terminators. Within the framework
of this model, s represents the group of newcomers, gi terminators, g1 transients
and substance remaining in the system, i.e., ∑i fi represents the group of contin-
uants.
In addition, we would further like to mention that there is a certain relation-
ship with the epidemicmodel according to Goffman andNevill (Goffman&Nevill,
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1964; Goffman, 1965), although the birth model with immigration and emigration
does not explicitly assume the occurrence of any epidemic situation, and is, on
the other hand, somewhat more complex as it differentiates the status of “infec-
tion” further by counting events. Goffman and Nevill introduced the theory of
intellectual epidemics as a model of scientific communication in 1964. According
to their model, which in turn is based on the classical Reed-Frost model, the dif-
fusion of ideas in a population of scientists could be compared to the spreading
of an influenza virus in a population of people, causing an epidemic. The pop-
ulation can at any time be subdivided into three groups of infected (I), resistant
or immune (R), and infection sensitive, i.e., susceptible (S) animals or persons.
Goffman andNevill considered a published article on a specific topic an infection.
Using this model as an analogon, we have S appearing in the Schubert–Glänzel
scheme as the group (s) entering the system I corresponds to and group R to those
who left the system (∑i gi). But most notably, in this context the twomain cases of
the epidemic model are also obtained, particularly, if σ = 𝛾 (with the further two
subcases σ = 0 and σ ̸= 0), or σ ̸= 𝛾, respectively. In the following section we will
analyze these cases more in detail.
3.1 Two Special Cases: “Closed Systems” and
“Equilibrium Systems”
For the entire population, we can derive x(t) = x(0) ⋅ exp ((σ − 𝛾) ⋅ t), i.e., the sys-
tem is asymptotically time-invariant (stationary) if σ = 𝛾, otherwise, if σ > 𝛾 or
σ < 𝛾, it exponentially grows or decays, respectively. The distribution of the “sub-
stance” (purchases, publication productivity, etc.) can be exactly determined in
two special cases using the notation of the Schubert–Glänzel scheme.
(i) In a “closed system” we assume σ = 𝛾 = 0, after (finite) time t.
In this case, the distribution of the substance will take a negative binomial
distribution (Pólya distribution, in the terminology of Coleman [1964, p. 301]).
yi = (k + i − 1i )(
k
μ + k)
k
( μμ + k)
i
, (4)
with a scale parameter μ = (a/b)(ebt − 1), and a shape parameter k = a/b, where
a and b are the two parameters of the transition rate, fi. The first factor, (k+i−1i ), is
a binomial coefficient.
This model was successfully used by Allison (1980) in describing the publica-
tion productivity of a cohort of chemists in the first six years after the doctorate.
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In the special case b = 0 (no cumulative advantage, as in Figure 1), we have
k →∞, μ → at, and the distribution becomes Poisson.
yi = μie−μ/i! . (5)
(ii) In an “equilibrium system” we assume σ = 𝛾 > 0, and t →∞.
In this case, b = 0 (no cumulative advantage) leads to a geometric distribu-
tion.
yi = q(1 − q)i , (6)
with q = σ/(σ + a).
This model describes the asymptotic steady state (“equilibrium”) of the pro-
ductivity distribution of an author community with a constant supply of new-
comers and a constant “dropout” of authors (for whatever reason: retirement,
death, topic change, leaving academia, etc.) independently of the productivity
level reached so far, provided that there is no cumulative advantage effect.
In the cumulative advantage case, b > 0, the equilibrium distribution has a
lesswell-known form, namely that of theWaringdistribution (Schubert&Glänzel,
1984). In particular, we obtain the following limiting distribution.
yi(∞) = σ(a + b) . . . (a + b(i − 1))(a + σ)(a + b + σ) . . . (a + bi + σ)
= α(N + 1) . . . (N + i − 1)(N + α)(N + α + 1) . . . (N + α + i) ,
(7)
with parameters α = σ/b, N = a/b.
3.2 Properties of the Waring Distribution
Although the closed-form definition of the Waring distribution looks a bit awk-
ward, it obeys a rather simple recursive formula.
y0 = α/(N + α) ,
...
yi = yi−1(N + i − 1)/(N + α + i) .
(8)
Also, the Waring distribution has some remarkable properties.
– It obeys Zipf’s law:
yi ≈ i−(α+1) , as i tends to infinity, (9)
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i.e., the tail of the distribution follows an inverse power law. Due to the re-
lation (8), the tail exponent can be estimated even from any two frequency
values.
– The mean value of the Waring distribution has the very simple form:
⟨y⟩ = N/(α − 1) . (10)
– The Waring distribution has a “self-similarity” property.
y−j ≡ yi−j(α, N) = yi(α, N + j) for any i ≥ j , (11)
i.e., aWaring distribution truncated from left at j and shifted backwith j units,
is again a Waring distribution with unchanged parameter α (as can be ex-
pected, since the asymptotic Zipf behavior must not change) and with a pa-
rameter N increased by j units. The geometric distribution, which is a limiting
case of theWaring distribution, if N, α →∞ and N/α = (1/q −1) > 0, has the
“lack-of-memory property,” that is, a geometric distribution truncated from
left at j and shifted back with j units, is the identical geometric distribution
with unchanged parameter.
– From equations (10) and (11) it follows, that
⟨y−j⟩ = (N + j)/(α − 1) , (12)
i.e., the mean value of the left-truncated and left-shifted Waring distribution
is a linear function of the point of truncation. This property is a characteri-
zation: the linear relation holds if and only if the distribution is Waring. This
characterization is a special case of a more general characterization theorem
(Glänzel et al., 1984).
3.3 Applications of a Characterization Theorem
The linear relation (12) can be used as the basis of an effective statistical test
and extrapolation tool. Plotting the series of truncated mean values ⟨y−0⟩, ⟨y−1⟩,⟨y−2⟩, . . . against the point of truncation, 0, 1, 2,… a straight line should be
obtained indicating the subsistence of aWaring distribution. A statistical test has
been elaborated and presented on a linguistic example by Telcs et al. (1985).
If onehappens tohave a left-truncated set of frequencydata, the same straight
line may help to extrapolate to the missing region. Most typically, publication
frequency data start with 1, i.e., do not account for the “silent majority”: those
researchers who happen not to publish within the framework studied. The num-
ber of these researchers can be estimated using the Waring model. A successful
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attempt has been reported by Schubert and Telcs (1987) on the example of esti-
mating the size of “publication-worthy” researcher community (“publication po-
tential”) of U.S. states. Furthermore, the method has been adapted to evaluate
research institutions in Sweden, and induced heated science policy debates that
have not yet been settled (Koski, 2013).
Another interesting consequence of the linear relation (12) is connected with
the so-called “Characteristic Scores and Scales” (CSS) method (Glänzel & Schu-
bert, 1988). This is amethod formarking thresholds to divide a sample into classes
according to the value of a random variable ξ . While, e.g., in case of quantiles, the
classes are defined to contain equal number of elements, CSS classes adjust them-
selves according to the nature of the distribution. CSS thresholds originated from
iteratively truncating samples at their mean value and recalculating the mean of
the truncated sampleuntil theprocedure is stoppedornonewscores are obtained.
This procedure is briefly described in the following.
After putting b0 = 0, the sample mean is chosen as the first threshold, de-
noted now as b1.
b1 = E(ξ) . (13)
Further thresholds are defined recursively.
bk = E(ξ | ξ ≥ bk−1) . (14)
That is, the second threshold, b2, is equal to themeanvalueof all sample elements
equal to or greater than the overall sample mean, and so on. The classes are then
defined by the pairs of the corresponding threshold values, particularly on the
basis of the half-closed intervals [bk−1, bk) with k ≥ 0. Depending on the sample
size and the nature of the distribution, three to five classes are usually sufficient
for a practical classification task.
Taking into account that in the above-average region Zipf’s law (Eq. (9)) be-
gins to come into force, the linear relation (12) leads to the following approxima-
tion (Glänzel, 2013):
bk ≈ b1(ak − 1)/(a − 1) , (15)
where a = α/(α − 1), α being the tail exponent, which is identical with the corre-
sponding parameter of the Waring distribution (cf. Eq. (9)). Approximate thresh-
olds can, therefore, be calculated from estimations of the mean value and the tail
exponent even if the full distribution of the variable is not available.
3.4 Another Special Case
The a = 0 case (here a denotes the coefficient in the transfer rate of the above
model according to Schubert and Glänzel) seems to lead to a trivial solution.
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Eq. (2*) reduces to a formula often associated with “Gibrat’s law”¹ (Gibrat, 1931):
fi = bixi , (16)
consequently, f0 = 0, thus no substance reaches beyond cell 0: y0 = 1, yi = 0 for
all i > 0. If, however, the limiting distribution is sought for i > 0, a → 0, a non-
trivial solution is found both in the “closed-system” and the “equilibrium-system”
case.
In a closed system, we have
yi = q(1 − q)i−1 . (17)
This is a geometric distribution analogous to equation (6), but in this case q =
ebt. In this case the geometric distribution emerges as a special case of the zero-
truncated negative binomial distribution. This case is treated in (Coleman, 1964,
p. 307).
In an equilibrium system the same procedure leads to a Yule distribution (see,
e.g., Price, 1976).
yi = α B(α + 1, i) , (18)
where B(⋅, ⋅) denotes the beta function. The Yule distribution is a prototype of dis-
tributions obeying Zipf’s law (Eq. (9)); remarkably, Simon (1955) derived it from
Gibrat’s law. In this case, extrapolation to zero is meaningless; there is an infinite
pool of zero-elements behind the apparent distribution.
3.5 A Summary of Distributions Emerging from the
Schubert–Glänzel Model
Table 1 summarizes thedistributions emerging from themodel outlined inFigure 2
and equations (1)–(3) under various conditions.
Themost striking feature is thatwhile the ‘closed-system’ solutions areGauss-
ian in nature (i.e., have an exponential tail), the ‘equilibrium’ solutions are Zipf-
ian (have a power-law tail). The special appeal of the model is that both of these
classes, sometimes considered antagonistic, can be derived from it. The geometric
distribution, which is a degenerate case of both classes has its generating scheme
in both columns.
1 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibrat’s_law
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Tab. 1: Distributions emerging from the Schubert–Glänzel model.
Closed system Equilibrium system
General case Negative binomial (Pólya); Eq. (4) Waring; Eq. (7)
b = 0 (no cumulative
advantage)
Poisson; Eq. (5) Geometric; Eq. (6)
a → 0, i > 0 Geometric; Eq. (14) Yule; Eq. (15)
i →∞ Exponential Inverse power (Zipf); Eq. (9)
4 An Alternative Explanation: Heterogeneity
It is important to note that the same distribution patterns can be explained
without the cumulative advantage hypothesis. We may assume that any given
researcher has a constant probability to publish the next paper independently
of the number of papers already published (i.e., b = 0), yet a set of researchers
may have a productivity distribution given in Table 1. This is possible, if the pop-
ulation is heterogeneous, namely, if a (constant for each single researcher) has a
gamma distribution. A Poisson distribution with a gamma distributed parameter,
μ, provides a negative binomial distribution, while a geometric distribution with
gamma distributed parameter, q, results in a Waring distribution.
As Coleman (1964) notes:
It is impossible to choose between a contagious² interpretation and a heterogeneity inter-
pretation merely on the basis of the empirical distribution itself, no matter how well it fits a
theoretical distribution. What are required in addition are over-time data, which can show
the development of contagion if it exists.
(p. 301)
In two rare cases of such longitudinal studies, Huber and Wagner-Döbler (2001a,
b) found that in two fields: mathematical logic and physics, heterogeneity rather
than cumulative advantage is responsible for the observed empirical productivity
distributions.
2 In Coleman’s terminology, “contagion” is analogous with cumulative advantage.
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5 Network Aspects
Given the fact that scientific publications are increasingly the result of collab-
orative authorship (see, e.g., Glänzel & Schubert, 2004)—or hyperauthorship
(Cronin, 2001), it seems obvious to seek cumulative advantage patterns in co-
authorship distributions as well. At the time of elaborating the cumulative advan-
tage publication productivity models, attempts to extend the idea to co-author
networks were largely hindered by the lack of a proper mathematical theory.
The Erdős-Rényi model of random graphs led to a Poisson distribution, and the
cumulative advantage element could not be included into the model.
An alternative approach was found by Barabási and his group at the turn of
the millennium. The scale-free network concept (Barabási & Albert, 1999) was in-
spired bywell-tested physical models, andwas successfully applied for such pop-
ular examples as the Internet and the network of movie actors. They coined the
term “preferential attachment” for the cumulative advantage phenomenon. The
applicability of the model to co-author networks has been demonstrated (New-
man, 2001; Barabási et al., 2002) and became milestone papers of the topic.
6 The Hirsch-Connection
Shortly after Hirsch (2005) let the h-index genie out of the bottle, Glänzel (2006)
attempted to find the position of the index in the framework of statistical theory.
He found that it is closely connected with Gumbel’s theory of characteristic ex-
treme values. For distributions having inverse power tail (obeying Zipf’s law), he
could relate the h-index to traditional statistical parameters of the sample with
the following formula:
h ≈ xα/(α+1)n1/(α+1) , (19)
where h is the h-index, x is the samplemean, n is the sample size, and α is the tail
exponent.
The formula found widespread empirical support, among others, on the ex-
ample of h-indices of journals (Schubert & Glänzel, 2007) and countries (Csajbók
et al., 2007).
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7 Network-based h-indices
Far beyond the scope of bibliometrics, in general, and research evaluation, in par-
ticular, the h-index raised interest in network/graph research. Eppstein and Spiro
(2009) interpreted it as a graph invariant used in constructing dynamic graph
algorithms particularly efficient for scale-free networks. Korn et al. (2009) used
it under the name of lobby-index as a centrality measure characterizing the net-
work’s capability for efficient communication. Its use as ameasure of coherence in
a community of researchers (authors)was demonstrated by Schubert et al. (2009).
An interesting Hirsch-type index characterizing social networks was defined
by Schubert (2012a) and amended by Rousseau (2012). Actually, the index is a
special case of an idea of Zhao et al. (2011). The partnership ability index, φ, can
be defined for arbitrary actions and actors as follows: An actor is said to have a
partnership ability index φ, if with φ of his/her n partners had at least φ joint
actions each, and with the other (n −φ) partners if they had no more than φ joint
actions each. In the original paper, the index was exemplified on a co-authorship
sample, but it proved to be applicable also in a network of jazz musicians (Schu-
bert, 2012b).
Although the indicator is meaningful for networks of any structure, for scale-
free networks Glänzel’s relation (19) is supposed to hold. Indeed, bothmentioned
studies supported the validity of this approximation, similarly to a studyona large
co-author sample reported by Cabanac (2013).
The reader should be reminded that, similarly to the empirical distribution
in the case of publication productivity models, the network properties (e.g., the
inverse power tail of the degree distribution) is not a sufficient basis for inferring
to the generating mechanism. Cumulative advantage (preferential attachment) is
a reasonable possibility, but othermechanisms (e.g., heterogeneity) cannot be ex-
cluded.
8 Conclusion
Success is an extremelymultifaceted concept. In scientific and scholarly research,
success is the creation and communication of new knowledge. In informetrics,
publication output and citation impact are considered the main measurable
aspects of success. In both aspects, success appears to be ‘contagious’: success
breeds success, advantages cumulate. Theories of informetrics should give an
account of this feedback mechanism—that is what our model attempted, and
maybe not quite unsuccessfully achieved.
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Aparticular recipe for success is attributed toMarkTyson: “Confidencebreeds
success and success breeds confidence…Confidence applied properly surpasses
genius.”³ As a net result, in this ‘model’, as well, success seems to breed success
and, although the mechanisms can be disputed, Matthew’s truth still prevails.
And as it could be seen from the overview compiled in this paper, success-breeds-
success is not only a successful way to reach success in publication and citation
terms, but also a fruitful and successful topic of bibliometric modeling.
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David Bawden and Lyn Robinson
Information’s Magic Numbers:
The Numerology of Information Science
1 Introduction
Two themes were presented at the Libraries in the Digital Age (LIDA) conference,
held in Zadar, Croatia, in June 2014. The first, chaired by David Bawden, focused
on “qualitative assessment”. Blaise Cronin chaired the second theme, focused on
“altmetrics”. They, as well as several other conference speakers, emphasized the
complementary nature of qualitative and quantitative methods; while quantita-
tive data is of unarguable importance, it must be interpreted insightfully and used
with care.¹ Applying numbers sensibly has always been amajor concern for Blaise
Cronin, as is attested by his publication list. His academic webpage² notes that
“much of his research focuses on collaboration in science, scholarly communi-
cation, citation analysis, the academic reward system and cybermetrics—the
intersection of information science and social studies of science”, while his
Wikipedia entry³ describes him as being jointly an “information scientist and
bibliometrician”. Despite this strong informetric focus, Cronin has had a long-
standing concern about the potential descent of this aspect of the information
science discipline into a “new age of numerology,” due to over-use and misuse
and of bibliometrics and altmetrics; see, for example, Cronin (1998; 2000), Cronin
and Sugimoto (2015), and Priego (2012). It is therefore appropriate to include in
this volume a chapter on the numerology of information science; to ask to what
extent we are able to identify a few numbers which may helpfully encapsulate
important aspects of the subject.
Numerology, roughly the belief that numbers in general, and integers in par-
ticular, have their own nature and properties, and can of themselves influence
events, is rather out of favor nowadays, being regarded as a pseudoscience. The
impeccable scientific belief that the regularities of nature can be captured by sim-
ple mathematical relationships is a long way from Blair’s (1976, p. 81) notion that
“numbers, quite distinct from their empirical use, become a language, as full of
1 Thepresentationsmaybe foundon the conferencewebsite at http://ozk.unizd.hr/proceedings/
index.php/lida
2 http://www.soic.indiana.edu/all-people/profile.html?profile_id=4
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blaise_Cronin
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metaphor and dimension as poetry”. However, before sneering at the idea that
numbers in themselves can have a significance, we should remember that the
long-standing, and still influential, Platonic tradition within science views num-
bers as having their own objective existence, and indeed that the physical uni-
verse and everything in it is, at root, a mathematical structure made of numbers
(see Tegmark [2014] for a recent and accessible account of this position).
As well as numbers per se, numerology is often taken, usually critically, to
mean an enthusiasm for simple numerical formulae, usually involving integers,
capturing some significant aspect of reality. These have been seen in both the sci-
ences and the social sciences: notoriously, the British physicist and astronomer
Sir Arthur Eddington spentmany years seeking simple integer relationships as the
clue to the universe (Kilmister, 2005). It is clear that there are strong relations be-
tween numbers, the physical world and cultural issues, as is clearly shown by the
sequence of “kissing numbers”, the number of sphereswhich in any space exactly
bound a further identical sphere (Weisstein, n.d.); two points on a one dimen-
sional line bounda thirdpoint, six circles circumscribe a seventh, and twelve balls
circumscribe a thirteenth. The resultant sequence of “kissing number plus one”—
three, seven, thirteen—captures the principal significant/lucky/unlucky numbers
in numerous cultures, and is numerologically present in the ‘leader with twelve
followers’memeof Christ, Osiris, KingArthur, and others (Blair, 1976).⁴ Therefore,
despite the dangers of slipping into a facile numerology, simple numbers and in-
teger relations may still be worth investigating.
There are, in fact, relatively few such simple numbers and number relations
in information science, and what exists was imported from adjacent disciplines.
In truth, they are not all very simple: one is very large, some have alternatives, one
is a sequence, and one is infinite. These numbers encapsulate a variety of issues:
how much information there is, or could be; the optimal size of communicating
groups; the structure of information networks; the distribution of information ac-
tivities; and the limits to the growth of knowledge. We find that sometimes, but
not always, the actual number is less important than the theoretical perspective
towhich it points.Webegin by considering the big picture: howmuch information
there is, or could be, in the human context and in the universe. Then we move to
the smallest scale, the information associated with the conscious attention of a
single person. From there, we move up the scale, to information associated with
4 It would have been nice if the four-dimensional kissing number, which was not known until
2003 (Pfender & Ziegler, 2004) and cannot be intuitively grasped like the small dimension equiv-
alents, had also related to some culturally significant number. Disappointingly, it was shown to
be 24, and 25 does not appear to have significance in any culture.
182 | David Bawden and Lyn Robinson
groups, with networks, and with disciplines; and finally up to the largest scale, to
the infinity of possible recorded information.
2 The Universal Number: 8× 1021
The most fundamental number-related question we can ask about information
is simply: How much information is there? This leads to a spin-off question: How
much information could there be? Both, perhaps not surprisingly, are difficult to
answer accurately. Attempts to answer such questions have been reviewed by
Bawden and Robinson (2012a), Gleick (2011), Davis and Shaw (2011), and Floridi
(2014).
Before the advent ofwidespreaddigital information, the “Howmuch informa-
tion is there?” question was generally answered in terms of counts of documents:
how many books, articles, reports, etc. had been published. For example, Jinha
(2010) suggested that the total number of scholarly articles had reached fifty mil-
lion. More recent attempts have had to include the much larger amount of born-
digital information—an intrinsically more difficult process—with results that can
only be approximate.
The first attempt in the digital era to address this question in a rigorous way
was the “How much information?” study from the School of Information Man-
agement and Systems at University of California Berkeley, United States (U.S.),
first carried out in 2000, and repeated in 2003 (SIMS, 2003). The study estimated
that approximately 12 exabytes of information had been recorded by humanity
before the general use of computers, but was being dwarfed by the amounts now
being generated and stored. About 5 exabytes of new information was stored dur-
ing 2002; equal to 37,000 times the information in the Library of Congress, or
800megabytes/30 feet (10 metres) of bookshelf content per person on the planet.
However, more than three times this amount of information was communicated
through electronic channels but never stored.
Later studies (Hilbert & Lopez 2011; Ganz & Reinsel 2011; Hilbert, 2014) have
suggested that the amount of information broadcast each year, in increasingly
varied formats, was approaching 2 zetabytes by 2007, that current capacity of all
information storage devices approaches 300 exabytes, and that the total grew to
over 1600 exabytes between 2007 and 2011. Floridi (2014, p. 13) points out that this
amounts to enough information being generated each day to fill all the libraries
in the U.S. eight times over, and that the figure is likely to grow threefold every
four years, so that there may be expected to be 8 zetabytes (8 times 1021 bytes) of
information by 2015; this figure is taken as ‘the number’ for this section.
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One consequence of this, as Floridi (2014) points out, is that since 2007 in-
formation has been produced at a faster rate than have storage devices to handle
it; this despite Kryder’s Law, which shows that the capacity of storage devices is
increasing at an even faster rate than is processing capability, the latter obeying
Moore’s Law. That we cannot therefore store all our information arguably does
not, in fact, matter; the great proportion now is data generated by machines and
used by machines, without any need for longer-term storage for human interven-
tion or reflection.
The actual value of these numbers is immaterial—what is of importance is
their scale and order of magnitude, and the ways in which they are changing, to
create what Floridi (2014) terms the “infosphere,” an entirely new form of infor-
mation environment.
The second question, how much information could there be, is answered by
considering the capacity of the physical universe to hold bits of information; a
rough estimate, subject to many approximations, is reported by Gleick (2011) to
be about 1090 bits. This figure, though of no practical significance for information
science, remindsus that information is alwaysphysically instantiated, and its pro-
cessing is limited by the constraints of the physical universe. Of course, there are
thosewhowould go further, and say that information is physical per se, but that is
a topic for a different discussion; see, for instance, Bawden and Robinson (2013),
the contributors to Davies and Gregersen (2010), and Hjørland (2007).
3 The Personal Number: 7 (or 4)
One of the most cited papers in the human sciences is American psychologist
GeorgeMiller’s “Magical number 7, plus orminus 2” (Miller, 1956). This paper drew
attention to the significance of the number in human information processing. The
main finding was that the number of concepts of itemswhich an adult can hold in
conscious attention, or short-term memory, at one time is about seven. Miller, an
early enthusiast for the application of information theory in psychology, used in-
formation theory concepts to speculate about what this meant for the mechanism
of memory. This limit has been widely tested, and was generally regarded as cor-
rect. However,more recent studies, summarized by Cowan (2001), have suggested
that the limit may be lower, between three and five rather than between five and
nine. On the basis of these findings, Cowan recommends a “magical number 4”.
Whatever the exact number may be, it is clearly small, and has implications
for the way in which information is handled and should be presented. However,
there seems to have been relatively little explicit recognition of this in information
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science. It is tempting to ascribe to this factor thewell-known tendency for users of
search engines to attend only to the items presented on the first page. This seems
likely to bemore amatter of disinclination to spend the time necessary to consider
more items, rather than an inability to hold them in conscious attention at once;
but itmay be that someunderlyingmechanism, associatedwith the number limit,
accounts for both factors.
Knowledge organization systems appear to respect this feature. Decimal clas-
sifications may be guided to their ten main sections by a desire for a pleasing
notation, and others, most notably the Library of Congress Classification, follow
the twenty six letters of the Roman alphabet. But the general tendency, follow-
ing Ranganathan’s five fundamental facets (Hedden, 2010; Broughton, 2006), to
have between four and ten main sections or facets in the great majority of tax-
onomies and thesauri may be seen as an unconscious recognition that this is a
number which enables the user, or at least the compiler, to hold the whole struc-
ture inmind.Miller’s numberholdsupatmoredetailed levels of taxonomydesign:
“A popular rule of thumb is to go only three levels deep and have only six to eight
concepts per level. These numbers are based on user experience tests, which have
shown that users have the patience to click down only to a third level and can
scan only six to eight term entries at once” (Hedden, 2010, p. 236). This, of course,
reflects the similar experience with search engines noted above.
4 The Group Number: 150
The group number stems from the work of the British evolutionary psychologist
Robin Dunbar, initially inspired by the study of the correlation between brain size
and the size of social groups in primates. This led to the idea that there is a natu-
ral group size for humans; stable communicative relationships can bemaintained
with about 150 people (Dunbar, 1993; Dunbar, 2008; Dunbar, 2012). The number
derived from the correlation was actually 148, but it has generally, and sensibly,
been rounded to 150. This idea is of evident importance for information science,
since it is well-known that close acquaintances are a major source of information
inmost, if not all, contexts (Case, 2012). Further, shared knowledge is a major fac-
tor in themaintenance of social groups (Dunbar, 2012;McPherson, Smith-Lovin,&
Cook, 2001).
Dunbar argues that the size of the group of communicative relationships
which can be maintained at any one time is constrained in part by cognitive
factors, and hence ultimately by some aspect of brain size and structure, and
partly by available time. Direct evidence in humans is provided by correlations
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of individual differences in social network size and volumes of social cognition
areas in the cortex and amygdala brain structures (Kanai, Bahrami, Roylance, &
Rees, 2012; Bickart, Wright, Dautoff, Dickerson, & Feldman Barrett, 2011; Pow-
ell, Lewis, Roberts, García-Fiñana, & Dunbar, 2012). Empirically, this has been
tested by the observations of groupings in a wide variety of contexts, including
hunter-gatherers, farming communities, military formations, industrial and com-
mercial workforces, Christmas card lists, online social networks, and academic
disciplines (Dunbar, 1992; Dunbar, 2008; Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Roberts, Dunbar,
Pollet, & Ruppens, 2009).
Objections to the 150 value have been raised by those who argue that group-
ings of around 30–50people are commonly found inhunter-gatherer populations,
arguably the most “natural” form of human grouping (de Ruiter, Weston, & Lyon,
2011). Others have suggested that the number must be much larger because of the
evidence that many people have several hundred contacts on social media (Well-
man, 2012). However, asDunbar (2012, p. 2195) asserts, “there is now considerable
evidence that groupings of this size [around 150 individuals] occur frequently in
human social organization, and that this is the normative limit on the size of per-
sonal social networks among adults.”
A more nuanced viewpoint, rather than seeking to insist on a single number
to encapsulate the complexities of social interaction, is to see a series of num-
bers, reflecting different strengths of social ties, and of shared knowledge and
perspectives. These groups exhibit the kind of “small world” network structure
and behavior which will discussed later. Typically, these represent groups with
rough sizes 5, 15, 50, 150, 500, 1500, which can be seen as circles, each includ-
ing those inner, with a scaling factor of about three (Dunbar, 2012; Hamilton,
Milne, Walker, Burger, & Brown, 2007; Roberts, Dunbar, Pollet, & Ruppens, 2009;
Zhou, Sornette, Hill, & Dunbar, 2005). Groups of these sizes may be characterized
roughly as follows:
– 5: a core social group, or “support clique,” to whom an individual would refer
very frequently for support, assistance, information and advice;
– 15: a “sympathy group,” with whom there are special ties and frequent con-
tact;
– 50: typically a temporary grouping, formed for a particular period or task;
– 150: the stable inter-communicating group, with regular interaction and
knowledge sharing;
– 500: the “megaband,” again typically a temporary or pragmatic grouping;
and
– 1500: the “tribe”—acquaintances at best, with whom any relationship, or
communication of information, is typically one-way, and there is no little or
no sharing of knowledge.
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Of these, the 5 and 150 levels seem particularly significant: 150 for the reasons
set out by Dunbar, supported by a good deal of evidence, and in keeping with
Shirky’s (2003, n.p.) recommendation for effective online group size (i.e., “larger
than a dozen, smaller than a few hundred”); five because it appears to be a nat-
ural small group equivalent, related to the idea that spontaneous conversation
and information sharing almost always occurs in groups of not more than four
individuals (Dunbar, Duncan, & Nettle, 1995).
It seems evident that an understanding of this group interaction structure, if
indeed it is valid and omnipresent, is important for several areas within informa-
tion science, perhaps most notably in knowledge management. However, there
seems to have been little examination of the significance of this group structure
with respect to the communication of information. Studies have established that
the smaller, and more information-intensive and knowledge-sharing, groups re-
quire an investment of time, and ideally substantial face-to-face contact, if their
members are not to slip into the larger, and less effective groupings (Dunbar, 2012;
Roberts, Dunbar, Pollet, & Ruppens, 2009). This seems to be a warning against
reliance on purely digital information sharing, particularly with an assumption
that its scale can be increased by technological means, and typifies the value that
such theoretical concepts can bring to information practice.
5 The Linking Number: 6
The idea that everyone in the world is connected to everyone else by no more
than “six degrees of separation” has become entrenched in popular conscious-
ness through newspaper andmagazine articles, plays, TV series, films, and games
(Six degrees of separation, n.d.). The concept was introduced by the Hungarian
writer Frigyes Karinthy (1929), in his short story Láncszemek (Chains), but became
well-knownonlywith the classic paper of American psychologist StanleyMilgram
(1967). This initiated a research program in what became known as “small world”
phenomena; for a detailed review, from Karinthy onwards, see Schnettler (2009).
In Milgram’s study, randomly chosen participants in the Midwest (U.S.), were
asked to try to send a printed message to a target in New England (U.S.), by send-
ing it to a person with whom they were personally acquainted, asking that it be
forwarded in the sameway. Only about 30% succeeded, and those that did varied
between two and ten intermediaries, with a median of five. This was the basis for
the idea of “six degrees of separation,” although Milgram did not use this phrase
in his paper. Focusing on the number of nodes, rather than links, in the chain,
he wrote of “five circles of acquaintances” (Milgram, 1967, p. 65). The rather more
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memorable “six degrees of separation” phrase was introduced two decades later,
in a play with that name (Guare, 1990).
Some limited empirical research in the social sciences investigated this idea
over thenext thirty years, until the subjectwas revitalizedby formalmathematical
modeling of network connectivity in all kinds of contexts, not just social (Cal-
darelli & Catanzaro, 2012; Mitchell 2009; Schnettler, 2009). The formal model-
ing results tend to support empirical studies in various contexts, in confirming
commonly occurring short paths through extensive networks, though they do not
support the idea that there is anything special about the number six (or five); me-
dian chain lengths can vary from three to fifteen, according to the nature of the
network. However, a study aiming to replicate Milgram’s work on a much larger
scale using e-mail gave quite similar results, of between five and seven steps for
the minority of messages which were completed, suggesting that this may be a
natural scale for social information networks (Dodds, Muhamad, & Watts, 2003).
As Stock and Stock (2013, p. 384–385) note, the “six degrees of separation”
concept has become synonymouswith the idea of “small worlds”. This expresses,
in the social context, the idea that “people are not only linked to their immediate
friends, family, and acquaintances, but they are embedded in a larger structure of
direct and indirect contacts” (Schnettler, 2009, p. 166). More formally, the “small-
world effect” denotes the fact that most nodes in most networks are joined by
relatively small paths; a specific “small-world network” has been identified as one
with a structure intermediate between highly regular and totally random, with
nodes highly clustered, as in regular graphs, and yet with a short path length be-
tween any two nodes, as is typical in random graphs (Schnettler, 2009; Watts &
Strogatz, 1998).
However, despite this theoretical support for short paths, empirical work on
social networks, typically carried out in the sociology domain, have tended to
show that, although extended chains of social contacts were available, they were
used infrequently for finding information (Schnettler, 2009). For example, in a
study of how people found information about job prospects, most used one in-
termediary, or none, and no chain was more than four links (Granovetter, 1995).
The only example of longer chains, with up to nine links and a median of five,
was found in a study of women in the U.S. seeking a doctor willing to perform an
abortion at a time when legal abortion was severely restricted (Lee, 1969).
Björneborn and Ingwersen (2001, p. 74) noted that small world metrics were
potentially relevant to several topics within information science including webo-
metrics, citation analysis, semantic networks, and thesauri, but that there was a
lack of research in these areas. Since then there has been some usage in webo-
metric studies, a typical example being the demonstration that the typical path
link between sites in the United Kingdom (U.K.) academic web network is three
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or four (Björneborn, 2006), and in bibliometrics, for example, a study of the co-
occurrence of keywords in databases, where the number reflects the distance be-
tween papers measured by the keywords in common (Zhu, Wang, Hassan & Had-
dawy, 2013). The only specific mentions of the “six degrees” idea in the recent
information science literature appears to be James’ (2006) reflections on the rel-
evance of the idea to information literacy instruction, and Dennie and Cuccia’s
(2014) application to a chemical literature search assignment.
While considerable research has been carried out within information science
using the “small worlds theory”, this has largely been detailed qualitative studies
of information interactions between groups and networks in limited spaces, phys-
ical or virtual (Savolainen, 2009). Concepts such as ‘density’ from network theory
may be applied (see, for example, Huotari & Chatman, 2001), but generally in
an informal and semi-quantitative way. Even within these caveats, Schultz-Jones
(2009, p. 626) found that “library and information service settings [are] a largely
undeveloped context for the application of social network theory and social net-
work analysis.” It may be that there is scope for better integration of qualitative
and quantitative methods, as Schnettler (2009) advocates in general for small
world research, and for a greater focus on contexts closer to our own (disciplinary)
home. The number, whether it be 6 or not, is not, in this case, as important as the
“network thinking” (Mitchell 2009) to which it points.
Finally, we might note that the “six degrees of separation” idea has launched
metrics such as the Bacon number, the closeness of the Hollywood actor Kevin
Bacon to any other actor, based on the actors who have worked with actors who
have worked with Kevin Bacon, and, perhaps more seriously, the Erdös number,
based on how many links of co-authorship link anyone to the Hungarian mathe-
matician Paul Erdös (Grossman, 2014). Perhapswe should establish an analogous
Cronin number: one of us [DB] would be 2, since he has not co-authored with
Cronin, but has co-authored with at least one person who has, LR would have
a Cronin number of 3, on the same basis.
6 The Network Number: 59
As we have just seen, experiments have shown that messages across small world
networks fail to get through a majority of the time. This may be due to a variety
of context-specific factors, depending on the nature of the network, and the pat-
tern and strength of its connections (Dodds, Muhamad &Watts, 2003; Schnettler,
2009). Milgram (1967) noted a specific, and fairly obvious, point that two groups
within a networkmay be cut off, if there is no link path joining them, so that there
Information’s Magic Numbers: The Numerology of Information Science | 189
is no possibility of information passing between them. Mathematical analysis of
networks by the American complexity scientist Stuart Kauffman has shed an in-
teresting light on network behavior in this respect.
Kauffman has shown that, for any network of nodes which are all initially
isolated, adding links randomly betweennodes causes a pattern of connections to
build up, steadily and linearly, so that linked groups are createdwithin the overall
network. This may be seen as an instantiation of Ramsey theory, which posits the
unavoidable emergence of regularity in large structures, such as networks. It is
often expressed as the ‘party problem’; howmanyguestsmust be invited to a party
(or people invited to link to a social media site) so that a minimum number (the
“Ramsey Number”) will know each other (Gould, nd).
Kauffman shows that when 59% of the nodes are linked to at least one other,
the pattern suddenly and dramatically changes, and the great majority of the
nodes are connected. This is referred to as a network phase transition. An accessi-
ble account of the phenomenon is given by Kauffman (1996), and its significance
is described for computer networks, such as the World Wide Web (Tetlow, 2007)
and for social networks such as the financial system (Beinhocker, 2006).
The importance of this number for information science is that it should in-
still an awareness that the behavior of information networks of all kinds may
change, suddenly and dramatically, as their interconnectivity increases. It is easy
to assume that overall connectivity within a network, and hence the ability to
pass information between any two of its nodes, will increase in a regular man-
ner, as more individual interconnections are added, depending on the number
of connected nodes. This is the basis for “laws” relating the value of a network,
specifically a computer network, to the number of nodes connected. Metcalfe’s
Law, for example, states that the value of a network increases as the square of
the numbers of nodes connected (Floridi, 2014), while a variant due to Briscoe,
Odlyzko, and Tilly (2006) argue for a less rapid growth of n(log n), with n nodes
connected. Kauffman’s number shows us that this kind of continuous growth in
network value is only valid up to a point. Beyond this, rather precisely specifiable,
point, a qualitative change in thenature, andvalue, of thenetworkoccurs, leading
to an essentially new information environment.
7 The Distribution Numbers: 90, 9, and 1
The numbers 90-9-1 have been found to represent the distribution of activity
among users of social media sites, including microblogs, such as Twitter, and
wikis, most notably Wikipedia. For every regular contributor, or “superuser”,
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there are nine occasional contributors, and ninety “lurkers”, who take informa-
tion but do not contribute with any regularity; as an example, see van Mierlo
(2014). This is an instantiation of a very widespread distribution in information
areas. From our days as information practitioners, we recall it being an article of
faith, stated anecdotally though never written down so far as we know, that in
any complex search for information requiring high recall it was easy to get 90%
of the material, very difficult to get 99% and impossible to get 100%.
These are examples of the ubiquitous power law distributions that govern
the information world, including those of Bradford, Lotka, Pareto, and Zipf (Baw-
den & Robinson 2012a; Egghe, 2005; Rousseau, 2010). As such, they are better
known within the information science community than the other numbers de-
scribed in this chapter, and need less exposition. An appreciation of these laws,
and the numbers which come from them, informs practice in areas such as col-
lection management, information retrieval, institutional bibliometrics, and the
assessment of impact of social media; see, as examples, Corby (2003), Nicolaisen
and Hjørland (2007), Bhavnani and Peck (2010), Åström and Hansson (2012), and
Hoffman and Doucette (2012). These are thus among the few “magic numbers”
which are used widely and directly in the practice of the information disciplines,
and particularly in scientometrics.
8 The Knowledge Number: ∞
The knowledge number is generally termed the Champernowne number, after the
BritishmathematicianDavid Champernowne,whoderived andpublished it while
still an undergraduate student before going on to a career as an economics pro-
fessor (Champernowne, 1933; Pickover, 2012, p. 364–365). While he derived his
number simply as a mathematical curiosity, it has interesting implications for the
information world (von Baeyer, 2003, p. 101–102).
Wefirst choose abase for ournumber, saybinary or decimal. Thenweenumer-
ate all the symbols that constitute that number set, then all the pairs, then all the
triplets, and so on, for as long as we wish. In decimal base 10, as Champernowne
originally presented it, we would write 0.12345678910111213141516… or, in the bi-
nary system,wewouldwrite 0 1 0001 10 11 000001 010 100…Sincewe can always
continue adding to this number, it must necessarily be infinite in magnitude.
Then we choose a code to convert the number to characters—something like
ASCII or Unicode—and convert our potentially infinite number to a potentially
long infinite text string. In this infinite character string there will be found ev-
erything that has ever been written using the chosen character set, embedded in
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the (literally) infinitely larger set of everything could be written. We will find the
text of Shakespeare’sMidsummer Night’s Dream, in all its editions, in all possible
languages, and with all possible misprints and errors. We will find a copy of this
paper, with all these variants, and a copy of all the works which Blaise Cronin has
written, or might have written. This is an instantiation of Borges’ (1998) Library of
Babel,
[Whose] bookshelves contain all possible combinations of [symbols] – that is, all that is able
to be expressed, in every language. All – the detailed history of the future, the autobiogra-
phies of the archangels, the faithful catalog of the Library, thousands and thousands of false
catalogs, the proof of the falsity of those false catalogs, a proof of the falsity of the true cata-
log, the Gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary upon that gospel, the commentary on
the commentary on that gospel, the true story of your death, the translation of every book
into every language, the interpolations of every book into all books, the treatise Bede could
have written (but did not) on the mythology of the Saxon people, the lost books of Tacitus.
(Borges, 1998, p. 115)
And Champernowne gives us this in a number.
The number is of no practical value, but it is a striking formal indication of the
idea that creativity, and growth of knowledge, are unlimited. While our first num-
ber indicated that the amount of information that can be held within the physical
universe must be finite, creativity is unlimited, and knowledge can grow indefi-
nitely (see, for example, Deutsch, 2011; Kauffman, 2010).
9 Conclusions
It is difficult to state concisely where these numbers fit into our understanding of
the informationworld, andmore specifically in our understanding of informetrics
and scholarly communication; though it would be difficult to deny their potential
significance. All these numbers are interesting, and some are of immediate use
for practice; they take us into the areas where the information sciences overlap
with the human sciences, especially psychology, with the physical sciences, and
even with philosophy. It is not evident that there is any metatheory which could
encapsulate them all, and it may be unrealistic to think of anything of the sort.
However, the links between the numbers, for example between Dunbar’s social
groups and Milgram’s small world networks, may serve as a basis for building a
modest theoretical framework.
It is still more unrealistic to seek for a single magic number for information.
Though, if we had to do so, it would probably be 5, since this appears in several
contexts, including cognitive scope, small world links, and optimal group size for
192 | David Bawden and Lyn Robinson
information exchange. The numbers measure attributes of people and groups,
cognition and networks, collections and activities; all three of Popper’s Worlds,
for those who like that ontology as a basic for the subject (Bawden, 2002; Baw-
den & Robinson, 2012B).
The numbers themselves appear rather fluid, and usually their exact value
does not matter. It is the general magnitude that is important; it does not mat-
ter exactly what volume of information is produced daily, but it does matter, for
practical purposes, that it is very large, and getting much larger very rapidly. Nor
does it matter, for our purposes, whether the optimal group size for information
interaction is exactlyDunbar’s 150; though it doesmatter that it is about 150 rather
than the suggested alternative values of 30 or 500.
We may do better to forget numerological relations, and think of qualitative
patterns, with the numbers acting as a kind of aide-memoire: “statistical regu-
larities, observed in a context where social influences play an important role”, as
Rousseau (2010, p. 2747) puts it. Orwemay take thenumbers as a clue, or introduc-
tion, to new theoretical perspectives, in the same way that Milgram’s small world
of 6 connections opens the way to the much wider idea of scale-free networks
following power laws (Mitchell, 2009).
In their LIDA2014 presentations, both Blaise Cronin and David Bawden cited
a quotation about the limitations of metrics. His quotation was Albert Einstein’s
remark that “not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that
counts can be counted,” while David’s mentioned Václav Havel’s recommenda-
tion that we should have “a humble reverence for everything that we shall never
measure”. They amount to the same thing.Numberswill never tell thewhole story,
in information or in any other context. But that should not prevent us from contin-
uing to seek for numbers, magic or otherwise, which capture the structures and
patterns of the information world.
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Part IV: Authorship theories

Howard D. White
Authors as Persons and Authors as Bundles
of Words
1 Introduction
In 2002 Blaise Cronin and Debora Shaw published “Identity-creators and image-
makers: Using citation analysis and thick description to put authors in their
place”. This article was, to my knowledge, the first to adopt the “ego-centered”
style of citation analysis I had put forward in White (2000, 2001a, 2001b)—“ego”
implying not egotism but an individual whose links to others (“alters”) in a net-
work are the focus of research interest (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In my work,
“ego” is an author’s nameused to retrieve terms that co-occurwith it in the records
of a bibliographic database. It is thus a seed term to which the co-occurring terms
(the “alters”) bear a fixed relation (e.g., “co-author-with”). When rank-ordered by
their co-occurrence counts with the seed, these other terms, especially the high-
ranked ones, characterize the seed economically and aptly. The characterizations
are superficial, but as rapidly-formed synopses, they can aid in browsing and
searching literatures and in gratifying curiosity about author-centered fields of
study.
Of particular interest among co-occurring terms are other authors related
to the seed in some way by citation. Cronin and Shaw’s “identity-creators” and
“image-makers,” which I will explain, are relations of this sort. However, authors’
names are an unusual unit of analysis, in that the same name can simultaneously
mean both a person and a body ofwritings. This fact bears on somemajor features
of ego-centered bibliometric distributions described in sections below. I will first
introduce the framework into which the Cronin and Shaw article fits—a frame-
work for bibliometric distributions in general. That will lead to an explanation of
ego-centered ones, which involves the relative ease with which terms in them can
be associated.
2 Bibliograms
Authors, editors, and indexers routinely use terms of various kinds to identify
and describe thewritings that constitute literatures. Over time, such terms appear
with differing frequencies in bibliographies, just as they appear with differing fre-
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quencies in the full-text writings themselves. When ranked by their frequencies,
the terms form bibliometric distributions. In White (2005a, b) I proposed “bibli-
ogram” as a name for these distributions as verbal constructs. Bibliograms consist
of (1) a seed term that sets a linguistic context, (2) terms of a fixed kind that co-
occur with the seed across a database of bibliographic records, and (3) counts
of term co-occurrences with the seed by which the terms can be ordered high
to low. With appropriate changes, the same definition can be extended to non-
bibliographic records, such as the texts of one or more items of discourse.
In return for merely knowing a seed term, bibliograms provide new infor-
mation. The top terms in them can be visualized as word clouds, for example.
Seeds of various kindsmay be used to obtain various kinds of co-occurring terms.
A classic Bradford distribution takes a subject term as seed and ranks the journals
that co-occur with it by how many articles in the journals are indexed with that
subject term. A classic Lotka distribution takes a subject term as seed and ranks
the authors that co-occur with it by how many papers they have contributed to
the literature it designates. Moving beyond bibliographic sources, a classic Zipf
distribution takes an extended text as seed (e.g., Joyce’s Ulysses) and ranks the
words that co-occur with its title by their frequencies in body text. If the last list
is stripped of high-ranking function words (like “the” and “of”), the remaining
content words often have thematic or stylistic interest.
For decades, information scientists have labeled such distributions by the
mathematical or statistical properties of their counts, calling them skewed,
empirical-hyperbolic, scale-free, power-law, size-frequency, reverse-J, core-and-
scatter, and so on (see, in this volume, Furner, and Glänzel and Schubert). The
point of adding “bibliogram” as a newdesignator is simply to emphasize semantic
and other features of the ranked terms no less than their counts. The counts are
content-neutral, but the ranked terms associatedwith a seedmake a verbal object
that is content-laden. As numbers people, many bibliometricians focus chastely
on the counts, whereas the verbal object invites word people to interpret why the
terms come together as they do—an instance of Geertz’s (1973) “thick description”.
Until White (2005a, b), that object had no name.¹
1 Bibliograms have analogues in fields allied to bibliometrics, such as webometrics and altmet-
rics. They also have an interesting parallel in word association lists from psycholinguistics. In
White (2005a, b, and 2011) I call the latter “associograms” to bring out the parallel.
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3 CAMEOs
The acronymCAMEOstands for CharacterizationsAutomaticallyMade andEdited
Online (White, 2001a). “Online” in White (2001a) refers to the now-defunct Dia-
log search system, whose Rank command could rapidly create CAMEOs in many
databases. However, a similar command has been and could yet be implemented
in other systems. The discussion here presumes Dialog’s near-instant response
time in retrieving the terms that co-occur with a seed.
A CAMEO is a specific type of bibliogram—one in which an author’s name
as seed retrieves a rank-ordered list of terms associated with the author’s pub-
lications. The terms characterize the author personally. When the list indicates
subject matter, a CAMEO is a profile in the librarian’s sense of a customer’s sub-
ject interests expressed in indexing terms. (This of course plays on theWebster’s
New Collegiate Dictionary sense of CAMEO as “a small medallion with a profiled
head in relief.”) White (2001a), for instance, used two scientists’ names as seeds
to rank the INSPEC and Ei Compendex descriptors applied to their papers. It also
used the name of a famous Victorian author and artist, William Morris, as a seed
to profile him bymeans of the Library of Congress subject headings applied to his
books. (The idea can be expanded from one author’s books to multiple authors’
books combined, as in Ginda et al., this volume.)
Notably, however, White (2000) and (2001a) show how “ego” authors as
seeds can be profiled in terms of their co-occurring “alter” authors in the citation
databases of Thomson Reuters. This was done by exploiting four retrieval strate-
gies that Dialog software made possible in these databases. (Dialog had tools not
in the Web of Science, Scopus, Google Scholar, or CiteSeer.) Using the tags AU for
author andCA for cited author, four different ego-alter relations could be revealed.
Dialog’s Select command formed a set of documents defined by the seed, while
its Rank command rank-ordered terms by their frequency of occurrence in the set.
The four relations are given in Table 1.
These CAMEOs are drawn from bibliographic records only, because their
tagged fields keep the relation between the seed and the co-occurring terms
constant. That is, when a seed from one field is used to generate a CAMEO of
co-occurring terms from the same or a different field, the tags will yield a single
relation, as seen in the AU and CA combinations of Table 1. In associating names,
a seed is active as a co-author or citer; passive, as a citee or co-citee. The individual
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Tab. 1: Four types of CAMEOs.
Co-authors Select AU = seed author forms the set of papers by the seed. Then Rank AU
ranks by frequencies the seed plus all other persons with bylines in this set.
This is the co-author relation.
Identity Select AU = seed author forms the set of papers by the seed. Then Rank CA
ranks the authors in this set by the frequencies with which the seed has cited
them. I call this relation the seed author’s citation identity. It includes (re-
movable) self-citations.
Image Select CA = seed author forms the set of papers in which the seed author
is cited. Then Rank CA ranks the authors in this set by the frequencies with
which they and the seed have been cited together. This is the co-citation
relation, which I call the seed’s citation image. (Self-citation is again present,
but removable.)
Image-makers Select CA = seed author forms the set of papers in which the seed author is
cited. Then Rank AU ranks the authors in this set by the frequencies of papers
in which they cite the seed. I call these authors the seed’s image-makers,
since they create the seed’s image through co-citation. (The seed can be one
of them through self-citation.)
citer’s identity is the basic citation relation, because it is from citers’ identities
that the counts for the image-makers and the image are aggregated.²
Co-authorships differ from the other relations, in that the data come solely
from bylines rather than reference lists. (Co-authors frequently cite their own past
collaborations, as well as each other; they are also frequently co-cited.) As one
would expect, co-authorships are strongly influencedbygeographic proximity (cf.
Katz, 1994), but with contemporary communications technology, they no longer
depend on it.
The CAMEOs in Cronin and Shaw (2002) present three seed authors: Cronin
himself, Stephen Harter, and Rob Kling, all at the time at Indiana University.
The relations displayed and analyzed are, first, their identities (authors they
frequently cite) and, second, their image-makers (authors who frequently cite
them). In Table 2, I give examples of all four relations, using as seeds Eugene
Garfield (from White, 2000) and Belver Griffith (White, 2001a). For brevity, the
distributions are severely truncated to show only the top four names from each
ranking—that is, the inmost core of core-and-scatter distributions that are hun-
2 Retrievals based on bibliographic coupling strength—the number of references any two papers
share—are possible in Web of Science and Scopus, but were not possible in Dialog. In any case,
they are not part of the ego-centered CAMEO framework presented here.
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Tab. 2: Top names in four CAMEO types, with Eugene Garfield and Belver Griffith as seeds.
Co-authors Identity Image Image-makers
1264 Garfield E 815 Garfield E 3630 Garfield E 846 Garfield E
7 Welljams-Dorof A 78 Merton RK 520 Price DJD 52 Vlachy J
6 Small H 76 Price DJD 295 Small H 26 Braun T
3 Cawkell AE 67 Zuckerman H 285 Narin F 22 Small H
Co-authors Identity Image Image-makers
36 Griffith BC 11 Griffith BC 368 Griffith BC 17 McCain KW
7 Drott MC 9 Price DJD 207 Small H 15 Garfield E
6 White HD 9 Small H 147 Price DJD 15 Griffith BC
2 McCain KW 4 Garvey WD 130 Garfield E 13 Small H
dreds of names long. The data comemainly from Social Scisearch (in its surname-
and-initials format). They are not current, merely illustrative.³
What stands out in the discussions of these CAMEOs, whether by Cronin and
Shaw or myself, is our almost automatic tendency to treat the authors in them as
persons—that is, as agents who write and cite on the basis not only of intellectual
ties, but of social ties and geographic proximity (see Ekbia, this volume, for
more on the somatics of science). Cronin and Shaw can do “thick description” of
their seed authors because they have extensive knowledge of them as persons.
In my own studies I used the Institute for Scientific Information’s Garfield and
Drexel University’s Griffith for the same reason. For example, because of my non-
bibliographic knowledge of the people involved, I can say that the seed authors
in Table 2 are or were personally acquainted with every other author listed. More-
over, in its columns I see collegial ties, mentor-student ties, employer-employee
ties, co-authorships, trusted assessorships, friendships, rivalries—the dense in-
terpersonal linkages that research specialties typically exhibit. Many of these
ties must be read into the data from one’s mental encyclopedia, but some, such
as an adviser-author tie, may be formally acknowledged in publications (Cronin,
1995). If onehas considerable domain knowledge of this sort, interpreting citation
CAMEOs is easy, and there ismuch to say.Without it, theremay seem little towrite
about.
3 I have used Small H (rather than Small HG) forHenry Small and chosenCawkell AE andMcCain
KW fromamong co-authorswhohad tied countswith the seed. Garfield’s self-citation count of 815
in his identity differs from the 846 in his image-makers column; Griffith correspondingly has 11
as against 15. These discrepancies in the ISI data are at least partially explained in White (2000,
2001a).
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Recall, however, that any author’s name in a CAMEO can also mean an oeu-
vre, which connotes subject matter. This opens upwholly different analytic possi-
bilities on two levels. On the primary level, an oeuvre consists of one or more full
texts—a bundle of retrievable words and their verbal contexts. On the secondary
(or meta-data) level, an oeuvre consists of the bibliographic records representing
those works, and they, too, are a bundle of retrievable words. It is these word-
bundles that allow us to document intellectual ties between authors. Intellectual
ties pre-eminently include subjects shared within and across oeuvres. They are
frequently signaled by exact or partial term-matches and by other easy-to-see ter-
minological relations (e.g., synonyms, hypernyms, hyponyms) fromwork towork.
Citation indexes contain millions of connections of this sort (see Stock, this vol-
ume, for the relationship between informetrics and knowledge organization sys-
tems). Aggregated in the Thomson Reuters databases on Dialog, they became a
form of collaborative tagging.
4 Intellectual Ties and CAMEO Structure
A shallow but important connection is semantic closeness in title terms. For ex-
ample, “Ritchie (2009)” is a journal article. Data from its bibliographic record in
Social Scisearch include its author, AU = L. David Ritchie, and its title, TI = Rel-
evance and Simulation in Metaphor. Among its 39 cited references (CR =) are a
book, a handbook chapter, and aMind & Language article. Abbreviated Thomson
Reuters-style, they are:
SPERBER D, 1996, RELEVANCE COMMUNICAT
WILSON D, 2004, HDB PRAGMATICS, P607
WILSON D, 2006, MIND LANG, V21, P404
Table 3 spells out the works that Ritchie is actually citing. They obviously map
onto his own title. The 2006 article matches Ritchie’s in two key terms. The 1996
book and the 2004 book chapter match his on one, but by moving from the bib-
liographic level to passages in full text, it will be found that they, too, discuss
metaphor. As Ritchie cites, he is actually indexing his own article topically with
other works.
This indexing process feeds into the CAMEOs seen here. The authors’ names
in them were extracted from the CR strings designating works, as in the Sperber
and Wilson examples above. Technically, an author’s name becomes a metonym
for the works in his or her oeuvre; that is, it can be substituted for them—or, more
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Tab. 3: Three works cited in Ritchie (2009).
Authors Titles
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson Relevance: Communication and Cognition
Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber Relevance Theory
Deirdre Wilson and Robyn Carston Metaphor, Relevance and the ‘Emergent Property’ Issue
hazily, for their subject matter—because of its frequent association with them in
bibliographic and full-text sources (Falkum, 2011, ch. 6). Through the metonymic
process, for example, the names Dan Sperber, DeirdreWilson, and Robyn Carston
have all come to stand for relevance theory, a major specialty in linguistic prag-
matics. (Sperber and Wilson (S&W) created it, and Carston is probably now their
foremost exponent.) At the bibliographic level, Ritchie’s own title and the works
he cites suggest that his name, too, connotes S&W’s relevance theory to the knowl-
edgeable reader, and the full text of his article confirms it.
Intellectual ties—broadly, shared specializations, shared journals, shared
topical relationships—are even more fundamental than social ties in binding
learned literatures together (White et al., 2004). As stated earlier, authors often
have (or had) social ties with the people, living and dead, they cite. But they also
know countless people they do not cite, just as they cite people they do not know.
The latter include living persons with whom they have never communicated, but
also, in many cases, the dead known only through reading. The tie underlying all
these possibilities is an intellectual one—the relevance of one work to another,
which frequently implies one or more topics in common.
However—and it is a big however—the relevance of onework to another varies
in how obvious it is, prior to reading. At one extreme, it may immediatelymanifest
itself on Cronin’s (1994) “opus” level, which is also the bibliographic level of titles,
subject indicators, and abstracts. At the other, it must be traced to Cronin’s “quan-
tum” level in body text—the passages actually cited—and it may not be obvious
even then. I reproduce Cronin’s full list of levels, with his headings and examples,
in Table 4.
Present readers can probably think of many ways in which the authors in Ta-
ble 2 are connectable through their articles and books: it is no great stretch to get
from, e.g., Garfield to Small, or Merton to Price, or Griffith to McCain through top-
ically similar publications, even when the authors’ technical vocabularies differ.
But what of a case like White (2000), in which I co-cited two papers by Garfield
withpoemsbyWaltWhitmanandW.H.Auden?For someonenot knowingmycon-
text, that is a stretch; the ties betweenWhitman, Auden, Garfield, andmy chapter
are neither obvious nor presumably strong.
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Tab. 4: Tiered citation typology from Cronin (1994).
Focus Scope Level
Oeuvre (works of Freud) Compound V
Motif (punishment in Foucault; writers on sex) Macromolecular IV
Opus (Belkin’s article) Molecular III
Chunk (the discussion section; chapter 3; opening paragraph) Atomic II
Quantum (formula; phrase; chemical compound; method; result) Subatomic I
As it happens, Garfield’s image—his CAMEO as a co-cited author—conveys as
much. Price, Small, and Narin are his top co-citees. The fact that citers refer to
works by him and these authors in many different contexts suggests that their
interrelatedness is easy to see. In contrast, authors like Auden and Whitman,
whose works have no apparent connection with Garfield’s, rank down in the tail
of his image’s frequency distribution. Moreover, like the vast majority of low-
ranked names in citation images, they will stay in the tail, because they and
Garfield do not jointly have rich implications for citers. There are no burgeoning
Auden-Garfield or Whitman-Garfield studies. Put simply, citers see Price, Small,
and Narin as vastly more relevant to Garfield than Auden or Whitman.
The same observation holds for citation identities, which are interpreted
much like citation images. For example, because I cited Auden and Whitman
once each in White (2000), they are in my identity, but they are among the many
names in the tail of the distribution. My top-ranked names include several of the
authors in Table 2—McCain, Small, Griffith, Garfield—and have for many years.
My identitywill continue to evolve, but none of the names in it are likely to change
much in their rankings—certainly not Auden and Whitman.
The overarching lesson at this point is that the ease of associating the seed’s
name with other authors’ names can be crudely measured by their co-occurrence
frequencies over time. Table 5 recasts the CAMEOs of Table 1 in terms of this idea.
If ease of association is linked to relevance, one must ask: what makes authors’
works relatively easy or hard to associate and therefore of varying degrees of rele-
vance to each other? I have already sketched an answer here and there, but it will
be laid out more fully later.
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Tab. 5: Hypothetical ease of association in four types of CAMEOs.
Seed as co-author A seed author knows some other potential authors. Co-authors shows
the relative ease with which the seed has been able to publish new works
with them.
Seed as citer A seed author knows some written works. Citation identity shows the
relative ease with which the seed, in his or her own new publications, has
cited their authors.
Seed as citee Many citers know a seed author’s works. Citation image-makers shows
the relative ease with which these citers, in their own new publications,
have cited anything by the seed.
Seed as co-citee Many citers know not only works by a seed author but works by others.
Citation image shows the relative ease with which these citers, in their
own new publications, have co-cited anything by the seed with anything
by others.
5 Inference
The names in Table 2 connote oeuvres linked by subject matter, and the reader
may also be able to interpret individual author’s names as implicit subject head-
ings on the basis of their writings (e.g., Derek Price = Citation Networks, William
Garvey = Communication in Science, Belver Griffith = Co-citation Mapping). Con-
sider, then, a global subject heading for all the names in Table 2: what would it
be? (Or if multiple global labels are allowed for subsets of names, what would
they be?) This, of course, is the problem of labeling clusters of authors in a co-
citation map, or factors of authors in a factor analysis. The same problem occurs
if one is clustering or factor-analyzing research publications or journals.
I do not propose a label here myself; many readers will be able to supply at
least one. Rather, I would point out that deciding on any label involves inference.
The reader starts with existing assumptions about information science as a field
and then is given as new input the names (i.e., the oeuvres) in Table 2. By com-
bining the new input with the existing assumptions, one or more global labels
are inferred as a new conclusion. Once the proposed labels are all in view, further
inferences might be drawn as to their quality. “Information Science” and “Com-
munication in Science” are too broad, “Co-citation Analysis” is too narrow, and
so on.
The larger point is that every act of connecting scholarly and scientific texts
involves inferences. As another example, take Table 6. These are the top names in
Richard Smiraglia’s citation image—the authors with whom he had been co-cited
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11 or more times in Social Scisearch as of 2009.⁴ Given this input, where does he
fit in information science? What thematic threads can be inferred from the data?
Let me imagine one response that you, the reader, as an information scientist,
might make: “I don’t see bibliometrics or information retrieval or even informa-
tion behavior in these names; in fact, I can’t make much of them at all.” Since
Table 6 failed to interact with any of your existing assumptions about information
science, it is largely orwholly irrelevant to you, like anunknown foreign language.
Tab. 6: Citation image for Richard Smiraglia.
Count Name
105 Smiraglia RP
23 Svenonius E
21 Wilson P
20 Tillett BB
16 Carlyle A
16 Yee MM
15 Gorman M
15 Hjorland B
14 Leazer GH
14 Lubetzky S
13 Buckland MK
13 Vellucci SL
12 Cutter CA
12 O’Neill ET
12 Smiraglia R
12 Taylor AG
11 Chan LM
Avery different response to Table 6would be: “It obviously represents the kinds of
things that people in the International Society on Knowledge Organization write
about—bibliographic control, bibliographic organization, works as cataloguing
entities, conceptual foundations of cataloguing and indexing… Smiraglia edits
the ISKO journal… His counts with Pat Wilson and Elaine Svenonius show he’s
a theory guy… In fact, I see theorists from long ago—Charles Ammi Cutter from
the 19th century and Seymour Lubetzky—which is a sign of humanities-type re-
4 Social Scisearch on Dialog counted the papers in which co-citations occurred. At the time, ex-
clusive of co-citation, Smiraglia had been cited with his middle initial in 105 papers and without
it in 12. All the other counts reflect co-citation; for example, 23 papers cited at least one of his
works with at least one by Elaine Svenonius.
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search… A practical cataloguer like Lois Mai Chan is lower down… All these
people are pretty library-oriented… They’re more qualitative than quantitative
in style… Greg Leazer was Smiraglia’s doctoral student…” A babbling-brook re-
sponse like this would indicate that Table 6 is at least somewhat relevant to you,
in that you can readily interpret it. In other words, as a new input, it interacts with
your existing assumptions—items of domain knowledge—to produce many new
inferences, which you then communicate. (More discussion on domain knowl-
edge and inference in scientometrics can be found in Hjørland, this volume.)
Your existing assumptions further suggest you are at least somewhat inter-
ested in the various topics that the names in Table 6 imply. From what you know
of theirworks, it is possible that you yourselfmight find contexts for citing them in
awork of your own. In that event, knowledge of your ownwork-in-progress is part
of your existing assumptions, and recollection or discovery of a related work is a
new input. Combining the two, you infer new conclusions, such as: “Pat Wilson’s
paper reinforces what I’m saying here. But if I adopt his terminology, I’ve got to
cite him.” In so doing, you document the connection between your work and a
previous one. Your motives for citing may be various, but one is constant across
citers—awish to observe the norm that use of other works will be documented. By
citing, you intend that your readers, too, will experience the “proper documenta-
tion” effect, alongwith others having to dowith your substantive claims. Youmay
believe, for instance, that the earlier work provides evidence for your own argu-
ment, or negates someone else’s, or supports a witty insight; there are numerous
possibilities. In any case, you trust that your citations will produce in your au-
dience the cognitive effects you intend. As a general principle, citers who intend
readers to draw certain conclusions from their citations must first have reached
those conclusions themselves.
Here, I have been imagining inferences by present readers, but surely the seed
authors in Table 2 also drew inferences about the relevance of certain works to
their own as they created their citation identities. In turn, their image-makers
drew inferences about these same authors’ works as they created their citation
images. From cognitive and communicative processes along these lines, the entire
edifice of citation is built.
6 Relevance Theory
Somemay recognize thatmydiscussions of “inferences” and “ease of association”
have been informed by Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) relevance theory, a tendency
I now want to make explicit. In the article that introduced relevance theory (RT)
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to information science, Harter (1992, p. 614) wrote: “The act of citing is the state-
ment of an historical relevance relationship, captured for all time in a published
article.” He was speculating about whether data from bibliometrics and citation
analysis could help information scientists understand relevance as a dynamic
cognitive process in S&W’s sense, as opposed to how it is commonly understood
in retrieval system evaluations (relevance = a query-document match in topic). In
the spirit of Harter, I will use RT to explain core and scatter in citation CAMEOs.
My argument is developed much more fully in White (2011), and so the treatment
of RT here will be brief and highly selective. I will relate it to CAMEOs in later
sections.
The First Principle of RT is that “Human cognition tends to be geared to the
maximisation of relevance” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 260). This is a cogni-
tive universal, reached through evolution. Wilson and Sperber (2004, p. 608) ask,
when is an input relevant?
Intuitively, an input (a sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) is relevant to an individual
when it connects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that
matter to him: say, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a
certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression.
In relevance-theoretic terms, an input is relevant to an individual when its processing in a
context of available assumptions yields a positive cognitive effect. A positive cognitive effect
is aworthwhile difference to the individual’s representation of theworld—a true conclusion,
for example. False conclusions are not worth having. They are cognitive effects, but not pos-
itive ones.
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 3.1–3.2)⁵
Wilson and Sperber (2004) proceed to define the relevance of an input to an indi-
vidual:
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achievedbyprocessing
an input, the greater the relevance to the individual at that time.
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the rele-
vance of the input to the individual at that time.
(p. 610)
Cognitive effects occur when newly presented information interacts with some-
one’s context of existing assumptions. “Context” in RT is thus a psychological no-
tion, and existing assumptions are the thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, and knowl-
5 Wilson and Sperber (2004) introduce RT at chapter length. The summary of S&W’s ideas in Yus
(2011) may be especially useful for present readers because it applies RT to Web-based commu-
nications, including document retrieval. Clark’s (2013) lucid book on RT is one of the Cambridge
Textbooks in Linguistics.
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edge (including knowledge of textual contexts—“co-texts”) that an individual can
access inmaking sense of new inputs. Such inputs produce effects by (1) strength-
ening an existing assumption, (2) contradicting and eliminating it, or by (3) com-
bining with it to yield a new conclusion—one derived from neither the new infor-
mation alone, nor the context alone, but from both together.
S&W hold that, while human beings constantly receive inputs from many
sources, they automatically heed those with the greatest relevance for them at
a given time—that is, they heed the inputs that produce the greatest effects for the
least effort. This in RT is defined as “maximal relevance.” Since the two factors
operate simultaneously, one way of expressing them is as a ratio:
Relevance = cognitive effects /processing effort
Relevance thus varies directly with effects and inversely with effort (White, 2007,
2010a, 2011). But S&W also deny that effects and effort can be measured on ratio
scales; the numerical values are not available to us either through introspection
or by instrument. Human beings can onlymeasure relevance comparatively—that
is, by sensing it as a matter of degree. This dovetails with information scientists’
ubiquitous use of ordinal-level scales to measure the relevance of documents in
retrieval system evaluations: one document will be more relevant to a query than
another, but the difference between them cannot be gauged in exact units. Also,
a document could be called “more relevant” than another either because it has
greater cognitive effects for the same processing effort or because it has about the
same effects as the other but costs less effort to process.⁶
As part of linguistic pragmatics, RT is primarily oriented toward spoken
communication—toward explaining how hearers infer speakers’ intended mean-
ings from what they actually say. Hearers automatically expect a speaker ad-
dressing them to be relevant, and speakers tend to comply, since they want their
utterances to be understood. For hearers of an utterance, writes Clark (2013,
p. 68), the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure is:
Follow a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects.
Consider interpretations in order of accessibility.
Stop when expectations of relevance are satisfied.
6 In RT, effort is mainly discussed as it affects the spontaneous processing of utterances at sen-
tence level. Larger units of processing, such as paragraphs or whole texts, and intuitions of future
processing costs, as opposed to present ones, have received relatively little attention. A relevance
theorist who does discuss the non-spontaneous interpretation of literary texts, as opposed to
ordinary talk, is Furlong (1995, 2007).
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For example, a wife says “It’s late” to her husband at a party, by which she
means—and he understands—“It’s time to leave.” Later, on the train platform, he
says to her, “It’s late,” bywhich hemeans, and she understands, “The train is past
due.” The hearer in each case understandswhat ismeant through inference—that
is, a new input, the speaker’s utterance, combines with a context of assumptions
readily available to the hearer to produce a new conclusion as a cognitive effect.
Out of the various meanings an utterance could have, hearers automatically seek
the interpretation that, in context, has the greatest cognitive effects for the least
effort. Moreover, they stop at the first interpretation that meets these criteria as
the only one, which allows talk to proceed without endless parsing of what was
meant. (This eliminates consideration of “It’s late” as possiblymeaning, e.g., “It’s
hours after sundown” in the above example.) Nevertheless, hearers’ interpreta-
tions are merely hypotheses, and they can be wrong. Speakers, too, can be wrong
(or deceitful), and so cognitive effects are by no means necessarily “positive.”
RT is not only a theory of interpersonal communication, however; it is also a
theory of cognition and can accommodate processes that go on in a single head,
such as a citing author’s. New inputs, that is, can come from an author’s percep-
tions or memories or trains of inference rather than talk. In White (2011), I wrote:
Citations in a sense are responses to stimuli that authors themselves have created. It is as
if the speaker-hearer pairs typical of RT are no longer separate individuals…but are lodged
within each author. An internal speaker proposes possible utterances by recording them;
an internal hearer acts like an editor or critic who accepts some utterances as maximally
relevant while rejecting others. Such deliberations presumably account for the redraftings
of documents, including the citations in them that depend on authorial reflection rather
than reader input or feedback.
(p. 3348)
As noted, Harter (1992) called each citation “a statement of an historical relevance
relationship”—in other words, it explicitly shows that an author judged a partic-
ular work to be relevant enough to cite, implying that, for the author, it produced
acceptably high effects and cost acceptably low effort in a particular context. Any
such judgment involves a bundle of inferences on the citer’s part—inferences in
which the citing work sets a context of assumptions and the cited work is a new
input.
In information science we sometimes read citers’ minds as to what these in-
ferences may have been (cf. Clark, 2013, p. 349–351). By examining the prose in
which citations appear, we infer why an author cited at that point (as in studies
of citer motivations) or what a citation contributes to the argument at that point
(as in studies of citation functions). Authors themselves sometimes explain why
they cited something. In any case, before readers ever see a citation, it will have
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had cognitive effects on the citer. It will also have been easy enough for the citer
to process; otherwise, it would not occur. (Citations considered but dropped are
thick on the ground.)
Table 7 presents some relevance judgments that are open to (pedestrian)
mind-reading. Zhao and Strotmann (2008) cited both Schneider et al. (2007) and
Zhao (2006). Zhao cites her own 2006 article not only because of its high cognitive
accessibility, but also because its topic bears directly on her new topic and shows
her developing a “research stream” within her oeuvre. Moreover, as she states,
Schneider et al. (2007) themselves built on—and cited—Zhao (2006), and their
title is a topical bridge between that article and Zhao and Strotmann (2008).
Admittedly, I have chosen titles whose topical relation to each other is very plain,
but then so did she.
Tab. 7: Titles in a citing-cited chain.
Year Citing authors Title
2008 Zhao & Strotmann Comparing all-author and first-author co-citation
analyses of information science
Year Cited Authors Titles
2007 Schneider, Larsen, & Ingwersen Comparative study between first and all-author
co-citation analysis based on citation indexes gen-
erated from XML data
2006 Zhao Towards all-author co-citation analysis
Zhao is citing the earlier articles on Cronin’s (1994) “opus” level; they are relevant
as entire works. When she sets up linkages like this, she implicitly justifies her
present research in terms of research already published. She intends this justifi-
cation to be inferred by readers—it is what RT calls an implicature—but it rests on
her own inference that the prior articles strengthen her argument and should be
discussed. These citer inferences occur whether the connections between citing
and cited works will be obvious to readers (as in Table 7) or initially obscure (as
in my linking Garfield to Auden and Whitman).
7 Explaining Core and Scatter
As Harter (1992) remarks, once a citation is made, the relevance judgment it rep-
resents is fixed over time. In contrast, citation CAMEOs are based on aggregates
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of citations that gradually change over time. Furthermore, unlike individual cita-
tions, they facilitate comparisons of data. Take the citation identity. As an author’s
publications accumulate, it will develop the core-and-scatter, power-law shape of
a bibliogram. Relatively few authors will be recited frequently, forming the core.
Increasingly many authors will be recited less and less frequently, forming the
scatter, which ends in a long tail of authors cited only once.
Looking only at the ranked counts, network physicists explain the power-law
shape of citation bibliograms probabilistically, under such names as “cumulative
advantage” (Price, 1976) or “preferential attachment” (Barabási & Albert, 1999).
As glossed by Newman (2005):
… the probability of a paper getting a new citation is proportional to the number it already
has. In many cases this seems like a natural process. For example, a paper that already has
many citations is more likely to be discovered during a literature search and hence more
likely to be cited again.
(p. 341)
But the depersonalized account of the physicists ignores the verbal content of the
distribution that makes it a bibliogram. A relevance-theoretic explanation of this
content at the level of individuals is compatible with the content-neutral proba-
bilistic explanation at the level of citers in general.
Byhypothesis, the shapeof citations identities is determinedbyprocessing ef-
fort, in theRT sense. Recall that an identity ranks citees by thenumber of papers in
which a seed author has cited them. The ranks of citees indicate their cognitive ac-
cessibility to the seed—that is, the effort it costs to associate his or her works with
theirs—over years or decades of authorship. Authors as citers reduce this effort by
stopping at certain names that spring tomind in the context of newwritings. (Cita-
tion counts in identities are counts of these writings after publication.) The more
frequently certain names have been cited in the past, the less effort is required to
use them again. Names easy to process form the core of citation identities. Other,
more numerous names cited in the past do not spring to mind in the context of
new writings. The less frequently they have been cited in the past, the more effort
required to process them again. They form the scatter in citation identities.
Wilson (2007, n.p.) notes that frequency of use is among the psychometric
factors that affect an individual’s effort in understanding utterances in conver-
sations: “Themore often a word, a concept, a sound, a syntactic construction or a
contextual assumption is used, the less effort is required to process it.” S&W(1995,
p. 77) extend this observation to use of items held in long-term memory: “…as a
result of some kind of habituation, the more a representation is processed, the
more accessible it becomes. Hence, the greater the amount of processing involved
in the formation of an assumption, and the more often it is accessed thereafter,
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the greater its accessibility.” The effortful habituation that forms certain assump-
tions I take to include instances of intensive reading, writing, social interaction,
and thought. But one devotes such effort to relatively few works, which thereby
become more accessible than others.
The verbal content of citation identities indicates which names (and asso-
ciated works) are more accessible in memory. Some key evidence comes from
authors as persons:
– Disproportionate self-citation;
– Disproportionate citation of selected acquaintances (including co-authors);
– Disproportionate citation of selected orienting figures (non-acquaintances)
from the citer’s reading;
– Disproportionate citation of works not highly cited by others (paceNewman);
– Disproportionate citation of familiar works—personal anthologies—as op-
posed to those that must be newly read.
Evidence that certain works are easier for citers to process comes from authors as
bundles of words:
– Repeated agreement in vocabulary in the full texts of citing and cited works;
– Repeated instances of matching or semantically close terms in citing-cited ti-
tles and abstracts;
– Repeated citation of the same works to symbolize the same concepts;
– Repeated citation of works in certain journals and from certain named spe-
cialties and disciplines.
This account grounds core-and-scatter citation distributions in the psychology
of individual citers—the “natural process” that Newman and other network
physicists explain probabilistically at a higher level of abstraction. White (2011)
gives examples of several of the bulleted points above, including evidence from
Newman’s own citation record (e.g., his personal anthology). Ideally, the bul-
leted points should be considered hypotheses that would be tested with massive
amounts of data. That is not presently feasible, but readers can test them against
what they know of citation practices. Readers can also test such hypotheses
against the examples in the next sections.
The notion of “personal anthologies” was introduced inWhite (2011). Table 8
displays a typical one—the works I myself cited five or more times through 2009.
The bulleted list above was based on other data, but mine show the predicted fea-
tures: frequent recitation of relatively few works, heavy self-citation, recitation of
acquaintances (McCain, Small), recitation of orienting non-acquaintances (Baldi,
Harter, Schvaneveldt), and re-use of works to symbolize concepts (Schvaneveldt
on Pathfinder networks; Small on “concept symbols” as an idea).
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Tab. 8: Top works in Howard D. White’s personal anthology.
Count Works
9 WHITE HD, 1989, V24, P119, ANNU REV INFORM SCI
8 WHITE HD, 1981, V32, P163, J AM SOC INFORM SCI
8 WHITE HD, 1997, V32, P99, ANNU REV INFORM SCI
8 WHITE HD, 1998, V49, P327, J AM SOC INFORM SCI
6 BALDI S, 1998, V63, P829, AM SOCIOL REV
6 MCCAIN KW, 1990, V41, P433, J AM SOC INFORM SC
6 WHITE HD, 1990, P84, SCHOLARLY COMMUNICAT
5 HARTER SP 1992, V43, P602, J AM SOC INFORM SC
5 SCHVANEVELDT RW, 1990, PATHFINDER ASS NETWO
5 SMALL HG, 1978, V8, P327, SOC STUD SCI
5 WHITE HD, 1982, V38, P255, J DOC
5 WHITE HD, 1986, V5, P93, INFORM TECHNOL LIBR
5 WHITE HD, 2000, P475, WEB KNOWLEDGE FESTSC
Count Titles
9 Bibliometrics
8 Author cocitation: A literature measure of intellectual structure
8 Visualization of literatures
8 Visualizing a discipline: An author co-citation analysis of information science,
1972–1995
6 Normative versus social constructivist processes in the allocation of citations:
A network-analytic model
6 Mapping authors in intellectual space: A technical overview
6 Author cocitation analysis: Overview and defense
5 Psychological relevance and information science
5 Pathfinder associative networks: Studies in knowledge organization
5 Cited documents as concept symbols
5 Authors as markers of intellectual space: Cocitation in studies of science, technology
and society
5 Cocited author retrieval
5 Toward ego-centered citation analysis
Very few authors know they can be profiled in this way. Citation CAMEOs and
personal anthologies reveal patterns that citers themselves do not monitor or see
reported. Asmy own anthology grewover time, I was largely unaware of it. Having
seen it, I am not surprised; it is a window into a long-term cognitive dynamic I rec-
ognize. But I did not intend to create this anthology as such; like every other citer,
I was simply behaving. However, I do intend this chapter’s tables as overt com-
munications, and so, for readers, they fall under the cognitive effects / processing
effort formula of RT. They do not convey single, sharp implicatures on the order of
“It’s late” = “It’s time to leave.” Rather, they convey an indeterminate number of
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what RT calls “weak implicatures”—variousmeanings they could be taken to have
(as in the case of Smiraglia’s image above). In this, as relevance theorists might
point out, they resemble poems.
The strings identifying works in Table 8 reappear in the lower part as bun-
dles ofwords—titles again. Certain terms explicitly linkworks, and there aremany
implicit linkages. Clearly, global topical relevance is a binding force here; Harter
(1992) was wrong to dismiss it summarily (cf. Bean & Green, 2001, pp. 120–121).
But he was right that there is far more to relevance than inferences about whether
topics match. For instance, no one would infer that the topics “Bibliometric Dis-
tributions” and “Marketing” are even remotely similar, yet the former is highly
relevant to the latter once the case is made, as in Chris Anderson’s (2006) book
The Long Tail.
8 Identities, Images, and Effort
The examples below focus on cores in citation identities and images, which reflect
citers’ past cognitive processes. But CAMEOs are also verbal constructs for present
readers to interpret. Readers can judge degrees of accessibility and processing ef-
fort in specialties they know, because they have the same cognitive mechanism
as citers: Relevance = cognitive effects / processing effort. By hypothesis, readers
with domain expertisewill find names in core easier to relate to a seed thannames
in scatter. If core and scatter are divided into zones, the descending zones of scat-
ter will tend to be progressively harder to interpret. In other words, readers will be
able to give reasonably quick and accurate accounts of what a set of top-ranked
names implies. By contrast, bottom-ranked names, taken together, will mean lit-
tle or nothing to them (cf. White, 2011). Interpretations of top-ranked names are
themselves hypotheses that can be tested for accuracy by examining further bib-
liographic or full-text data. For example, a domain expert might be able to look at
the names of an ego-alter pair in a citation image and correctly predict the exact
works of theirs that are being co-cited.
Table 9 presents 30 names from the information scientist Peter Ingwersen’s
citation identity in 2010. His name is italicized as the seed. At left are authors he
has cited in eight or more papers. At right are alphabetically selected authors he
has cited in one paper each. I discussed the core of this identity at some length in
White (2010b). Here, let me simply recapitulate a few points.
Although I recognize several names in the scatter column, they seem virtu-
ally meaningless as a group. Core names, in contrast, are vividly suggestive. Ing-
wersen’s interests as a citer put him at the center of the last few decades of in-
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Tab. 9: Peter Ingwersen’s identity: Names from top core and bottom scatter.
Core Scatter
Ingwersen P 41 Abraham RH 1
Wormell I 17 Babbie ER 1
Belkin NJ 16 Calza L 1
Garfield E 11 Dahlberg I 1
Saracevic T 11 East H 1
Bates MJ 10 Fagan JL 1
Christensen F 10 Gaillard J 1
Cronin B 10 Hahn U 1
Jones KS 9 Jacob EK 1
Rousseau R 9 Kaplan D 1
Brookes BC 8 Larsen HL 1
Croft WB 8 Machlup F 1
De Mey M 8 Nance RE 1
Ellis D 8 Oddy RN 1
Pejtersen AM 8 Paice CD 1
formation science—the intersection of informetrics (Wormell, Garfield, Cronin,
Rousseau,); cognitive information science (Belkin, Saracevic, Brookes, De Mey,
Ellis); experimental information retrieval (Croft, Jones); and online interactive
behavior (Bates, Christensen, Petjersen). The Festschrift editors independently
drew much the same conclusion about Ingwersen as an integrator of informa-
tion science fields (Larsen et al., 2010). His identity also bears out claims from
the bulleted list above, such as disproportionate self-citation and disproportion-
ate citation of works not highly cited by others. His social ties are evident as well:
Wormell (his wife), Christensen and Pejtersen (workplace colleagues), and just
about everyone else (friends and acquaintances).
Another kind of test, which appears in White (2010b, 2011), involves compar-
ing a seed author’s citation identity with his or her citation image. I have claimed
that names in the core of an identity are relatively easy for the seed to cite. It would
strengthen this assumption, however, if the seed’s image-makers frequently co-
cited the seed with at least some of the same names. For example, Blaise Cronin
might cite certain authors heavily for both intellectual and social reasons. If those
authors are also repeatedly co-citedwith him, it confirms that names he finds easy
to relate to hiswork are similarly easy for his image-makers. But the image-makers
need not consider Cronin’s social ties, if any, with his co-citees—with authors as
persons. They can base their co-citations on intellectual ties between oeuvres—on
authors as bundles of words.
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Tab. 10: Top cores in identity and image for Blaise Cronin.
Identity Image
Cronin B 106 Cronin B 1237
Davenport E 21 Garfield E 308
Garfield E 20 Small H 192
Merton RK 18 Merton RK 132
Small H 18 White HD 132
White HD 16 Rousseau R 128
Chubin DE 15 Price DJD 121
McCain KW 14 Borgman CL 116
Kling R 11 Ingwersen P 112
MacRoberts MH 11 van Raan AFJ 112
Porter ME 11 Oppenheim C 108
Ingwersen P 10 Harter SP 106
Machlup F 10 Egghe L 99
Meadows AJ 10 MacRoberts MH 96
Mullins NC 10 Glanzel W 95
Porat MU 10 Moed HF 94
Swanson DR 10 Leydesdorff L 92
Toffler A 10 McCain KW 90
Edge D 9 Thelwall M 89
Hyland K 9 Bar-Ilan J 88
Latour B 9 Chubin DE 88
Shapin S 9 Lancaster FW 83
Table 10 has the identity-image comparison for Cronin, with counts as of 2009.
The identity displays authors he has cited at least eight times, an arbitrary core
of 21 names plus his own. Accordingly, his top 21 co-citees are also shown, and
identity-imagematches are bolded.Unboldfacednames fromhis identity could be
matched in lower ranks of his image; even so, the top names show considerable
overlap.⁷
Both matched and unmatched names in Table 10 are open to interpretations
that are applicable, I believe, to many other seeds (Cronin, 1981). Particulars first.
The bolded names in Cronin’s identity imply that he specializes in citation theory
and analysis. By co-citing him heavily with these same names, his image-makers
reveal that the same associations are obvious to them as well, which supports the
7 Cronin’s identity in Cronin and Shaw differs somewhat from the one here. If Dialog were avail-
able, I could probably reduce the differences. For example, Derek Price should be above the
threshold in my data. He is not, because his count is fragmented among his various name-forms
in ranks I excluded in my 2009 retrieval.
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ease-of-processing hypothesis. Cronin and Shaw (2002, p. 36) call Cronin’s spe-
cialty “citation analysis,” but note that he has other strings to his bow. The first—
“social studies of science”—is attested in Table 10 by Meadows, Mullins, Edge,
Latour, and Shapin; the second—“business strategy”—by Porter. The remaining
unboldfaced names in Cronin’s identity suggest his wide-ranging interests in in-
formation science as a discipline.
These additional interests, however, are not themost salient ones for Cronin’s
image-makers. They pigeonhole him among citationists and bibliometricians,
including mathematical ones (Egghe, Rousseau, Glänzel) that he, as a non-
mathematician, is less inclined to cite. If asked to convert his name to a subject
heading, as I didwith some authors earlier, his image-makerswould probably just
say “Citation Analysis.” In effect, they tend to stereotype him (called typecasting
in White, 2010b). Identities generally imply the grounds for the stereotype—“the
author as subject-heading”—while also picking up a seed author’s idiosyncratic
choices. They reveal the seed’s own reading, as opposed to what is widely read
by the image-makers.
Stereotyped associations, like clichés, spring to mind with relatively little ef-
fort. They abound in research fields (as elsewhere) because they speed interpre-
tation. Above, I described RT’s stopping rule for conversations:
…hearers automatically seek the interpretation that, in context, has the greatest cognitive
effects for the least effort. Moreover, they stop at the first interpretation that meets these
criteria as the only one, which allows talk to proceed without endless parsing of what was
meant.
For individual citers, the first and only interpretation of an author—the one they
stop at—is defined by relatively few works. This allows them to cite without end-
lessly considering possibilities from an author’s oeuvre. Moreover, they tend to
converge on the sameworks, suggesting an economy of attention. Cronin as a very
big bundle of words is thereby reduced to a much smaller bundle of words, such
as The Citation Process (1984), which is cited repeatedly and hence co-cited re-
peatedly. Out of hundreds of works he has written, that book and 10 or so of his
other top-ranked items account for about a third of his citations (as ofmid-2014) in
Google Scholar. The content of hismost citedworks helps to determine the top co-
citees in his citation image. RT, inwhichmaximal relevance goes up as processing
effort goes down, allows us to make sense of these phenomena.
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9 Conclusion
To summarize, the foregoing remarks illustrate two broad claims, based on my
reading of RT. Suitably adapted, they apply to all bibliograms, but I will confine
them to citation CAMEOs:
– CAMEOs store cognitive effects—the associations that authors have inferred
among cited works.
– CAMEOs reflect processing effort—the ranked frequencies with which authors
have made those associations.
Hypothetically, as authors write, their effort varies with the cognitive accessibility
of terms—the ease with which the mind supplies them in particular contexts. Au-
thors as citers reduce processing effort by citing people, works, journals, and vo-
cabulary that are relatively accessible to them over time. In CAMEOs, more acces-
sible terms will appear more frequently and become cores; less accessible terms
will appearmore rarely andbecome scatter. Determinants of accessibility arewhat
citers know of their citees as persons and as useful bundles of words.
At the same time, CAMEOs are intentional communications for readers to in-
terpret. Those excerpted above are meant to lead readers to certain inferences
I myself have drawn, and perhaps to other inferences I have not foreseen. This
is merely to say that they permit my claims from relevance theory to be intuitively
tested.
While Dialog-based CAMEOs were possible only from 1992 (when Dialog got
the Rank command) to 2013, CAMEOs remain instructive bibliometric displays.
Practically speaking, their creation has been limited to a few people who could
searchDialog through institutional accounts. The underlying programming, how-
ever, has turnedup in various document retrieval systems since thedays ofNASA’s
RECON system in the 1960s (cf. White, 1990, pp. 453–454; White, 1996, pp. 244–
245). The idea of featuring CAMEOs within citation-bearing databases, such as a
future Web of Science or Scopus, is therefore not entirely far-fetched. Meanwhile,
WoS can rank co-authors or image-makers, but cannot do a seed’s identity, image,
personal anthology, or co-cited works. It seems unlikely that these constructs, es-
pecially their cores, have lost their interest. Rather, they have not yet been made
easy enough for enough people to generate.
Finally, I would add that segments of bibliograms, such as those seen here,
are examples of the citation objects that Wouters, this volume, discusses in the
last three sections of his chapter on semiotics. They are constructs that can exist
only through the retrieval and reorganization of data from citation indexes, and
their whole raison d’être is to be interpreted as numerically conjoined names or
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words. Although they are closely related to the raw data that underlie the maps of
science Wouters mentions, they are themselves interesting objects. If explicated,
they can make the abstractions of semiotics more concrete. (One can even make
testable predictions about their contents.) I have focused on grounding them in
what I take to be citers’ psychological processes, but that is not the only line of
semiotic analysis they can support. Likening them to poems, above, was mainly
tongue-in-cheek. But not altogether.
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Nadine Desrochers, Adèle Paul-Hus, and Vincent Larivière
The Angle Sum Theory: Exploring the
Literature on Acknowledgments in Scholarly
Communication
1 Introduction
“Theauthorswould like to thank”andother variations on this formulationare one
of many conventions by which researchers bestow their gratitude upon the indi-
viduals, organizations, or funding agencies that help research come to fruition
as published works. However, beyond niceties, these often formulaic sentences
are also the markers of a clear division in academic standing: those who have
obtained the status of author, as established by varying and often unclear param-
eters (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 2006; 2013; Pontille,
2004), and those who are denied such status. There are also individuals whose
names appear in reference lists. References bestow yet another status upon the
individuals they name—and they do so whether the referenced work is alluded
to, praised, questioned, or critiqued.
Thus emerge the three statuses that have come to form the “reward trian-
gle” (Cronin & Weaver-Wozniak, 1993) of science: author, person cited, person
thanked. Merton’s (1973) work on the structure of the scientific community and,
more specifically, on cumulative advantages in science (i.e., the Matthew Effect),
shed light on the process by which an individual moves from being an accessory
to becoming an author—andback again, althoughwithmore prestige, through the
accumulation of citations or by being acknowledged for his or her contribution to
a work. In this way, acknowledgments place the highly regarded alongside those
who have not yet attained recognition.
Blaise Cronin began studying the dynamics of scientific acknowledgments in
the 1990s, quickly placing hiswork among the fewmodels in existence or in devel-
opment at the time (Mackintosh, 1972; McCain, 1991; in Cronin, 1995). He revived
his interest for this topic at various moments in his career and with various col-
laborators, creating an unrivalled body of work on acknowledgments in scholarly
communication. In recent years, the relationship between those who thank and
those—individuals or organizations—who are thanked has been studied theoreti-
cally and empirically.
This chapter maps the landscape of research on scientific acknowledgments
which has appeared relatively regularly in the literature since the 1970s. Analy-
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ses of the role and value of acknowledgments are often isolated by discipline
or methodological approach, and present data-specific models or adaptations of
previous models as premises for new analyses. We provide here an analytical re-
view of the literature on acknowledgments in scholarly communication in order
to gauge how this phenomenon has been studied. This is not a systematic review
in themethodological sense; rather, we triangulate qualitative analysis and quan-
titative descriptions to paint a portrait of the acknowledgement literature in terms
of approaches, theories, contributions, trends, and limitations.
2 Triangulating the Rewards of Science
The social sciences’ penchant for figures and the geometric schematization of
concepts is served well by the notion of a “reward triangle.” This turn of phrase
represents the basic premise upon which acknowledgments research is built. In
1995, Cronin posited that, “authorship and citation do not tell the whole story,”
and situated acknowledgments as “another vector” in the assessment of scholar-
ship (p. 14). Three years earlier, he had underlined the intrinsic value of certain
types of acknowledgments by qualifying them as “closet citations” (Cronin, 1992,
p. 25). Twenty years prior to that, however, Mackintosh had been even more cat-
egorical: “[L]ack of interest in acknowledgements does not necessarily indicate
their complete irrelevance as rewards in science, or, if it does, then citations of
one’s published work by others must fall at the same stroke” (p. 70).
The “reward triangle” phrase itself was coined in 1993 by Cronin andWeaver-
Wozniak: “If authorship and citedness are to be counted, so ought acknowledg-
ments. By admitting acknowledgments, the Reward Triangle is closed” (p. 94).
This image, reintroduced by the same authors two years later (Cronin & Weaver,
1995; Cronin, 1995, p. 27), featured prominently in the title of a recent paper by
Costas and van Leeuwen (2012) in which the authors cite Cronin and Weaver
(p. 1648), thereby revealing sustained interest in this imagery.
The perception of the fruits of scholarly pursuits as “rewards” allows for an
easy stretch towards Mertonian and later Bourdieusian perspectives which have
had either stated or indirect influences in acknowledgments literature. Acknowl-
edgments research has long been anchored in the conceptual framework of a “re-
ward system of science” (Mackintosh, 1972, p. 16;¹ McCain, 1991, p. 495). Cronin
integrated both theoretical perspectives in his corpus, at times in tandem, for ex-
1 Mackintosh cited Merton, but not Bourdieu—likely because the first English translations of
Bourdieu’s works were not published until the late 1970s.
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ample inTheHand of Science: AcademicWriting and its Rewards (2005). This book
offers, in itself, a framework for the study of the “reward system of science, un-
derstood in terms of an economy of attention” (p. 5). Therefore, we can argue for a
triumvirate of theoreticians in the study of the reward triangle: Cronin, Bourdieu,
and Merton.
Acknowledgments have a dubious reputation. This is due, first, to their “sub-
tler” (Cronin, 1992, p. 128), and more “personal” (Hyland, 2003, p. 243) nature;
second, to the fact that they are unruly, and not “as frequent or as standardized”
as citations (Cronin, 2014, p. xvii); and third, to their perceived propensity to be, at
least in certain cases, “self-serving gestures, [… that are] by no means innocent”
(Coates, 1999, p. 255). Perhaps given these very characteristics, acknowledgments
offer insight into both the scientific field and the incarnation of that field in the
very person of the scientist (see Bourdieu, 2001, pp. 84–85)—the “homo academi-
cus” (Bourdieu, 1984). The practice of acknowledgments, its forms, its purposes,
and its evolution are of course deeply rooted in the scholar’s habitus, and it goes
without saying that the set of dispositionswhich form this habitus answers to both
the broader field of scholarly production and disciplinary paradigms. Again be-
cause of their nature, acknowledgments participate in the illusio upon which the
scientificfield, like all others (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 228) is built: thepremisewhereby
adhering to the rules of the game supposes, ipso facto, that one deems this game
relevant and, more importantly, worth one’s time, effort and, as is often the case
for academics, livelihood. Bourdieu (1988) insists on this: without illusio, “there
would be no stakes to play for, nor even any game” (p. 56).²
As stated above, acknowledgments can also testify to the ebb and flow of
legitimization (often provided by authorship) and consecration (intrinsic to cita-
tion), which are key in the construction of symbolic capital—the “accumulation”
of which “is a driving force of academic life” (Cronin, 2005, p. 139). Finally, ac-
knowledgments differ from authorship or citations in that they can satisfy the
two sets of values that underlie symbolic goods: the obvious symbolic values of
contribution and intellectual indebtedness, but also the economic value, often
decried, yet obviously intrinsic to all fields where funds are involved. Such is the
role of funding acknowledgments or the identification of paid services, facilities,
and institutions.
This chapter presents a review of the literature on acknowledgments in schol-
arly communication, demonstrating the significance of acknowledgements in the
2 Interestingly, the English translation omitted part of the sentence here; the original French text
is more specific, since it qualifies the illusio as “an adherence to the cultural arbitrary that is the
very foundation of the group” (1984, p. 80, our translation).
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reward system of science. In doing, so, wewill show that the interactions between
the three elements of the triangle (authorship-citations-acknowledgments) play a
fundamental role in the illusio that shapes the sociology of science.
3 Finding the Literature
We searched the following bibliographic databases to retrieve items pertain-
ing to acknowledgments in scholarly communication: Web of Science (WoS)
citation indexes (Science Citation Index Expanded, Social Sciences Citation In-
dex, Arts & Humanities Citation Index, Conference Proceedings Citation Index-
Science and Conference Proceedings Citation Index); Library and Information
Sciences Abstracts (LISA); Library, Information Science & Technology Abstracts
(LISTA); Library Literature & Information Science Index; Dissertation & Theses
(ProQuest); FRANCIS; and Sociological Abstracts. Keyword³ and controlled-
vocabulary searches were used, as well as pearl-growing techniques (Bopp &
Smith, 2011, p. 112). We then examined and mined the reference lists of relevant
items, which were identified through a preliminary assessment of abstracts or a
summary reading. The dataset was considered “open,” as new items could always
be added, no matter their means of discovery. As stated, this was an exploratory
analysis of the existing literature, rather than a systematic review. A total of
115 items were identified and selected for analysis.
Two researchers independently read the retrieved documents in order to as-
certain the relevance of these items to acknowledgments research and to assign
initial classification tags to each of them. Only one item caused a tagging conflict,
which was resolved through discussion.
The following rounds of analysis were qualitative and inductive. Researchers
jointly validated the original tags assigned to each document and identified
71 documents for deeper, qualitative analysis. 10 documents were excluded (this
was validated byboth researchers) and reasons for exclusionwere: false positives,
format (presentation notes or abstracts of work published elsewhere in more
complete form); book reviews; documents not written in English or French;⁴ and
3 Keywords searched in title, keyword and abstract fields: acknowledgement*, acknowledg-
ment*, author*, subauthorship OR sub-author*, credit*, contribution*, reward*, gratitude and
courtes*.
4 While we did not actively search for French-language texts, we did not exclude the ones that
came to our attention, since we were capable of analyzing them; nevertheless, it goes without
saying that studying the literature fromother languages and culturesmight yield other interesting
findings.
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documents not secured before the end of the analysis process—these items were
deemed, upon evaluation of the abstracts, as having little potential impact on the
findings. The remaining documents were classified as “peripheral,” meaning that
they informed the research in some way, but were not part of the “core” dataset.
Due to the preliminary nature of analysis, the coding that ensued was, of
course, “data-driven” (Schreier, 2012, p. 88), but did not begin with a tabula rasa.
Rather, it was directed by the premise emanating from the framework presented
above and the aspect of the illusio it supports: that acknowledgments are worth
studying. While such a stated theoretical bias is, of course, quite acceptable in
directed qualitative research, it can make it “more likely” for researchers “to find
evidence that is supportive rather than nonsupportive of a theory” (Hsieh& Shan-
non, 2005, p. 1283). Given the fact that our stated goal was to provide the reader
with a foray into the current state of the literature, we wished to target certain
aspects, and so had some “predetermined” categories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005,
p. 1282), such as the discipline of the sample (where applicable), the methods
used, the presentation of a model, etc. However, aside from these broad axes,
the rest of the codes emerged from the iterative readings of the texts. Neverthe-
less, while the overview presented here is analytical in nature, it does not have
the pretension to be a full content analysis of the textual data contained in the
documents that were examined.
These limitations notwithstanding, some validations and verification mea-
sures were put into place throughout the process, in a manner that befits the
review approach and the methodology used, in accordance with the flexibility
(White & Marsh, 2006) and contextual principles (Morse et al., 2002) of qualita-
tive studies. Treating the whole document as the unit of analysis, one coder (C1)
used an initial subset of 10 texts to create a first codebook; the coding schemewas
then used on the same 10 documents by the second coder (C2). The two codersmet
and discussed their respective coding. The codebook was then refined and a new
version was proposed. All the coding for the original subset of 10 was imported to
the revised codebook; the two coders reconciled all conflicting codes and made
sure that they were in agreement regarding any coding change resulting from the
revision of the codebook.
The analysis continued in parallel with open discussions between the two
coders throughout the process as they each coded different texts. If the creation
of a new code was deemed necessary, or if a coder questioned the application of
a code, the case was discussed and resolved. The creation of a new code was al-
ways accompanied by the decision to recode any texts thatmay be affected by this
addition. As ameasure of verification, after the coding of all documents was com-
pleted, C2 recoded 10 of C1’s documents; a few conflicts arose, but were resolved
through discussion. During the process, memoswere kept to document each step;
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furthermore, various notes and comments on the content of the papers were in-
serted in the coding spreadsheet itself. More reading led tomore discoveries, and,
by the end of the process, 80 items had been analysed.
Ultimately, what we propose is a classification of the body of work on ac-
knowledgments, in the hopes that it will guide others in their own research; we
encourage this namely through the lists presented in Appendix 1 which contain
the full references of the documents we analyzed andwhich form the core dataset
of 80 documents; these include: 66 journal articles, 9 book chapters, 2 books,
2 conference proceedings papers and 1 doctoral dissertation.
4 Assessing the Trends in the Literature
The 80 documents form a foundation for anyone aiming to research acknowledg-
ments in scholarly communication from the “rewards of science” perspective, as
represented in Figure 1. Of these, 59 can be considered acknowledgment-centric.
This includes 11 documents that pertain to acknowledgments in theses and dis-
sertations (T&D), which are treated as specific types of academic output and per-
ceived as having an acknowledgment culture of their own.
Core Dataset
80
Acknowledgment-centric
59
T&D
11
Core Dataset
Acknowledgment-centric
Theses & Dissertations
Fig. 1: Core dataset of documents considered in the analysis.
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4.1 Bibliometric characteristics
As shown in Figure 2, the publication years of the 80 documents indicate a clear
rise of the interest in the topic in the 1990s, with waxing and waning in the fol-
lowing decades creating a pendulum effect.
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Fig. 2: Evolution of the number of documents published on acknowledgments, 1970–2014.
Table 1 presents the authors who contributed more than one item to the core
dataset, whether as sole author or as co-authors. It clearly shows that Cronin’s
work is the unequivocal cornerstone of research on the topic. Some of his work
builds on or presents other angles of previously published research; this pattern
of iterative analysis and the important (not to mention humble) realization that
“one’s perspective changes over time” (Cronin, 2005, p. 15) are just some of the
factors that have shaped Cronin’s corpus as authoritative.⁵
Given the formats of the documents, establishing the fields that have taken
an interest in acknowledgments research is slightly more complex. Limiting our
analysis to the journal articles and using the Web of Science “Research Areas”
classification of journals (Web of Science, 2012), we identified the field of publi-
cation of the 52 journal articles from our corpus that were indexed in WoS (where
5 A bibliometric analysis could be performed, in further studies, to show the progression and
influence of Cronin’s acknowledgment-centric work through the years.
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Tab. 1: Authors of acknowledgments research corpus.
Author Number of documents
Cronin, Blaise 23
Salager-Meyer, Françoise 4
Weaver (Wozniak), Sherrill* 4
Alcaraz-Ariza, María Ángeles 3
Berbesí, Maryelis Pabón 3
Giannoni, Davide Simone 3
Hyland, Ken 3
McKenzie, Gail* 3
Shaw, Debora* 3
Tiew, Wai Sin 3
Chubin, Daryl. E. 2
Costas, Rodrigo 2
Heffner, Alan. G. 2
Rubio, Lourdes* 2
Sen, B. K. 2
van Leeuwen, Thed N. 2
Verner, Dima 2
Yang, Wenhsien 2
(60 other authors) (1)
* Collaborators of Cronin. To our knowledge, these authors did not contribute
to acknowledgments research beyond the publications co-authored with Cronin.
there were more than one category assigned, we favored disciplinary categories
such as “Information Science & Library Science” over broader categories such as
“Social Sciences”). To this, we added, as shown in Table 2, the 14 journal articles
not indexed in WoS but whose journal titles or editorial mission clearly situates
them in a given discipline.
Granted, our search strategies may have created a bias towards Information
Science and Library Science; nevertheless, we harnessed a strong output of Lin-
guistics contributions, aswell as articles fromother fields.However, Tables 2 and 3
clearly show the preponderance of Information Science and Library Science (in-
cluding bibliometrics) contributions to the acknowledgments research corpus.
These disciplinary boundaries may yet be seen as arbitrary and, in many re-
spects, they are, because other systems may classify academic disciplines differ-
ently. Interestingly, the complexity that accompanies the notion of “discipline”
(Abbott, 2001) allows us what we hope to be an eloquent leap into our findings,
in which such boundaries certainly play an important part.
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Tab. 2: Number of articles by “Research areas”.
Research areas Number of
journal articles
Information Science & Library Science 37
Linguistics 11
History & Philosophy of Science 3
Astronomy 2
Education 2
Literature 2
Psychology 2
Anthropology 1
Business & Economics 1
Communication 1
Medical Ethics 1
Science & Technology 1
Social Issues 1
Sociology 1
Tab. 3: Number of articles by journal.
Journal Number of
journal articles
Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology* 11
Journal of Documentation 6
Social Science Information 3
Social Studies of Science 2
The Messenger 2
Scientometrics 2
Malaysian Journal of Library & Information Science 2
Journal of Scholarly Publishing 2
(36 other journals) (1)
* Previously known as the Journal of the American Society for Information Science and
Technology and the Journal of the American Society for Information Science.
Only journals with more than one article are named.
4.2 Conceptual characteristics
Let us begin by noting that our dataset contains items that do not present orig-
inal empirical research but whose conceptual or theoretical contributions help
shape the acknowledgments research landscape. We have already mentioned the
importance of Cronin’s The Hand of Science (2005). To this, we add Cronin’s 1992
234 | Nadine Desrochers, Adèle Paul-Hus, and Vincent Larivière
“Opinion” paper in the Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science,
Cronin’s 2012 comparison of artistic and scientific collaboration in Information &
Culture, and Cronin’s foreword to the book Examining Paratextual Theory and its
Applications in Digital Culture (co-edited by one of this chapter’s authors; 2014).
Other texts contribute to the topic by proposing theoretical and critical views
of acknowledgments as representative of the field-made-man, to revive the Bour-
dieusian image evoked earlier (2001, pp. 84–85). This can help contextualize the
dichotomous reputation of acknowledgments as valuable tools for insight into
the field and excessively self-serving academic fluff. Some authors even offer
comic relief. Hollander (2002) notes, for instance, that “Never do we come upon
an author who does not wholeheartedly embrace criticism” (p. 64); he even de-
scribes the self-portraits of scientific acknowledgments as “disarmingly humble,
self-effacing, even self-deprecating, sometimes bordering on confessions of in-
competence” (p. 65). Such tone puts a great deal of weight on those the literature
has come to call “trusted assessors” (see for example Mullins & Mullins, 1973,
pp. 21, 32; Chubin, 1975b, pp. 363, 365; Cronin, 1991; Cronin, 1995, p. 18; Cronin,
2005, p. 56). The sometimes incongruous humanity shown through the acknowl-
edgments’ looking-glass is epitomized in the fictitious want-ad derived by Corey
Coates from his 1999 analysis of acknowledgments of spouses in English Studies
monographs:
WANTED:Wife for scholar. Duties: general help—researching, proofing, typing/wordpro, in-
dexing, style advice. Good humour and cheer necessary. Patience and endurance essential.
Hours: many, variable. Remuneration in form of short acknowledgment.
(pp. 258–259)
On themore serious side, reading conceptual pieces canhelp contextualize empir-
icalworks byproviding thebackdropagainstwhich these studieswere conducted.
In that sense, Chubin (1975) helps contextualize early research like that of Mack-
intosh (1972); likewise, Caesar (1992) complements the work of McCain (1991) and
the early Cronin studies.
Perspectives, of course, vary. We found that 34 of the 80 items included
some analysis of the attributes of the acknowledgments themselves (length,
placement, form, structure, wording, etc.) and some also performed a linguistics
move-pattern analysis. In certain cases (such as Al-Ali, 2010 and Gesuato, 2004),
acknowledgmentswere the central focus of adetailed text-basedanalysis. In other
cases, like some early Cronin pieces, the discussion on style was brief, mentioned
almost in passing, and used mostly as a means of outlining the importance of
the actual wording in studying acknowledgments. This might be done, for exam-
ple, with respect to the language used to thank certain people (Cronin, 1992b,
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p. 131), through a look at language trends by discipline (Cronin, McKenzie, &
Rubio, 1993, p. 41), or by mentioning the difficulties wording can create in the
analysis (Cronin, McKenzie, & Stiffler, 1992, p. 112). Another trend was research
by comparison. Comparative findings by such variables as journals, researchers,
disciplines, countries, types of documents, or time-period were found in 51 items
(including different papers based on the same studies).
Finally, there is a clear propensity in the literature for suggesting typologies
of acknowledgments. However, this is not as straightforward as might appear. We
looked at this qualitatively and coded for an angle to the research that would ad-
dress the questions “who gets thanked for what?,” “who gets thanked instead of
being an author?,” or “what are the roles, functions, or statuses of the people
and organizations being thanked?;” we took into consideration occurrences of
typologies presented in text, whether as findings or as models. This allowed us
to identify 50 documents that could be analyzed further to draw comparisons and
establish potential trends in terms of how acknowledgments are constructed, why
they are included in apublication, aswell as anyproposed typologies ormodels. It
should be noted that this is a very heterogeneous set. In some cases, followingHy-
land’s 2004 model, the purpose (such as “Thanking for academic assistance”) is
presented as a subcategory of a structural analysis (p. 308); Al-Ali (2010) presents
an adaptation of this model (p. 8) while Yang (2012) uses it as a framework for
quantitative descriptions. In Basthomi’s (2008) analysis, the focus is placed on
how people are thanked; yet its method yields a list of who gets thanked (p. 4) as
a necessary by-product. The reporting style of the aforementioned Coates (1999)
does not afford him a typology, but one could certainly be derived from a qualita-
tive content analysis of his findings.
Of course, Cronin’s typologies are presented as central frameworks in Library
and Information Science; this is true of the original six-part typology (1991, p. 231),
which he built before encountering Mackintosh’s 1972 work and simultaneously
with McCain’s 1991 work (1995, p. 41). It is also true of the subsequent typolo-
gies he developed with other collaborators, namely Weaver, between 1992 and
1995. These foundational classifications are sometimes presented in a continuum
with other models (e.g., Tiew & Sen, 2002, p. 45; Rattan, 2013); they are also
adapted, tweaked, or augmented, either slightly or significantly (e.g., Salager-
Meyer, Alcaraz-Ariza, Berbesí, & Zambrano, 2006; Salager-Meyer, Alcaraz-Ariza &
Berbesí, 2009; Weber & Thomer, 2014).
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4.3 Limitations
The aim of the analytical review presented in this chapter is to provide insight into
the acknowledgments research literature from the reward triangle perspective. Its
limitations are obvious: the research strategy had a strong LIS and social sciences
bias, given the fact that the bulk of the research was done in databases which
favor journals over monographs. We did try to remedy this through bibliography
mining, whichmade the dataset both richer andmore complete. Furthermore, our
qualitative content analysis was exploratory and used the document as its unit of
analysis.
Other avenues could be pursued, including an analysis of the papers that
pertain strictly to funding acknowledgments (FA); these were excluded from our
analysis since they were seen as lying outside our reward triangle paradigm. We
nevertheless flag this as a fast-growing field, namely thanks to the addition in
the Web of Science databases of three funding acknowledgments or FA-related
fields (Web of Science, 2009). As noted above, a review of the literature in other
languages would be another important addition to this landscape.
Finally, the literature on acknowledgments in the context of editorial stan-
dards or guidelines should also be considered. As the interest for authorship and
acknowledgments has been growing in the past decades, the editorial and opin-
ion pieces that have been published since Kassirer and Angell (1991) raised the
issue of the proliferation of acknowledgments in scientific articleswould certainly
warrant attention and add depth to the discussion.
5 Summing Up the Reward Triangle
We have already anchored our review in the reward triangle paradigm proposed
by Cronin andWeaver-Wozniak (1993) and Cronin andWeaver (1995). The triangle
figurewas also used by Cronin in TheHand of Science to illustrate the aptly named
“triadic sign systems” of references, acknowledgments, and citations through a
semiotic lens (2005, pp. 147–151). We have chosen to expand upon this imagery.
Although none of the Cronin (1995) or Cronin and Weaver (1995; and as
Weaver-Wozniak, 1993) articles, nor the Costas and van Leeuwen (2012) article
offer an actual visualization of the reward triangle, an instinctive reading might
lead to something like what is presented in Figure 3.
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Authorship
Citations Acknowledgments
Fig. 3: The reward triangle:
A classic interpretation.
However, through the help of the literature reviewed here, we now have an oppor-
tunity to visualize this triangle differently and to further its use by looking inside
inmoredetail, all thewhile examining the relationships createdbetween the three
constitutive elements.
The angle sum theorem is a basic geometric paradigm: the sum of the mea-
sures of the interior angles of any given triangle is 180°. Building on this Euclidian
truth, we propose an angle sum theory of the reward triangle in the scientific field.
Todo this,wemoved the three constitutive elements from the vertices (understood
here in the mathematical sense as all intersections), to the sides, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.
Reward Triangle
17
AuthorshipCit
ati
on
s
Acknowledgments
9 22
Fig. 4: The reward triangle: An angle sum
theory interpretation of the literature, with
the distribution of the relevant dataset
numbers.
The apex of the triangle is where authorship meets citations. Scholarly perfor-
mance is often assessed by bothmeasures: “[t]o set the reward register ringing, all
a scholar has to do is feature as an author or co-author and/or have his work cited
by another” (Cronin &Weaver, 1995, p. 173). Indeed, if becoming an author grants
legitimization, becoming a cited author grants consecration, in a field where one
of the objectives, according to Bourdieu (1988), is to “make a name for oneself”
(p. 2). In other words, the apex of the figure is not just authorship, but the inter-
section of authorship and intellectual influence—the intersection of an author’s
“productivity” and an author’s “productive impact” (Cronin, 1995, pp. 14–15). This
is the cornerstone of the scientific reward system. While the literature solely de-
238 | Nadine Desrochers, Adèle Paul-Hus, and Vincent Larivière
voted to these two features was not included in our corpus, this angle has been
studied thoroughly by a large body of literature and is at the core of the biblio-
metrics field; hence the right angle, fixed and enduring, to represent the body of
research pertaining to the authorship-citation relationship.
The hypotenuse of the triangle, opposite the right angle, represents acknowl-
edgments. It is the broader base. It is foundational because collaboration is key to
producing high-impact knowledge (Larivière et al., 2014). It is broad because ac-
knowledgments remain, for the most part, elective textual testimonies that man-
ifest in a myriad of ways reflective of the myriad contents, forms, and even pur-
poses they espouse.
While the right angle illustrates the strongest connection, the angle at the in-
tersection of acknowledgments and citations constitutes the least studied portion
of the triangle, with only 8 documents in our corpus addressing this relationship
without much, if any, attention to authorship issues. The connection between ac-
knowledgments and authorship has been the subject of a broader subset—our
dataset includes 22 documents that discuss these two issues conjointly, with only
a contextual, if any, reference to citations. Finally, the full reward triangle formed
by authorship, citations, and acknowledgments was addressed in 17 documents.
In other words, to truly understand how the scientific community views and
apprehends the reward triangle as both a set of independent elements and a set
of relationships, one has to look not only at the center of the figure, but also at
the angles that reflect the attention given to the various relationships between
the three constitutive elements. When considered along with the literature that
focuses on only one of the three elements of the reward triangle, this will provide
an even more complete view; it will also reveal where imbalances lie. This, in it-
self, is telling in terms of the values granted to each relationship as a vector of
symbolic capital in the scientific field.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
The findings presented herein show that acknowledgments research is not an
emerging field, even though it is as eclectic as acknowledgments themselves.
Flattening this landscape too quickly would be reductive to the collective knowl-
edge it has contributed to the study of the reward system of science. The scientific
field, with its “high degree of codification of entry into the game” (Bourdieu, 1996,
p. 226), ensures the legitimization of its members; their consecration, however, is
ruled by aspects of the illusio that the sociology of science has labelled recognition
after Merton (1973), capital after Bourdieu, or the reward triangle after Cronin.
The Angle Sum Theory | 239
There are other views, of course, but these are the ones that led us to sum up,
quite literally, the literature on acknowledgments research. Acknowledgments,
like authorship and citations, testify to the fact that “[w]riting, in short, does not
take place in a sociocognitive vacuum” (Cronin, 2005, p. 109). We now partake
in more of the illusio by ending this co-authored chapter with acknowledgments
and references of our own. In so doing, we are drawing the reward triangle, for
ourselves and for other players in the game, from apex to hypothenuse, with every
angle in-between.
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Hamid R. Ekbia
The Flesh of Science: Somatics and
Semiotics
1 Introduction: Content, Context, and Structure
Scientists are human beings, too. This innocuous statement might strike us as
trivially true, banally evident, conditionally valid, or despicably demeaning, de-
pending on our perspective on science and scientists. Versions of each of these
interpretations did, in fact, emerge in the second half of the twentieth century,
after science turned into an object of inquiry in the hands of sociologists, an-
thropologists, and historians of science. Although the language and conceptual
framingapplied varied across studies and schools of thought—institutional norms
(Merton, 1973), paradigms and ab/normal science (Kuhn, 1962), deviance and ex-
planatory symmetry (Zuckerman, 1977; Barnes & Edge, 1982), tokenmanipulation
(Latour &Woolgar, 1979), boundary objects (Star &Griesmer, 1989), epistemic cul-
tures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999), to namebut a few—the sharedmotif, broadly speaking,
was to find social, cultural, or historical mechanisms and processes that enable
scientists or prevent them from going about the business of “constructing” truth
claims about the physical, biological, and psychological worlds.
The processual perspective (Becker, 2003) behind these studies was one of
the features that differentiated them from works of philosophers of science who
had traditionally focused on the products of science, making sure that they meet
the standards and metrics derived from one or other foundational philosophical
framework—logic and rationality in logical empiricism, evidential adequacy in
verificationism, falsifiability in Popper’s objectivism, and so forth. The type of
processes that were studied, however, varied according to the theoretical framing
behind the specific account, as a brief overview will demonstrate.
2 Science Studies: The Quest for Realism
2.1 1st Wave Institutionalism: Scientists follow norms
The strategy adopted by social scientists was “to distinguish the behavior of sci-
entists as scientists from the details of their ‘output”’ (Storer, 1973, xvii). This
strategy, however, found two different interpretations or orientations among so-
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ciologists. The first orientation, focusing on the social context in which scien-
tific inquiry takes place, sought to delineate the boundaries of the scientific com-
munity. This is roughly the strategy that Thomas Kuhn pursued in his seminal
work on scientific paradigms, although he sought to identify the social param-
eters that can explain the formal organization of scientific knowledge. The sec-
ond orientation, largely associated with Robert Merton’s work, focused on the
(internal) social structure of science, postulating norms that allegedly govern the
behavior of scientists as they engage in the production of scientific knowledge:
universalism, communism, organized skepticism, and disinterestedness (Merton
1973). This second orientation, which provided a meaningful strategy for sepa-
rating content from context, is considered the founding moment of sociology of
science as an area of inquiry.
Scientists, according to this institutional and structural perspective, are like
the rest of us in that they follow the norms specific to their community. What
makes them different from others is in the character of the norms to which they
adhere. This was a powerful and defensible position, given the dominant think-
ing in social sciences of the time, except that it faced the challenge of explaining
“deviant behavior” among scientists. One such controversial case was that of the
geologist and amateur archaeologist Charles Dawson who, in 1912, presented a
fossil as the skull of what came to be known as the PiltdownMan, which allegedly
predated all human fossils found until then—e.g., the Java Man or the Heidelberg
Man. Disagreements over the genuineness of Dawson’s claimwere finally resolved
when new X-ray techniques showed that some of the “fossil” teeth have been ar-
tificially ground down, leading to the conclusion that the evidence was forged
(Zuckerman, 1977). Cases such as this illustrate that the norms postulated by soci-
ologists do not protect scientists against error, forgery, and deception, as rare and
unlikely as these behaviors might be.
2.2 2nd Wave Institutionalism: Scientists also deviate
from norms
To deal with such instances of deviant behavior, along with many other cases of
explicit and implicit error, sociologists of science proposed a distinction between
cognitive (technical) norms, on the one hand, and moral norms, on the other.
Harriet Zuckerman, a student (and later spouse) of Merton, describes these two
sets of norms as, respectively, those that “specify what should be studied and
how” and “prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions concern-
ing the attitudes and behaviors of scientists in relation to one another and their
research” (Zuckerman, 1977, p. 89). Both sets of norms, according to Merton, “are
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binding, not only because they are procedurally efficient, but because they are be-
lieved right and good” (Merton, 1973, p. 270). The empirical analysis of multiple
cases of fraud and error bymarginal as well as prominent scientists leadsMerton,
Zuckerman, and others to conclude that science is not “special or even unique
among social institutions in having the same normative and social conditions
pressing for deviant behavior and for its disclosure” (Zuckerman, 1977, p. 131). In
other words, as with Durkheim’s famous hypothesis on crime and punishment,
the same reward mechanisms (e.g., reputation) that encourage deviant behavior
among scientists also exert social control over them by imposing high costs to
non-conforming behavior.
2.3 Strong Programme: Scientists adhere to the principles
of science itself
The interest in 2nd-wave institutionalism in deviance and in “the blind alleys en-
tered by science” (Ben-David, 1971, p. 11) did not sit well with those sociologists
who sought after a “strong programme” for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
(SSK)—namely, one that would explain the success stories of science as much as
its failures; a symmetric account, in other words, that can provide a sociological
explanation for the truth of “our culture’s most highly valued form of knowledge”
(Shapin, 1995, p. 292). These sociologists found a strong ally and a useful insight
in Thomas Kuhn and his idea that science itself provides the principles that regu-
late scientists’ conduct. By emphasizing the collective and distributed character
of knowledge and of the processes that give rise to it, they sought to put SSK
on the right sociological footing, avoiding individualistic philosophies that only
give credence to direct experiential observations. In their place, they proposed so-
cial mechanisms of trust, authority, and morality as guarantors of the collective
creation of valid knowledge (Barnes, 1985), and highlighted customs and conven-
tions as the means to propagate it beyond its situated sites of production (Bloor,
1982). Simultaneously, these authors did not question the realism of scientific
claims, iterating that “[t]here is indeed one world, one reality, ‘out there’” (Bloor,
1992, p. 33). The robust realism, which arose from this combination of natural and
sociological realism, is often contrastedwith rationalist thinking that is grounded
in rules of method (Shapin, 1995, p. 303).
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2.4 Laboratory Studies: Scientists are as worldly
as the rest of us
SSK’s realism, however, was challenged on a number of fronts by a broad array
of commentators fromwithin science studies itself, from those who took an inter-
est in the rhetorical and persuasive devices of scientific discourse (e.g., Woolgar,
1976) to those who highlighted the embodied and physical character of knowl-
edge-making in science (Collins, 1992; Lynch, 1991). Most radical among these
critiques perhapswas the so-called “laboratory studies” line ofwork, inaugurated
famously by Latour and Woolgar (1979)’s Laboratory Life, which portrayed a very
mundane image of the scientific enterprise as heavily involved in the production
of signs and symbols. Following an anthropological approach, and portraying
themselves as “foreign observers,” these authors described scientists in a lab as
a “strange tribe” of “compulsive and manic writers…who spend the greatest part
of their day coding, marking, altering, correcting, reading, andwriting” (Latour &
Woolgar, 1979, pp. 48–9).¹
2.5 Semiotics of Science: Scientists are cyborgs,
like the rest of us
Laboratory studies, and the diverse body of work that followed from it—e.g., the
studies of the epistemic machinery and cultures of science (Knorr-Cetina, 1999)—
led further down the road to the influential work in actor-network theory (ANT)
and beyond. With its strong post-humanist impulse, ANT injected a discourse
with a new dimension of symmetry between human and nonhuman actors. In so
doing, it turned scientists, like the rest of us, into cyborgs—with technologically
augmented brains and bodies, but presumably not much feeling.
In navigating the narrow strait between naïve realism and social construc-
tivism, actor-network theorists took extreme pain to show that their account of
science provides amore “realistic” image of science and scientists than the earlier
alternatives. To that end, they distanced themselves from, among others, phe-
nomenology that provides “much talk about the real, fleshy, pre-reflexive world,
but…[that] leaves us with the most dramatic split in this whole sad story”—
namely, the split between the “cold” world of science and the lived world of
humans. ANT sought to eliminate this split by presenting a “modernist settle-
ment,” which brings four seemingly independent spheres together: “‘out there,’
1 Having been trained in the natural sciences, I clearly remember the deeply deflating and de-
pressing impact that reading Latour and Woolgar’s book had on me the first time I read it.
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‘nature’; ‘in there,’ the mind; ‘down there,’ the social; ‘up there,’ God” (Latour
1999, p. 14). What was missing from this settlement, however, was “deep there”—
the body.
3 Somatics of Science: Scientists are made
of flesh, like the rest of us
This brief overview of the development of perspectives and theories in science
studies illustrates some of the seminal moments and “turns” in the history of the
field and in how it has looked at science and scientists, in their relationship to
each other and to the broader socio-cultural and historical context. The overview
also reveals a certain gap, an unspoken dimension of scientific life, in all of these
accounts that seems to have escaped, by and large, the attention of science studies
scholars. The multifaceted character of this dimension makes it difficult to give
it an encompassing label but I propose to call it the “somatics of science”.² To
distinguish someof these facets, I now turn toCronin’sworkwhichhasbeenpartly
oriented toward this dimension.
3.1 Paratext: A Window to the Invisible
Blaise Cronin’s oeuvre, broadly speaking, is grounded in scientometrics, with its
established theories and methods, which tend to be conveniently aligned with
quantitative techniques. The quantitative bent of the tradition, however, has not
occluded his view to those aspects of science and scientific work that seem to be
more amenable to qualitative methods such as ethnography. To the contrary, he
has shrewdly and effectively used the so-called quantitativemethods as awindow
and a support to understand and explicate “the messy materiality of science in
the raw” (Cronin, 2008b)—a feat that deserves intellectual nod but that also casts
great doubt on themeaningfulness of the commonly accepted dichotomybetween
quantitative and qualitative work.
2 By “somatics” I mean that which has to do with the soma, broadly understood. This goes be-
yond the more specific meaning of the term as, for instance, used by Hanna (1986), where soma
is defined as the body as perceived from within by first-person perception. I use the term to also
refer to relationships between bodies.
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One example of this approach is Cronin’s work on “paratext”: acknowledg-
ments, dedications, forewords, and the like, which he once described as “the goat
droppings of scholarly communication” (Cronin, 2008b, p. 43)—trivial and banal
on first sight but revealing and informative on closer examination. Through a se-
ries of studies, using novel techniques, Cronin identified patterns of authorship,
crediting, and trading among research groups and scientific labs but also hidden
tessellations of proximity, co-location, and friendship among individual scien-
tists (Cronin, 2008a). These kinds of ties, hidden and unnoticed as they were,
turn out to be as significant in the day-to-day practice of science as more rigorous
“academic” measures such as credentials, specialty, and ranking. Location and
proximity, for instance, turn out to be key determining parameters in the selection
of collaborators, highlighting a facet of place other than its role in the construc-
tion of truth, which has been the focus of some science studies scholars (Gieryn,
1999).
3.2 Rhopography: Deconstruction of an Historical Myth
Acknowledgments and other forms of implicit crediting, however, form the tip of
a bigger iceberg—namely, the broad range of contributions from unacknowledged
contributors suchas technicians, apprentices, suppliers, experimenters, analysts,
and, of course, students who carry the bulk of the daily work of science but who
have remained unnoticed and underappreciated since the beginning of modern
science and, for that matter, art (Cronin, 2012). Cronin has borrowed the term
“rhopography” (from the Greek “rhopos” meaning “petty wares”) from the realm
of art—another key interest of his—to refer to a new kind of accounting in sci-
entific work. In contrast to “megalography”—the dominant narrative style in the
history of sciences and the arts, which givesmost or all of the credit to BigMinds—
rhopography can provide an historical corrective, where Little Hands would also
get credit for what they, in fact, contribute to the practice of science and the pro-
duction of scientific knowledge.
The migration of a large portion of science communication to the digi-
tal medium, according to Cronin, will facilitate this historical shift toward the
recognition of Little Hands. Customs and traditions, however, have proven to be
stubborn, and there are as yet no promising indications to corroborate this opti-
mism, as in the case of citizen science, for instance (Kouper et al., forthcoming).
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3.3 Warm Bodies and Cool Minds: Science in the Flesh
Opening up scholarly inquiry to these hidden dimensions of scientific work does
not, and perhaps should not, stop here. If physical proximity matters in the
choice of colleagues and collaborators, one might ask, what about more sublime
forms of affinity and association? What about friendships, romantic relations,
and fleeting moments of flirtation? In fact, the history of science is witness to
many instances where these kinds of relationships seem to have, indeed, left
their print on the real practice of science. It has been known, for instance, that a
relatively large proportion of female scientists—e.g., 70% and 80%, respectively,
of women physicists and mathematicians—marry or partner with other scientists
(Blaser, 2008). This pattern seems to still be in place, perhaps with an overall
upward trend of “more husband-wife teams” (Anonymous, 2008). How can this
be explained sociologically?Marriagewith peers in the 19th century could provide
women scientists an entry point to a male-dominated academe, but is this still
the case in the 21st century (Creamer, 2001)? Or does the “greedy institution” of
science (Grant, Kennelly & Ward, 2000) or its need for “collegial roles” (Reskin,
1978) drive this in order to facilitate the interweaving of family and professional
lives among scientists—e.g., in the form of invisible labor, spouses discussing or
reviewing each others’ work, or simply an environment of productive trust and
proximity (Creamer, 2001)? What kinds of concepts and theories do we need to
investigate the place of romance, affect, and friendship in science?
The official history of science, ironically, has been less attentive to these rela-
tionships and their effects andmore focused on rivalries and competitions among
major figures, theorizing them in concepts such as “concurrent discovery”. The
not-so-novel facets and dimensions of science discussed above, however, suggest
we need more inquiries into the scientific enterprise of the kind that Cronin has
pursued throughout his career. For reasons that should be clear by now, I pro-
pose to call this line of inquiry “the somatics of science”, which can be broadly
understood as a subfield of science studies that would take into account the ef-
fects on the practice of science of bodily relationships—from physical proximity
to friendships and romantic attachment.
Whetherweare concernedwith realism (natural or social), symmetry, or “con-
text”, I argue, the somatics of science seems to be an integrated aspect of its con-
duct.
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4 Conclusion: For a Somatics of Science
Science studies has been historically haunted by an inner tension and dilemma
between “symmetry” and “realism”. On the one hand, driven by the sociologi-
cal impulse to understand science as a socio-cultural institution, it seeks to put
science in its proper place, understanding it symmetrically beyondmodernist du-
alisms such as nature-culture,mind-body, and self-society. The pursuit of symme-
try, however, comes to clash with the realism and the realistic idiom that science
studies, embedded as it is in modernism, has to adopt as a baseline. Hence, “say-
ing that science ought to be understood as a typical form of culture is, of course,
not the same thing as saying that it is no different from other forms of culture”
(Shapin, 1995, p. 305). This is what gives rise to the somewhat defensive avowal
that the ultimate goal of science studies is to “add[ed] reality to science” (Latour,
1999, p. 2). It is this dilemma perhaps that explains why historians and sociolo-
gists of science have, by and large, shied away from engaging with the somatics
of science.
There is, however, a deeper conceptual reason for the paucity of work in this
area, and that has to do with the impoverished understanding of “embodiment”
in the analytic tradition:
Disengagement and disembodiment were ancient tropes of value. Removing knowledge-
making from the polis was seen as a technique for transcendence. Accordingly, to say that
knowledge was produced in and through mundane interactions between people, as well
as between people and reality, was taken to say that its truth, objectivity, universality, and
power were compromised. So far as genuine philosophical knowledge was concerned, the
polity was a pollutant.
(Shapin, 1995, p. 299)
While phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty have provided deep insights
into the multifaceted nature of embodiment, Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy
has been reluctant to incorporate them into its thinking. The semiotic tradition
is science studies, on the other hand, which, in principle, could have provided
an accommodating milieu for phenomenological insights, leaned toward a more
Heideggerian and technological understanding of embodiment. The emphasis in
actor-network theory on the agential symmetry between human and non-human
actants is emblematic of this trend, which came at the expense of the more bio-
logical aspects of embodiment. The timemight be ripe for an adjustment, turning
our attention to the somatics of science and beyond.
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Part V: Knowledge organization theories

Wolfgang G. Stock
Informetric Analyses of Knowledge
Organization Systems (KOSs)
1 Introduction
For many evaluation models, an important indicator of the quality of an infor-
mation service is the quality of its content. In our Information Service Evaluation
(ISE) model (Schumann & Stock, 2014), Content Quality is a sub-dimension of the
main dimension of Information Service Quality (see Figure 1). The content quality
concentrates on the knowledge that is stored in the system (DeLone & McLean,
1992; DeLone & McLean, 2003; Jennex & Olfman, 2006). Knowledge in regard to
information services consists of two aspects, namely the knowledge of the doc-
uments (the knowledge authors put into their publications) and knowledge of
the surrogates (the knowledge indexers put into the document’s metadata). In
turn, the knowledge of the surrogates has two dimensions: the quality of index-
ing (applying the right concepts to describe the document’s knowledge; Stock &
Stock, 2013, p. 817–825) and the quality of the Knowledge Organization System
(KOS), which is deployed for indexing (Stock & Stock, 2013, p. 809–816). A KOS
is an order of concepts which is used to represent (in most cases: scientific or
other specialized) documents. Common types of KOSs include nomenclatures,
classification systems, thesauri, and ontologies. KOSs are applied in professional
information services which support scholarly communication by the provision of
specialized literature. While there is a vast number of studies on indexing quality
and its indicators (e.g., indexing depths including indexing exhaustivity of a sur-
rogate and indexing specificity of the attributed concepts, indexing effectivity of
the concepts, and indexing consistency of the surrogates), there are in informa-
tion science only a few works on the quality of the KOSs.
Information services for science and technology (e.g., Medline for medicine,
Chemical Abstracts Service for chemistry, or Inspec for physics) and informa-
tion services in the context of corporate knowledge management in many cases
apply so-called “controlled vocabularies” or “documentation (or documentary)
languages” for the purposes of information indexing and information retrieval.
Such vocabularies organize the concepts and the semantic relations between the
concepts of a specific knowledge domain in a “Knowledge Organization System”
(KOS).
262 | Wolfgang G. Stock
Fig. 1: The Content Quality Dimension in the Information Service Evaluation (ISE) Model.
Source: Schumann & Stock, 2014, p. 8 (modified).
The aim of this chapter is to underline the importance of the evaluation of KOSs
as part of empirical information science, i.e., informetrics. According to Tague-
Sutcliffe (1992), informetrics is “the study of the quantitative aspects of informa-
tion in any form…and in any social group” (Tague-Sutcliffe, 1992, p. 1). Wolfram
divides informetrics in two aspects, namely “system-based characteristics that
arise from the documentary content of IR systems and how they are indexed, and
usage-based characteristics that arise from the way users interact with system
content and the system interfaces that provide access to the content” (Wolfram,
2003, p. 6). Stock and Weber (2006) distinguish three subjects and accordingly
three research areas of informetrics: (1) information users and information us-
age (with the area of user/usage research); (2) information itself including special
information (e.g., science information) and Web information (with the research
areas of bibliometrics, scientometrics, and webometrics); and, (3) information
systems (with the research area of evaluation and technology acceptance studies).
The informetric analysis of KOSs is part ofWolfram’s system-based characteristics
and of Stock and Weber’s information systems evaluation research.
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Evaluation studies are able to answer two questions (Drucker, 1963): Do we
do the right things (leading to an evaluation of effectiveness), and do we do the
things in a right way (this time leading to an evaluation of efficiency)? Concerning
KOS evaluation, effectiveness means the construction of right KOS, and efficiency
the appropriate construction of the KOSs (adequately employed funds, speed of
implementation, optimal software tools, etc.) (Casellas, 2009, p. 597). We focus
on effectiveness and ignore efficiency. Our research question is: How can we infor-
metrically analyze the effectiveness of KOSs? Quantitative informetric indicators
allow for the empirical description, for comparative analyses as well as for eval-
uation of KOSs and their quality. Indicators of KOS analyses and evaluation are
off the beaten path of mainstream informetrics and thus “beyond bibliometrics”
(Cronin& Sugimoto, 2014).With the empirical investigation of KOSswe break new
ground in the theories of informetrics.
In the next paragraph, we describe briefly Knowledge Organization Systems
as systems of concepts and semantic relations. Hereafter, an overview on the state
of the art of the description and evaluation of KOSs will follow. In the chapter’s
core paragraph, we present measures and indicators for the informetric evalu-
ation of KOSs. The aim is not only to present a synthesis of a large number of
approaches of KOS evaluation, but also to propose a solution for a comprehensive
set of basic KOS structure measures and of KOS assessment criteria. For KOS de-
velopers, these measures and indicators should provide useful hints to construct
good nomenclatures, thesauri, classification systems, and ontologies.
2 Concepts and Semantic Relations
Knowledge Organization Systems consist of both concepts as well as semantic re-
lations between the concepts with respect to a knowledge domain (Stock, 2010).
A “concept” is a class containing certain objects as elements where the objects
have certain properties. The linguistic expression of a concept is a “word.” Con-
cepts do not exist independently of one another, but are interlinked. We will call
relations between concepts “semantic relations” (Khoo & Na, 2006; Storey, 1993).
Apart from folksonomies, semantic relations in KOSs always are “paradigmatic”
relations, i.e., relations which are valid independently of documents (in contrast
to syntagmatic relations, which depend on co-occurrences of concepts in docu-
ments). In KOSs, the following semantic relations are important:
– Equivalence (synonymy, quasi-synonymy, or gen-identity between concepts);
– Hierarchy (hyponymy, meronymy, and instance); and,
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– as a residual class, Further relations (“see also” as association relation, or spe-
cific relations such as usefulness or has_subsidiary_company in an enterprise
KOS).
We define knowledge organization systems via their cardinality for expressing
concepts and semantic relations. The three “classical” methods in informa-
tion science and practice—nomenclature, classification, thesaurus—are supple-
mented by folksonomies and ontologies. Folksonomies represent a borderline
case of KOSs, as they do not have a single paradigmatic relation (Peters, 2009).
Nomenclatures (keyword systems) distinguish themselves mainly by using
the equivalence relation and ignoring all forms of hierarchical relation. In clas-
sification systems, the (unspecifically designed) hierarchy relation is added. The-
sauri also work with hierarchy; some use the unspecific hierarchy relation, others
differentiate via hyponymy (“is-a” relation) and meronymy (“part-of” relation).
In thesauri, a generally unspecifically designed associative relation (“see also”)
is necessarily added. Ontologies make use of all the paradigmatic relations men-
tionedabove. Theyaremodeled in formal languages,where terminological logic is
also accorded its due consideration. Compared to other KOSs, ontologies categori-
cally contain instances (individual concepts).Most ontologiesworkwith precisely
defined, further relations. The fact that ontologies directly represent knowledge
(andnotmerely thedocuments containing the knowledge) allows the syntagmatic
relations to disappear in this case.
Tab. 1: Knowledge Organization Systems (KOSs) and the Relations They Use.
Source: Stock, 2010, p. 1965 (modified).
Folksonomy Nomenclature Classification Thesaurus Ontology
Tag Keyword Notation Descriptor Concept
Equivalence — yes yes yes yes
Synonymy — yes yes yes yes
Gen-identity — yes — — yes
Hierarchy — — yes yes yes
Hyponymy — — — yes yes
Meronymy — — — yes yes
Instance — — — as req. yes
Further relations — — — yes yes
“See also” — as req. as req. yes yes
Specific relations — — — — yes
Syntagmatic relation yes yes yes yes no
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3 State of the Art of the Evaluation of KOSs
Most of the evaluation studies found in the literature are about ontologies (for
overview articles, see Brank, Grobelnik, & Mladenić, 2005; Gangemi, Catenacci,
Ciaramita, & Lehmann, 2005; Gómez-Pérez, 2004a; Hartmann et al., 2005; Ke-
hagias, Papadimitriou, Hois, Tzovaras, & Bateman, 2008; Obrst, Ceusters, Mani,
Ray, & Smith, 2007; Pak & Zhou, 2011; Vrandečić, 2009). The first article on KOS
evaluation—by Gómez-Pérez in 1995— was on ontologies as well. Our scope is
broader and covers all kinds of KOSs. There are a few evaluation studies about
other kinds of KOSs. Vogel (2002) developed a set of quality criteria for classifi-
cation systems and thesauri deployed in his retrieval system Convera. Applying
parameters such as usability, scope, recall, and precision, Owens and Cochrane
(2004) worked out methods of thesaurus evaluation. Wang, Khoo and Chaudhry
(2014) evaluated the navigation effectiveness of a classification system.
Gómez-Pérez, Fernández-López, and Corcho (2004) distinguish between KOS
verification and KOS validation. While verification is focused on the correct (for-
mal as well as informal) representation of concepts and semantic relations (with
aspects like consistency, completeness, and redundancy; Lovrenčić & Čubrillo,
2008), KOS validation refers to the “real world”, i.e., the comparison between the
content of the KOS and its “real” counterpart in the corresponding knowledge do-
main (Lovrenčić & Čubrillo, 2008).
Based on the definition given by Sabou and Fernandez (2012, p. 194), KOS
evaluation is the determination of the quality of a KOS against a frame of refer-
ence. In this definition, there are two crucial concepts. What is the definition of
“quality” and to what does “frame of reference” refer? Quality criteria define a
“good” KOS. Vrandečić (2009, p. 295–296) provides us with a list of such quality
criteria, among others: accuracy (Does the KOS correctly represent its knowledge
domain?), adaptability (Does the KOS anticipate its use?), completeness (Is the
knowledge domain appropriately covered?), consistency (Is the KOS logically co-
herent?), and commercial accessibility (Is the KOS easy to access and to deploy?).
But all these quality criteria are “desiderata, goals to guide the creation and eval-
uation of the ontology. None of them can be directly measured” (Vrandečić, 2009,
p. 296). It is important to bear in mind that we cannot always work with quality
measures, but only with quality indicators. There are several frames in the lit-
erature concerning the frame of reference (Brank, Grobelnik, & Mladenić, 2005;
Sabou & Fernandez, 2012, p. 197 ff.), namely primitive metrics (as, e.g., the num-
ber of concepts), data-driven frames (comparisons of the KOS with its knowledge
domain), KOS to KOS comparisons, frameworks concerning the syntactic and se-
mantic structures of the KOS and, finally, user-driven frames (experiments with
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users and questionnaires or interviews). For all frames of reference, we present
illustrative examples from the literature.
3.1 Primitive Metrics
Simple evaluation metrics—better known as description metrics—are based on
counting concepts and relations in KOSs. For Huang and Diao (2006, p. 133), the
“Concept Quantity evaluation is to count the number of concepts in the ontology,”
and the “Property Expectation evaluation provides an overview of the abundance
of relations between concepts.” Tartir and Arpinar (2007) distinguish between
inheritance relationships (relations, in which the concepts’ properties become in-
herited to the concepts’ narrower terms such as thehyponymy) andother relations
(as, e.g., the association relation) and count both kinds of relations. Additionally,
Tartir and Arpinar (2007, p. 187) count instances, otherwise known as concepts
in the KOS, which represent individuals. Yang, Zhang, and Ye (2006, p. 165) work
with the average number of relations per concept. A more subtle indicator is the
“tree balance” of the KOS (Huang & Diao, 2006, p. 133): “If a tree is balanced, all
its sub-trees have the same structure.”
3.2 KOSs and Their Knowledge Domains
Does a KOS represent its knowledge domain adequately? Brewster, Alani, Dasma-
hapatra, and Wilks (2004) re-define the well-known recall and precision metrics
with regard to KOSs:
One would like precision to reflect the amount of knowledge correctly identified (in the on-
tology) with respect to the whole knowledge available in the ontology. One would like to
define recall to reflect the amount of knowledge correctly identified with respect to all the
knowledge that it should identify.
(Brewster et al., 2004, p. 1)
For the authors, “knowledge” refers to “concepts”, as represented linguistically by
words. They developed a corpus of typical documents for the knowledge domain
and compared the words in the texts with the words in the KOS. For Brewster and
colleagues the ontology “can be penalized for terms present in the corpus and
absent in ontology, and for terms present in the ontology but absent in the corpus”
(Brewster et al., 2004, p. 3).While it is not difficult to identify thewords in a KOS, it
is a bold venture to collect typical (or even all) documents of the given knowledge
domain.
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3.3 KOS and Other KOSs
To indicate the uniqueness of a KOS, it is necessary to compare it with other KOSs.
The simple research question here is: “So, how may we measure the similarity
of ontologies or of ontology parts?” (Maedche & Staab, 2002, p. 251). But the an-
swer is by no means as simple as the question. In the literature, there are two
approaches to study similarity between KOSs: one approach based on common
words and concepts in the vocabulary (Maedche & Staab, 2002; Obrst et al., 2007,
p. 146–147; Brank, Grobelnik, & Mladenić, 2005), and another that works with in-
dexed documents in the case of polyrepresentation (i.e., applying different KOSs
to index the same documents) (Haustein & Peters, 2012).
3.4 Syntactic and Semantic Structure of KOSs
The evaluation of the syntactical structure is targeted at the correct use of a formal
language. For ontologies assigned for application in the semantic web, the Web
Ontology Language (OWL) and Resource Description Framework (RDF) are used.
Much more important is the evaluation of the semantic structure of a KOS. Fahad
and Abdul Qadir (2008) distinguish between redundancy, incompleteness (which
is similar to the data-driven approach of recall and precision), and inconsistency.
Redundancy occurs when certain information is inferred more than once in the
KOS, for example, when a concept is located twice in the KOS at two different po-
sitions. Inconsistency is mainly the consequence of circularity errors (a concept
is defined as a broader term or as a narrower term of itself) and partition errors
(wrong decompositions of a concept into narrower terms). Fahad, Abdul Qadir,
and Noshairwan (2007) determine that “the main reason for these errors is that
ontologists do not classify the concepts properly” (p. 286).
3.5 User-driven Approaches
Noy (2004) calls indicators like completeness, consistency, and correctness “ob-
jective” evaluation criteria: “Although all these evaluation types or comparison
methods are necessary, none are helpful to ontology consumers, who need to dis-
cover which ontologies exist and, more important, which one would be suitable
for their tasks at hand” (Noy, 2004, p. 80). To get a user-driven impression of the
quality of KOSs, some authors conducted experimental studies with test persons
or interviewed users with the aid of questionnaires or guides.
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Casellas (2009) evaluated a KOS through usability measures. He offered two
questionnaires, one with questions concerning concepts, definitions, instances,
and relations of the KOS, and a second one with more general items (as, e.g.,
“I found the ontology easy to understand,” or “I thought there was too much in-
consistency in this ontology.”). The questionees were experts in the knowledge
domain of the KOS. They were asked to express their opinions on a scale between
0 and 5 (first questionnaire) and 1 and 10 (second questionnaire).
Suomela and Kekäläinen (2006) evaluated an ontology as a query construc-
tion tool.Wang, Khoo,&Chaudhry (2014) evaluated thenavigational effectiveness
of a classification system. Both studies worked with experiments (task-based test
method) as well as with interviews (Wang, Khoo, & Chaudhry, 2014) or question-
naires (Suomela & Kekäläinen, 2006).
4 Measures and Indicators of the Evaluation
of KOSs
In this section, we introduce informetric measures and indicators of KOS evalua-
tion. Based upon the literature review and the chapter on evaluation of KOSs in
our Handbook of Information Science (Stock & Stock, 2013), we introduce one set
of measures of the structure of KOSs and four indicators of KOS quality (complete-
ness, consistency, overlap, and use).
4.1 Basic Structure Measures
Several simple parameters canbeused to analyze the structure of aKOS (Gangemi,
Catenacci, Ciaramita, & Lehmann, 2006). These parameters relate both to the con-
cepts and to the semantic relations. We will introduce the following structural
measures:
– Number of concepts;
– Semantic expressiveness (number and kind of semantic relations);
– Granularity (average number of semantic relations per concept);
– Number of hierarchy levels;
– Fan-out factor (number of top terms);
– Groundedness (number of bottom terms);
– Tangledness (degree of polyhierarchy); and
– Precombination degree (average number of partial terms per concept).
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An initial base value is the number of concepts in the KOS. Here the very opposite
of the dictum “the more the better” applies. Rather, the objective is to arrive at an
optimal value of the number of terms that adequately represent the knowledge
domain and the documents contained therein, respectively. If there are too few
terms, not all aspects of the knowledge domain can be selectively described. If a
user does not find “his/her” search term, this will have negative consequences for
the recall, and if he/she does find a suitable hyponym, the precision of the search
results will suffer. If too many concepts have been admitted into the KOS, there
is a danger that users will lose focus and that only very few documents will be
retrieved for each concept. When documents are indexed via the KOS (which—
with the exception of ontologies—is the rule), the average number of documents
per concept is a good estimate for the optimal number of terms in the KOS. Of fur-
ther interest is the number of designations (synonyms and quasi-synonyms) per
concept. The average number of designations (e.g., non-descriptors) of a concept
(e.g., of a descriptor) is a good indicator for the use of designations in the KOS.
Analogously to the concepts, the number of different semantic relations used
provides an indicator for the structure of a KOS (semantic expressiveness). The
total number of relations in the KOS is of particular interest. Regarded as a net-
work, the KOS’s concepts represent the nodes while their relations represent the
lines. The size of relations is the total number of all lines in the KOS (without the
connections to the designations, since these form their own indicator). A useful
derived parameter is the average number of semantic relations per concept, i.e.,
the terms’ mean degree. The indicators for size of concepts and size of relations
can be summarized as the “granularity of a KOS”.
Information concerning the number of hierarchy levels as well as the distri-
bution of terms throughout these individual levels is of particular interest. Also
important are data concerning the number of top terms (and thus the different
facets) and bottom terms (concepts on the lowest hierarchy level), each in rela-
tion to the total number of all terms in the KOS. The relation of the number of top
terms to the number of all terms is called the “fan-out factor”,while the analogous
relation to the bottom terms can be referred to as “groundedness”. “Tangledness”
in turn measures the degree of polyhierarchy in the KOS. It refers to the average
number of hyperonyms for every concept. By counting the number of hyponyms
for all concepts that have hyponyms (minus one), we glean a value for each con-
cept’s average number of siblings.
Soergel (2001) proposes measuring the degree of a term’s precombination. A
KOS’s degree of precombination is the average number of partial terms per con-
cept. The degree of precombination for Garden is 1, for Garden Party it is 2, for
Garden Party Dinner 3, etc. For English-language KOSs, it is (more or less) easy
to count the words forming a term, for other languages, e.g., German with many
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Tab. 2: Basic KOS Structure Measures. Source: Stock & Stock, 2013, p. 815 (modified).
Dimension Informetric Measure Calculation
Granularity Size of concepts Number of concepts (nodes in the
network)
Size of relations Number of relations between con-
cepts (lines in the network)
Semantic expressiveness Number of different semantic rela-
tions
Documents per concept Average number of documents
per concept (for a given information
service)
Use of denotations Average number of denotations
per concept
Hierarchy Depth of hierarchy Number of levels
Hierarchical distribution of concepts Number of concepts on the different
levels
Fan-out factor Quotient of the number of top terms
and the number of all concepts
Groundedness factor Quotient of the number of bottom
terms and the number of all concepts
Tangledness factor Average number of hyperonyms
per concept
Siblinghood factor Average number of co-hyponyms
per concept
Precombination Degree of precombination Average number of partial concepts
per concept
compounds (Garten: 1; Gartenfest: 2; Gartenfestessen: 3), we have to apply com-
pound decomposition in the first place and then to count for every KOS entry its
number of partial terms. Table 2 presents an overview of the multitude of basic
KOS structure measures.
4.2 Completeness Indicator
Completeness refers to the degree of terminological coverage of a knowledge do-
main. If the knowledge domain is not very small and easily grasped, this value
will be very difficult to determine. Yu, Thorn, and Tam (2009, p. 775) define com-
pleteness via the question: Does the KOS “have concepts missing with regards to
the relevant frames of reference?” Portaluppi (2007) demonstrates that the com-
pleteness of thematic areas of the KOS can be estimated via samples from indexed
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documents. In the case study, articles on chronobiology were researched inMed-
line. The original documents were acquired, and the allocated MeSH concepts
(“Medical Subject Headings”, which is a thesaurus for medical terminology) were
analyzed in the surrogates. Portaluppi (2007, p. 1213) reports, “By reading each ar-
ticle, it was…possible to identify common chronobiologic concepts not yet asso-
ciated with specific MeSH headings.” The missing concepts thus identified might
be present in MeSH and may have been erroneously overlooked by the indexer
(in which case it would be an indexing error), or they are simply not featured in
the KOS. In the case study, some common chronobiological concepts are “not to
be associated with any specific MeSH heading” (Portaluppi, 2007, p. 1213), so that
MeSH must be deemed incomplete from a chronobiological perspective.
If one counts the concepts in the KOS’s thematic subset and determines the
number of terms that are missing from a thematic point of view, the quotient of
the number of missing terms and the total number of terms (i.e., those featured
in the KOS plus those missing) results in an estimated value of completeness or
recall (in the sense of Brewster, Alani, Dasmahapatra, &Wilks, 2004) with regard
to the corresponding knowledge subdomain.
4.3 Semantic Indicators
The consistency of a KOS relates to five aspects:
– Semantic inconsistency;
– Circularity error;
– Skipping hierarchical levels;
– Redundancy; and
– the “tennis problem”.
Inconsistencies are particularly likely to arise when several KOSs (that are consis-
tent in themselves) are unified into a large KOS. In the case of semantic inconsis-
tency, terms have been wrongly arranged in the semantic network of all concepts.
Consider the following descriptor entry:
Fish
BT: Marine animals
NT: Salt-water fish
NT: Freshwater fish.
BT (broader term) andNT (narrower term) span the semantic relationof hyponymy
in the example. In this hierarchical relation, the hyponyms inherit all character-
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istics of their hyperonyms. The term Marine animals, for instance, contains the
characteristic “lives in the ocean”. This characteristic is passed on to the hyponym
Fish and onward to its hyponyms Salt-water fish and Freshwater fish. The semantic
inconsistency arises in the case ofFreshwater fish, as these donot live in the ocean.
Circularity errors occur in the hierarchical relation when one concept ap-
pears more than once in a concept ladder (Gómez-Pérez, 2004a): “Circularity
errors…occur when a class is defined as a specialization or generalization of it-
self” (p. 261). Suppose that two KOSs are merged. Let KOS 1 contain the following
set of concepts:
Persons
NT: Travelers
whereas KOS 2 formulates
Travelers
NT: Persons
When both KOSs are merged, the result is a logical circle (example taken from
Cross & Pal, 2008).
Skipping errors are the result of hierarchy levels being left out. This error is
well described by Aristotle in his Topics (2005, Book 6, Ch. 5, p. 479–480). Here,
too, we can provide an example:
Capra
NT: Wild goat
NT: Domestic Goat
Wild goat
NT: Domestic goat.
In the biological hierarchy, Capra is the broader term for Wild goat (Capra aega-
grus).Wild goat, in turn, is the broader term for Domestic goat (Capra hircus). By
establishing a direct relation between Capra and Domestic goat, our KOS skips a
hierarchy level. The cause of the skipping error is the erroneous subsumption of
NT Domestic goat within the concept Capra.
A KOS is redundant when a concept appears more than one time in the KOS.
Such an error can occur when the concept is integrated in several contexts. In a
thesaurus,Cherrymaybe hyponymof Fruit tree andhyperonymof Sour cherry and
Sweet cherry. In another facet of the same thesaurus, Cherry is a narrower term of
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Fruit brandy and a broader term of Cherry brandy. In this example, the second
variant is erroneous. Cherry has to be removed from the Brandy-facet. Instead of
this descriptor, an association link between Cherry and Cherry brandy should be
established.
For ontology evaluation, Hartmann et al. (2005, p. 17) mention the so called
“tennis problem”. This is a phenomenon “where related words could occur in two
completely different parts of the ontology with no apparent link between them,
e.g., “ball boy” could occur as a descendant of ‘male child’ and ‘tennis ball’ as a
descendant of ‘game equipment,’ despite an obvious semantic relation.” Indeed,
if a KOS only consists of hierarchy, the tennis problem gives ontology engineers a
headache. However, every KOS that allows for the use of the association relation
is able to relate both concepts:
Ball boy SEE ALSO Tennis ball
(and vice versa). The task for the evaluator is to locate concepts in the KOS with
close semantic relations which are not linked via short paths.
4.4 Overlap with Other KOSs
An approach to study the similarity between KOSs is to count common words and
concepts in twoKOSs. On theword level,Maedche and Staab (2002, p. 254) use the
Levenshtein distance (i.e., the number of edit steps between two strings). Words
with low numbers of editing steps are considered similar. If KOS 1 has the entry
“TopHotel” and KOS 2 “Top_Hotel”, the Levenshtein distance is 1 (one insertion
operation) and the words are therefore similar. But this method is prone to fail-
ure. The Levenshtein distance between “Power” and “Tower” is 1 as well despite
their dissimilarity. On the concept level, the comparison is evenmore challenging.
Obrst et al. (2007) describe this problem:
To say that two concepts have similar semantics…means roughly that they occupy similar
places in their lattices. A problem with the above is, however, clear: ontology alignment
is defined in terms of correspondence (equivalence, sameness, similarity) of concepts. But
how, precisely, do we gain access to concepts in order to determine whether they stand in a
relation correspondence?
(p. 146)
Obrst et al. (2007) found that the majority of studies are based on the vocabulary
(i.e., the words—with the above-mentioned problems) or on the structure of the
KOS (e.g., similar broader terms and similar narrower terms). Counting common
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words and common concepts is a good idea on a theoretical level, but when it
comes to practical application, a problem arises.
Fortunately, there is an alternative method. In the case of polyrepresentation
(Ingwersen & Järvelin, 2005, p. 346), different methods of knowledge representa-
tion aswell as different KOSs are used to index the same documents. Haustein and
Peters (2012) compare the tags (i.e., in the sense of folksonomies, the readers’ per-
spective), subject headings of Inspec (the indexers’ perspective), KeyWords Plus
(as a method of automatic indexing) as well as author keywords and the words
from title and abstract (the authors’ perspective) of over 700 journal articles. The
authors are particularly interested in the overlap between folksonomy-based tags
and othermethods of knowledge representation. Of course, one can also compare
several KOSs with each other, as long as they have been used to index the same
documents. The value g represents the number of identical concepts of different
KOSsper document, a is thenumber of unique concepts fromKOS 1per document,
and b the number of unique concepts from KOS 2 per document. The similarity of
KOS 1 and KOS 2 can be calculated by the Cosine.
The Haustein-Peters method can be used to comparatively evaluate different
KOSs in the context of polyrepresentation.When the similarity measurements be-
tween two KOSs are relatively low, this points to vocabularies that complement
each other—which is of great value to the users, as it provides additional access
points to the document. If similarities are high, on the other hand, one of the two
KOSs will probably become redundant in practice.
4.5 Use
Wehave learned fromNoy (2004) that it is essential for KOS evaluation to consider
the KOS users’ view. Accordingly, the KOS evaluation has to be embedded into a
broader frame, which includes the service, the user, his/her acceptance, the en-
vironment, and time (Schumann & Stock, 2014). Aspects of user-driven methods
include indicators of perceived service quality (captured, e.g., by the SERVQUAL
method), perceived system quality with the sub-dimensions of perceived ease of
use, usefulness, trust, fun, usability, and further factors (applying the Technology
Acceptance Model).
For evaluating the perceived service quality we propose to use SERVQUAL
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1988). SERVQUAL works with two sets of
statements: those that are used to measure expectations about a service cate-
gory in general (EX) and those that measure perceptions (PE) of the category
of a particular service. Each statement is accompanied by a seven-point scale
ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). For the expectation
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value, one might note that “in a KOS in economics it is useful to have the relation
has_subsidiary_company when formulating queries”, and then ask the test sub-
ject to express this numerically on the given scale. The corresponding statement
for registering the perception value would then be: “In the KOS X, the relation
has_subsidiary_company is useful when formulating queries.” Here, too, the
subject specifies a numerical value. For each item, a difference score Q = PE − EX
is defined. If, for instance, a test subject specifies a value of 1 for perception after
having noted a 4 for expectation, the Q value for system X with regard to the
attribute in question will be 1 − 4 = −3.
When evaluating perceived KOS quality, questionnaires are used. The test
subjects must be familiar with the system in order to make correct assessments.
For each subdimension, a set of statements is formulated that the user must es-
timate on a 7-point scale (from “extremely likely” to “extremely unlikely”). Davis
(1989, p. 340), for instance, posited: “using system X in my job would enable me
to accomplish tasks more quickly” (to measure perceived usefulness), and “my
interaction with system X would be clear and understandable” (for the aspect of
perceived ease of use).
UsableKOSs are those that do not frustrate the users. A common procedure in
usability tests according to Nielsen (1993) is task-based testing. Here, an examiner
defines representative tasks that can be performed using the KOS and which are
typical for such KOSs. Such a task for evaluating the usability of a KOS in eco-
nomics might be as follows: “Look for concepts to prepare a query on the Fifth
Kondratiev cycle!” Test subjects should be “a representative sample of end users”
(Rubin & Chisnell, 2008, p. 25). The test subjects are presented with the tasks and
are observed by the examiner while they perform the prescribed tasks. It is useful
to have test subjects speak their thoughts when performing the tasks (“thinking
aloud”). In addition to the task-based tests, it is useful for the examiner to in-
terview the subjects on the KOS (e.g., on their overall impression of the KOS, on
completeness, and semantic consistency). In Table 3, all mentioned KOS quality
indicators are listed.
5 Conclusion
Is KOS evaluation a new research problem (Cronin, 1991), leading to valuable sci-
entific results? Our parameters in the group of “Basic Structure” are simple mea-
sures, which can be made automatically available by the system. Indeed, it is a
quality aspect of every KOS construction and maintenance software to provide
such basic structure data (Vogel, 2002). Completeness, semantic consistency, the
276 | Wolfgang G. Stock
Tab. 3: KOS Quality Indicators. Source: Stock & Stock, 2013, p. 815 (modified).
Dimension Informetric indicator Calculation/method
Completeness Completeness of knowledge sub-
domain
Quotient of the number of missing
concepts and the number of all con-
cepts (in the KOS and the missing
ones) regarding the subdomain
Semantics Semantic inconsistency Number of semantic inconsistency
errors
Circularity Number of circularity errors
Skipping hierarchical levels Number of skipping errors
Redundancy Number of redundancy errors
Tennis problem Number of missing links between
associated concepts
Multiple KOSs Degree of polyrepresentation Overlap
Use Perceived KOS quality SERVQUAL questionnaires
KOS acceptance Technology acceptance surveys
Usability Task-based tests
overlap with other KOSs, and user-based data are quality indicators, which “will
remain a task for a human level intelligence” (Vrandečić, 2009, p. 308).
Next steps in KOSs evaluation research should include the analysis of the dif-
ferent evaluation methods. Gómez-Pérez (2004b, p. 74) mentions research ques-
tions such as “How robust are ontology evaluation methods?” or “How do ontol-
ogy development platforms perform content evaluation?”
The focus of this chapter was to draw information scientists’ attention to a
widely neglected aspect of informetrics: the informetric description and evalua-
tion of KOSs. As a basis for further discussion, we described the state of the art of
KOS evaluation and introduced suggestions for measures as well as indicators of
the quality of KOSs. We thereby expand the theory of informetrics by introducing
evaluation methods of KOSs.
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Loet Leydesdorff
Information, Meaning, and Intellectual
Organization in Networks of Inter-Human
Communication
1 Introduction
Due to the salience of citations in bibliometrics, there have been periodic calls
for a theory of citation (e.g., Amsterdamska & Leydesdorff, 1989; Cozzens, 1989;
Cronin, 1981, 1984, 1998; Garfield, 1979; Kaplan, 1965; Leydesdorff, 1998; Leydes-
dorff & Amsterdamska, 1990; Luukkonen, 1997; Nicolaisen, 2007; Woolgar, 1991;
Wouters, 1998, 1999). Theories about citations tend to emphasize the relational
aspect—that is, citation relations amongauthors and/or documents. Relations can
also be aggregated into networks and the citation networks can be analyzed using
social network analysis (e.g., Hummon & Doreian, 1989; Otte & Rousseau, 2002).
However, neither meaning nor knowledge is purely relational. Meaning, rather, is
provided positionally, not relationally.
Unlike Shannon-type information—that is, the uncertainty in a probability
distribution (Shannon, 1948, p. 10)—meaning can only be providedwith reference
to a system for which “the differencesmake a difference” (MacKay, 1969; Bateson,
1972, p. 315). I shall argue that systems can be considered as sets of relations that
are the results of first-order relations. However, the sets relate at the systems level
not in terms of individual relations, but in terms of correlations. Because of poten-
tially spurious correlations among two distributions of relations given a third one,
uncertainty can also be reduced in the case of interactions among three (or more)
sources of variation (Strand & Leydesdorff, 2013; cf. Garner & McGill, 1956). This
communication at the systems level can be expressed as mutual information in
the overlap among the sets—or with the opposite sign as reduction of uncertainty
because of mutual redundancies.
On top of the information and meaning exchanges, discursive knowledge de-
velops by relatingmeanings reflexively on the basis of cognitive codes that remain
mentally and socially constructed (Callon et al., 1986). The specification of the
role of citations in the development of discursive knowledge thus first requires
that the relational perspective be extended with a positional one. Positions make
it possible to develop perspectives (Leydesdorff & Ahrweiler, 2014). Translations
among perspectives provide a third layer of the exchange on top of information
processing in relations and the redundancy generatedwhenmeanings are shared.
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2 Meaning, Meaningful Information, and the
Codification of Meaning
One can provide the Shannon-type information contained in relations with a va-
riety of meanings from different perspectives. A perspective, however, presumes
a position. In the case of a reflecting agent, each position is defined in terms of
the vector space that is spanned—as an architecture—by the set(s) of relations
(Leydesdorff, 2014a). When a distributed network reflects (e.g., discursively), the
positioning contains uncertainty since different (and potentially orthogonal) per-
spectives can be used at the same time, but from different positions. Themeaning
of the information for the receiving system can then no longer be identified un-
ambiguously, but can only be hypothesized with reference to a virtual domain of
possible relations and meanings. Giddens (1979, p. 64) called this virtual struc-
ture “an absent set of differences”. The latent dimensions can be considered as
providing perspectives that allow for sharing or not-sharing meaning(s) when in-
formation is positioned in a network.
For example, a perspective can be used to develop discursively a rational-
ized system of expectations, and thus to generate knowledge by codifying specific
meanings. The codification provides an additional selectionmechanism: perspec-
tives thus add a third layer by potentially codifying communication on top of the
information and meaning processing. In this context, the notion of “double con-
tingency” (Parsons, 1968, p. 436; Parsons & Shills, 1951, p. 16) can be extended to
a “triple contingency” (Strydom, 1999, p. 12). Meaningful information can first be
selected from the Shannon-type information fluxes on the basis of codes that are
further developed in the communications. The three layers operate in parallel.
The construction of this triple-layered system is bottom-up, but—using a cy-
bernetic principle—control can increasingly be top-down as the feedback layers
are further developed (Ashby, 1958). Whereas the three contingencies can be ex-
pected to develop in parallel, this assumption enables us to hypothesize a hierar-
chy among the layers that can be expected for analytical reasons. Let me stepwise
extend the single-layered and linear Shannon-model (Figure 1 below) into such a
triple-layered model, as depicted in Figure 2.
3 Extensions of the Shannon-Weaver Model
As is well known, Shannon (1948, p. 3) first focused on information that was not
(yet) meaningful: “Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to
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or are correlated to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities.”
According to Shannon (1948, p. 3), however, “(t)hese semantic aspects of com-
munication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.”
It is less well known that Shannon’s co-author Warren Weaver argued that
Shannon’s distinction between information and meaning “has so penetratingly
cleared the air that one is now, for thefirst time, ready for a real theory ofmeaning”
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 27). Weaver (1949, p. 26) proposed to insert another
box with the label “semantic noise” into the Shannon model between the infor-
mation source and the transmitter, as follows (Figure 1):
 
SEMANTIC
NOISE 
SEMANTIC
NOISE 
Fig. 1: Schematic diagram of a general communication system. Source: Shannon (1948, p. 380);
with Weaver’s box of “semantic noise” first added (to the left) and then further extended with a
second source of “semantic noise” between the receiver and the destination (to the right).
What if one adds a similar box to the right side of this figure between the receiver
and the destination of themessage (added in grey to Figure 1)? The two sources of
semantic noise may be correlated; for example, when the sender and receiver of
the message share a language or, more generally, a code of communication. I pro-
pose to distinguish between “language” as the natural—that is, undifferentiated—
code of communication versus codes of communication which can be symboli-
cally generalized and then no longer require the use of language (Luhmann, 2002;
2012, pp. 120 ff.). For example, instead of negotiating about the price of a commod-
ity, one can simply pay the market price using money as a symbolically general-
ized medium of communication. One is able to translate reflexively among codes
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of communication by elaborating upon the different meanings of the information
in language (Bernstein, 1971).¹
Thus, one arrives at the following model (Figure 2):
Fig. 2: Three mutual contingencies in the dynamics of codified knowledge.
Contrary to Shannon’s counterintuitive definition of information as uncertainty,
MacKay (1969) proposed to define information as “a distinction which makes a
difference,” and Bateson (1972, p. 315) followed by defining information as “a dif-
ference which makes a difference” to which he added “for a later event” (p. 381).
Inmy opinion, a difference can onlymake a difference for a system of reference re-
ceiving the information. This latter systemmaybeable toprovide a relevant part of
the Shannon-type information with meaning from the perspective of hindsight—
that is, at a later moment. Meaningful (Bateson-type) information can no longer
be considered as Shannon-type information, since it is a selection from the un-
certainty that prevails. Bateson-type information may add to the uncertainty, but
it can also be “informative” and thus reduce uncertainty for the receiving system
(Brillouin, 1962).
1 I deviate here from Luhmann’s theory. In his theory, the sub-systems of communication are
operationally closed and communications cannot be transmitted reflexively fromone system into
another (cf. Callon, 1998; Leydesdorff, 2006, 2010a).
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In other words, one can distinguish between “meaningful information”—
potentially reducing uncertainty—and Shannon-type information that is by def-
inition equal to uncertainty (Hayles, 1990, p. 59). Shannon (1948) chose his
formulas so that uncertainty could be measured as probabilistic entropy in bits
of information. The mathematical theory of communication thus provides us
with entropy statistics that can be used in different domains (Bar-Hillel, 1955;
Krippendorff, 1986; Theil, 1972). Meaning is provided to the information from
the perspective of hindsight (of the “later event”—that is, a system of reference).
However, the measurement of “meaningful information” in bits or otherwise had
remained heretofore without an operationalization (cf. Dretske, 1981).
4 The Cybernetic Perspective
The semantic noises can be correlated when the semantics are shared, for exam-
ple, in a common language. Various forms of semiotics have been developed to
study the processing of signs in inter-human communication (e.g., Fiske, 2011,
pp. 37–60; Nöth, 2014). The focus of this contribution, however, remains on the
shaping of discursive knowledge using cybernetic and information-theoretical
perspectives. Can the effects of the codification in scholarly exchanges also be
measured?
The sharing of meaning is far from error-free, and thus other uncertainty can
be generated at this later moment, but the selective operation is analytically dif-
ferent from the generation of variation: some differences are selected as making
a difference—a signal—whereas other differences (bits) are discarded as noise.
A second contingency is thus added reflexively to the relational uncertainty in
the communication of information.
The relations are “contingent”—and not necessary or transcendent—because
a variation could also have been different. Secondly, the relational information
may mean something different for the sender and the receiver, but this is again
contingent because it depends on the respective positions in the networks of rela-
tions. However, both analysts and participants are able to specify an expectation
about this meaning, given codes of communication, insofar as the codes have
emerged as densities (eigenvectors) in the networks of communications at the two
lower levels of relational information processing and positional meaning-sharing
(Leydesdorff, 1998).
Parsons (1951, p. 10 f.) elaborated “double contingency” as a basic condition
for inter-human interactions, but he presumed a normative—that is, relatively
stable—binding of mutual expectations in a symbolic order (Deacon, 1997).
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However, different horizons of meaning can always be invoked (Husserl, 1962;
Luhmann, 1990, p. 27 and 1995, p. 69). This third layer of codes in the communi-
cation emerges as a source of friction—and thus contingency—when differences
become manifest in historical encounters such as misunderstandings. Normative
integration is then no longer sufficient, and differentiation among the codes of
communication can become functional. For example, while concerned about
“truth,” science is not involved in the pursuit of religious truth. “Truth-finding”
in a criminal investigation is differently coded from heuristics in theoretical con-
texts.
The symbolic order among the codes of communication is not a given, but
a construct that can be reconstructed reflexively by using another code such as
another alphabet or language. Luhmann (1995) added that symbolically gener-
alized codes of communication can be functionally different. Whereas normative
integrationwas presumed in understanding at the second level—using a common
language—differentiation operates against the integrative tendency of normative
learning by developing cognitive learning in parallel. When this differentiation
prevails, the fluxes of communication can no longer be integrated historically into
organizations, but tend to “self-organize.”
Against Luhmann’s reification of these tendencies (Habermas, 1987; Leydes-
dorff, 2006, 2010a), I propose considering the self-organizing dynamic as a third
contingency (Strydom, 1999): a triple contingency can thus be expected to oper-
ate in inter-human communications, but the processing at different levels remains
historically contingent since socially constructed. The self-organizing tendencies
have the status of hypotheses; the codes can be expected to enable both partici-
pants and analysts to specify expectations (Leydesdorff, 2012).
In other words, inter-human communication first requires a historical medi-
um in which probabilistic entropy (Shannon-type information) is generated, but
this first-order proliferation of differences can be provided with meaning at both
the sending and receiving ends. Meaning can be provided to the communication
from the perspective of hindsight, but also differently using other perspectives
and codeswith reference to self-organizing “horizons ofmeaning” (Husserl, 1962;
Luhmann, 1995, pp. 60 ff.; cf. Borch, 2011, p. 41).
Note that the codes of communication canbe consideredas second-order vari-
ables, that is, variables that are attributed as eigenvectors to the communications
as first-order variables (Von Foerster, 2003).² Consequently, the coded dimensions
2 Luhmann indicates the latent dimensions with the word “eigenvalue”. Technically, the eigen-
value of an eigenvector is the factor by which the eigenvector is scaled when multiplied by the
matrix.
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of the communication can no longer be attributed to the communicating agents;
they are attributes of the communications and the analysis thus becomesmore ab-
stract and layered: not only can the agents interact, but also their interactions can
be expected to interact. The next-order interactions among interactions provide
the lower-level structures of first-order interactions with new degrees of freedom
in feedback loops.
In summary, this model—based on and inspired by Luhmann (1995)—follows
Herbert Simon’s (1973) model of complex systems, but with modifications. One
assumes both horizontal and vertical differentiation in the communication. Ver-
tical differentiation was visualized in Figure 2 and can be labeled as (1) interac-
tions at the bottom providing variation, (2) organization of the communication
when thedifferent codes of communicationarehistorically interfaced, and (3) self-
organization of the codes of communication spanning horizons of meaning (Luh-
mann, 1975).
Horizontally, the codes of communication can be expected to operate in par-
allel; they can be considered as the evolving units and are modeled as “geno-
typical.” Because the codes are not material (“phenotypical”), they can develop
with a higher frequency than the historical realizations. Expectations proliferate
faster than actions (Weinstein & Platt, 1969). In this respect, themodel is different
from Simon’s model where the higher the level, the lower the frequencies. The
additional feed forward of the communication under the condition of horizon-
tal differentiation among the codes enables the communication to process more
complexity. When the normative order among the codes is broken, differentiation
can evolve into another degree of freedom in the system’s capacity (Leydesdorff,
2014b).
The uncertainty can be reduced by the specification of expectations in highly
codified communications such as systems of rationalized expectations or, in other
words, scholarly discourses. Translations from one code into another require in-
tegration into elaborate discourse in a historical context (at the second level), but
not necessarily at the samemoment. The historical organization can thus be con-
sidered as a synchronizing retention mechanism of the otherwise self-organizing
dynamics. While these mechanisms can be distinguished analytically, they oper-
ate in parallel and can be expected to “overflow” (Callon, 1998) into one another
because of the ongoing generation of uncertainty in all historical processes.
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5 Relevance for the Study of Organized
Knowledge Production in the Sciences
The distinction between organization and self-organization of communication
enables us to operationalize distinctions that were made in science studies, but
could at the time not yet be operationalized in communication-theoretical terms.
In the sociology of science, for example, Whitley (1984) distinguished between
the social and intellectual organization of the sciences or, in otherwords, between
the “field”-level and the “group”-level (Rip, 1981). In the philosophy of science,
Popper ([1935] 1959) introduced the distinction between the locally contingent
context of discovery and the trans-local context of justification (cf. Lakatos &
Musgrave, 1970). The field-level, the intellectual organization, and the context
of justification are evolutionary and self-organizing (Popper, 1972); whereas the
group-level, the social organization, or the contexts of discovery are historically
organized. The two levels co-evolve and are co-constructed, but the direction of
the arrows is reversed (Campbell, 1960).
For example, when the peer-review process is organized in terms of editors
and referees at the journal level, this is a social process, but the intellectual orga-
nization is supposed to take control in terms of the codes of the communication.
The codes of communication are needed for the context of justification in order
to function, but the material conditions also need to be organized. The social or-
ganization of science is sensitive to funding, but the intellectual organization in
terms of self-organizing codes of communication can be expected to resist such
steering of the scientific enterprise (van den Daele & Weingart, 1975). The intel-
lectual self-organization operates as a latent feedback mechanism. Under certain
conditions, this feedback can come to fruition into a feed-forward, and the field
can auto-catalytically develop its code(s) of communication (Figure 3).
Figure 3 elaborates on Ulanowicz’s (2009, p. 1888) model of auto-catalysis
(cf. Padgett & Powell, 2012): a third code—that is, meaning providing system or
perspective—can auto-catalyze the relation between the other two. However, the
rotation can be clockwise or counter-clockwise (Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014,
p. 930). Whereas the one dynamic can be appreciated as a feed-forward from
1
2
3
(a)
1
2
3
(b)
Fig. 3: Circulation and feedback in cycles
in both directions.
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organization at each moment of time to self-organization over time, the reverse
dynamic retains historical organization at each moment of time. Since both dy-
namics can be expected to operate in parallel but opposite directions, one can
assume a balance or trade-off between them: is intellectual self-organization
leading at the field-level or historical organization at the institutional level? Note
that one can only observe the historical instantiations; the self-organization
remains a theoretically-informedhypothesis about an evolutionary (that is, supra-
historical) dynamic.
In another context—that of the TripleHelix of university-industry-government
relations—I proposed mutual information in three (or more) dimensions as an in-
dicator of this trade-off between historical organization (in networked university-
industry-government relations) versus the evolutionary self-organization of syn-
ergy in terms of functionalities such as—in the case of Triple-Helix relations—
(i) novelty production through the development of science and technology,
(ii) economic wealth generation, and (iii) normative control by governance (Ley-
desdorff & Zawdie, 2010; cf. Ulanowicz, 1986, p. 143). The historical relations
cannot be the sole purpose of a Triple Helix, but one rather aims at the fruition of
these relations into synergy at a systems level. Under what historical conditions
can the loops among the three juxtaposed coordinationmechanisms flourish and
blossom auto-catalytically?
T123 = H1 + H2 + H3 − H12 − H13 − H23 + H123 (1)
Mutual information in three dimensions (Eq. (1)) can be used to model the trade-
off between organization and self-organization because this measure can be pos-
itive or negative. The equation can be derived from the Shannon formulas (e.g.,
Abramson, 1963; McGill, 1954; cf. Jakulin, 2005; Yeung, 2008), but T123 can no
longer be considered as a Shannon entropy because it can also be negative (Krip-
pendorff, 2009a). Shannon’s model (Figure 1), however, excluded feedback loops
and thus developments against the arrow of time—in accordance with Shannon’s
aim to discard meaning-processing as not relevant to the engineering problem.
Leydesdorff and Ivanova (2014) showed that the mutual information in
three (or more) dimensions can also be considered as a measure of mutual
redundancy—that is, overlap among “pure sets” (ibid., p. 391). An overlap among
sets is then appreciated twice (or more times) by considering both overlapping
systems as systems of reference. It could then be shown that the mutual redun-
dancy R12 = −T12 in the case of two systems, while in the case of three systems
R123 = T123 (with the opposite sign). The choice of sign warrants consistency
with Shannon’s (1948) mathematical theory of communication, so that the values
can be expressed in bits of information (Leydesdorff, 2010b). Negative values
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of R indicate reduction of uncertainty because of synergy in the configuration of
relations.
Given space constraints, I will not repeat this argument, but instead use the
mutual redundancy in three dimensions as a possible operationalization for the
distinction between (self-organizing and hypothesized) intellectual versus histor-
ical organization in texts using, on the special occasion of this Festschrift, the
work of Professor Blaise Cronin. This œuvre provides an example of a historically
organized set of documents inwhich intellectual organization operates reflexively
to the extent that it can be expected to prevail over the historical organization of
the texts.
To what extent are these documents organized intellectually in terms of ti-
tle words, cited references, and/or the title words of the papers citing them? Can
one use the concepts of latent variables (factors or eigenvectors) of the matrices
of documents versus words to uncover this trade-off between intellectual self-
organization over time and social or semantic organization at specific moments
of time? I operationalize the three layers specified above as follows: (1) relations
in terms of co-occurrences of title words, (2) the positions of these words in the
vector-space spanned by these relations, and (3) themutual redundancies among
the three main (factor-analytic) dimensions of this vector-space in each set.
6 Data
Given the character of this Festschrift for Professor Cronin, it seemed reasonable
to illustrate the above arguments empirically by focusing on this author’s œuvre
insofar as available using the Web of Science (WoS) data provided by Thomson-
Reuters. Since there are several authors under “B Cronin” in WoS, the download
was limited to “au = Cronin B* and ci = Bloomington”. Cronin has published at
this address since 1991. Thus, 164 documents were retrieved from the database on
April 23, 2014. I use these data and the 949 articles citing these 164 documents at
this same date. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
The sets of documents are used as samples to pursue an analysis analogous
to the evaluation of aggregated journal-journal citations (Leydesdorff, 2011a) and
of title words in a single journal—namely, Social Science Information (Leydesdorff,
2011b).
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Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics of the downloads under study, including the number of cited
and citing documents.
N Times Cited Cited References
Article 65 1113 2314
Article; Proceedings Paper 7 151 187
Biographical Item 2 9 2
Book Review 36 1 78
Discussion 1 0 0
Editorial Material 35 36 51
Letter 7 17 16
Meeting Abstract 1 0 0
Note 4 72 75
Review 6 42 780
164 1441* 3503
* These 1441 citations—based on aggregating the field “times cited” of the
164 documents—were carried by 949 citing documents (including self-citations).
7 Methods
Three matrices are central to the analysis:
1. The asymmetrical word/document matrix based on the 164 documents au-
thored by Cronin as cases, and the 57 title words in these documents that
occurred more than twice in this set (after correction for stopwords, using a
list of 429 stopwords)³;
2. The asymmetrical word/document matrix based on the 949 documents citing
one of these 164 documents (1441 times) versus the 108 words that occurred
more than ten times in the titles of these citing documents (after a similar
correction for stopwords); and,
3. Parsing the 3526 cited references in the first document set⁴, 398 cited source
names could be retrieved, of which 109 (27.4%) matched with the abbrevia-
tions for journal names used in the Journal Citation Index 2012 of WoS.⁵ These
3 Provided at http://www.lextek.com/manuals/onix/stopwords1.html
4 Table 1 provides the number of 3503 cited references based on cross-tabulation in Excel, and
using the field “N of references” (NRef) in the WoS output.
5 Using automatic matching, the Journal of the American Society for Information Science (JASIS)
is not matched because it is included in JCR 2012 as the Journal of the American Society for Infor-
mation Science and Technology (JASIST). However, 163 references in the set refer to this old title.
We will use this set as an additional control in the discussion section.
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109 journal names were used as variables to the 164 documents as cases for
the construction of a third matrix.
Co-occurrencematrices and cosinematriceswere derived from each of these three
matrices for further analysis and visualization using Pajek (v. 3.11).⁶ The threema-
trices can be used for drawing semantic maps, both in terms of relations and in
terms of cosine-normalized relations in the vector space.⁷ Moreover, the asymmet-
rical word/document matrices can be imported in SPSS (v. 21) for factor analysis.
Factor loadings on the three main components (after orthogonal rotation using
Varimax) are used for visualizing the variables (vectors) in relation to the first
three eigenvectors andalso for the analysis ofmutual redundancyusingdedicated
software.
8 Results
8.1 The Document Set Authored by Cronin (N = 164)
As noted, 164 documents were downloaded on April 23, 2014, using the search
string “au = Cronin B* and ci = Bloomington”. These documents contain 57 ti-
tle words which occur more than twice after correction for stopwords. Figure 4
shows the relational network among 56 of these words colored according to the
partitioning using Blondel et al.’s (2008) algorithm for community-finding, and
Kamada and Kawai’s (1989) algorithm for the layout.
A relational map of co-occurring words in the same subject area can always
be provided with an interpretation because the words are grouped and placed in
relation to one another. Frequently used words will tend to be central (e.g., “Sci-
ence,” “Society,” “Library”). In this set, for example, “Bibliometrics” is placed in
this central set, but in a grouping different from words which are commonly used
in bibliometrics such as “Author,” “Journal,” and “Citation.”
6 Pajek is a program for network analysis and visualization; available for download at http://
pajek.imfm.si/doku.php?id=download
7 The cosine can be considered as the non-parametric equivalent of the Pearson correlation; as
against the latter, the distribution is not first z-normalized with reference to the mean (Ahlgren
et al., 2003).
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Fig. 4: 56 (of the 57) words connected in the largest component of the network of title-words
occurring more than twice in the set. Q = 0.359; N of Clusters = 5.
After cosine-normalization and setting a threshold of cosine > 0.2, one obtains a
systems perspective on Cronin’sœuvre. Fifty-three of the title words form a largest
component (Figure 5); five communities are indicated using the algorithmof Blon-
del et al. (2008)⁸ with a modularity Q = 0.542. The modularity of this network is
enhancedbecause of the threshold; thewords are nowgrouped in the vector space
(Leydesdorff, 2014a). The grouping indicates the structure in the set of relations.
Thus,wehavemoved froma relational to apositional perspective on the struc-
ture in this data (Burt, 1982; Leydesdorff, 2014a). The topology is different: we
no longer study the network of relations among words in terms of co-occurrences
(“co-words”; Callon et al., 1983), but the correlations among the distributions of
words over the documents under study. The grouping of words in Figure 5 indi-
cates the latent dimensions of the network as a system of words (Leydesdorff,
2014a).
8 This algorithm is used because the algorithm of VOSviewer indicated threemore communities.
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Fig. 5: 53 words organized in five communities forming a largest component using 164 docu-
ments (cosine > 0.2).
In Figure 5, for example, “Bibliometrics,” “Library Studies,” “Education,” and
“Management” are grouped (using pink) as different from bibliometric terminol-
ogy such as “Citation,” “Analysis,” “Measure,” “Author,” and “Journal.” The dif-
ferences between Figures 4 and 5, however, are, in this case, not so large.
Figure 6 uses a different input: it visualizes the three-factor matrix based on
the same set (Vlieger & Leydesdorff, 2011). For reasons of presentation, I have re-
moved the negative (dotted) lines from the visualization and also the nine words
which thus became isolates. All 57 words and their factor loadings were used in
the further analysis of themutual redundancy in three dimensions.Whereas these
dimensions could be induced from Figure 5, I now force the three (latent) dimen-
sions to become center stage. As noted, the choice for three is made for reasons of
parsimony, but one can also extend this to more than three dimensions.
Factor 1 groups the words in bibliometrics; factor 2 the words focusing on
scholarly communication; and factor 3 more general terminology. The three
factors can be considered as the latent dimensions (eigenvectors) of the word/
document matrix.
Eq. (1) can be used for the computation of the mutual redundancy among
these three dimensions (Leydesdorff, 2010b). The (binned) factor loadings of the
57 words as variables provide a mutual redundancy of −1888.9mbits of informa-
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Fig. 6: 48 words with positive loadings on three factors in a matrix of 164 documents and
57 variables (words).
tion. In other words, the uncertainty in this textual domain is reduced by almost
two bits by the intellectual organization of the words in the three main (latent)
dimensions.
8.2 Citing Papers (N = 949)
Using the 949 documents that could be retrieved as citing at least one of the
164 documents authored by Cronin, a similar procedure was followed. Figure 7
shows 92 of the 108words occurringmore than ten times in these documents with
at least one (among three) positive factor loadings, similarly to Figure 6.
Figure 7 shows the structure in the vocabulary of Cronin’s (citing) audiences.
Bibliometric terminology loads on a second factor after a first one with a focus on
academia; factor 3 indicates concerns of library and education.
Following an analogous procedure, the mutual redundancy among the three
main dimensions in this matrix of 949 documents versus 108 title words is
−70.1mbits of information. This is only 3.7% of the synergy retrieved from the
word distributions in the 164 cited documents that were authored by Cronin
himself.
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Fig. 7: 92 (of the 108) words occurring more than ten times in the 949 citing documents in rela-
tion and positive factor loading on at least one of the three factors.
8.3 Cited References
The document set of 164 documents authored by Cronin is not only cited, but
also citing. As noted, the documents contain 3526 cited references. Since the cited
references in WoS do not contain title words, I used the subfield of the abbrevi-
ated journal titles in the references as variables to the 164 documents. This can be
considered as a representation of the knowledge bases of Cronin’s articles (Ley-
desdorff & Goldstone, 2014).
Among the 3526 cited references, 398 unique sources can be counted,⁹ of
which 109 sources could be matched to the journal abbreviations provided by the
Journal Citation Reports for 2012. One can thus construct two matrices: one with
398 cited sources as variables and another with 109 matched sources that occur
in 1223 (34.3%) of the cited references.
Figure 8 shows the map of the factor matrix of 96 of these 109 journals based
on 91 documents carrying these references.¹⁰ Factor 2 is recognizable as a group of
information-science journals, but the designation of the other two factors is less
obvious except that Factor 1 includes general-science journals such asNature, The
9 A referenced journal has to be included more than once into the set so that two journals are
related by the document as the observational unit.
10 The 3526 cited references to 398 sources were counted in 111 documents.
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Lancet, and the American Economic Review,whereas Factor 3 is composedmainly
of specialist journals in the social sciences and the humanities.
The mutual redundancies are +14.2mbit for the larger set of 398 cited sources
versus −160.4mbit for the references to journals active in theWoS database. Thus,
thesemore codified references contribute to the synergy, while the larger set tends
to be more incidental and contingently organized. Table 2 summarizes the find-
ings for the four analyses discussed above.
Tab. 2: Mutual redundancy among the three main dimensions of the four document/word ma-
trices compared (in mbits of information).
Mutual redundancy in mbits
164 documents authored by Blaise Cronin −1888.9
949 citing documents −70.1
398 cited sources +14.2
109 cited sources that match with JCR −160.4
9 Discussion
As noted, I performed a similar analysis in a contribution on the occasion of the
50th volume and publication year of Social Science Information (SSI) using title
words in the volumes between 2005 and 2009 (Leydesdorff, 2011b). Using 69 title
words occurring three or more times in a set of 149 titles, the mutual redundancy
among the three main dimensions of this matrix added +50.6mbits to the un-
certainty. These 149 documents were cited by 187 other documents; for the title
words in these citing journals I obtained a mutual redundancy of −106.2mbits.
In this case, the citing journals provide windows on different (self-organizing)
literatures, whereas the articles published in the journal were intellectually a het-
erogeneous set that was organized historically.
In the case of Cronin’s publications, the original documents are all authored
by him and thus the title words are intellectually organized to a degree much
larger than the citing documents. The latter show a synergy comparable to that
of the set of citing papers in the case of SSI (−70.1 versus −106.2mbits). When the
non-source references are included in the analysis of Cronin’s set, the synergy dis-
appears, while it remains when the analysis is restricted to the set of references to
indexed journals.
We note another possible control: Adding the abbreviation “J AM SOC IN-
FORM SCI”, that is, the name of JASIST before 2001 (but no longer included in
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JCR and therefore not matched above), another 163 references can be included
(1223 + 163), and the journal set is extended to (109 + 1 =) 110. The mutual redun-
dancy is in this case further increased to −179.5mbits. This result accords with the
expectation that references to JASIS contribute to the intellectual organization of
the set.
10 Conclusions
Luhmann’s sociological theory of communication and Shannon’s mathematical
one can be considered two almost orthogonal perspectives. On the one hand, Luh-
mann (1995, p. 67) defined information as a selective operation and stated that “all
information has meaning.” Thus, the measurement of communication (e.g., in
bits of information) remains external to this theoretical perspective. On the other
hand, Shannon (1948, p. 3) excluded “meaning” as not relevant to his theory of
communication. The crucial question, inmyopinion, is howmeaning is generated
in communication of information and then also codified. Can the one perspective
be translated into the other or are these theories fully incommensurable?
Weaver’s (1949, p. 27) call for a “real theory of meaning” based on Shannon’s
distinction between meaning and information can be elaborated both theoreti-
cally and then also empirically. We have begun to develop instruments such as
semanticmaps for the positioning of information, andmutual redundancy for the
measurement of the relations among codes in the communication. These opera-
tionalizations have been illustrated empirically.
The first step in how meaning is generated in communicative relations is ar-
ticulated in the operation of semanticmapping. The aggregate of relations allows
for a systems perspective since an architecture is shaped by the network which
can also be analyzed in terms of correlations and latent dimensions. The rela-
tional analysis can thus be complemented with a positional one (see Leydesdorff,
2014a). Meaning is provided in terms of positions, that is, with reference to a
system. The system(s) of reference position the incoming information and thus
appreciate uncertainty as noise or signal. Over time, this positioning may either
increase or decrease uncertainty within the system. Brillouin (1962) introduced
the concept of “negentropy” in this context.
Negative entropy can be generated when the redundancy increases more
rapidly than uncertainty, given that the maximum entropy—that is the sum of
the redundancy and uncertainty—can also evolve in dynamic systems (Brooks &
Wiley, 1986, p. 43). As Krippendorff (2009b, p. 676) formulated: “Note that inter-
actions with loops entail positive or negative redundancies, those without loops do
not. Loops can be complex, especially in systems with many variables.”
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Using Weaver’s (1949, p. 26) loophole of “semantic noise”, next-order loops
can be related to the Shannon model. Using the sociological progression from
Parsons’ assumption of normative integration in the first next-order loop to Luh-
mann’s option of functional differentiation in a second-order loop of codes of
communication, a model with both horizontal and vertical differentiation (Luh-
mann’s social or systems differentiations, respectively) could thus be developed
in terms that allow for empirical operationalization.
The codes of communication provide a superstructure that operates evo-
lutionarily (as “genotypes”), and thus becomes historically manifest only as a
source of structural reduction of uncertainty (i.e., redundancy). When different
codes of communication operate, the same information may redundantly be
provided with different meanings and thus appreciated twice or more times. In
the case of three or more codes, two rotations are possible (Figure 3 above), of
which one can be considered as feed forward and the other as feedback. Using
the example of Cronin’s publications, we have suggested that mutual redundancy
can be used as a measure of intellectual versus historical (in this case, textual)
organization.
Unlike the organization of articles in journal issues, the single author adds
intellectual organization to his texts. The titles are not a bag of words which can
be co-occurring or not, but their organization can be made visible as meaning-
ful using a semantic map, and then further be analyzed in terms of the synergy
among the latent dimensions of the vector space spanned by the distributions of
words as variables in relation to their textual organization—that is,with thehistor-
ical documents as the cases (Hesse, 1980, p. 103; Law & Lodge, 1984; Leydesdorff,
1997). The author organizes this vector space intellectually by more than an order
ofmagnitudewhen comparedwith the cited references or the documents that cite
his œuvre.
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Michael Ginda, Andrea Scharnhorst, and Katy Börner
Modeling the Structure and Dynamics
of Science Using Books
1 Introduction
Scientific research is a major driving force in a knowledge-based economy. In-
come, health, and well-being depend on scientific progress. The better we under-
stand the inner workings of the scientific enterprise, the better we can prompt,
manage, steer, and utilize scientific progress. Diverse indicators and approaches
exist to evaluate andmonitor research activities—from calculating the reputation
of a researcher, institution, or country to analyzing and visualizing global brain
circulation. However, there are very few predictivemodels of science that are used
by key decision makers in academia, industry, or government interested in im-
proving the quality and impact of scholarly efforts.
Other scientific communities rely extensively onpredictivemodels to simulate
events such as weather, seismic hazards (UNAVCO Facility, 2010), or epidemics
(Colizza et al., 2006). Recent efforts have sought to forecast science and tech-
nology in the form of an “innovation accelerator” (Van Harmelen et al., 2012).
However, the heterogeneous and proprietary datasets required to model science
remain scattered, cultures of algorithm andmodel sharing are slow to evolve, and
a unified theory that interlinks validated models of science does not yet exist.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2002), the termmodel may func-
tion as: a representation of structure or system; an object of imitation; and a type
and design. The latter two definitions of model are used to indicate an object’s
status as an exemplar meant to be imitated or a prototype to be copied and are
irrelevant for what is discussed in this chapter. The first function, i.e., a repre-
sentative model, is the focus here and may either describe a targeted system or
phenomena (e.g., a sciencemodel); represent a broader theoretical interpretation
of the laws, axioms, and models of a discipline (e.g., a model of science); or per-
form both functions simultaneously (Frigg & Stephan, 2012).
In this chapter—building on prior work (Scharnhorst et al., 2012)—we define
a model of science as “a systematic description of an object or phenomenon that
shares important characteristics with its real-world counterpart and supports its
detailed investigation” (Börner et al., 2012a, p. 1). Models of science put forward
a theoretical and/or empirical understanding with predictive power and are val-
idated based on the accuracy of their predictions. Focusing on scientific mod-
els of science, we purposefully exclude anecdotal evidence and narratives, e.g.,
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the analysis of science fiction literature to identify possible future developments
(Steinmueller, 2010). Instead,we focus onmodels of science that explain andhelp
to predict the activities of scholars (also called authors, researchers, scientists) be-
cause they are the generators of ideas and innovation—papers don’t write papers,
authors do (Cronin, 2005)—and it is scholars who collaborate and read and write
papers leading to the diffusion of ideas, knowledge, innovations, and the “making
of science” (Cronin, 2008).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section dis-
cusses challenges and opportunities when attempting to delineate and map the
space of existing models of science. Subsequently, we present a novel “biblio-
graphic-bibliometric” analysis which we apply to a large collection of books rele-
vant for themodeling of science—we explain the data collection together with the
results of the data analyses and visualizations. In the final sectionwe discuss how
the analysis of books that describe different modeling approaches can inform the
design of new models of science.
2 Prior Work: Context and Focus
Models of science are developed in many scientific disciplines and use different
(mathematical) approaches and terminology that are difficult, if not impossible,
to align across disciplinary boundaries.
Descriptive models of science can be found in philosophy of science, history
of science, sociology of science, and science and technology studies—in short, in
all those areas of social sciences and humanities which have knowledge produc-
tion as their object of study. Bernal’s encyclopedic work, “The Social Function of
Science” (1939, 1967), has influenced many of those reflecting about science in
a systematic manner (Garfield, 2007). Since 1981, the Society for Social Studies
of Science¹ awards the John Desmond Bernal Prize annually to scholars that have
made a distinguished contribution to the field. The first three award recipients
were Derek de Solla Price (1981), Robert K. Merton (1973), and Thomas S. Kuhn
and their books–Little Science, Big Science (Price, 1963), The Sociology of Science
(Merton, 1973), and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962)—are in-
cluded in this analysis.
Predictive models of science (computational and mathematical) are devel-
oped in scientometrics, bibliometrics, system dynamics, physics, mathematics,
and, more recently, in a new branch of philosophy of science and cognition
1 http://4sonline.org/
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(Payette, 2012). One of the first predictive models was introduced by Goffman—he
used a model originally developed to predict the spread of diseases to describe
the spreading of ideas (Goffman & Nevill 1964; Goffman 1966; Harmon 2008).
The so-called SIR model orders researchers in three categories: the number of
researchers ‘susceptible’ to a new idea but not yet infected with it (S), the number
of ‘infected’ researchers (I), and the number of ‘recovered’ researchers (R) who
lost interest and will not return to the idea. The model presumes that bound-
aries of scientific fields and/or invisible colleges (Crane, 1972) can be defined.
Goffman’s work showcases the complex relationship between mathematical and
theoretical models, and empirical validation. Using Goffman’s model, it is possi-
ble to define the probability that a researcher will become ‘infected’ with an idea
and the predicted growth rate of a new scientific field can be compared with the
actual growth rate (Wagner-Döbler, 1999) (see also Lucio-Arias and Scharnhorst
[2012] for a review). However, case studies have demonstrated that it is difficult to
validate all processes inscribed in Goffman’s model (Burger & Bujdoso, 1985).
There are very few comparisons of existing models or attempts to combine
multiple models to arrive at a more holistic understanding of the structure and
dynamics of science. The isolation of mathematical models was demonstrated in
an empirical study of journals using Lotka (1926), Price (1965; 1976), and Goffman
(1966) as models (Lucio-Arias & Scharnhorst, 2012). Textbooks that provide an
overview of different types of models can only be written if an acknowledged and
shared body of validated models exists—which is not yet the case, though an in-
ventory of models in certain domains has been attempted, e.g., see Scharnhorst
et al. (2012) and Schulze (2014).
As with any system, there are many different ways one can study and model
the science system: e.g., from the perspective of the cognitive structure (Collins,
1988); political-economic base (Nowotny et al., 2005); institutions, politics, and
social actors (Gibbons et al. 1994); or communications (Kaufer & Carley 1993).
Those cognizant of the problems of studying science are scattered acrossmultiple
domains, all of which have their own epistemological and methodological em-
phases. There are few who try to bridge between different epistemic perspectives,
and even fewer who reflect about science in a wider historic context of knowledge
production. Among them, Blaise Cronin stands out as a scholar able to play on all
strings of the harp of scientific reflection about science. He looks at current forms
of scholarly communication from amacro perspective which encompasses schol-
arship from the Enlightenment to Force11 (Cronin & Sugimoto, 2014). His early
book The Citation Process (1984) called for a study of science as a social system
taking into account “norms and values which guide and constrain the actions of
individual scientists” (p. 1).
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It is from a broad perspective that we evaluate and describe the relationships
among books on the topic of models of science. World Cat data² of library cata-
log records and subject headings plus library classification codes were used to
identify a set of relevant books, to identify major topical clusters, and to show
interlinkages. The resulting semantic networks were then explored to determine
the spheres of influence, relevance, and context around specific sets of books on
models of science, subject headings, and library classification codes.
3 Bibliographic-Bibliometric Data Collection
and Analysis
Currently there exists neither a “Models of Science” handbook nor a comprehen-
sive annotated bibliography. A search for “models of science”, “models of science
dynamics”, “modeling processes of science”, “modeling of scholarly communi-
cation”, or similar phases using any major citation index is of limited value when
aimed at identifying relevant literature. Our starting point is the collectionModels
of Science Dynamics (Scharnhorst et al., 2012), which presents a review of major
types of and applications for models of science. While this book does not claim to
cover all relevantworks across the landscape of science, the authors of each chap-
ter reviewed a specific branch of models of science developed in different areas of
science. Using references to books onmodeling science, library classification data
and subject headings can be retrieved and used to map the evolving topical space
in which models of science are researched and developed.
3.1 Identification of Relevant Books
To map the concept “model of science”, a book list was generated using the ref-
erences from the Models of Science Dynamics (Scharnhorst et al., 2012). Using a
bibtex file that captured all 589 references cited in the book, 196 citations were
identified as book references. Two additional bookswere added: theModels of Sci-
enceDynamics (2012) book itself and the bookTheWeb of Knowledge: A Festschrift
2 World Cat is a databasemanaged by theOnline Computer Library Center (OCLC) that collects li-
brary catalog records from around the world into a single information resource discovery system.
http://www.worldcat.org
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in Honor of Eugene Garfield (2000), edited by Blaise Cronin and Helen Barsky
Atkins.
3.2 Identification of Associated World Cat Subject Headings
The resulting list of 198 books was then searched in World Cat to collect all En-
glish language subject terms and to determine the accuracy of the document type.
Twenty-one titles were removed from the seed list for three reasons: (a) the cita-
tion was not a book [e.g., conference proceedings that were not published as a
book, and therefore not cataloged (9), journal articles (3), or self-published pro-
gram instruction manuals (4)]; (b) the book reference lacked subject headings in
English (4); or (c) the book reference duplicated a book in the data (1). For the fre-
quency distribution of the final 177 titles by type—book, ebook, incollection, and
inproceedings³—see Table 1.
For a distribution of all 198 book titles and the 177 final books references per
publication year (binnedby 5-years) see Figure 1.Most of the citedbooks inModels
of Science Dynamicswere published between 2001 and 2005 (bin label 2005). This
age-distribution for cited work is in line with other studies on obsolescence of
literature (Lariviére et al., 2008), but could also signal the relative youth of the
domain of science modeling.
Tab. 1: Number of reference types of book titles.
Initial Reference Types Final Reference Types
article 3 Book 147
book 151 Ebook 1
ebook 1 Incollection 18
electronic (handbook) 1 inproceedings 11
incollection 21
inproceedings 21
Grand Total 198 177
3 Each citation collected for this analysis had a bibtex category assigned that defined its genre.
The categories include: article indicates that a citation is an article published in a book and ebook
that indicate that a citation is either a book or an electronic bookwithout a print publication; elec-
tronic (handbook) indicates that a citation is for software tool handbooks; inproceedings indicates
that a citation was published in a conference proceeding rather than a book; last, the category
incollection indicates that a citation is chapter included a multi-author or edited book.
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Fig. 1: Number of initial 198 (blue) and final 177 book titles (red) per publication year.
The bibliographic record for books in World Cat contains, among others, a field
called subject. This field contains the subject headings, genre terms and forms, and
unindexed subject keywords attributed to a book by a librarian or cataloguer when
the book is purchased and added to the collection of a library. Modern informa-
tion systems may allow librarians to identify already attributed subject headings
for a work, and wide-spread bibliographic classification systems as Dewey, Uni-
fiedDecimal Classification, and Library of Congress lead to some standardization.
Still, libraries have idiosyncratic classification schemes and indexing practices,
whereby a number of distinct subject headings can be assigned to the same item.
To harvest the various subject headings, we selected “View all editions and
formats” in the publically displayed bibliographic records on World Cat. Collect-
ing from all unique editions of a book allowed us to gather the full variety and
scope of subjects assigned by catalogers around the globe. This method provided
a substantial number of different subject headings for each book and all distinct
terms per book were identified using a semi-automatic process.
The collected subject headings were then normalized for spelling, topicality,
and relevance. The initial list of 1313 subject headings for all 177 books was con-
solidated into a list of 876 unique subject headings after removing duplicate oc-
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currences. The unique subject headingswere refined a second time to combine re-
lated topics and remove extraneous headings. Subject headingswere combined if:
the subject varied in spelling or punctuation (e.g.,Biology–Mathematicalmodels⁴
also includes Biology/Mathematical model); the subject heading contained a des-
ignation of the type of material (e.g., Biology – Mathematical models – Textbooks
would appear under Biology – Mathematical models), geographic region (e.g., Al-
coholism and crime – Wales – Cardiff is grouped with Alcoholism and crime), or
temporally (e.g., Economic history – 16th century would appear under Economic
history); or the subject headings were topically similar enough that a work could
be found using the chosen variant (e.g., Biophysics/Biomedical Physics is grouped
under Biophysics; Comprehension (Theory of knowledge) is grouped under Com-
prehension). Subject headings were removed if they described the materiality of a
book (e.g., electronic book), a geographic place without a proceeding topic (e.g.,
Japan, Great Britain), or were the name of a researcher (e.g., Lotka). The final list
contains 675 unique subject headings.
These subject headings are distributed unevenly over the 177 books: there
were an average of 6.31 subject headings per book, ranging from 1 to 31. A book’s
set of subject headings indicate the topics that indexers and catalogers determine
are coextensive to the work, i.e., the concepts that most accurately represent a
book’s subject. Coextensive subject headings indicate a co-occurrence relation-
ship between concepts. The co-occurrence of subject headings have been used to
identify inter-index consistency and tomap concept-spaces based on indexer per-
ceptions of subject headings (Olson & Wolfram, 2008; Gabel & Smiraglia, 2009).
Within this analysis, the co-occurrence of subject headings across multiple books
is used as a proxy measure of the relationships between science domains.
3.3 Identification of Associated Library of Congress
Classification Codes
Using the Library of Congress online catalog,⁵ the Library of Congress Classifica-
tion (LCC) shelf numbers⁶ were collected for 171 books (six books did not have
LCC such numbers). The number of books and the number of subject headings
for each of the nine LCC classes is given in Table 2. For example, seven of the
4 Throughout the text, book subject heading are italicized; subject heading domains groups are
bold.
5 Library of Congress Online Catalog http://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/searchAdvanced
6 Library of Congress Classification codes http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/lcc.html
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Tab. 2: Library of Congress Classifications and Respective Book and Subject Heading Counts.
Library of Congress Classification Book Count Subject Heading Count
B – Philosophy, Psychology, Religion 7 36
B – Philosophy – General 2 12
BF – Psychology 2 12
BC – Logic 1 7
BD – Speculative philosophy 1 4
BJ – Ethics 1 1
H – Social Science 63 429
HM – Sociology 18 155
HB – Economic Theory, Demography 15 75
H – Social Sciences – General 9 52
HD – Industries, Land use, Labor 8 68
HC – Economic history and conditions 4 30
HV – Sociology – Social pathology … 3 21
HQ – Sociology – The family … 2 8
HA – Statistics 2 6
HF – Commerce 1 9
HG – Finance 1 5
J – Political Science 1 10
JN – Political Institutions … 1 10
L – Education 2 25
LC – Special Aspects of Education 2 25
Q – Science 77 563
Q – Science – General 38 253
QH – Natural History, biology 15 141
QA – Mathematics 13 98
QC – Physics 7 50
QP – Physiology 2 13
QD – Chemistry 1 4
QL – Zoology 1 4
R – Medicine 2 23
RC – Internal Medicine 1 12
RA – Public Aspects of medicine 1 11
T – Technology 10 121
T – Technology – General 5 42
TK – Electrical Engineering … 4 65
TA – Engineering – Civil Engineering 1 14
U – Military Science 1 8
UG – Military Engineering, Air forces 1 8
Z – Bibliography. Library Science… 8 63
Z – Books (General), Writing … 7 56
ZA – Information resources 1 7
Books without LCC Codes 6 27
Total 177 1305
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171 books have been classifiedunderB–Philosophy, Psychology,Religion. How
these seven books and their subject headings distribute over the next level in the
classification is also shown in the table. That is, the table interlinks LCC classes
to books and subject headings. Note that different subject headings might appear
simultaneously in different LCC classes.
LCC numbers were then used to define a crosswalk of LCC classes to a wider
scientific domain coding system (Table 3). We use the thirteen major scientific
disciplines identified in the UCSD Map of Science (Börner, et al., 2012b) as a
proxy for upper-level knowledge organization. For example, QH, QP, QL are
assigned to Biology. Four domains from the UCSDmap did not appear in the LCC
codes: Health Professionals, Infectious Diseases, Biotechnology, and Earth
Sciences. Earth Sciences was given a code because it could not be subsumed
under a secondary code; Biotechnology was grouped with Biology, Health
Tab. 3: LCC class and science domain code crosswalk, with related book counts.
Code Domain LCC Class Book Count Notes
0 Science General Q 37 Subjects that can be
applied across domains.
1 Biology QH, QP, QL 18 UCSD domain Biotech-
nology grouped here.
2 Medical Specialties R (all) 2 UCSD domains Health
Professionals grouped
here.
3 Engineering T, TA, UG 5 LCC class T is split be-
tween code 3 and 6.
4 Chemistry QD 1
5 Earth Science — 0
6 Electrical Engineering &
Computer Science
T, TK, Z, ZA 14 Library and Information
Science included
7 Brain Research BC 1 Cognitive Science and
Psychology
8 Humanities B, BD, BF, BJ, LC 8 History, Philosophy,
Education
9 Math & Physics QA, QC 20
10 Social Sciences H (all), JN 65 Sociology, Economics,
Business, etc. UCSD
Infectious Diseases
grouped here.
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Professionals with Medicine, and infectious diseases with Epidemiology in
the Social Sciences. A Science General category was also added to categorize
subjects that either could be applied across domains (e.g., the subject heading
Research is coded zero) or relates a specific domain’s study of science broadly
(e.g., Science – social aspects is coded zero and twelve to indicate connection
between social science and the general study of science).
The division of domains within LCC classes does not align cleanly with the
domains identified in the UCSDmap. In particular, Social Science books are dis-
persed across and combined within LCC class divisions, while works related to
modern technology are classified within the general Technology class. This is
not unusual—classification and knowledge organization systems have a history
within, and moreover are tailored towards, the collection for which they are de-
signed (Smiraglia, 2014).
We then applied the same domain coding system to assign the book subject
headings a scientific domain using a common code book. Each subject heading
was assigned one to two of the eleven domain codes shown in Table 3. A subject
heading’s domain codewas identified by analyzing its topic coverage and the LCC
number(s) assigned to the book(s) using the particular subject heading. The goal
of coding subject headings in this manner is to see where topics (as expressed by
subject headings broadly) overlap across domains and disciplines. We treat sub-
ject headings as terms of a controlled vocabulary. Individually, or in combination
with one another, they characterize a topic. Domain codes were applied in an as
needed fashion; some subject headings have only one associated domain and sec-
ondary domain codes were onlymadewhen the subject is studied acrossmultiple
domains. Subject headings with broad application were mapped into the domain
code zero. The resulting code matrix is unbalanced because some subject head-
ings were given both a primary code for a domain most associated with a subject
and a secondary code indicating the second domain associated with a subject.
Likewise, many subjects were not coded twice.
The result of these multiple mappings is a co-occurrence of domains by the
number of subject headings associated with both domains related to books on
modeling science (Table 4).
Of the 675 unique subject headings, 317 subjectswere codedwith one domain.
Conversely, 358 subject headingswere assigned twodomain codes as theywere ei-
ther complex subject headings,multiple concepts anddomains imbedded in them
(e.g., the subject heading Science – Psychological aspectswould be coded for Sci-
ence (General) and Psychology) or a subject heading topic was associated with
multiple domains (e.g., the subject Social Networks is a methodology used within
theElectrical Engineering&Computer Science and Social Sciencesdomains).
The subjectCommunication in science –Data processingwas coded Science (Gen-
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Tab. 4: Cross tabulation of domain codes assigned to book subject headings.
Domain Name Do
m
ai
n
Co
de
0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 Si
ng
le
Do
m
ai
n
Co
de
Gr
an
d
To
ta
l
Science (General) 0 1 1 2 6 15 17 42
Biology 1 2 3 3 4 13 3 23 51
Medicine 2 4 2 4 3 13
Engineering 3 1 2 5 6 5 19
Chemistry 4 1 2 3 6 12
Earth Science 5 3 2 0 5
Elect. Eng. &
Comp. Science
6 3 6 1 23 29 56 118
Brain Research 7 1 7 1 5 2 24 9 49
Humanities 8 2 1 3 1 15 10 32
Math & Physics 9 2 4 1 7 2 14 1 10 61 102
Social Sciences 10 5 5 23 1 50 21 127 232
eral) and Electrical Engineering & Computer Science because Communication
in science could refer to research by any number of domains, while the secondary
topic Data processing is a topic most relevant to Information and Computer
Science.⁷
The domains of Social Sciences (sociology, economics), Math & Physics,
and Computer and Information Science are most strongly associated with
subject headings from the 171 books, followed by Biology, Psychology, and gen-
eral science domains. Domains with the most domain intersections are bolded
in Table 4: Social Sciences and Humanities (50); Electrical Engineering &
Computer Science and Social Sciences (29); Brain Research and Social Sci-
ences (24);Electrical Engineering&ComputerScience andMath&Physics (23);
Social Sciences and Electrical Engineering & Computer Science (23); Social
Sciences and Math & Physics (21). Please note that these intersections are cre-
ated by the content of our specific set of books. In other words, books relevant
to modeling science combine knowledge between social sciences, mathematics
7 Throughout the text, book subject heading are italicized; subject heading domains groups are
bold.
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(and physics), computer and information science. This also suggests that to be
able to study models of science, readers and authors needs to be familiar with
several areas of research.
4 Topical Space of Books Relevant for
Modeling Science
Using the data detailed in the previous section, different topical spaces can be
extracted, analyzed, visualized, and interpreted.
4.1 Major Subject Headings Linked to Books
To understand the topical space of books and subject headings, a bipartite net-
work of the 177 books and their 675 subject headings was extracted. The resulting
networkhas 852 nodes—toomany to depict in a network layout in letter size. Using
the Science of Science tool (Sci2)⁸ and theGephi⁹ graphvisualizationplatform, the
network was analyzed to identify all subject nodes with an out-degree (i.e., num-
ber of linked books) greater than five, and all their associated books. The resulting
network has 19 subject nodes and was laid out in a two dimensional space using
a force-directed layout (Figure 2).
Subject heading nodes are colored pink and labeled by subject headings; the
nodes for the 177 books are green and labeled with book titles. For the 19 subject
heading nodes, node and label size increases and color darkens as the out-degree
increases from six to 21. For book title nodes, the node and label size and the color
are scaled according to the number of unique subject headings associated with a
book title in the original network. Node labels are truncated to improve the read-
ability of the graph.
Overall, the network shows that the high-degree subject headings and asso-
ciated books cover a wide range of modeling approaches developed in diverse
disciplines of science. Science characterizes many of the books, and its subcate-
gories Science – Social Aspects and Science – Philosophy play amajor role.We also
see “Mathematics” and “Mathematical models”. Specific areas in mathematical
modeling emerge: System Theory, Game Theory, models of Evolution and Social
Networks. Another set of subject headings describes research areas that inspired
8 http://sci2.cns.iu.edu
9 http://gephi.org
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Fig. 2: Bimodal network of high-degree subject heading nodes (in pink) linked to associated
book nodes (in green). See website at http://cns.iu.edu/2015-ModSci.html for a high-resolu-
tion, searchable pdf file.
new mathematical models of science to answer questions related to the process
of knowledge production, e.g., Innovation, Communication, Internet, and Biblio-
metrics. While most books are associated with only one subject heading, some
books are associatedwithmany areas. Among them isThe Structure andDynamics
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of Networks (Newman et al., 2006) which introduces the highly interdisciplinary,
emerging area of network science to a broad audience. Usually, books belonging
to the same epistemic thread are connected to the same subject headings. For
instance, Per Bak’s How Nature Works (1996) is linked to the subject node Evo-
lution which contains other books that discuss evolution from the perspective of
physics (physics of self-organization), game theory (evolutionary game theory),
or biology. One of them is the German title Physik der Evolutionsprozesse (Ebeling
et al., 1990)—a linkage that would be difficult to identify using linguistic analysis
or citation-based analysis. Those two books belong to one research streamwithin
statistical physics. Some titles do not deal with science specifically, but describe
methods that can be applied to describe and model complex phenomena such as
the science system itself. Only a close inspection of the content of the books can
reveal this similarity, yet subject headings and library classification codes can be
used to identify key linkages.
Figure 3 shows the same network using the very same node positions. How-
ever, the Blondel community detection¹⁰ algorithm (Blondel et al., 2008) was ap-
plied randomly using a resolution parameter of 0.9. The networksmodularity was
measured to be 0.643. The communities detected in this network represent the
major areas of research on models of science discussed in Modelling Science Dy-
namics (Scharnhorst et al., 2012), including, philosophy of science andknowledge
(teal), science studies (yellow), innovation and communication in science (pink),
economics and social sciences (purple), mathematical models (lime green), bib-
liometrics and information science (Kelly green), evolution andgame theory (light
blue), and computer science (blue).
The science studies community encompasses books from science and tech-
nology studies, such as theNew Production of Knowledge by Gibbons et al. (1994),
the classics Invisible Colleges by Crane (1972) from the sociology of science, aswell
as The New Invisible College byWagner (2008) from bibliometrics. Also “Science”
as general subject heading is put into this community. Note thatTheWebof Knowl-
edge: A Festschrift in Honor of Eugene Garfield, edited by Blaise Cronin and Helen
Barsky Atkins (2000) (indicated by a red dotted frame) bridges twomajor commu-
nities relevant to study science: the community of science studies “Science” and
the community of “Bibliometrics”.
10 The Blondel community detection algorithm partitions a network into communities based on
the density of links in a network. A node’s membership in a Blondel community is determined by
its relationship to other nodes. Nodes are more likely to link tomembers within their community,
than link to those outside of their communities. The algorithm detects and partitions communi-
ties based on the relative density of the relationship between nodes in a given network.
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Fig. 3: Bimodal network of high-degree subject heading nodes linked to associated book nodes
and colored by Blondel communities. See website at http://cns.iu.edu/2015-ModSci.html for a
high-resolution, searchable pdf file.
As in Figure 2, the different subject headings are grouped by disciplines,methods,
and perspectives. The community detection algorithm and coloring groups dif-
ferent subject headings, e.g., Science – Philosophy and Philosophy. It also makes
visible how aggregations of subject headings are interlinked, e.g., Mathematical
Models andMathematics are closely interlinked with Social Sciences.
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Figure 4 shows how the topic space of models of science has developed over time.
We use the publication date of the different books (first print) and color coded
book nodes by binned years. Books published between 1750 and 1990 are given
on the left-hand side. 18 of the 19 subject headings are shown—only Internet is
missing. Several books are not yet published. The full network is given on the
right hand side—with book nodes colored by year bins. Early books in yellow and
later books in cyan and green can be easily identified.
5 Limitations
A closer examination of Models of Science Dynamics (Scharnhorst et al., 2012)
reveals some limitations of the present approach. The book is divided into three
major parts: The “Foundations” includes two introductory chapters; the “Ex-
emplary Model Types” part introduces three different types of models such as
epidemics models, agent-based models, and game theoretic models; the “Exem-
plary Model Applications” section showcases the application of different models
to study collaboration and citation networks. The chapters are written by author
teams from different scientific disciplines and they cite different areas of work.
Fourteen books are cited in more than one chapter or in the Foreword (FW) or
Preface (PF) (Table 5). Among the books listed in Table 3, Kuhn’s Structure of Sci-
entific Revolution (1962) stands out, followed by Price Little Science, Big Science
(1963). Although written in the 1960s, both still inspire today’s modeling science
efforts.
Figures 2–4 present only nine of the listed books as the other five are not con-
nected to the highly interlinked 19 subject headings. For example, the Atlas of
Science (Börner, 2010) has subject headings: Classification of sciences – Atlases,
Science – Atlases, Communication in science – Data processing, Digital mapping.
Only Science – xxx occurs in the network shown in Figures 2–4. However, the sub-
ject Science – Atlas was not merged under the term Science in the initial subject
heading aggregation process and hence the book does not show in the figures.
Subject headings indicate multiple aspects of the topics covered in a work.
Complex subject headings may be used to combine multiple topical subjects into
one or to combine topical subjects with a specific methodology; temporal period
and era; thematerial, format, and genre; or geographic regions and languages of a
work. Many subject heading schemes have a hierarchical structure, e.g., a subject
term has parent and child terms, or is a composite of two parent terms with two
facets of co-equal status. In otherwords, there are relationships between subjects,
books and classification schemes that are currently not utilized in this initial anal-
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Tab. 5: Listing of books that are cited by more than one chapter, the Foreword, or Preface.
Title of the book (authors) Year Chapters*
The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour
(Von Neumann, Morgenstern)
1944 2,5
Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least-Effort (Zipf) 1949 1,3
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn) 1962 FW,PF,1,2,3,6
Little Science, Big Science and Beyond (Price) 1963 FW,PF,1,3,4,6
Invisible colleges: Diffusion of knowledge in scientific communities.
(Crane)
1972 FW,1,6
The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations
(Merton)
1973 PF,1,6
Matematicheskie modeli v issledovanii nauki (Yablonsikii) 1986 PF,FW
Introduction to informetrics: quantitative methods in library,
documentation and information science (Egghe & Rousseau)
1990 FW,2,3
The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and
Research in Contemporary Societies. (Gibbons et al.)
1994 1,6
Social network analysis: Methods and applications
(Wasserman & Faust)
1994 6,7
Growing artificial societies: social science from the bottom up
(Epstein & Axtell)
1996 2,4
Linked: The New Science of Networks (Barabási) 2002 PF,2,6
Evolution and structure of the Internet: A statistical physics approach
(Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani)
2004 2,7
Atlas of Science: Visualizing What We Know (Börner) 2010 FW,PF,8
* PF = Preface, FW = Foreword
ysis. A follow-up study could refine links between books, classification schemes,
and domains by using both topical and methodological subject headings.
There are also problems connected with the context-richness of subject head-
ings. Oneproblem is the vagueness of compound subject terms. Subjects headings
like “Data processing”, “Methodology”, and “Research” can describe many ideas
and techniques. However, compound subjects can allow for the collection of the-
matically related materials for later comparison. More specific methodological
subjects, like network analysis, may be used to compare the use of a method or
technique across disciplines.
While the bibliographic-bibliometric method proposed and exemplified here
benefits from the collectivewisdomof indexers, it also comeswith its own caveats.
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However, the resulting analyses and visualizations can be used to gain a new,
more comprehensive understanding of the richness of scientific disciplines,meth-
ods, and perspectives as captured in books.
6 Conclusions
The edited bookModels of Science Dynamics provided a review ofmajormodels of
science for an expert audience (Scharnhorst et al., 2012). This chapter introduced
and exemplified a novel means to construct the topical or concept space in which
works onmodels of science are situated by using key books, library subject head-
ings, and classification codes. Specifically, this chapter extends existing methods
of bibliometric analysis of classification systems to subject headings, which come
frommultiple controlled vocabularies. We implemented a method to identify and
classify both LC classifications and subject headingswithin a common framework
of scientific domains to facilitate comparative analysis.
Our method, as applied to subject headings, is unique in that it reveals a de-
gree of cross-domain pollination of concepts andmethod that is not capturedwith
LCCnumbers.While LCCnumbers reveal themost unique domain associatedwith
a work, our analysis of subject headings reveal the interlocking domains used to
create models of science.
The bibliographic-bibliometric analysis of existing models of science pro-
vides a first depiction of major disciplines, methods, and perspectives. The study
also highlights challenges and opportunities that arise when books, cataloging
data, and subject headings are used in delineating and mapping a domain. It is
our hope that this study inspires future reviews, exemplifications, and discus-
sions of models of science developed in different scientific disciplines. Future
work might expand this bibliographic-bibliometric analysis beyond books, e.g.,
to journal publications, course content, and/or encyclopedias. It might attempt to
generate cross-walks between science, engineering, education, and other classi-
fication systems and taxonomies that define and organize different model types.
Likely, challenges encountered in thework presented herewill persist—document
titles and author names are non-unique, the terminology used differs consider-
ably among the different disciplines, and among catalogers.
Most relevant to the present volume, this work depicts the landscape of
models of science by identifying key works and visualizing the relationships
among these works. Starting with the references in one book on models of sci-
ence (Scharnhorst et al., 2012), a landscape unfolds as diverse and broad as the
table of contents in Bernal’s book (Bernal, 1939). However, a comparison of the
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headings of Bernal’s book and the dominant subject headings in Figure 3 reveals
an important difference. The structure of Bernal’s book reads like a what-to-be-
modeled list. Examples are organization (The existing organization of research
in Britain), scientific practices (The efficiency of scientific research), scientific
careers (The training of the scientist), and globalization (International science). In
turn, the dominant subject headings form a checklist of necessary dimensions
or ingredients for a good model of science, a how-to-model list. Such a model
would need to address the epistemic foundations of science (Science Philosophy),
its social structure (Science Social), its relations to innovations and economic
growth (Innovation), and aspects of its networked nature (Systems theory, Social
Networks, Internet). Taken together, these depictions provide science modelers
with holistic orientation to begin their work.
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Part VI: Altmetric theories

Michael Thelwall
Webometrics and Altmetrics: Home Birth vs.
Hospital Birth
1 Introduction
Almost two decades ago it became apparent that scientometric techniques that
had been developed for citation databases could also be applied to the web. This
triggered two reactions: optimism and pessimism. On the one hand, a number
of optimistic articles were written by Ray Larson, Tomas Almind, Josep-Manuel
Rodríguez-Gairín, Peter Ingwersen, Blaise Cronin, Judit Bar-Ilan, Isidro Aguillo,
Lennart Björneborn, Alastair Smith, and Ronald Rousseau that described or de-
veloped newways inwhich theweb could be used for scientometrics. On the other
hand, more critical articles were written by Anthony van Raan and Leo Egghe
that focused on the problems that webometric methods were likely to face. This
chapter argues that these two approaches represented different theoretical per-
spectives on scientometrics and that timehas shownboth to be valid. This chapter
concludes by contrasting the academic literature that gave birth to webometrics
with the coherent set of goals that announced altmetrics on a public website.
2 The Birth of Webometrics
Webometrics is an information science research field concerned with quantita-
tive analyses of web data for various purposes. It was born from scientometrics,
the quantitative analysis of science, with the realization that, using commer-
cial search engines, some standard scientometric techniques could, and perhaps
should, be applied to the web. The basic idea for webometrics apparently dawned
on several people at almost the same time (Aguillo, 1998; Almind & Ingwersen,
1997; Cronin, Snyder, Rosenbaum, Martinson, & Callahan, 1998; Larson, 1996;
Rodríguez-Gairín, 1997), although themost developed conceptwas that of Almind
and Ingwersen (1997), who explicitly compared the web to traditional citation
indexes and coined the term webometrics.
The idea driving the birth of webometrics was that many scientometric stud-
ies had analyzed information about sets of scientific documents extracted from
a publication database or citation index, and that the same methods could be
adapted for the web. For example, the productivity of one or more departments
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could be assessed by counting the number of documents produced by them, as
recorded in an international scientific database, but on the web the number of
web pages produced by them could also be counted, either directly or using an
appropriate search engine query. Perhaps more usefully, evaluative scientomet-
ric studies often assessed the impact of the documents produced by one or more
researchers by counting citations to them. On the web, the impact of collections
of documents could be assessed to some extent by counting the number of hy-
perlinks pointing to them (Ingwersen, 1998). In addition, new types of study of
scientific impact were possible with the web because of the increasingly many
activities that were recorded online, such as for education, public engagement,
and talks. Hence, for example, it might be possible to trace the wider impact of
individual academics by counting and analysing how often they were mentioned
online (Cronin et al., 1998).
There were two different reactions to the emergence of webometrics: enthu-
siasm and scepticism. The enthusiastic perspective described the range of stud-
ies that might be possible with webometrics and concentrated on its potential
applications and strengths (Björneborn, & Ingwersen, 2001; Borgman, & Furner,
2002; Cronin, 2001; Leydesdorff, & Curran, 2000); the critical perspective instead
emphasized the problems inherent in web data and focused on the limitations
thatwebometricmethodswould necessarily face (Björneborn, & Ingwersen, 2001;
Egghe, 2000; van Raan, 2001). Drawing from both strands, webometrics emerged
as an empirical field that sought to identify limitations with web data, to develop
methods to circumvent these limitations, and to evaluate webometric methods
through comparisons with related offline sources of evidence (e.g., comparing
counts of hyperlinks to journal websites with counts of citations to the associated
journals), when possible (Bar-Ilan, 1999; Rousseau, 1999; Smith, 1999).
3 Webometric Theories
Like themother field scientometrics, webometrics has not succeeded in creating a
single unifying theory for its main tasks but it has produced a few theoretical con-
tributions and one specific new theory. Within scientometrics, a detailed theory
to deal with the practice of citation analysis has long been needed (Cronin, 1981),
but has not been produced. Instead, practicing scientometricians draw upon a
range of different theories (e.g., Merton, 1973; de Solla Price, 1976) and empiri-
cal evidence (Oppenheim, & Renn, 1978) about why people cite and the biases in
citation analysis (e.g., Cronin, 1984) in order to effectively process and interpret
citation data (van Raan, 1998). Within webometrics and altmetrics there are spec-
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ulations about why people cite in the web as well as some empirical evidence, but
both are weaker than for citation analysis.
Although early webometric papers were mainly quite theoretical in terms of
discussing the potential for webometrics, the first major clearly articulated the-
oretical contribution to the mature field was an article that gave it a formal def-
inition as “the study of the quantitative aspects of the construction and use of
information resources, structures and technologies on the Web drawing on bib-
liometric and informetric approaches” (Björneborn 2004, p. vii), placed the name
of the field within a research taxonomy, systematically named themain objects of
study for link analysis, and introduced a standard diagram style for link networks
(Björneborn & Ingwersen, 2004).
While no article has attempted to create a unifying theory of hyperlinks (or
any other aspect of webometrics), a third article proposed a unifying “theoretical
framework” for link analysis by specifying the stages that an effective link analysis
would have to include, as follows:
1. Link interpretation is required in any link analysis exercise if conclusions are
to be drawn about underlying reasons for link creation. An exception would
be made for evaluative link analysis if it could be consistently demonstrated
that inlink counts correlate with the phenomenon desired to be evaluated.
2. No single method for link interpretation is perfect. Method triangulation is
required, ideally including a direct method and a correlation testing method.
3. Fundamental problems, including the “rich get richer” property of link cre-
ation and web dynamics, mean that definitive answers cannot be given to
most research questions. As a result, research conclusions should always be
expressed cautiously.
4. Extensive interpretation exercises are not appropriate because of the reasons
given in point 3 above. (Thelwall, 2006)
Thepurposes of the above theoretical frameworkwere to create a consensus about
the minimum requirements for a published link analysis study and to ensure that
the conclusions drawn from future studies would always be tied to the evidence
provided in them. In this sense it copies the earlier work of van Raan (1998). Al-
though no new link analysis theories have been proposed since the above, more
powerful link analysis methods have been developed (e.g., Seeber, Lepori, Lomi,
Aguillo, & Barberio, 2012) and the field has continued to progress.
Within webometrics, link analysis’ younger sibling is search engine evalu-
ation, the analysis of properties of commercial web search engines. This area
of study was conceived from its parent fields—scientometrics and informetrics—
when it became apparent that link analysis could not survive alone because the
results that web search engines gave for queries were inconsistent and sometimes
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illogical. Search engine evaluation studies attempted to cure this childhood dis-
ease by identifying strategies for extracting information that was as reliable as
possible (e.g., Bar-Ilan, 2001; Bar-Ilan, 2004), such as by conducting multiple
searches and aggregating the results (Rousseau, 1999). In addition, by under-
standing and mapping the extent of the problem of search engine reliability
(e.g., Vaughan & Thelwall, 2004), the results of link analysis studies could be
interpreted with an appropriate degree of caution. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, this is a very odd type of information science research because the object
of study is a computer system (Google, Bing etc.) created by a small number of
humans (mainly computer scientists) that is, in theory, perfectly understandable
to researchers. Nevertheless, the exact details of the functioning of all the major
commercial search engines are proprietary secrets, thus necessitating empirical
analysis. This area of research has generated no formal theories at all, perhaps
because it seems illogical to theorize about a very small number of complex
computer systems. To fill this gap, here are some new theoretical hypotheses
about commercial search engines. These are consistent with the history of search
engines over the past decade but are clearly not directly testable until one of them
fails:
– Incompleteness hypothesis: No major commercial search engine will ever be
designed to give an accurate and complete set of matches to a user’s search.
– Unknown ranking hypothesis: No major commercial search engine will ever
fully specify its ranking algorithm.
– Instability hypothesis: No major commercial search engine will ever cease to
make continual changes to its core ranking and retrieval algorithms.
– Unknown coverage hypothesis: No search engine will ever crawl the entire
web, with any reasonable definition of “the entire web”.
Although the majority of early webometric studies focused on either hyperlinks
or search engine evaluation, later studies investigated new types of website, such
as blogs, and attempted to engage a wider social science audience. This led to
a proposed new definition for webometrics as “the study of web-based content
with primarily quantitative methods for social science research goals using tech-
niques that are not specific to one field of study” (Thelwall, 2009, p. 6). Thereinwe
find the theoretical contribution of webometrics: a big data theory that casts in-
formation scientists as proactive data librarians for the web. Information Centred
Research (ICR) theory proposes that information science as a discipline should
take on the roles of evaluating new sources of web data and helping to ensure
that it was used, and used effectively, by researchers in disciplines for which it
would be most useful (Thelwall, Wouters, & Fry, 2008). The background to ICR
was the realization that when a new web service arises (e.g., blogs, social net-
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work sites, Twitter), many researchers from different fields naturally investigate it
to see whether it could provide new evidence to shed light on field-specific prob-
lems (e.g., perhaps public tweets about research could give insights into the topics
found to bemost interesting). ICR argued that a more efficient approach would be
for information scientists to investigate the new web service and target research
fields for which the data could be useful (e.g., if tweets tended to be about politi-
cians then politics researchers should be targeted to research it but not family
researchers).
In terms of the theoretical basis of webometrics, although the foundations
of the field lay within scientometrics and its theoretical basis and goals overlap
with those of scientometrics, its theoretical contributions seem to have mainly
come from within webometrics rather than externally. The main exception is the
theorizing about the position of webometrics with respect to bibliometrics, scien-
tometrics, and informetrics (Björneborn & Ingwersen, 2004), which explicitly ex-
tends similar prior work (Tague-Sutcliffe, 1992). Webometrics research has mostly
been concerned with developing and evaluating methods and hence many of its
theoretical contributions are formulated as methodological rather than theoret-
ical and have typically been web-specific and generated to fill a gap that prior
scientometrics research not had to address. The above theoretical framework for
link analysis and ICR theory are exceptions to the atheoretical methods focus of
much webometrics, but these are both clearly about methods, albeit at a more
general level than in most webometric research. It is interesting to contrast this
with another theoretical contribution, the alternative document model formula-
tion (Thelwall, 2002), which suggested new methods for counting hyperlinks by
aggregating all links from the same source and target website into one. This idea
was theoretical in the sense that it hypothesized, for example, that the website
could be the real single “document” of the web rather than the web page, in the
same way that academic publications are counted by article rather than by page.
Nevertheless, the purpose was to generate improved methods for counting links.
The alternative document model idea was later expressed in a more theoretical
abstract mathematical way (Thelwall & Wilkinson, 2008) but has since become
methodologically less relevant¹. In summary, it seems that while webometrics has
drawn freely upon theory from other fields its own theories have tended to be in-
ternally generated in order to fill gaps that existing theories have not needed to
address.
1 This is because commercial search engines now try to avoid returning too many matches from
a single website, reducing the importance of the problem that the alternative model concept was
introduced to solve.
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4 The Birth of Altmetrics
Although not originally at the heart of webometrics, counts of various forms of
web citations to individual academic publications began to dominate webometric
research, starting with a seminal paper on web citation counting that used com-
mercial search engine queries to identify and count web pages citing academic
articles (Vaughan& Shaw, 2003). Although initially targeted at whole journals (by
aggregating citation counts to individual articles), web citation countingwas later
applied to evaluate individual articles in many different ways, providing broader
evidence of the impact of academic articles than that obtainable from scholarly
citations alone (e.g., Kousha, Thelwall, & Rezaie, 2010).
Despite the empirical success of web citation counting in webometrics, it re-
quires significant human labour to identify citations on a large scale. It also be-
came expensive to do this as commercial search engines withdrew permission for
researchers to run large-scale free web searching. Altmetrics was conceived, or at
least launched, by a few people that identified a new source of data for individual
article webometrics: the social web—complete with, in many cases, free, large-
scale, automated web access.
In contrast to the home birth of webometrics, emerging from several differ-
ent similar articles published around the world in an apparently uncoordinated
fashion, altmetrics was bornwide awake and screamingwith its ownwebsite pro-
claiming an apparently carefully thought-out andwell-articulatedmanifesto of its
potentials and aims (Priem, Taraborelli, Groth, & Neylon, 2010) (see also, Moed,
this volume, for an extract). It recognized that parts of the social web, such as
Twitter and the reference sharing siteMendeley, were practical and useful sources
of article-level metrics. They were practical because they had free Applications
Programming Interfaces (APIs) that allowed the automatic large-scale harvest-
ing of citation-like information (e.g., counts of “readers” in Mendeley and counts
of tweets with links to articles in Twitter). They were useful because they could
provide both broader evidence of impact (like webometrics) and earlier evidence
of impact than hyperlinks or citations, broadly speaking, since articles could be
“read” ormentioned in the social web shortly after publication, whereas citations
fromscholarly publications take years to accumulate as evidence of impact. Taken
together, this meant that altmetrics had the potential to be used by publishers to
help guide readers to themost important recently published articles, which never
seemed be a realistic goal for webometrics. This idea has greatly enhanced the
value of altmetrics by making it potentially relevant to all scientists, rather than
just to science evaluators. This importance has been reflected in the publicity that
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altmetrics has generated (Cronin, 2013), which already far exceeds that of webo-
metrics.
5 Altmetric Theories
Unlike webometrics, altmetrics has not produced any clearly named theories
(Priem, 2014) but was born with theoretical analyses of its possibilities, as dis-
cussed above. In addition, almost all empirical altmetric studies have drawnupon
theoretical analyses from scientometrics in order to justify correlating citations
with altmetrics (or using other statistical tests of association) as a first step to-
wards assessing whether the latter have value (Bornmann & Leydesdorff, 2013;
Costas, Zahedi, & Wouters, 2014; Eysenbach, 2011; Shema, Bar-Ilan, & Thelwall,
2014; Li, Thelwall & Giustini, 2012; Thelwall, Haustein, Larivière, & Sugimoto,
2013; Waltman & Costas, 2014; Zahedi, Costas, & Wouters, 2014). This approach
relies upon the dual beliefs that citation counts have some value and that a
statistical relationship with them is partial evidence of a related value. At the
very minimum, such a relationship shows that altmetrics are not completely
random. Moreover, the stronger the relationship, the closer the connection be-
tween citations andmetrics, and themore likely they are to reflect similar aspects
of the impact of articles (Sud & Thelwall, 2014). Most studies covering multiple
fields have also drawnupon a range of other types of theoretical knowledge that is
commonwithin scientometrics, such as the importance of disciplinary differences
and the likelihood that indicators vary between fields in utility andmeaning (e.g.,
Kousha & Thelwall, in press; Mohammadi & Thelwall, 2014).
Another strand of altmetric research is descriptive but could be used to build
future theories. This strand involves analyses of the sources and content of altmet-
ric data in order to understand more about what is created and by whom (Priem,
2014), or detailed analyses of individual groups of users (e.g., Haustein, Bowman,
Holmberg, Peters, & Larivière, 2014). Such informationwould presumably be nec-
essary for any future altmetric theory. Content analyses have also been popular in
webometric studies (e.g., Holmberg, 2010) but there do not seem to have been
substantial investigations into the creators of the webpages involved.
An important theoretical contribution to altmetrics was an analysis of the
purposes for which a range of existing websites delivering altmetric data could
be used (Wouters & Costas, 2012). This argued that the existing websites did not
give high enough quality data to be used for “control” purposes, such as for eval-
uations of researchers, but that they could be used by individual researchers for
self-evaluation purposes (or “narcissism”, butwithout a pejorative overtone), and
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for “users” in the sense of those using altmetrics to help them to discover impor-
tant articles. This theoretical perspective seems to be particularly helpful for those
seeking to argue that altmetrics can have value in some contexts but should not
be used in evaluations without extreme care being taken to guard against abuse.
Finally, although altmetrics is still controversial and is perhaps not yet fully
established as providing clear value to publishers and scientists, it ismaking good
progress (Adie & Roe, 2013) and the expertise of its careful delivery to the world in
the well-constructed hospital of altmetrics.org attests to the safety of web metrics
research in the hands of the next generation of information scientists.
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Lutz Bornmann
Scientific Revolution in Scientometrics:
The Broadening of Impact from Citation
to Societal
1 Introduction
In recent decades, scientometrics has developed into a distinct research fieldwith
its own journals, conferences, academic chairs, and prizes. In this research field,
a widely accepted taxonomy has been established for the investigation of partic-
ular research questions by the use of publication and citation data. Taxonomy is
understood here to mean a widely accepted framework for the community of sci-
entometricians to pursue research and application (Wray, 2011). Following Kuhn
(1962), we can regard scientometrics of recent decades as a normal science in a
field of research, in which refinements, revisions, and extensions may take place,
but without fundamental alterations of the taxonomy. Thus, for example, scien-
tometrics regularly applies indicators in the evaluation of research which are nor-
malized for subject category and publication year (Bornmann &Marx, 2013). Dis-
cussion is taking place in scientometrics about, inter alia, whether the “rate of
averages” or the “averaging of rates” (Gingras & Larivière, 2011) should be cal-
culated, or whether percentiles should be used instead of mean citation rates
(Leydesdorff, Bornmann, Mutz, & Opthof, 2011); but hardly a scientometrician
would dispute that a field and time normalization of citation impact is necessary
(Cronin & Sugimoto, 2014).
Scientific revolutions, in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1962), can be charac-
terised as taxonomic changes in a research field. An example of a taxonomic
change is the Copernican revolution (further examples of revolutionary changes
can be found in Wray, 2011): Whereas Ptolemaic astronomers did not consider
the earth to be a planet, Copernican astronomers did. According to Kuhn (1962),
when competing taxonomies do not categorize phenomena in the same way and
the meanings of key terms are incompatible, a revolution in the field replaces one
taxonomy with another (Wray, 2011). Recently, Bornmann (2014) claimed that
scientometrics is now in a phase of a change of taxonomy and thus a revolution.
The most important key term in scientometrics is “scientific impact”, which is
typically measured by citations in literature databases (such as Web of Science,
Thomson Reuters, or Scopus, Elsevier). In recent years, however, the operational-
348 | Lutz Bornmann
ization of impact haswidened and is interpreted not only in the context of science,
but in all areas of society.
This chapter expands on Bornmann’s (2014) assertions regarding taxonomy
change and discusses its effect on the measurement of, and theory construction
around, scientific impact. Parallel to this epistemological view there is a second
dimension, the psychological or sociological view (Kvasz, 2014), which is not
the object of this chapter. Rather, the chapter follows the argumentation of Wray
(2011) and treats scientific revolutions as taxonomic changes.
2 Measuring of Societal Impact
Historically, the measurement of scientific impact revolved exclusively around
the impact of research on academia and scientific knowledge—it concerned the
impact of science on science. It was assumed that society could best profit from
science which was pursued at the highest level. Since the end of the 1990s, the re-
lationship between science and societal value has been challenged. Sciencemust
now prove its worth: “Research that is highly cited or published in top journals
may be good for the academic discipline but not for society” (Nightingale & Scott,
2007, p. 547). Impact is increasingly understood in a broader sense which implies
not only scientific but also many other kinds of impact. This alters the meaning
of the key term “scientific impact,” which no longer relates only to a section of
society (science) but to almost all areas. The scope of research evaluations then
broadens (Hanney, Packwood, & Buxton, 2000; van der Meulen & Rip, 2000), as
societal use (i.e., societal references) and societal benefits (i.e., changes in soci-
ety) of research come into scope (Mostert, Ellenbroek, Meijer, van Ark, & Klasen,
2010).
The measurement of societal impact (especially use, but also changes) gen-
erally involves the measurement of (1) social, (2) cultural, (3) environmental, and
(4) economic returns (impact and effects) from results or products of publicly
funded research (Donovan, 2011; European Commission, 2010; Lähteenmäki-
Smith,Hyytinen, Kutinlahti, &Konttinen, 2006). In this chapter, (1) social benefits
refers to the contribution of research to the social capital of a nation (e.g., stim-
ulating new approaches to social issues, informed public debate and improved
policy-making); (2) cultural benefits are contributions to the cultural capital of
a nation (e.g., understanding how we relate to other societies and cultures, con-
tributing to cultural preservation and enrichment); (3) environmental benefits
contribute to the natural capital of a nation (e.g., reduced waste and pollution,
uptake of recycling techniques); and (4) economic benefits signify contributions
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to the economic capital of a nation (e.g., enhancing the skills base, improved
productivity) (RQF development advisory group, 2006).
3 Incommensurabilities of Key Terms
Wray (2011) calls changes in the meaning of key terms—such as the change
of impact measurement—“meaning-incommensurabilities” (p. 71) between two
different taxonomies. In scientometrics, change of meaning of key terms nat-
urally leads to changes in the practice of impact measurement: There will be
differences in the methodology of the measurement, which Wray (2011) calls
topic-incommensurability. Scientometricians in the 1990swould have relied upon
citations tomeasure science. However, citations cannot be used tomeasure scien-
tific impact in all areas of society. Contemporary scientometricians will therefore
have to increasingly concern themselves with different kinds of societal impact
measurement. In this measurement, an important role will be played by new
tools (besides other options of impact measurements), which are often subsumed
under the heading “altmetrics” (Priem, 2014):
Activities outside classic publication channels such as scientific journals are rarely consid-
ered in official evaluations of scientists’ impact and scope. Yet, with the growing importance
of using the Internet in scientific communication, there is a need for discussing combina-
tions of scientometric and webometric indicators. So far, the most notable effort to promote
and discuss alternative scientometric indicators for Web environments has been the altmet-
rics initiative.
(Weller & Peters, 2012, p. 210)
Data providers, such as ImpactStory¹ or Altmetric², claim tomeasure the impact of
scientific papers beyond the area of science (Wouters & Costas, 2012). Altmetrics
has already been included in the Snowball Metrics Recipe Book (Colledge, 2014).
Snowball Metrics, which is owned by several research-intensive universities
around the globe, is a list ofmetrics fromwhich a selection can bemade to analyse
institutional strengths and weaknesses (see http://www.snowballmetrics.com/).
A current overview of the data which are used by this and other providers (e.g.,
tweets) can be found in Costas, Zahedi, and Wouters (2014). Torres-Salinas,
Cabezas-Clavijo, and Jimenez-Contreras (2013) have categorized altmetric data as
follows: (1) social bookmarking anddigital libraries (e.g.,Mendeley), (2)mentions
1 http://impactstory.org/
2 http://www.altmetric.com/
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in social networks (e.g., Twitter and ResearchGate), (3) mentions in blogs (e.g.,
Wordpress and Nature Blogs), (4) mentions in encyclopedias (e.g., Wikipedia),
and (5) mentions in new promotion systems (e.g., Faculty of 1000). As the classi-
fications of ImpactStory in Table 1 show, the different altmetrics can be divided
into scholarly and public metrics.
Tab. 1: Altmetrics classification of ImpactStory (ImpactStory, 2014).
Scholars Public
Recommended Citations by editorials, F1000 Press article
Cited Citations, full-text mentions Wikipedia mentions
Saved CiteULike, Mendeley Delicious
Discussed Science blogs, journal comments Blogs, Twitter, Facebook
Viewed PDF downloads HTML downloads
In order to improve the flow of information from science into society (which could
then be measured by altmetrics), the output of science should be widened. For
example, Bornmann and Marx (2014) propose that scientists write so-called as-
sessment reports summarizing the state of research on a particular topic. Such a
summary should be expressed in appropriately general terms so as to be compre-
hensible to people outside the specialist area or science in general. These assess-
ment reports could be regarded as belonging to the secondary scientific literature,
which was previously fed by review journals, monographs, handbooks, and text-
books (the primary literature consists of the publications of the original research
literature) (Ziman, 2000). As the proposal of Bornmann and Marx (2014) shows,
the alteration of the key term “impact” will likely lead to an alteration of the key
term scientific “output” or “productivity”. Productivitywon’t only bemeasured by
number of publications or external funds received, but by products (e.g., assess-
ment reports or training for lay people) producing impact outside the sciences.
There are a number of studies available which have investigated the use of
metrics for societal impact measurement (e.g., Bornmann, 2012, 2013). In 2005,
Godin and Dore (2005) saw the general state of research into the possibilities of
societal impactmeasurement at the stagewhere themeasurement of research and
development (R&D) was in the early 1960s. There has been, in recent years, an in-
creasing emphasis on the assessment of societal impact, particularly in health
and medical fields (Hanney et al., 2000; Holbrook & Frodeman, 2010). For ex-
ample, a special issue of Research Evaluation was published with a collection of
papers presented on aworkshopon ‘State of theArt inAssessingResearch Impact’
(Donovan, 2011). However, notions of societal impact remain ambiguous and con-
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tentious. Research into scientometrics should now—after a revolutionary phase
with alterations in key terms—come into a phase of normal science in which es-
tablished methods for societal impact measurement are developed, which can be
generally applied and continuously developed further in the community.
Even more than with the measurement of impact on science, the measure-
ment of societal impact urgently demands research effort from scientometricians.
Societal impact is significantly more difficult to measure than impact on science.
There may be no indicators corresponding to citation counts in the area of scien-
tific impact measurement which can be applied across subjects and institutions
andmadeeasily accessible indatabase format (Martin, 2011). In addition, the soci-
etal impact of research is often revealed aftermany years, and it is difficult inmany
cases to establish a causal connection between a particular piece of research and
a particular effect.
4 Theories of Citations
What significance does the change in the meaning of the key term “scientific im-
pact” have on theory construction in scientometrics?
Two competing theories of citing behavior have been developed, both of them
situated within broader social theories of science. One is often denoted as (1) the
normative theory of citing behavior, and the other as (2) the social constructivist
view of citing behaviour (see Small, this volume, for extensive treatment of these
theories; see Haustein, Bowman, and Costas for the application of these theories
to altmetrics).
Thenormative theory, followingMerton’s (1973) sociological theory of science,
states that scientists give credit to colleagues whose work they use by citing that
work. Thus, citations represent intellectual or cognitive influence on scientific
work. Merton (1988) expressed this aspect as follows:
The reference serves both instrumental and symbolic functions in the transmission and en-
largement of knowledge. Instrumentally, it tells us of work we may not have known before,
some of which may hold further interest for us; symbolically, it registers in the enduring
archives the intellectual property of the acknowledged source by providing a pellet of peer
recognition of the knowledge claim, accepted or expressly rejected, that was made in that
source.
(p. 622, see also Merton, 1957; Merton, 1968)
According to Small (1978, 1982), the cognitive symbol, or the content concept, that
links citing scientists to a particular work can be studied through content analy-
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sis of the citation context. Over a set of citing documents, the percent uniformity
(the degree to which citing scientists demonstrate consensus on the nature of the
cited concept) can be calculated to identify the ideas symbolized by the citedwork
(Cronin, 1984).
If wewere to regard themeasurement of societal impact from the point of view
of normative theory, then mentions in social media would mean societal credit
for the scientists and papers named. These mentions demonstrate that a scientist
was successful in producing results which are relevant to society and are thus
transferred as reliable knowledge from research into society. Assessment reports
written by scientists for lay people would facilitate the uptake of this knowledge.
The problem with the measurement of societal impact with altmetrics is that it is
not clear what the individual altmetrics actually measure. The symbolic meaning
of a piece of research can vary significantly (Cronin & Sugimoto, 2014): A pa-
per can appear on a private Facebook page in one context or in an important
government publication in another context. With citations in papers there are
also differences in the significance of citations—citations with or without content-
related discussions of a paper (Bornmann & Daniel, 2008)—but the differences
could be exacerbated with altmetrics. It seems particularly important within the
realm of altmetrics to determine the cognitive symbol (or symbols) of a publica-
tion beyond its beingnamed in various contexts, in order to determine its value for
society (or for various parts of society). The measurement of impact which does
not consist solely of a count of mentions, but also involves a content analysis of
the mentions, seems to be significantly more important in the use of altmetrics
than with the use of citations in scientific papers: What is the actual value of a
piece of research for the various subgroups of society?
The social constructivist view on citing behaviour is grounded in the construc-
tivist sociology of science (see, e.g., Collins, 2004; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour &
Woolgar, 1979). This view casts doubt on the assumptions of normative theory
and questions the validity of evaluative citation analysis. Constructivists argue
that the cognitive content of papers has little influence on how they are received.
Scientific knowledge is socially constructed through themanipulation of political
and financial resources and the use of rhetorical devices (Knorr-Cetina, 1991).
For this reason, citations cannot be satisfactorily described uni-dimensionally
through the intellectual content of the paper. Scientists have complex citing mo-
tives that are variously socially constructed. The varying motivations for citing
have long been acknowledged in the field. In the 1960s, Garfield (1962)—the
Founder and Chairman Emeritus of the Institute for Scientific Information (now
Thomson Reuters)—listed fifteen possible motivations for citing (p. 85):
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1. Paying homage to pioneers;
2. Giving credit for related work (homage to peers);
3. Identifying methodology, equipment, etc.;
4. Providing background reading;
5. Correcting one’s own work;
6. Correcting the work of others;
7. Criticizing previous work;
8. Substantiating claims;
9. Alerting to forthcoming work;
10. Providing leads to poorly disseminated, poorly indexed, or uncited work;
11. Authenticating data and classes of fact (physical constants, etc.);
12. Identifying original publications in which an idea or concept was discussed;
13. Identifying original publication or other work describing an eponymic con-
cept or term (…);
14. Disclaiming work or ideas of others (negative claims);
15. Disputing priority claims of others (negative homage).
Taylor (2013) considers all these motivations as relevant to mentions of papers
in social media in 2013 as they were to mentions of papers in papers in 1962. To
this list, Taylor (2013) added the following six motivations which are especially
relevant for mentions of papers in social media (p. 20):
16. Building a network of related researchers;
17. Building a reputation as a good networker;
18. Paying visible homage to a senior researcher;
19. Seeking the attention of a senior researcher;
20. Demonstrating that one’s reading is up to date;
21. Intimidating critics with the breadth of one’s reading.
Withmentions of research in socialmedia, aswith references in scientific publica-
tions, we can assume that it is not only the intellectual content of the paper which
has an influence—in this area too there will be complex motives for mentioning a
particular piece of research.
Bornmann (2015b) argues that the existence of a couple of motives for citing
should be interpreted in the context of the normative theory. The social construc-
tivist view cannot only be reduced to the existence of these motives—this view is
more complex and radical. According to Merton’s (1938) theory of deviant behav-
ior scientists do not follow norms of citing (i.e., scientists cite when they were
influenced by important publications) and have other motives, for example, if
metrics are over-stressed in research assessments.
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Using impact measurement based on social media data, there will be great
danger of manipulation in the measurement of societal impact. The more impor-
tant thesemeasurementswill be in future, the greater the danger ofmanipulation.
According to the NISO Alternative Assessment Metrics Project (2014), “one impor-
tant aspect of data quality is the potential for gaming metrics, e.g., behavior that
is meant to unfairly manipulate those metrics, generally for one’s benefit. Many
alternative assessment metrics are more prone to gaming compared to traditional
citations” (p. 9). Citation impact measurement may be influenced to some extent
by manipulative factors (for example by excessive self-citation); but with soci-
etal impact measurement, deliberate manipulation can occur much more simply
and more effectively: “It is well-known that mentions on the Internet or in other
electronic communicationmedia are very sensitive tomanipulations: just ask any
businessman how tomanipulate large crowds on a public forum” (Rousseau&Ye,
2013, p. 3289).
According to Greenhow and Gleason (2014), “social media practices can em-
body social constructivist values of knowledge as decentralized, accessible and
co-constructed among a broad base of users; ‘knowledge’ may become ‘collective
agreement’ that ‘combines facts with other dimensions of human experience’
(i.e., opinions, values)” (p. 394). Studies on social media practices indicate that
scholarly blogging is used to construct a “personal thinking space” in which
ideas are developed, disseminated, and discussed with colleagues (Kjellberg,
2010). Thus, blogging is a kind of “knowledge construction in the context of
being a researcher” (Kjellberg, 2010, para. 7). Bloggers create a certain image of
themselves which can be called their online identity. An interviewee of Kjellberg
(2010) expresses this point as follows: “It is like all writing, you develop yourself
by writing” (para. 52). Whereas the results of Kjellberg (2010) might be also true
for micro-blogging (using, e.g., Twitter), it can be questionedwhether it is true for
other social media platforms. Saving a paper on Mendeley or posting it on Face-
book seems to be a more technical process than a process of self-construction.
5 Summary
This chapter presents and further develops Bornmann’s (2014) assertion that sci-
entometrics is now in a state of scientific revolution. This statement is justified by
there being (or havingbeen) a change in the taxonomyof scientometrics. Impact is
no longer understood as impact on science (which can bemeasured by citations),
but as impact on society. Alterations in impact measurements will also lead to al-
terations in the deliveredproducts of science. As notedbyKurtz andBollen (2010):
Scientific Revolutions in Science | 355
…bibliometrics is undergoing a renaissance; novel types of data are being combined with
powerful newmathematical techniques to create a substantial change. The new techniques
are being developed across awide range of scholarly disciplines, from evolutionary genetics
to theoretical physics. Central to the new bibliometrics is the study of usage and usage pat-
terns. Collections of article level usage event records have existed for only about a decade
and their applications are not yet at the level of commonplace acceptance that was long ago
reached by article counts and citations.
(p. 51)
There have been many developments in scientometrics in recent years—besides
the changes in the key term—which have received much attention. The develop-
ment of the h-index (Hirsch, 2005) can be interpreted as a high profile event in
scientometrics (Bornmann & Daniel, 2007). The introduction of this indicator led
to an enormous amount of research (e.g., Cronin & Meho, 2006); yet, as distinct
from the change of the key term “impact”, the introduction of the h-index was not
associated with a basic taxonomic change in scientometrics. The h-index merely
combined two things that were previously treated separately (output und citation
impact). According to Wray (2011), changes in techniques and practices can be
significant contributions to a field, but we need not treat all these changes as rev-
olutionary.
Contemporary scientometricians are facing the question of how to conceptu-
alize and oeprationalize “societal impact” (Bornmann, 2012, 2013; Bornmann &
Marx, 2014; Grant, Brutscher, Kirk, Butler, &Wooding, 2009). Scientometrics now
needs a phase of “normal science”, to arrive, after years of research, at a similarly
set of advancedmethods for themeasurement of societal impact as now exists for
the measurement of impact on science. At the moment, the case study approach
is regarded favorably in the measurement of societal impact. However, this re-
sults in a lack of generalizability and comparability. Altmetrics offer large volumes
of attractive data for societal impact measurement; however, it is not yet clear
what the individual metrics are measuring. Most of the studies which have empir-
ically investigated altmetrics focus on correlations between citations and altmet-
rics (Bornmann, 2015a; Costas, et al., 2014; Torres-Salinas, et al., 2013). The result-
ing small to medium correlation coefficients provide evidence that both metrics
are not completely independent, but measuremore or less different dimensions—
depending on the kind of altmetrics studied (see, e.g., Haustein, Peters, Sugimoto,
Thelwall, & Larivière, 2014). Scientometric research should work on evaluating
these novel data to enable the determination of the concept symbol of a piece of
research for society. Since a large volume of altmetrics data covering various ar-
eas is available from a range of data sources, it should be possible to determine
validly and reliably the contribution of a piece of research for the various subunits
of society.
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Until scientometric research has developed robust and reliable methods for
societal impact measurements in a phase of normal science, it certainly makes
sense initially to have the societal relevance of research qualitatively assessed
with the help of expert panels: “Just as peer review can be useful in assessing
the quality of academic work in an academic context, expert panels with relevant
experience in different areas of potential impact can be useful in assessing the
difference that research has made” (Rymer, 2011, p. 12).
In a phase of normal science in scientometric research, not only robust and
reliable methods for societal impact measurements should be developed, but
the connection between these measurements and sociological theories, theories
of informetrics, and theories of scholarly communication should be extensively
studied.
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Henk F. Moed
Altmetrics as Traces of the Computerization
of the Research Process
1 Introduction
In the Altmetrics Manifesto published on the Web in October 2010, the concept of
“Altmetrics” is introduced as follows:
In growing numbers, scholars are moving their everyday work to the web. Online reference
managers Zotero and Mendeley each claim to store over 40 million articles (making them
substantially larger than PubMed); asmany as a third of scholars are on Twitter, and a grow-
ing number tend scholarly blogs. These new forms reflect and transmit scholarly impact:
that dog-eared (but uncited) article that used to live on a shelf now lives in Mendeley, Ci-
teULike, or Zotero–where we can see and count it. That hallway conversation about a recent
finding has moved to blogs and social networks–now, we can listen in. The local genomics
dataset has moved to an online repository–now, we can track it. This diverse group of ac-
tivities forms a composite trace of impact far richer than any available before. We call the
elements of this trace altmetrics.
(Priem et al., 2010)
Online reference managers, social networking tools, scholarly blogs, and online
repositories are highlighted as technological inventions, and their use by the sci-
entific community or even the wider public leaves traces of impact of scientific
activity.
A leading commercial provider of such data, Altmetric.com, distinguishes
four types of altmetric data sources (Altmetric.com, 2014):
– Social media such as Twitter and Facebook, covering social activity;
– Reference managers or reader libraries such as Mendeley or ResearchGate
covering scholarly activity;
– Various forms of scholarly blogs reflecting scholarly commentary;
– Mass media coverage, for instance, daily newspapers or news broadcasting
services, informing the general public.
This paper is based on a keynote lecture presented by the author at Altmetrics’14, Indiana Uni-
versity, Bloomington, USA, 23 June 2014.
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I distinguish three drivers of development of the field of altmetrics.¹ Firstly, in
the policy or political domain, there is an increasing awareness of the multi-
dimensionality of research performance, and an increasing emphasis on societal
merit, an overview of which can be found in Moed and Halevi (2015a) (see also
Bornmann, this volume). A typical example of this awareness is the ACUMEN
project (Academic Careers Understood throughMeasurement and Norms) funded
by the European Commission, aimed at “studying and proposing alternative
and broader ways of measuring the productivity and performance of individual
researchers” (Bar-Ilan, 2014). The reader is referred to Bar-Ilan (2014) for an
overview of this project and the role of altmetrics therein.
In the domain of technology, a second driver is the development of informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICTs), especially websites and software in
order to support and foster social interaction. The technological inventions men-
tioned in the Altmetrics Manifesto are typical examples of this development. It
seems appropriate to link the Altmetrics manifesto to the notion of a “computer-
ization movement”. Elliot and Kraemer (2009) define a computerization moment
as “…a type of movement that focuses on computer-based systems as the core
technologies which their advocates claim will be instruments to bring about a
new social order. These advocates of computerization movements spread their
message through public discourse in various segments of society such as ven-
dors, media, academics, visionaries, and professional societies” (p. 3). A further
positioning of the Altmetrics ideas as a computerization movement falls outside
the scope of this chapter, even though there is a vast amount of literature on
computerization movements, of which Elliot and Kraemer give an overview. I am
inclined to conceive the Altmetrics Manifesto as a proclamation of a computeri-
zation movement, but a very special one, appealing to basic ideals of science and
scholarship. What is important in this chapter is to characterize the type of ideals
that inspires the altmetrics movement. I believe they can best be associated with
a third driver, primarily emerging from the scientific community itself, namely the
Open Science movement. Open Science is conceived as:
The movement to make scientific research, data and dissemination accessible to all levels
of an inquiring society, amateur or professional. It encompasses practices such as publish-
ing open research, campaigning for open access, encouraging scientists to practice open
notebook science, and generally making it easier to publish and communicate scientific
knowledge.
(“Open Science”, n.d.)
1 Practitioners increasingly use the new term “alternative metrics” rather than “altmetrics”. In
this contribution I use the original term.
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The increasing importance of altmetrics is also reflected in the foundation of the
NISO Altmetrics Standards Project. The National Information Standards Organi-
zation (NISO) is a United States non-profit organization that develops, maintains
and publishes technical standards related to publishing, bibliographic, and li-
brary applications. Funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, NISO established a
project to identify standards and/or best practices related to altmetrics, as an im-
portant step towards the development and adoption of new assessment metrics.
The NISO Project Group published a White Paper in June 2014 (NISO, 2014).²
In the NISO Project mentioned above and also in sessions of scientific confer-
ences, altmetrics is increasingly linked to—and often limited to—social media ref-
erences, and to research performance assessment. Empirical studies of altmetrics
have focused nearly exclusively on these as well. In the following section, I will
propose a much broader, multi-dimensional conception of altmetrics, namely as
traces of the computerization of the research process. “Computerization” should be
conceived in its broadest sense, including all recent developments in ICT and soft-
ware, taking place in society as a whole. I distinguish four aspects of the research
process: the collection of research data and development of research methods;
scientific information processing; communication and organization; and, last but
not least, research assessment. I will argue that in each aspect, computerization
plays a key role, and metrics are being developed to describe this process. I pro-
pose to label the total collection of such metrics as “Altmetrics”. I then provide
a theoretical foundation of altmetrics, based on notions developed by Michael
Nielsen in his monograph Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Sci-
ence (Nielsen, 2011).
To the extent that altmetrics are used as research assessment tools, I under-
line a series of basic theoretical distinctions, which are not only valid in the case
of “classical” metrics such as those based on citation analysis, but also, and, per-
haps, even more so, in the case of new metrics such as those based on social
media references or electronic document usage patterns. These are as follows:
the distinctionbetween scientific-scholarly and societal impact; scientific opinion
and scientific fact; peer reviewed versus non-peer reviewed manuscripts; imme-
diate and delayed response or impact; intended and unintended consequences of
particular behaviors; and, lastly, a distinction between the various domains of sci-
ence and scholarship, for instance, between natural, technical, formal, biological
and medical, social sciences, and humanities.
2 A project headed by Vincent Larivière, Stefanie Haustein, and Cassidy Sugimoto is being cur-
rently funded by the Sloan foundation, to investigate the meanings and motivations of social
media metrics. In a way, this activity is a follow-up to the NISO project (Sugimoto, 2014).
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I conclude that altmetrics can provide tools not only to reflect this process
passively, but, even more so, to design, monitor, improve, and actively facilitate
it. From this perspective, altmetrics can be conceived as tools for the practical re-
alization of the ethos of science and scholarship in a computerized or digital age.
2 The Computerization of the Research Process
I distinguish four aspects of the research process. In this section, I briefly explain
these aspects by giving typical outcomesofmetrics-based studies of these aspects.
The purpose of these examples is to illustrate an aspect, rather than give a de-
tailed account of it. Firstly, at the level of the everyday research practice, there is
the collection of research data and the development of research methods.A “classi-
cal” citation analysis in Scopus of articles published during 2002–2012 and cited
up until March 2014, generated per discipline a list of the most frequently cited
articles. A subject classification of journals was used to classify these into 26 re-
search disciplines. It was found that in many disciplines, computing-related arti-
cles are the most heavily cited (Halevi, 2014). Table 1 presents nine such articles.
The term “computing-related” is used in a broad sense. Most articles describe
software packages for data analysis, digital imaging, and simulation techniques.
Interestingly, the most frequently cited article in social sciences is about user ac-
ceptance of information technology.
The second aspect relates to scientific information processing. There is a long
history of research in the field of information science on information seeking be-
havior; since this behavior occurs increasingly online, a digital trace of it can be
readily identified. A topic of rapidly increasing importance is the study of search-
ing, browsing, and reading behavior of researchers, based on an analysis of the
electronic log files recording the usage of publication archives such as Elsevier’s
ScienceDirect or an Open Access archive such as arxiv.org. Comparison of cita-
tion counts and full text downloads of research articles may provide more insight
both into citation practices and in usage behavior (Kurtz et al., 2005; Kurtz &
Bollen, 2010; Gorraiz, Gumpenberger, & Schlögl, 2013; Guerrero-Bote & Moya-
Anegón, 2014). Table 2 summarizes themain sources of differences between these
two types of counts (Moed & Halevi, 2015b). Usage and citation leaks, bulk down-
loading, differences between reader and author populations in a subject field,
the type of document or its content, differences in obsolescence patterns between
downloads and citations, and different functions of reading and citing in the re-
search process, all provide possible explanations of differences between down-
load and citation distributions.
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Tab. 1: Computer science-related top cited articles in Scopus.
# Cites Discipline Article Title
17 171 Agr & Biol Sci, Mol Biol; Medicine MEGA4: Molecular Evolutionary Genet-
ics Analysis (MEGA) software version 4.0
(2007)
4 335 Social sciences; business, managemt User acceptance of information technology:
Toward a unified view (2003)
5 325 Chemistry UCSF Chimera – A visualization system for
exploratory research and analysis (2004)
15 191 Computer Sci; Eng Distinctive image features from scale-
invariant keypoints (2004)
1 335 Energy Geant4 developments and applications
(2006) [software for simulating passage of
particles through matter]
7 784 Engineering; Math A fast and elitist multi-objective genetic
algorithm: NSGA-II (2002)
4 026 Environm Sci GENALEX 6: Genetic analysis in Excel. Popu-
lation genetic software … (2006)
4 404 Materials Science The SIESTA method for ab initio order-N
materials simulation (2002)
10 921 Physics & Astron Coot: Model-building tools for molecular
graphics (2004)
Tab. 2: Ten important factors differentiating between downloads and citations.
1 Usage leak: Not all downloads may be recorded.
2 Citation leak: Not all citations may be recorded.
3 Downloading the full text of a document does not mean that it is read.
4 The user (reader) and the author (citer) population may not coincide.
5 Distribution # downloads less skewed than that of # cites, and depends upon the type
of document differently.
6 Downloads and citations show different obsolescence functions.
7 Downloads and citations measure distinct concepts.
8 Downloads and citations may influence one another in multiple ways.
9 Download counts are more sensitive to manipulation.
10 Citations are public, usage is private.
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Communication and organization is a third group of aspects. These two elements
are distinct, from an altmetric point of view, to the extent that the first takes place
via blogs, Twitter, and similar social media, whereas the second occurs for in-
stance in scholarly tools as Mendely or Zotero. In this paper, the two aspects will
be discussed jointly. The analysis of the use of online tools such as social media,
reference managers, and scientific blogs perhaps constitutes the core of studies
of the computerization in this domain. Many altmetric studies cover this aspect.
In a recent special altmetrics issue of the journal Research Trends, Thelwall gives
an historical overview of the study of social web services using altmetrics, focus-
ing on Mendeley and Twitter (Thelwall, 2014). He underlines the need to further
validate altmetrics, by investigating the degree at which they correlate with—or
predict—citation counts and other traditionalmeasures. In the same issue, Shema
presents an additional, and state of the art, altmetric data source: scholarly blogs
(Shema, 2014). The studies focusing on this aspect aim to deepen our understand-
ing of the ways in which researchers communicate and organize themselves, and
how the new technologies not only influence communication and organization,
but also how they could improve these processes.
The use of altmetrics—or metrics in general—in research assessment is a
fourth aspect of the computerization of the research process. Mentions of authors
and their publications in social media like twitter, in scholarly blogs and in refer-
ence managers form the basis of the exploration of new impact measures. In his
historical overview, Thelwall concludes that “altmetrics [also] have the potential
to be used for impact indicators for individual researchers based upon their web
presences, although this information should not be used as a primary source of
impact information since the extent to which academics possess or exploit social
web profiles is variable” and that, “more widely, however, altmetrics should not
be used to help evaluate academics for anything important because of the ease
with which they can be manipulated” (Thelwall, 2014).
Moed andHalevi (2015a) underline that indicators that are appropriate in one
context may be invalid or useless in another. The decision as to which indica-
tors should be used in a particular assessment depends upon (a) what units have
to be assessed; (b) which aspect of research performance is being assessed; and
(c)what constitutes the overall objective of the assessment. The authors introduce
the notion of a “meta-analysis” of the units under assessment, in which metrics
are not used as tools to evaluate individual units, but rather to reach policy in-
ferences regarding the objectives and general set-up of an assessment process.
For instance, publication counts and average journal impact factors of a group’s
publications are hardly useful in a relative assessment of research active groups
with a strong participation in international networks, but they may be very use-
ful in a context in which there is solid evidence that a substantial number of
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groups is hardly research active or publishingmainly innational journals (Moed&
Halevi, 2015a).
3 A Theoretical Foundation: Michael Nielsen’s
“Reinventing Discovery”
Fully capturing the notion of the ethos of science and scholarship and tracing
back its history requires a full essay, the presentation of which reaches far beyond
the scope of the current chapter and also exceeds the competency of its author.
Perhaps it is appropriate to refer to Francis Bacon and his proposal “for an uni-
versal reform of knowledge into scientific methodology and the improvement of
mankind’s state using the scientific method” (“Francis Bacon”, n.d.).
It must be noted that Bacon is generally conceived of as the founder of the
positive, empirical sciences. But the ethos I seek to capture does not merely relate
to this type of science, but to science and scholarship in general, including, for
instance, hermeneutic scholarship. In any case, Bacon’s proposal develops two
base notions, namely the notion that science can be used to improve the state of
mankind, and that it is governed by a strict scientific-scholarlymethodology. Both
dimensions, the practical and the theoretical-methodological, are essential in his
idea.
A key contemporary issue is how the ethos of science and scholarship, admit-
tedly outlined so vaguely above, must be realized in the modern, computerized,
or digital age. The state of development of information and communication tech-
nology (ICTs) creates enormous possibilities for the organization of the research
process, aswell as for society as awhole. I believe that it is against this background
that the emergence and potential of altmetrics should be considered.
Michael Nielsen’s (2011) monograph presents a systematic, creative explo-
ration of the actual and potential value of the new ICT for the organization of
the research process. The aim of the remaining part of this section is to summa-
rize some of the main features of this thinking. I believe it provides an adequate
framework in which altmetrics can be positioned and further developed, without
claiming that alternative frameworks are of no value.
In scaffolding his ideas, Nielsen borrows concepts from several disciplines,
and uses them as building blocks or models. A central thesis is that online tools
can and should be used in science to amplify collective intelligence. Collective
intelligence results from an appropriate organization of collaborative projects. In
order to further explain this, he uses the concept of “diversity”, borrowed perhaps
from biology, or its sub-branch, ecology, but in the sense of cognitive diversity, as
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he states: “To amplify cognitive intelligence, we should scale up collaborations,
increasing cognitive diversity and the range of available expertise asmuch as pos-
sible” (Nielsen, 2011, p. 32).
As each participant can give only a limited amount of attention in a collabo-
ration, there are inherent limits to size of the contributions that participants can
make. At this point the genuine challenge of the new online tools comes into the
picture: they should create an “architecture of attention”, and in my view one
of the most intriguing notions in Nielsen’s work, “that directs each participant’s
attention where it is best suited—i.e., where they have maximal competitive ad-
vantage” (Nielsen, 2011, p. 33).
In the ideal case, scientific collaboration will achieve what he terms as “de-
signed serendipity”, so that a problem posed by someone who cannot solve it
finds its way to one with the right micro expertise. Using a concept stemming
from statistical physics, namely, critical mass, he further explains that “conver-
sational critical mass is achieved and the collaboration becomes self-stimulating,
with new ideas constantly being explored” (Nielsen, 2011, p. 33).
One of the ways to optimize the collaboration is by modularizing it. Here
Nielsen adopts the open source software development as a model. Actually, he
speaks of open source collaboration, in which participants work in a modular
way, make small contributions, and have easy reuse of earlier work. And, last but
not least, this type of collaboration uses signaling mechanisms (e.g., scores, or
metrics) to help people to decide where to direct attention.
Also, heuses the concept of “dataweb”, beingdefinedas “a linkedwebof data
that connects all parts of knowledge”, and “an online network intended to be read
bymachines”. He underlines that data driven intelligence is controlled by human
intelligence and amplifies collective intelligence. Nielsen highlights the potential
of the new online tools to stimulate interaction and even collaboration between
professional researchers and the wider public, and the role this public can play
for instance in data collection processes using crowdsourcing techniques.
My proposal is to use Michael Nielsen’s set of creative ideas as a framework
in which altmetrics can be positioned. Their role would not merely be that of
rather passively descriptors, but, actively, or proactively, as tools to establish and
optimize Nielsen’s “architecture of attention”, a configuration that combines the
efforts of researchers and technicians on the one hand, and the wider public and
the policy domain on the other. I will further discuss this issue later in the chap-
ter. In the next section I will highlight a series of distinctions that are crucial when
discussing the potential and limits of altmetrics in the assessment of research per-
formance.
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4 Useful Distinctions
To further explore the potential and limitations of altmetrics, I believe it is useful
to highlight a series of distinctions that are often made in the context of the use
of “classical” metrics and publishing, but that are, in my view, highly relevant in
connection with altmetrics.
First of all, a distinction is that between scientific-scholarly and societal merit
and impact. These two aspects do not coincide. In the previous section, speak-
ing of the ethos of science, two dimensions were highlighted: a practical and a
theoretical-methodological: science potentially improves the state of mankind,
and is governed by strict scientific-scholarly methodology. I defend the position
that thesemethodological rules are essential to the scientific method. These rules
are constitutive for science and scholarship, and discriminate between what is a
justified scientific-scholarly knowledge claim and what is not.
Societal merit of scientific–scholarly research is in my view a legitimate and
valuable aspect, not only in connection with motives and strivings of individual
researchers, but also related to funding and assessment criteria. But it cannot be
assessed in a politically neutralmanner. To be successful, the project proposed by
Bacon and somany others requires a certain distance and independence from the
political domain, andmost of all, a strong, continuous defense of proper method-
ological rules when making knowledge claims and examining their validity.
A next distinction is perhaps evenmore difficult tomake, namely between sci-
entific opinion and scientific fact. In journal publishing,many journals distinguish
between research articles on the onehand, andopinionpieces, discussionpapers,
or editorials on the other. At least in the empirical sciences, the first type ideally
reports on the outcomes of empirical research conducted along validmethodolog-
ical lines and discusses their theoretical implications. The second type is more in-
formal, normally not peer-reviewed, and speculative. The two types have, from an
epistemological point of view, adifferent status. I believe it is crucial to keep this in
mind when exploring the role of altmetric data sources containing scholarly com-
mentaries, such as scientific-scholarly blogs. It is also important to distinguish
between speculations or opinion pieces related to scientific-scholarly issues, and
those primarily connected with political issues. I believe it is in the interest of the
ethos of science to be especially alert to a practice inwhich researchersmakepolit-
ical statements using their authority as scientific-scholarly experts. Suchpractices
should be rigorously unmasked whenever they are detected.
Intended versus unintended consequences of particular behavior is the next
distinction. During the past ten years or so, the general debate on the applica-
tion of “classical” metrics based on publication and citations, especially their
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large-scale use in national research assessment exercises, strongly focused on the
effects that the actual use of such metrics have upon researchers, and on the de-
gree of manipulability of themetrics (a discussion of these systemic effects can be
found in Cronin and Sugimoto’s [2015] compilation). These were among the main
topics of the discussions on the organization of national research assessment ex-
ercises in the United Kingdom and Australia. This debate is equally relevant as
regards the use of altmetrics based on social media. But, as indicated in the previ-
ous section, Thelwall warns that the problem of manipulability is much larger in
case of altmetrics than it is in the application of citation indices (Thelwall, 2014).
Finally, it is also crucial to distinguish the various domains of science and
scholarship—for instance, natural, technical, formal, biological, medical, social
sciences, and humanities. Although such subject classifications suffer from a cer-
tain degree of arbitrariness, it is important to realize that the research process,
including communication practices, reference practices, and orientation towards
social media, may differ significantly between one discipline and another.
In this context one of the limitations of themodelMichael Nielsen proposes in
his monograph Reinventing Discovery should be highlighted: the use of the open
source software development as amodel of collaborationmayfit thedomain of the
formal sciences rather well, but may be less appropriate in many subject fields in
humanities and social sciences. In other passages in his monograph he is aware
that this organizational model may not be appropriate in all domains of science
and scholarship.
5 Concluding Remarks
What then are the main conclusions of this chapter? I propose a broad concep-
tion of altmetrics. Altmetrics is more than measuring attention in social media to
scientific-scholarly artifacts, but should be conceived as metrics of the computer-
ization of the research process in general. I propose the set of ideas developed by
Michael Nielsen as a framework within which altmetrics can be positioned and
further explored. His work represents a thorough, systematic account of the po-
tential of online tools in the research process, and, in this way, articulates the
practical realization of the ethos of science and scholarship in the computerized
or digital age. He shows how the new online tools support open science, the no-
tion that is in my view one of the pillars, perhaps even the most important one, of
the altmetrics manifesto.
Many proponents of altmetricsmay, either as a first impression, or after reflec-
tion, not be happy with my proposal—after all, the demarcation between altmet-
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rics and “classical” metrics is rather vague. Citation indexes are also the product
of the ICT development, be it in an earlier phase than the current one. Moreover,
citation indices are evenused to illustrate the computerization of the researchpro-
cess (for more on the relationship between high quality knowledge organization
systems and informetrics, see Stock, this volume). Therefore, in a sense, classical
metrics are altmetrics as well. Both classical metrics and altmetrics are subjected
to the same danger, namely, that their utility is limited to a few very specific cases,
and both types of metrics do have in principle the same potential.
In the sameway that classical citationmetrics are often uniquely linked to the
use of journal impact factors for assessing individual researchers—althoughmany
other citation-based metrics and methodologies have been developed, applied
to different aggregations and with different purposes—altmetrics runs perhaps
a danger of being too closely linked with the notion of assessing individuals by
counting mentions in Twitter and related social media, a practice that may pro-
vide a richer impression of impact than citation counts do, but that clearly has its
limitations as well (e.g., Cronin, 2014).
Altmetrics and science metrics, or indicators in general, are much more than
that. Apart from the fact that much more sophisticated indicators are available
than journal impact factors or Twitter counts, these indicators do not have a func-
tion merely in the evaluation of research performance of individuals and groups,
but also in the study of the research process. In this way, in terms of a distinction
developed in Geisler (2000), these indicators are used as process indicators rather
than outcomemeasures. Also, like science metrics in general, altmetrics does not
merely provide reflections of the computerization of the research process, but can,
in fact, develop into a set of tools tool to further shape, facilitate, design, and con-
duct this process.
Cited References
Altmetric.com (2014). www.altmetric.com.
Bar-Ilan, J. (2014). Evaluating the individual researcher – adding an altmetric perspective.
Research Trends, 37. Retrieved from http://www.researchtrends.com/issue-37-june-
2014/evaluating-the-individual-researcher/
Cronin, B. (2014). Meta Life. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Tech-
nology, 65(3), 431–432.
Cronin, B. & Sugimoto, C. R. (Eds.) (2015). Scholarly metrics under the microscope: From cita-
tion analysis to academic auditing. Medford, NJ: Information Today, Inc./ASIST, pp. 976.
Elliott, M. S. & Kraemer, K. L. (2009). Computerization Movements and the Diffusion of Tech-
nological Innovations. In M. Elliott & K. Kraemer (Eds.), Computerization Movements and
Altmetrics as Traces of the Computerization of the Research Process | 371
Technology Diffusion: From Mainframes to Ubiquitous Computing (p. 3–41), Medford,
New Jersey: Information Today, Inc.
Francis Bacon. (n.d.) In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 25, 2014 from http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Francis_Bacon
Geisler, E. (2000). The Metrics of Science and Technology. Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Pub-
lishing Group.
Gorraiz, J., Gumpenberger, C., & Schlögl, C. (2013). Differences and similarities in usage versus
citation behaviours observed for five subject areas. In Proceedings of the 14th ISSI Confer-
ence Vol. 1, 519–535. http://www.issi2013.org/Images/ISSI_Proceedings_Volume_I.pdf.
Guerrero-Bote, V. P., & Moya-Anegón, F. (2014). Relationship between Downloads and Citations
at Journal and Paper Levels, and the Influence of Language. Scientometrics, 101(2), 1043–
1065.
Halevi, G. & Moed, H. (2014). 10 years of research impact: top cited papers in Scopus 2001–
2011. Research Trends, 38. Retrieved from http://www.researchtrends.com/issue-38-
september-2014/10-years-of-research-impact/
Kurtz, M. J., Eichhorn, G., Accomazzi, A., Grant, C., Demleitner, M., Murray, S. S., Martimbeau,
N., & Elwell, B. (2005). The bibliometric properties of article readership information. Jour-
nal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 56, 111–128.
Kurtz, M. J., & Bollen, J. (2010). Usage Bibliometrics. Annual Review of Information Science and
Technology, 44, 3–64.
Moed, H. F. & Halevi, G. (2015a). The Multidimensional Assessment of Scholarly Research Im-
pact. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, to be published.
Moed, H. F. & Halevi, G. (2015b). On full text download and citation distributions in scientific-
scholarly journals. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, to
be published.
Nielsen, M. (2011). Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Science. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
NISO (National Information Standards Organization) (2014). NISO Altmetrics Standards Project
White Paper. Retrieved from http://www.niso.org/apps/group_public/download.php/
13295/niso_altmetrics_white_paper_draft_v4.pdf
Open Science. (n.d.) In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 22, 2014 from http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Open_science
Priem, J., Taraborelli, D., Groth, P. & Neylon, C. (2010). Altmetrics: A Manifesto. Retrieved from
http://altmetrics.org/manifesto/
Shema, H., Bar-Ilan, J. & & Thelwall, M. Scholarly blogs are a promising altmetric source.
Research Trends, 37. Retreived from http://www.researchtrends.com/issue-37-june-
2014/scholarly-blogs-are-a-promising-altmetric-source/
Sugimoto, C. (2014). Private communication.
Thelwall, M. (2014). A brief history of altmetrics. Research Trends, 37. Retrieved from
http://www.researchtrends.com/issue-37-june-2014/a-brief-history-of-altmetrics/
Stefanie Haustein, Timothy D. Bowman, and Rodrigo Costas
Interpreting ‘Altmetrics’: Viewing Acts on
Social Media through the Lens of Citation
and Social Theories
1 Introduction
More than 30 years after Blaise Cronin’s seminal paper (Cronin, 1981), the met-
rics community is once again in need of a new theory, this time one for so-called
‘altmetrics’. Altmetrics, short for alternative (to citation) metrics—and as such a
misnomer—refers to a newgroup ofmetrics based (largely) on socialmedia events
relating to scholarly communication. The term originated on September, 29, 2010
in a tweet by Jason Priem in which he uttered his preference for the word altmet-
rics in the context of variousmetrics provided for PLOS journal articles: “I like the
term #articlelevelmetrics, but it fails to imply *diversity* of measures. Lately, I’m
liking #altmetrics” (Priem, 2010). Although Priem is responsible for coining the
term, the idea of measuring broader scientific impact through the web had been
discussed by Cronin and others (e.g., Almind & Ingwersen, 1997; Cronin, Snyder,
Rosenbaum, Martinson, & Callahan, 1998; Cronin, 2001; see also Thelwall, this
volume) in the context of webometrics years before:
Scholars may be cited formally, or merely mentioned en passant in listservs and others elec-
tronic discussion fora, or they may find that they have been included in reading lists or
electronic syllabi. Polymorphous mentioning is likely to become a defining feature of Web-
based scholarly communication.
(Cronin et al., 1998, p. 1320)
There will soon be a critical mass of web-based digital objects and usage statistics on which
to model scholars’ communication behaviors—publishing, posting, blogging, scanning,
reading, downloading, glossing, linking, citing, recommending, acknowledging—and with
which to track their scholarly influence and impact, broadly conceived and broadly felt.
(Cronin, 2005b, p. 196)
Priem—co-author of the altmetrics manifesto (Priem, Taraborelli, Groth, & Ney-
lon, 2010) and co-founder of ImpactStory,¹ an online tool aggregating various
metrics on the individual researcher level— and colleagues argued that metrics
based on “traces” of use and production of scholarly output on social media plat-
1 https://impactstory.org/
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forms could help to improve scholarly communication and research evaluation.
The term altmetricswas introduced out of the need to differentiate these newmet-
rics from traditional citation-based indicators, which the altmetrics movement
seeks to replace or use as an alternative. The altmetrics manifesto and other work
by Priem and colleagues call on the scientific community and research managers
to “value all research products” (Piwowar, 2013, p. 159), not just journal articles,
and to measure impact in a broader sense by looking at more than just citations.
The manifesto lists various sources of new metrics that would complement and
replace traditional forms of publication, peer review, and citation analysis (Priem
et al., 2010). Priem (2014) claimed that with scholarship moving online, former
invisible aspects of scholarly communication—such as reading, discussing, and
recommending scientific papers—leave traces that can be collected earlier and
easier than citations and would thus provide an alternative to citations. The idea
of altmetrics resonated with scholars, academic librarians, publishers, and (par-
ticularly) with research managers and funders, who were attracted by the idea
of measuring the impact of research on the broader non-scientific community
as a return on their investment (Adie, 2014). Within the bibliometric community,
the examination of social bookmarking data as indicators of readership was one
of the early examinations of altmetrics (Haustein & Siebenlist, 2011). Bornmann
(2014a) even argued that scientometrics was undergoing a scientific revolution
(Kuhn, 1962) due to taxonomy changes regarding the definition of impact (i.e.,
from scientific to a broader concept of impact) (see Bornmann, this volume, for
more on this taxonomic change).
Although hopes are high that these new metrics are able to capture research
impact earlier ormorebroadly than citations, they are limitedby the technological
ecosystems from which they are captured as they often measure what is techni-
cally feasible insteadofwhat is sensible (Taylor, 2014; see also,Moed, this volume,
on altmetrics as a computerization movement). While there is a debate among
scholars onhow toproperlydefine thesenewmetrics, they are consideredby some
university administrators, librarians, publishers, funders, and others to evaluate
and assess scholarly output. In the context of the Research Excellence Frame-
work (REF), the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) requests
metrics that demonstrate “all kinds of social, economic and cultural benefits and
impacts beyond academia” (HEFCE, 2011, p. 4). This has introduced a certain level
of social pressure for scholars to understand, participate in, andmanage their use
of computer-mediated environments, as there is the possibility that their events
within these contextswill be recordedandmadeavailable to others for evaluation.
The new metrics purportedly provide insight into measuring societal impact, as
they are able to track events outside the scientific community revolving around
scholarly output (Priem et al., 2010; Priem, 2014).
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Just as there is a need for citation theory, there is also a strong need to define
the meaning of the various indicators grouped under the term altmetrics. As de-
picted in Cronin (1981), the search for the meaning of citations was pervasive in
the early days of citation analysis. Similar to Gilbert (1977, p. 114), who stated that
“we do not yet have any clear idea about what exactly we are measuring when
we analyze citation data”, the question “What do they actually mean?” has been
a recurring one in research on altmetrics. At the same time, the study of various
roles and functions of citations (i.e., their ‘polymorphous’ nature) as well as theo-
retical discussions of the citation process with regard to the meaning and validity
of citationmetrics are still part of the current scientometrics research agenda (see
for example Bertin, Atanassova, Gingras, & Larivière, 2015;Hjørland, this volume;
Wouters, this volume).
Several parallels can be drawnbetween the early days of citation analysis and
today’s search for themeaning and need for a theoretical framework of social me-
dia metrics. What is considerably different, however, is that altmetrics capture
events onplatforms that are highly dynamic andwhose use anduser communities
are new, diverse, and not entirely understood,while the act of citing (althoughnot
always being counted) has existed since the early days of modern science. While
social rules and norms exist within the scientific community of how, when, and
what to cite, these norms are currently lacking with regard to social media.
2 Defining and classifying social media events
and metrics
Although altmetrics are generally understood as metrics that measure impact be-
yond citations and define scholarly output in a broader sense than restricting it
to peer-reviewed journal articles, there is no common, agreed-upon definition or
understanding of altmetrics except for that they “capture very different things”
(Lin & Fenner, 2013, p. 20). The only unifying concept is that they stand in op-
position to “traditional” bibliometrics and common practices in research evalua-
tion, especially citations (Priem, 2014). Altmetrics include download and article
usage statistics, although these have been available much longer than social me-
dia applications (Borghuis, 1997; Kaplan & Nelson, 2000; Luther, 2001; Glänzel &
Gorraiz, 2014). Priem (2014, p. 266) defines altmetrics as the “study and use of
scholarly impact measures based on activity in online tools and environments”
and thus situates it as a subset of webometrics (see Thelwall, this volume). As a
pragmatic attempt at a suitable definition for altmetrics, one could say that these
metrics are: events on social and mainstream media platforms related to scholarly
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content or scholars, which can be easily harvested (i.e., through APIs) and mea-
sured, and are not the same as the more ‘traditional’ concept of citations.
The criticism for the termaltmetrics has grownasmore empirical studies have
found that most social media based indicators are complements and not alter-
natives to citation-based indicators. Rousseau and Ye (2013, p. 3289) stated that
altmetrics was “a good idea but a bad name” and proposed influmetrics—initially
introduced by Elisabeth Davenport and discussed by Cronin andWeaver (1995) in
the context of acknowledgements andwebometrics (Cronin, 2001)—as an alterna-
tive term to “suggest diffuse andoften imperceptible traces of scholarly influence–
to capture the opportunities formeasurement and evaluation afforded by the new
environment” (Cronin, 2005b, p. 176). Haustein and colleagues (Haustein, Lari-
vière, Thelwall, Amyot, & Peters, 2014a) used social media metrics to emphasize
the platforms from which the metrics were obtained without attempting to de-
scribe intent or meaning and to better differentiate new indicators frommore tra-
ditional ones (i.e., citation and downloads). Although social media metrics seems
a better fit as an umbrella term because it addresses the social media ecosystem
from which they are captured, it fails to incorporate the sources that are not ob-
tained from social media platforms (such as mainstream newspaper articles or
policy documents) that are collected (for instance) by Altmetric.com. As current
definitions of altmetrics are shaped and limited by active platforms, technical pos-
sibilities, andbusinessmodels of aggregators suchasAltmetric.com, ImpactStory,
PLOS, and Plum Analytics—and as such constantly changing—this work refrains
from defining an umbrella term for these highly heterogeneous new metrics.
Rather, a framework is presented that describesacts leading to (online) events
on which the metrics are based. These acts refer to activities occurring in the con-
text of social media, such as discussing on Twitter or saving to Mendeley, as well
as downloading and citing. The framework groups various types of acts into three
categories—accessing, appraising, and applying—and provides examples of ac-
tions that lead to visibility and traceability online. These are the polymorphous
mentions Cronin and colleagues (1998, p. 1320) anticipated. In order to discuss the
traces that these acts leave online, the following generic terms —as agreed upon
at the 2014 PLOS ALMworkshop (Bilder, Fenner, Lin, & Neylon, 2015)— have been
adopted:
– research object: a scholarly object, for which an event can be recorded;
– event: a recorded activity or action which relates to the research object;
– host: the place where research objects are made available and exposed to
potential events;
– source: a platform where events are available;
– consumer: a party that collects and/or uses events related to research ob-
jects
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– aggregator: a type of consumer who collects and provides events to re-
search objects with a specific methodology;
– end user or audience: a type of consumer who uses and applies events in
a specific context and intention.
As acts and recorded events will differ whether they focus on, for example, a jour-
nal article or a researcher, this framework distinguishes between scholarly agents
and scholarly documents as two particular categories of research objects. Agents
(Bourdieu, 1975) include individual scholars, research groups, departments, uni-
versities, funding organizations, and others entities acting within the scholarly
community. Following Otlet’s (1934, p. 6) broad definition of a document as “a set
of facts or ideas presented in the form of a text or image”,² this category includes
traditional scholarly publications (e.g., journal articles, book chapters, confer-
ence proceedings, monographs, theses, reports, and other types of grey litera-
ture), patents, presentations and lectures, aswell as blog posts, datasets, software
code, and other forms of scholarly work and output. This dichotomy between
agent and document demonstrates that ‘altmetrics’ can appear not only as article-
level metrics,³ but can also be applied to a broad spectrum of research objects.
In order to differentiate between various acts leading to online events on dif-
ferent sources in relation to the document or agent, we propose a framework that
classifies these acts into three categories (Figure 1). We argue that these three
categories—access, appraise, and apply—capture various stages and facets of use
and interactions with research objects. The framework is designed to incorporate
allmain act types leading to events related to scholarly documents and agents. Al-
though it does not claim to be exhaustive as to include all types of possible events,
particularly in terms of future changes regarding technology and affordance⁴ use,
it is assumed that the categories should be broad enough to incorporate new de-
velopments when required. A framework is proposed in this instance because it
allows one to consider the “system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, be-
2 Translated by the authors from: “un ensemble de faits ou d’idées présentés sous forme de texte
ou d’image” (Otlet, 1934, p. 6).
3 It should also be noted that from an indicator perspective, events related to a particular
research object can also be aggregated. For example, if the act of saving a journal article toMende-
ley leads to a recorded number of Mendeley readers, these event counts can be aggregated for all
documents of a particular agent associated with the documents (e.g., author, journal, discipline,
country). However, even though the indicator refers to the agent, the recorded event relates to the
research object as the smallest level of analysis, in this case the document and not the particular
agent.
4 Affordances are observed qualities of an object within a context that allow for some type of
action (Gibson, 1977).
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Fig. 1: Framework of categories and types of acts referring to research objects (scholarly docu-
ments and agents).
liefs, and theories that supports and informs” (Maxwell, 2009, p. 222) the problem.
It is thought to improve the understanding of the various heterogeneous acts that
relate to different research objects.
As shown in Figure 1, each of the three act categories, access, appraise, and
apply, includes various types of acts, which differ slightly depending on the re-
search object. For example, applying a document would comprise reusing and
building upon theories, software, or datasets, while for an agent the act of ap-
plying refers to collaboration. Emphasized by the spiral layout, it is generally as-
sumed that the level of engagement increases as one moves across categories of
acts from accessing over appraising to applying (i.e., inwards across layers in Fig-
ure 1), as well as across types of acts within categories (i.e., clock-wise along the
spiral). For example, acts related to engagement with a journal article increase
within the access category as one moves from viewing a paper title to storing it in
a reference manager or within the appraise category as one moves from a quick
mention on Twitter to a mention in a policy document. It is also important to note
that the boundaries between specific categories and types are permeable, as they
can vary and overlap based on use or context.
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2.1 Access
This category refers to acts that involve accessing and showing interest in the re-
search object. In the case of scholarly documents this includes viewing metadata,
which involves viewing the title, abstract, or description of, for example, a pa-
per or book, presentation slides, datasets, or software.Accessing content includes
viewing and downloading the entire document, while storing the research object
implies making it available for future use. Online events that currently capture
these acts include view and download counts on various platforms and repos-
itories (e.g., journal websites, Dryad, FigShare, SlideShare, Github) and reader
and bookmarking counts on reference managers such as BibSonomy, CiteULike,
Mendeley, and Zotero.
Focusing on agents as research objects, the access category includes, for ex-
ample, viewing a university’s or scholar’s homepage or user profile on platforms
such as ResearchGate or Academia.edu, accessing the agent through electronic
means (e.g., email, messaging, Skype, etc.), and storing their information for fu-
ture use, for example by downloading a scholar’s CV or ‘friending’ or ‘following’
them on a social media platform such as Twitter, ResearchGate, or Academia.edu.
2.2 Appraise
The category of appraising includes the act of mentioning the research object on
various platforms such as a microblogs, in a social network, in a comment, on a
Q&A site, listserv, or rating or voting platform, as well as in a podcast or video,
presentation, review, blog post, Wikipedia article, mainstream media and news,
or scientific or policy document. These appraisal acts are almost identical for both
types of researchobjects except for particular technical differences andaffordance
use, which can be different for agents and documents. For example, mentioning
a scholarly paper on Twitter usually implies linking to it via a URL or document
identifier (e.g., http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/504211a),whilementioning a researcher
implies using the “@” symbol followed by a Twitter handle (e.g., @csugimoto to
mention the Twitter user Cassidy R. Sugimoto).⁵ With increasing level of engage-
ment, appraising a scholarly document or agent can range from a brief mention
in a post on Twitter or Facebook to a citation in a policy document. Various acts
5 Of course, mentions of scholars, as well as scholarly documents, occur on Twitter without
the use of these particular affordances (e.g., “Cassidy R. Sugimoto”, “Sugimoto’s latest paper in
JASIST”), but they are not recognized as such by Twitter and their proper identification requires
more sophisticated tools.
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of appraisal can be expressed in a comment, on rating and voting systems (which
are usually crowd-sourced and quantitative) such as rating functions on Reddit,
Upworthy, or RateMyProfessor.com, or as brief discussions and more extensive
and qualitative (peer) judgment, typically carried out by an expert (e.g., on F1000,
Pubpeer, and ResearchGate).
2.3 Apply
In terms of scholarly documents, we define apply as actively using significant
parts of, adapting, or transforming the research object. This occurs in the form
of applying theories, frameworks, methods, or results from a scientific document,
software code, or dataset(s) as a foundation to create new work. In scholarly doc-
uments, applying the content of other documents (and to a lesser extent datasets
and software code) is usually indicated through a citation, in which case the dis-
tinction between the event categories “mentioning” and “applying” may become
blurry. However, applying suggests a much higher degree of engagement with the
original content than is found in the access or appraise categories. This mirrors
the different functions of citations as reflected in the distribution of references
across scientific articles: a few influential papers are cited in the method sec-
tion, while a large number of references are briefly mentioned in the introduction
(Bertin, Atanassova, Gingras, & Larivière, 2015). Examples of types of applying
acts include the thorough discussion of an article’s content in a blog, the use of
a scholarly document for self-study, the adaptation of the content of an article
for a lecture, the modification or improvement of a dataset or software, or even
the use of scholarly output for commercial purposes. Regarding agents, the apply
category refers to the act of collaboration. The scholar’s knowledge, experience,
and reputation are applied to formulate something that did not exist before. Itmay
also refer to the participation of the scholar in Q&A sites (such as ResearchGate)
where their involvement helps to answer questions.
3 Introducing potentially relevant theories
To improve the understanding of the acts resulting in online events from which
metrics are collected, select citation and social theories areusedbelow to interpret
the phenomena being measured. Citation theories are used because the newmet-
rics based on these eventswere proposed to replace or complement citations as in-
dicators of impact. Social theories, on the other hand, are discussed because there
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is an inherent social aspect to the measurements and because scholars are in-
creasingly facing pressures to ensure their work has societal impact (e.g., HEFCE,
2011).
3.1 Citation theories
Knowledge about citing behavior and the symbolic characteristics of citations is
essential to determiningwhether itmakes sense to use citation analysis in various
areas of application, particularly in the context of impact metrics and research
evaluation. However, a complete theory of citations is lacking (Cronin, 1981; Ley-
desdorff, 1998). The increasing use of social media in scholarly communication
comes with the same demand, as theories and frameworks are required to as-
sess meaning and to validate new indicators as performance and impact metrics
(Wouters & Costas, 2012). Citation theories discussed here are the normative the-
ory, the social constructivist theory, and concept symbols.⁶ The normative and so-
cial constructivist approaches can be considered as two of the most important
(and opposing) facets of citation theory (Cronin, 2005a) that are still discussed
and tested today (Riviera, 2015). In addition, Small’s (1978) concept symbol the-
ory has been intensively discussed in the literature, particularly in the context of
“obliteration by incorporation” (Merton, 1968a) and for the study of the “socio-
cognitive location” of scholars (Costas & Van Leeuwen, 2012; Moed, 2005), and
has been considered in recent conceptual discussions in the field of scientomet-
rics (Guns, 2013).
3.1.1 Normative theory
According to the normative theory, citations are indirect indicators of intellec-
tual influence, reflecting norms and values of science through which scholars
are expected to acknowledge the use of the cited work (Kaplan, 1965). Merton
(1973) defined the ethos of science (i.e., the set of norms and values that rule sci-
ence) in terms of four basic norms: communism, universalism, disinterestedness,
and organized skepticism. As the basis of normative citation theory, Merton’s “so-
ciology of science provides the most coherent theoretical framework available”
(Small, 2004, p. 72). Although the normative citation theory is based on the as-
6 There are other theoretical approaches that have been used for citation theories. Examples are
the “reflexive theory” by Wouters (Wouters, 1999) or the ‘handicap principle’ (Nicolaisen, 2007),
as well as network theories (de Solla Price, 1965; Newman, 2005).
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sumption that referencing behavior is guided by these norms, it does not claim
that authors always strictly adhere to it (De Bellis, 2009; Moed, 2005). In Merton’s
words, the communism norm refers to the “nontechnical and extended sense of
common ownership of goods” (Merton, 1973, p. 273). In the context of citations,
the well-known idea of “giving credit where credit is due” is attributed to this
norm, as authors acknowledge the value of a colleague’s work by citing it. Uni-
versalism, as defined by Merton, “finds immediate expression in the canon that
truth-claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to pre-established imper-
sonal criteria” (Merton, 1973, p. 210). Thus, this norm ascertains that all scientists
can contribute to science and are expected to evaluate the works of others regard-
less of non-scientific characteristics such as race, nationality, culture, or gender.
Merton (1988, p. 621) argued that “symbolically, [the reference] registers in the
enduring archives the intellectual property of the acknowledged source by pro-
viding a pellet of peer recognition of the knowledge claim”. Thus, according to
the normative theory, citations are the rewards in the science system indicating
fair cognitive and intellectual influence.
That scientists should act for the benefit of a common scientific enterprise,
rather than professional gain, is expressed by the disinterestedness norm. In Mer-
ton’s (1973, p. 276) words “a passion for knowledge, idle curiosity, altruistic con-
cern with the benefit to humanity, and a host of other special motives have been
attributed to the scientist”. In the context of citation analysis, Nicolaisen (2007,
p. 617) argues that “it assumes that scientists are disinterested and do not seek
to gain personal advantages by flattering others or citing themselves”. Accord-
ing to the organized skepticism norm, scientific claims must be exposed to criti-
cal scrutiny before being accepted. From a citation analysis perspective, this is
directly related with the publication process of scientific results and new knowl-
edge, as scientists must treat any new claim with skepticism, including their own
contributions. Frequently, the norm of originality is also included (Ziman, 2000)
among the Mertonian norms of science because this norm requires that scientific
claims contribute something new, whether a new problem, a new approach, new
data, a new theory, or a new explanation.
3.1.2 Social constructivist theory
The focal point of this theory is that works are cited for a variety of factors, many
of which have nothing to do with intellectual debt as explained by the norma-
tive theory. This implies that the foundation of science originates from social ac-
tors engaging in a negotiation process in which one party convinces the other
through persuasion. Thus, citations are sometimes seen as “mere persuasion”
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(Gilbert, 1977); accordingly, citations are merely attempts at persuading readers
of the goodness of an author’s claims. In essence, the social constructivist theory
opposes the normative theory as it suggests that there are different motivations
for citing, many of them influenced by cognitive style and personality and not
necessarily by universalistic reasons. Citations are activities based on social psy-
chological influences and are not free of personal bias or social pressures and are
not alwaysmade for the same reasons. The following describes four main sources
of distortion or biases: persuasion hypothesis, perfunctory citations, Matthew ef-
fect, and negational citations.
The persuasion hypothesis considers citations as ‘tools of persuasion’ to per-
suade the scientific community of the value of the work. According to White
(2004), persuasion is achievedby logical arguments and inference detailedwithin
the body of the work and by selecting important (authoritative) and adequate pa-
pers to convince readers of the importance and validity of the results resulting in a
kind of “logical” persuasion, which aligns with the universalism norm. However,
White also talks about “dark” persuasion thatwould be in linewith the social con-
structivist theory. Within this “dark” persuasion there are two types: “persuasion
by distortion” that occurs when “citers often misrepresent the works they allude
to” (White, 2004, p. 96) and “persuasion by name-dropping” that can be linked
to the disproportionate citation of works by established authorities to gain cred-
ibility through association. Perfunctory citations,⁷ according to Murugesan and
Moravcsik (1978), are citations that describe alternative approaches not utilized
in the citing paper, references that are merely used to compare certain results or
conclusions, references that are used to indicate the fact that a certain method
employed is routine in the literature, and references that merely contribute to the
chronological context of the citing paper. In other words, perfunctory citations
are nonessential, superficial, redundant, or even wrong citations.
According to Merton (1968b, p. 58) the Matthew effect can be defined as the
“accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contribu-
tions to scientists of considerable repute and withholding of such recognition
from scientists who have not yet made their mark”. Thus, scientists who are rich
in recognition find it easier to get more recognition (and resources), which causes
“the rich [to] get richer at a rate that makes the poor become relatively poorer”
(Merton, 1968b, p. 62). Price (1976) demonstrated the Matthew effect mathemat-
7 Perfunctory citations are opposed to “Organic” citations which are references to those from
which concepts or theories are taken to lay the foundations of the citing paper, or papers from
which certain results (including numerical ones) are taken to develop the ideas in the citing pa-
per, or papers which help to better understand certain concepts in the citing paper (Murugesan &
Moravcsik, 1978).
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ically for publications and citations and referred to it as cumulative advantage
or success breeds success, showing that the probability of being cited increases
with the number of citations already obtained (formore on success indicators, see
Glänzel and Schubert [this volume] and Rousseau and Rousseau [this volume]).
This self-reinforcing effect for citations has also been shown to apply to countries
(Bonitz, Bruckner, & Scharnhorst, 1997) and papers published in journals with
high impact factors (Larivière&Gingras, 2010). In network theory, theMatthewef-
fect is referred to aspreferential attachment,wherenodes in anetwork accumulate
new edges proportionally to their number of edges, leading to power law distribu-
tions (Barabási, 1999; Newman, 2001). Obliteration by incorporation is a variant
of the cumulative advantage and was also suggested by Merton (1968a), but it
takes the point of view that there is an underestimation of mentions through the
obliteration of the sources by their incorporation in currently accepted knowledge
(Merton, 1988). In essence, papers that have become well known are no longer
formally cited. Negational (or negative) citation is a citation that “describes the
situation when the author of the citing paper is not certain about the correctness
of the cited paper” (Murugesan & Moravcsik, 1978, p. 297). In other words, these
are citations to papers that may have been challenged or contradicted in other (or
the citing) work.
3.1.3 Concept symbols theory
The concept symbols theory (Small, 1978) considers the citation as symbolic of the
idea expressed in the paper. The basic idea is that a citation is a symbolic act of au-
thors associating particular ideas (i.e., concepts, procedures, or kind of data) with
particular documents and is thus based on Garfield’s (1964) notion of citations as
descriptors in subject indexing. By using this theory one can consider citations as
private symbols (cited by only one or a few authors) or standard symbols (highly
cited). With a document that is repeatedly cited the citers engage in a dialogue on
the document’s significance, thus the meaning is conferred through this iterative
activity, while at the same time the meaning of the document becomes limited
through the capsulizing of a complex text into a few standard sentences (Small,
1978). This may result in the distortion or oversimplification of the original text
and cause the symbolic meaning to change over time.
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3.2 Social theories
Researchers investigating actors and output in specific computer-mediated en-
vironments have interpreted interaction and communication using a variety of
theories including theories from economics, psychology, anthropology, and soci-
ology. In this section a select few theories will be considered in order to improve
the understanding of the acts resulting in online events from which metrics are
collected. These include the theories of social capital, attention economics, and
impression management.
3.2.1 Social capital
Social capital is a theory that has garnered much interest from a variety of disci-
plines. The theory stipulates that humans are social creatures and thus need to be
connected to others in close-knit groups; these connections are treated as two-way
investments that are maintained through reciprocal support and re-investment.
Bourdieu (1985) was the first sociologist to distinguish social capital as one of
three types of capital in social relations: economic, cultural, and social. Social
capital canbe thought of as a source of power that canbe accrued through connec-
tions in a social network; actors in networks establish andmaintain relationships
with other actors in the hope that they may benefit in some way from these re-
lationships. The relationships can be strong or weak (Granovetter, 1973) and this
measure canhave an impact on the return that an actor derives fromeither type in-
cluding emotional support, the exchange of information, or mobilization toward
a common goal. Bozionelos (2014, p. 288) used social capital theory to examine
career paths in the Greek academic system and found that social capital “deter-
mines careers within that system.” In social media research, several researchers
(Hofer & Aubert, 2013; Steinfield, Dimicco, Ellison, & Lampe, 2009; Valenzuela,
Park,&Kee, 2008) have used social capital theory to discuss aspects of interaction
on various platforms.
Many other definitions in multiple disciplines have been suggested since
Bourdieu’s discussion of social capital (see Adler & Kwon, 2002; Portes, 1998 for
summaries) including two prominent definitions from Coleman (1988, 1990) and
Putnam (1995, 2000). The concept has become (in a sense) a catchall term that
captures aspects of social interaction that have been studied through the lens of
other concepts. Outside the arena of information communication technologies
(ICT), social capital has been used to study youth behavior problems, families,
schooling, public health, education, political action, community, and organiza-
tional issues such as job and career success, innovation, and supplier relations
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(Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social capital has become “one of themost popular exports
from sociological theory into everyday language” (Portes, 1998, p. 2).
3.2.2 Attention economics
The theory of attention economics (Davenport & Beck, 2001) considers the costs
and benefits of finding useful information. Simon (1971)was one of the first to pos-
tulate that the world is full of information and that this takes the attention of the
information consumer. When considering the theory of attention economics it is
necessary to think of the growing amount of information available as a scenario in
which human attention becomes increasingly valuable because there is a limited
amount to beutilized. Franck (2002, p. 9) argued that scientists are “entrepreneurs
who allocate time and effort so as to maximize the attention received from other
scientists” and it is this view that allows one to consider the ways in which scien-
tists use tools and technologies tominimize the amount of attention they spendon
sifting through the never-ending output of material to locate relevant and useful
information.
Researchers have used this theoretical framework to analyze behavior within
social media platforms. For example, Rui and Whinston (2011, p. 322) examined
approximately 3 million Twitter users and found that social media environments
are a “marketplace where people contribute information to attract attention
and contribute attention while consuming information.” The attention economy
framework has also been used to evaluate novelty and popularity in social net-
works (Huberman, 2013) and to examine pedagogical strategies for retaining the
attention of law students in the technology-rich environment of today’s classroom
(Matthews, 2012). The attention level of an audience member is determined by
their “attention capacities and on the total volume of signals to which they are
exposed” (Falkinger, 2003, p. 4), and today’s environment exposes scholars to
an unconscionable amount of information suggesting that it is extremely im-
portant to consider how they manage and conserve attention (see Bawden, this
volume, for more on the escalating size of available information and psychologi-
cal attention).
3.2.3 Impression management
The dramaturgical framework put forth by Erving Goffman (1959) describes activ-
ities termed self-presentation and impression management. Impression manage-
ment is a process that takes place as humans interact with one another and ismo-
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tivated by the need to avoid shame and embarrassment, while self-presentation is
the act of presenting informationabout oneself to anaudience.Goffmandescribed
these processes using dramaturgical concepts which include actors, audience,
and stage, and argued that when people interact with one another they act out
a role for their audience and are required to maintain the impression of that role
through the entirety of the interaction; if the impression is broken and the au-
dience loses faith in the presentation of the role, the actor will be shamed and
embarrassed.
The concepts of impression management and self-presentation have been
defined in the literature in many ways, with most building upon Goffman’s de-
scription. Gosling and colleagues (Gosling, Gaddis, & Vazire, 2007) examined the
accuracy of impressions on Facebook finding that personality impressions were
limited in accuracy and that authors did enhance their own self-presentations.
When comparing impressions made on Facebook with impressions made in face-
to-face meetings, Weisbuch and colleagues (2009) found that they were very
similar. With regards to Twitter, Gilpin (2011, p. 234) writes that tweeting plays
an important role in impression formation, “as followers will primarily draw
conclusions based on the contents of tweet messages as well as indications of the
intended recipients of those messages.”
4 Applying theories to selected acts
Using the framework in Figure 1 to describe, define, and distinguish various acts
related to research objects, we discuss the citation and social theories introduced
above. Due to space restrictions, this work will focus solely on applying these
theories to acts related to the scientific journal article⁸ as the most common and
important type of scholarly documents (and the focus of most currently captured
altmetrics). Future work should consider discussing acts related to other types
of documents, as well as to scholarly agents. In order to simplify the discussion
and provide more room for detail, the focus will be on some of the most popu-
lar acts in terms of number of captured online events to scholarly papers as well
as researched events in the current altmetrics setting.⁹ These include the acts of
8 In this context, the journal article as the research object may also refer to other versions of
the original publication such as the preprint/eprint on repositories, which may or may not be
considered as one single research object.
9 See for example Bornmann (2014b); Costas, Zahedi, andWouters (2014); Haustein, Costas, and
Larivière (2015b); Haustein et al. (2014a); Holmberg and Thelwall (2014), Mohammadi and Thel-
wall (2013) and Waltman and Costas (2014).
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saved in Mendeley, for the access category;mentioned in a tweet, and reviewed on
F1000 for appraise; and cited in a blog post for a specific case of applying the con-
tent of a scientific journal paper. Mendeley reader counts and tweets have been
shown to be the most prevalent online events currently captured for scientific pa-
pers;¹⁰ Mendeley reader counts account for two thirds of recent journal articles
and tweets mention approximately one fifth of recent journal articles. Reviews
on F1000 and blog citations occur much less due to their selectivity and higher
level of engagement, but are discussed as they represent particular forms of acts
regarding journal articles (Bornmann, 2014b; Costas, Zahedi, & Wouters, 2014;
Haustein, Costas, & Larivière, 2015b; Haustein et al., 2014a).
4.1 Access: Saved in Mendeley
AMendeley readership count for a particular document (at present) indicates that
a Mendeley user has added the document to his or her Mendeley library.¹¹ Users
of Mendeley are assumed to have an interest in organizing bibliographic meta-
data to keep track of and manage scientific documents either for citing or using
them in a professional or educational context (which could include teaching and
self-teaching). However, each document added to a Mendeley user library is not
necessarily read (Mohammadi, 2014) and there is no guarantee that a user adds all
documents he or she has (read or cited (or intents to read or cite) to theirMendeley
library.
According to previous research (Mohammadi, Thelwall, Haustein, & Lari-
vière, 2015; Mohammadi, 2014), most Mendeley users are students, postdocs,
and researchers and as such it is assumed that Mendeley readership counts are
a reflection of interest by a scholarly audience beyond the community of citing
authors. It is not known whether the approximately three million Mendeley users
(Haustein & Larivière, 2014) are representative of the entire readership of scien-
tific documents and whether certain biases exist regarding disciplines, academic
age, or countries. Among the currently captured social media metrics related to
scientific documents, Mendeley reader counts have the highest correlations with
10 It should be noted that due to current technical constraints, the scholarly document being
tracked is (in most cases) a peer-reviewed journal article with a DOI or comparable identifier
(e.g., arXiv id or PMID).
11 Technically, a user can save a document either online or in the desktop version of the refer-
encemanager. Bibliographic information is typically extracted directly from the document or the
metadata is harvested from the website where the document is located. This may lead to errors
in the bibliographic data that can be manually corrected by the user.
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citations, ranging from medium to high values (e.g., Mohammadi et al., 2015;
Mohammadi & Thelwall, 2014; Zahedi, Costas, & Wouters, 2014), which implies
a certain similarity between the two metrics. This suggests that citation theories
may be of value to understand what is happening in the Mendeley environment.
Opposed to citing, where the different norms of communism, universalism,
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism (and originality) are expected to ap-
ply, Mendeley users may not necessarily adhere to these norms when adding doc-
uments to their libraries – in fact, norms regarding literature management do not
exist. Students and young scientists presumably are not (yet) taught that they are
supposed to save and organize all relevant documents in reference management
software. When saving papers, the principle of giving credit where credit is due
does not necessarily apply because documents are often added before they are
actually read, which implies that Mendeley user libraries do not only include the
most influential and relevant documents, but also include those without actual
value to the user. The act of saving a document to Mendeley is assumed to be
more general than the act of citing, because more documents are saved and read
than cited. Moreover, saving to Mendeley may not only be due to utilitarian rea-
sons of saving and organizing, intended reading, highlighting, and annotating,
whichwould imply a certain level of giving credit to authors, but also due to (self-)
marketing.
However, if the act of saving to Mendeley is considered use of the document—
including various facets from mere saving to intense reading, annotating, and
citing—then Merton’s communism, as well as universalism, could apply because
authors receive Mendeley reader counts when their papers are saved to Mende-
ley. If users added all documents they read to their Mendeley libraries, Mendeley
readership would give credit to the sources upon which their knowledge is based
without distinguishing to what extent these documents were relevant or required
to fulfill the library owner’s information needs. In this regard, the act of saving
to Mendeley as reflected in reader counts could be considered as a ‘pellet of peer
recognition’ similar to citations, although certainly on a different level of engage-
ment andwithout any quality control or space restrictions¹² of peer-reviewed jour-
nal articles. However, a survey among 679Mendeley users found that only 27% of
users had read all of the documents in their libraries (Mohammadi, 2014). It can
be argued that the disinterestedness normapplies to saving toMendeley, butmore
as an unconscious act given that saving to Mendeley is essentially anonymous;¹³
12 Note that technical limitations such as available space in user libraries could still apply.
13 It should be note that the link between user and document is visible on other platforms (e.g.,
CiteULike).
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this is in contrast to the act of citing, which can be considered “a private process
with a public face” (Cronin, 1981, p. 16). The norm of organized skepticism does
not apply to the act of saving to Mendeley because documents are often added
before they are read, thus they are added without being considered “skeptically”.
Organized skepticism could only apply if a document was scrutinized by the user
and then removed from their Mendeley library.
Empirical user studies have yet to showwhether and to what extent users ad-
here to normswhen saving documents toMendeley in order to determinewhether
Mendeley reader counts might signify influence (albeit in a broader sense than
citations). Even if the normative theory does not yet apply to the act of saving to
Mendeley due to the current lack of equivalent norms regarding the use of refer-
ence managers, norms regarding literature management could be introduced in
the future to establish saving to Mendeley (or any other reference manager) as an
inherent part of the scholarly communication process.
The value of the social constructivist theory to interpret this event would stem
from its ability to interpret the act in terms of its pre-citation role and, indeed,
a survey among Mendeley users found that the main reason to save documents
to Mendeley was to cite them in the future (Mohammadi, 2014). It is, however,
difficult to expect that someone would simply save a document in Mendeley for
persuasive reasons given the anonymous nature of the act on Mendeley. Saving a
document as a negative example would conceptually be possible, although iden-
tifying this kind of negative use is currently not possible.
The Matthew effect could apply to Mendeley in a manner similar to citations.
Considering the cumulative advantage within the platform, documents that have
alreadybeen saved toMendeley libraries aremore likely tobeaddedbyotherusers
because they appear inMendeley search results andwhenbrowsing theMendeley
website. Applying the Matthew effect in a more general sense, considering vari-
ous aspects of scientific and social capital, Mendeley userswould be prone to save
more documents from renowned authors and high impact journals. Findings by
Costas, Zahedi, and Wouters (2015) note that articles published in high-impact
journals such as Nature or Science account for a substantial amount of reader
counts suggesting that some kind of Matthew effect applies when documents are
saved to Mendeley.
Apart from the pre-citation context—saving a document to Mendeley in order
to cite it—the idea of concept symbols could be applied to tagging or summarizing
a document in Mendeley and thus make it a particular symbol for the Mendeley
user.However, thiswouldbemore in linewith appraising thanaccessing aMende-
ley document.
Using the theory of social capital to interpret why a user saves a document
in Mendeley can also be useful. Users may save their publications into the sys-
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tem with hope that it will increase their worth by increasing the visibility of their
own work. As social network connections are seen to be of value, it is clear that
increasing the visibility of one’s work has the potential of increasing one’s social
capital in that network.
When examining this act from the perspective of attention economics, this
social theory is well suited to explain why a user saves documents in Mendeley.
He or she is making use of Mendeley (such as searching, storing, and organizing)
to reduce the amount of attention they will need to utilize it in the future. Saving
a publication to Mendeley allows the user to reduce the amount of time and effort
they spend on information sifting so that theymay spend their valuable attention
on other matters.
If one applies impression management theory to the act of saving a docu-
ment in Mendeley, it becomes clear that a user may save their own publication
to Mendeley (and thus the publications appear in the Mendeley search or when
browsing the Mendeley website) in order to impress upon others that they are
accomplished in their area of study or that they are merely meeting certain im-
pressions others (such as their colleagues, students, or administrators) have of
them.
4.2 Appraise: Mentioned in a tweet
Due to the 140-character limitation of a tweet, a scientific document has to be re-
ferred to by a commonly used unique identifier or URL.¹⁴ Perhaps themost impor-
tant difference between citations and tweets is that the former is a standardized
and codified type of mention, while in Twitter the norms surrounding the men-
tions are rather different. Many documents are highly tweeted not due to their
scientific merits (Haustein, Peters, Sugimoto, Thelwall, & Larivière, 2014b), but
instead because they reflect “ephemeral (or prurient) interest[s], the usual trilogy
of sex, drugs, and rock and roll” (Neylon, 2014, para. 6), which discreditsMerton’s
notion of valuing knowledge claims. Twitter users donot seem to (and they are not
expected to) concern themselves with whether or not the document is original,
if it is of high quality, if they are rewarding the authors, etc., instead the Twit-
ter environment appears to be mostly free of these expectations (or at least not
intrinsically based on the Mertonian norms). It could still be argued that some
14 Mentions of scientific papers on Twitter are currently captured if they include the publisher
URLor commondocument identifiers such asDOI, PMID, or arXiv ID. Formal or informal citations
such as Cronin, B. (1981). The need for a theory of citing. Journal of Documentation, 37(1), 16–24 or
Cronin’s paper in JDoc are not captured.
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degree of communism, universalism, or disinterestedness apply to a specific sub-
set of tweets, if researchers use Twitter to discuss, debate, or contrast scientific
ideas. Findings regarding bot accounts, which automatically tweet links to scien-
tific documents, are another example of the limitations ofMertonian norms to this
type of act (Haustein,Bowman, Holmberg, Tsou, Sugimoto, & Larivière, 2015a), as
automated diffusion cannot be considered a social act.
Finding aspects of social constructivism in tweets mentioning scientific pub-
lications is hampered by the 140-character restriction. However, it can be argued
that some forms of persuasionmight be attributed to Twitter users whenmention-
ing a scientific document. Perfunctory tweets, for example wrongful mentions of
papers linked to unrelated topics or presenting authoritative references for invalid
arguments, are possible. However, these might instead be considered misunder-
standings or “misframings” (Goffman, 1974) by their users instead of a conscious
act of manipulation of the counts of publications with superficial or wrong men-
tions. The findings that retracted publications tend to receive more Twitter men-
tions than regular papers (Haustein et al., 2015b) supports the idea that negative
mentions of scientific papers on Twitter occur, but initial studies (Friedrich, Bow-
man, Stock, & Haustein, 2015; Thelwall et al., 2013) suggest that they might be
as rare as negative citations in the natural sciences and medicine (Murugesan &
Moravcsik, 1978).
The Matthew effect might play an important role in the accumulation of
tweets for scientific documents, for example within the platform itself through
affordances like the retweet function. A (re)tweeted paper would increase its
Twitter visibility and accruemore (re)tweets as an effect of its previous (re)tweets.
Twitter users receive push notifications if a particular number of users they fol-
low has retweeted the same tweet (Satuluri, 2013), which might produce further
tweets. Another Twitter-specific aspect related to the cumulative advantage is
the number of followers. A paper mentioned by an account with a large number
of followers can be expected to be visible to a larger audience, thus increasing
its potential to receive more tweets. This might, for example, be the case when
official Twitter accounts of scientific journals tweet their papers (Haustein et al.,
2014b). The Matthew effect can be argued to apply in a more general sense; for
example, when a paper is frequently mentioned on Twitter due to the academic
capital (Bourdieu, 1984) of the authors or the journal in which it was published.
It is likely that success on Twitter is bred by amix of social capital and impression
management within the platform—profile information, number of (re)tweets and
followers, etc.—as well as in the scientific community (e.g., reflected by the cita-
tion impact, funding success, or awards). This is supported by the finding that
the highest number of tweets are obtained by papers published in journals such
as Nature, Science, New England Journal of Medicine and Lancet, which belong
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to the most prestigious scientific journals and, at the same time, promote their
content through official Twitter accounts with many followers (Costas, Zahedi, &
Wouters, 2015; Haustein et al., 2014b).
The fast and brief nature of tweeting promotes obliteration by incorporation
in so far as usersmight avoid linking to the original paper due to space limitations.
This could lead to an undervaluation of certain documents.
The concept symbols theory has a special fit for the act of tweeting about
scientific papers. The short nature of tweets strongly supports the narrowing of
meaning stipulated by this theory, as the meaning of (or engagement of the Twit-
ter users with) the publication has to be encapsulated in 140 characters. Also,
the association of publications with hashtags (which can be signs or signifiers
referring to ideas or concepts) supports the idea that mentions of documents on
Twitter are concept symbols. Similarly, when a document is repeatedly tweeted
and Twitter users engage in a discussion about the value of the document, the
meaning of the tweets is conferred through the symbolic usage of the publications
(similar to theuse of citations as symbols). This narrowing ofmeaning and the fact
that many of the users are not necessarily experts on the paper’s topic may result
in the distortion or oversimplification of the original text (similar to citations), a
phenomenon that has been already discussed for altmetrics (Colquhoun, 2014).
Approaching the act ofmentioning on Twitter using social theory can provide
additional insight. Users may have many different motivations for mentioning a
scientific document in a tweet, yet the theory of social capital suggests that one of
these motivations will be to establish a connection between the tweeter and the
publication (and in return the author(s) of the document). When a scholar tweets
about a scientific document, they are making a weak connection in the network
between themselves and the other. If the tweeter continues to tweet about publi-
cations from the same author(s), the connection between the two (or more) can
become stronger creating a potential form of revenue that can be later converted
into benefits such as a collaboration or a letter of reference.
When examining the Twitter mention from the perspective of attention eco-
nomics, the tweeter will use Twitter-specific affordances (such as the URL, an
@ symbol, favoriting, and/or a #hashtag) to reduce the amount of attention they
and others will need to access and understand the article, as the searching and
organization in the Twitter environment is facilitated by the use of these affor-
dances.
Looking at this act through the lens of impression management allows one to
interpret the act as an attempt to impress upon others that he or she is up to date
on the work in their field, that they present themselves as one who can be trusted
to spread relevant documents, or that they are simply reinforcing their identity as
an expert in a specific domain.
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4.3 Appraise: Reviewed on F1000Prime
Faculty of 1000 (F1000Prime or F1000¹⁵) is a commercial online post-publication
peer review and recommendation service for biological and medical research
launched in 2002. More than 5000 peer-nominated researchers and clinicians,
referred to as F1000 faculty members, produce the reviews. Faculty members are
requested to select the most interesting publications they read and to provide
reviews of these publications. A review of a publication consists of a recommen-
dation (“good”, “very good”, or “exceptional”) along with an explanation of the
strengths (and possibly also theweaknesses) of the publication. Facultymembers
can choose to review any primary research article from any journal without being
limited to recent publications or publications indexed in any given database
(Waltman & Costas, 2014). Papers are not only rated in F1000, but they are also
reviewed and labeled in order to indicate such things as the appropriateness for
changes to clinical practice, suitability for new drugs, or usability for teaching
(Mohammadi & Thelwall, 2013).
Given the scholarly nature of F1000 reviews, the normative theory can apply
in a similar manner as to citations. F1000 faculty are expected to behave accord-
ing to the “ethos of science” when selecting and reviewing their publications for
F1000, as “theymust sign a statement to indicate that the article has been selected
for inclusion in F1000Prime’s Article Recommendations entirely on its scientific
merit and that they have not been influenced directly or indirectly in the selection
of articles by the authors or any third party”.¹⁶ The F1000 post-publication peer
review system shares advantages as well as some disadvantages and biases—e.g.,
subjectivity, lack of consensus and biases of referees, cost and time issues, and
difficulty to scale (e.g., King, 1987; Lee, Sugimoto, Zhang, & Cronin, 2013)—with
traditional ‘blind’ peer review, which makes the normative theory highly appli-
cable. In addition to the traditional pre-publication review, recommendations on
F1000 are attributed and linked to referees and there are various steps of qual-
ity control, such as monitoring by section heads and the possibility for faculty
members to disagree with recommendations,¹⁷ which should further encourage
referees to behave according to Mertonian norms.
15 See http://f1000.com/prime
16 http://f1000.com/prime/about/whatis
17 http://f1000.com/prime/about/whatis
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For the same reasons, persuasive and perfunctory reviews and recommen-
dations are quite unlikely and negative reviews are technically not possible on
F1000,¹⁸ although constructive criticism is encouraged.¹⁹ Although publications
from all types of sources and authors are expected to be reviewed, the higher ac-
cumulation of reviews in high impact journals (Waltman& Costas, 2014) points to
a form of the “Matthew effect” in the selection and review of documents by F1000
similar to what Larivière and Gingras (2010) found for citations. The cumulative
advantage taken in a stricter sense, in that papers with many F1000 recommen-
dations are likely to accrue even more within the same platform, is less likely to
apply because F1000 functions as a filter where experts supposedly choose the
most important articles from their research area. This assumption is supported
by findings that the vast majority of reviewed publications have only one review
and less than 2.5% receivemore than three recommendations (Waltman&Costas,
2014).
The concept symbol theory applies in so far that faculty members choose
and recommend documents for particular reasons that are indicated by particular
tags, such as new findings, controversial, or good for teaching or in the recommen-
dation text in the form of concrete statements about the content, interest, and
usefulness of the documents. A recommended document could thus be consid-
ered a private symbol of the reviewer, who distills themeaning of the original text
in his or her review. The idea of standard symbols is less likely to apply, as most
documents are only recommended by one faculty member.
When a scholar reviews an article he or she is establishing a (weak) connec-
tion between his or her review and the paper itself, and subsequently the venue
in which the paper occurs, the content of the article, and potentially the author(s)
of the document. This connection can be of value to the reviewer at a later time as
they can list this service on their CV or they can help establish trends in research
areas by reviewing (what they consider) quality documents, thus supporting the
interest of the social capital theory in the understanding of F1000 recommenda-
tions.
From another perspective, attention economics might suggest that a reviewer
would choose to participate in this act to reduce the amount of information they
need to search by focusing on documents relevant to their own work. This would
reduce the amount of documents they would need to examine when trying to find
information in the future.
18 It should be noted that negative reviews are possible on other platforms (e.g., Publons or
Pubpeer).
19 http://f1000.com/prime/about/whatis
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If one were to use impression management to examine this act, it is clear that
the reviewer may be looking to create a new impression of himself or herself as
someone who can be relied upon to act as a gatekeeper of science or to reinforce
an existing impression. The affordances of the platform allows for the establish-
ment of a reviewer as a “global expert”²⁰ thus allowing them to present a self that
contributes to the impression others have of them.
4.4 Apply: Cited in a blog post
Among current social media activity, the act of citing in blogs is believed to be
the most similar to citing in scientific documents, because research blogs allow
for and provide the space to discuss and analyze scientific content (Shema, Bar-
Ilan & Thelwall, 2014). The findings that blogs have moderate correlations with
citations (Costas, Zahedi, & Wouters, 2014; Haustein et al., 2015b; Shema et al.,
2014) support this assumption. As a result, citation theories are more likely to
apply to blog citations than mentions on Twitter. However, even in the case of
applying a scientific document to a blog (e.g., building upon and reusing results,
methods, and theories of a scientific documents²¹) particular differences between
scientific peer-reviewed documents and blog posts limit the applicability of cita-
tion theory; this can be caused by blogs not having the same scholarly nature as
scientific publications as they lack the gatekeeping and quality control present in
academic work: anyone can publish a blog on their homepage, posts are typically
not peer-reviewed, and some blog posts simply announce the publication of inter-
esting articles. It should be noted, however, that some blog aggregator platforms
(such as ResearchBlogging.org) have bloggers agree to specific guidelines²² to en-
sure that the posts of bloggers on the platform discuss peer-reviewed research
that they have fully read, understood, and formally cited, while adding original
content.
The normative theory could thus be applied tomentions in blogs, if onewould
expect bloggers and science journalists to cite according to similar “norms” as
scholars. However, given the more open and less controlled nature of blogs, it is
reasonable to think that the application of these rules would be less strict than in
scholarly contexts.
20 As indicated on the F1000 website (http://f1000.com/about-and-contact).
21 This seems plausible, as reported by Fausto and colleagues (Fausto et al., 2012) the number
of citations per blog is increasing but with values of citations per blog post between 1.38 to 1.48.
22 http://researchblogging.org/news/?p=53
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From another perspective, persuasion is indeed a driving force in blogging
and scientific journalism by frequently discussing scholarly information and pre-
senting the viewpoints of their authors on scientific issues (Shema et al., 2014;
Shema, Bar-Ilan, & Thelwall, 2015). However, it could be debated whether the
value of name-dropping and perfunctory mentions have the same incidence in
blog posts as in scholarly publications. Considering that bloggers and science
journalists do not share the same reward system as scholars, it is arguable that the
presence of these types of persuasions may be less frequent in this environment,
although the possibility still exists that other types of rewards (e.g., followers,
visitors of their blogs, commenters, etc.) may play a role in influencing bloggers’
behaviors (e.g., by distorting the content of scientific documents in order to sup-
port their views or to mention publications from esteemed journals or authors).
TheMatthew effect is also applicable for blog posts, as it is plausible that bloggers
and scientific journalists primarily focus on well-established, famous, and pop-
ular authors or journals (Shema et al., 2015). Finally, the existence of important
blogging activities around retracted publications (Haustein et al., 2015b) supports
the idea that negative mentions are also important in the consideration of blog
mentions.
The concept symbols theory can be applied to blogmentions in a similarman-
ner as to citations; being reinforced by the open-natured and laymen-authored
activity of typical blogs, which allows for the narrowing of the document’s origi-
nal meaning.
Social capital, attention economics, and impression management all provide
useful insight into why a blogger or journalist may cite a scholarly document in
their blog. For instance, the blogger establishes a weak connection between her
blog and the scholarly document (and subsequently the author(s) and/or the jour-
nal) that can become stronger by the continued use of other documents by the
same author(s), thus providing social capital to the blogger by creating a connec-
tionbetweenher and the author(s) of the documents, or by simply driving traffic to
her blog. The creation of blogs around scientific documents also allows the blog-
ger (andhis or her users) to keepa recordof “useful” (or not useful) academicwork
that can be easily filtered through the typical blogging affordances of searching,
tagging, and storing posts, thus decreasing the attention needed to find these doc-
uments in the future. Finally, impressionmanagementmay explainwhy a blogger
might cite a specific scholarly document, as the blogger must be concerned about
the impression he or she is creating by applying the document. Thus the blogger
may be attempting to create an impression that implies they understand and have
expertise on the cited material.
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5 Conclusions and Outlook
In the current debate around so-called altmetrics, some argue that these poly-
morphous mentions (Cronin et al., 1998, p. 1320) can be a good proxy for societal
impact (Bornmann, 2014b), early scientific impact (Eysenbach, 2011), attention,
and educational and practical use (Mohammadi et al., 2015; Zahedi, Costas, &
Wouters, 2013), while others argue that they reflect nothing but buzz, popularity,
or simply increasing visibility (Colquhoun, 2014). The answer is probably that the
new metrics are all of the above and the extent to which each of these occurs de-
pends on the particular platform, its uptake and users, as well as on the research
topic, the unit of analysis, and the context of the metric.
It is important to keep in mind that these new metrics may be influenced by
“noise” (i.e., all mentions that are not meaningful or deviate from the intended
meanings such as “automated” mentions, self-mentions, data errors, etc.) and
that this noise can introduce doubt as to how to properly interpret the significance
of the acts leading to these capturedmetrics. In addition, the technology and its af-
fordances are constantly changing so that the acts themselves are being affected,
which in turn can bring new challenges and issues to the understanding of these
metrics. In general, what is lacking is a concrete set of frameworks, models, and
theories that can help to support interpretations and uses of these new metrics.
This chapter provides a conceptual framework that can be applied to the acts
leading to (online) events underlying these metrics in the context of scholarly
communication. In order to better comprehend these heterogeneous acts, the
framework identifies three broad categories of acts related to scholarly docu-
ments and agents: accessing, appraising, and applying. Common citation and
social theories are introduced to discuss whether they can be used to explain
the acts underlying the various indicators referred to as altmetrics. The reason to
begin theoretical discussions by applying normative, social constructivist, and
concept symbols theories to socialmediametrics is based on the strong, albeit an-
tagonistic, relationship of altmetrics to citations (Priem et al., 2010; Priem, 2014).
In addition to these citation theories, three social theories were used to interpret
these events including social capital, attention economics, and impression man-
agement because of the inherent social nature of these platforms. Focusing on the
journal articles as the most common form of scholarly documents, these theories
were applied to the acts of saving to Mendeley, mentioning on Twitter, reviewing
on F1000, and citing in a blog post in order to determine their applicability.
Due to the heterogeneity of various types and categories of acts (i.e., access,
appraise, and apply), the discussed citation theories are more or less suitable.
Similar to Hogan and Sweeney (2013) who discussed the limited fitting of Mer-
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tonian norms to the new social media, this work found that Mertonian norms fit
quite well with the act of reviewing and recommending on F1000, to a lesser ex-
tent with being cited in blogs, and that the norms did not apply to mentions on
Twitter. In the context of saving to Mendeley, the normative theory is more likely
to apply only in the pre-citation context, i.e., when it is linked to the act of citing.
In terms of social constructivist theories, the Matthew effect idea has the
strongest potential for most of the discussed acts and can, to a certain extent,
explain the concentration and skewness of social media events across publi-
cations. This might be attributed to the networked nature of these platforms.
Thus, platforms such as Mendeley and Twitter support the necessary processes
most often associated with the Matthew effect and preferential attachment, as
documents with more events get higher visibility within the platforms through
different mechanisms (e.g., re-tweets, number of followers, or Mendeley filtering
tools). For F1000 reviews, as well as blogs, the higher presence of papers from
prestigious journals suggests that the Matthew effect could apply from the point
of view of the concentration of events around specific agents (e.g., prominent
authors, journals, etc.) represented in the system. The presence of the Matthew
effect may have important implications for the potential consideration of acts in
social media metrics with regard to the reward and communication systems of
science.
Concept symbols are more likely to apply to the act of tweeting documents in
so far as Twitter could serve as a language system with particular symbols (e.g.,
hashtags linked to publications) indicating a particular idea or concept in relation
to the document. The applicability of this theory would conceptually support the
notion of tweeted papers being used as concept symbols by an audience broader
than the scientific community. Thus, it would be reasonable to use Twitter as a
tool to capture the public perception of science, particularly if these concepts re-
garding scientific documents differ from those of the scientific community.²³ To a
lesser extent than Twitter, the theory of concept symbols could also be applied to
the acts of blog mentions and F1000 reviews.
Three social theories were used to interpret these acts: social capital, atten-
tion economics, and impression management. Each of these theoretical view-
points allows one to interpret the specific acts described above using different
lenses. From a purely social perspective, social capital explains how the use
of these platforms benefits the scholars by providing them with a network of
23 For example, a common criticism is that Twitter users do not understand scientific publica-
tions and therefore they mention them for other reasons than their scientific merit. Identifying
these different symbolic connections generated by the general public would help to develop
mechanisms to improve the understanding of research results outside the scientific community.
Interpreting ‘Altmetrics’ | 399
potential resources to mine and utilize when necessary. From a pragmatic view,
attention economy is useful as it discusses the benefits of using social media
to decrease the time spent both finding and attending to information sources.
Finally, impression management describes the ways in which scholars must ac-
tively maintain their presentation of self as they navigate the blurring boundaries
of the public/private nature of social media.
The theories discussed in this chapter cannot fully explain social media acts
related to scholarly communication. Empirical research—such as content analy-
ses along the lines of Shema et al. (2015), as well as user surveys like Mohammadi
(2014)—is needed to further investigate user motivations behind these acts and
support (or not) the use of altmetrics in research evaluation. This chapter provides
the scaffolding for such research. It represents a very much needed step towards
understanding the various outputs and impacts of research in the digital age.
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